Transcript IMPLEMENTATION

IMPLEMENTATION AND
POLICY CONVERGENCE
Lecture 6
2014-15
• Correct and timely implementation by the
member states of common policies agreed
upon at the regional level is a pre-requisite
of regional integration.
• No regional integration can be achieved
without homogeneous policy
implementation
Implementation in regional
organizations
• Regional organizations are multi-level
structures.
• Policies decided at the regional level must be
implemented at the level of governance of
member states or lower (regions).
• The number of actor involved and of “clearance
points” (Wildavski , Pressmann see lect. 4) is
particularly high and therefore the probability of
implementation deficits is also particularly high.
Implementation in the EU
• Steuneberg (2004) :
• “the current literature on the EU tends to
emphasize the EU legislative stage in which
policy is shaped by the interactions between the
Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament.
• However, from a policy perspective, such a view
is insufficient and does not show how the
ambitions formulated in Brussels are
transformed and implemented in the national
and sometimes regional and local
administrations of the member states”p.315
Why is the implementation problem
relevant in the EU ?
•
The EU is a multi-level structure.
•
Policies decided at the EU level are implemented at the level of governance
of member states or lower (regions).
•
EU directives normally set only the policy goals and the deadline for
incorporation into national law (transposition).
•
Moreover a directive may contain ambiguous provisions resulting from
intergovernmental bargaining at the EU level.
•
Only after transposition directives are applied at the national level.
• Implementation is also a problem for candidates to EU membership
(membership is conditional on legal implementation of the acquis )
•
The number of “clearance points” (Wildavski , Pressmann see lect. 4) is
particularly high
Implementation in the EU
• “the black hole…..”
MULTI-LEVEL POLICY PROCESS OF THE EU
European policy process
Commission’s proposals – Decisions of the Council
of Ministers or the European Council
Role of Permanent Representative in preparation
Of decisions
State’s preferences
Directives
regulations
I
M
Government
P
Domestic governments
and parliaments
Interest groups
Regional governments
PARLIAMENT
TRANSPOSITION
EU legislation incorporated
into national legislation
L
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M
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IMPLEMENTATION
National Burocracies, Regional Governments
T
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Enforceability of EU law
• Unlike international agreements, the EU has
“commitment institutions” (Mattli 1995) to
enforce compliance of m.s. with EU law.
• The European Commission can instigate legal
proceedings against m.s. for non compliance
with the EU law, that, in case of continuing noncompliance , can end up in a judgment of the
ECJ that obliges the state to comply and may
impose financial sanctions .
Studying implementation of EU
policies (1)
• Started late, after the re-launch of the Single Market in
the late 1980s, which produced legislation that needed
to be properly implemented in order to achieve the
goal of single market.
• First wave of studies focus mainly on legal
transposition, on the basis of the assumption that once
transposed EU legislation was implemented as
national legislation.
• Explaining factors: clarity of the directives, institutional
framework of transposition, administrative capability
Studying implementation of EU policies
Europeanization and the “goodness of fit”
thesis
• Posits that the greater the similarity between EU policy
and the domestic policy traditions, the better the
implementation of EU policies.
• Main assumption is that governments and
administrators prefer the status quo
• When EU policies are consistent with existing policies
and no major policy change is needed domestic
governments and administrators are willing to comply;
when fundamental changes are needed they will drag
their feet .
• The thesis of misfit was meant to explain both
problems of transposition and problems of application,
that in fact involve different actors .
Studying implementation of EU policies (3):
• conditions that influence the
implementation process.
• 1) veto players and their preferences
(Tsebelis) .
• 2) administrative capabilities
Studying implementation of EU policies (3):
• Steunenberg : Identifying who the relevant
actors are in process of implementation of a
EU policy.
• This depends on the national legal system and
the extent to which this system gives policymaking power to different political and
administrative actors: in some countries
transposition through law voted by national
parliaments, in other governmental decrees or
ministerial orders or lower-level legal
instruments adopted by administrators .
Veto players
• “veto players are those actors than can block the
adoption of a policy” (Tsebelis 1995, 305)
• More are the veto players that are needed to
adopt a policy, more difficult is to adopt it.
• But policy preference of veto players may
converge therefore making policy change
possible.
• Preferences of relevant actors may be more
important than policy fit/misfit
It’s the bureaucracy, stupid! (Knill, 2006)
• Implementation depends on the resources and
characteristics of the national bureaucracies, in
particular regarding the practical application of
legislation.
• 3 characteristics of the bureaucracies are
particularly relevant:
• -financial resources
• -strength of the bureaucracies
• -degree of fit of the administrative arrangements
with the EU requirements
financial resources
• Administrative action costs money
(salaries, computers etc.)
• Administrations that are understaffed and
under-resourced are less effective in
implementation
strength of the bureaucracies
• Bureaucratic autonomy from the political
power
• Administrative action based on clearly
specified legal rules (accountability)
• Absence of corruption
degree of fit of the administrative
arrangements with the EU requirements
• Effective implementation can be expected only
as far as European requirements are not at odds
with long established administrative styles and
structures at the national level.
• Example: role of evaluation in policy making and
implementation (cohesion policy)
• Effectiveness or labor inspectorates for even
application of regualations on safety at work
• Law experts vs technicians
How to increase compliance
• -enforcement
• -management
• Persuasion
Enforcement
The basic assumption is that nonimplementation derives from actors
preferences. The way to assure
compliance is therefore to make the
costs of non compliance higher than
the benefits of non-compliance The
level of compliance therefore depends
on the probability and the severity of
sanctions .
Cost-benefit calculations
Compliance - logic of consequences
Infringement procedure
the EU ha uncommonly strong means of ensuring compliance
through enforcement: through its infringement procedure the
European Commission probably exerts more direct pressure on
defecting Member States than any other international
organization. When a Member State does not follow commonly
agreed rules the Commission can begin an infringement
procedure. It consists of four steps:
• ‘Letter of Formal Notice,
• Reasoned Opinion,
• Referral to the European Court of Justice
• and Judgment of the ECJ’.
In cases of continuing opposition to the ECJ judgment, the
procedure can be started over again and possibly lead to
financial sanctions.
Normally 90% of the cases are solved before the reasoned
opinion (m.s. comply) and sanctions are extremely rare events,
nevertheless the provision is a rather powerful deterrent (legal
transposition)
Softer enforcement tools
• Increasingly used in the EU and widespread in
other organizations:
• Naming and shaming
• Scoreboards
Management
• Instrumental logicIncrease the capability for
implementation of national administrations
• EX. EU : During the transposition phase of a
directive, bilateral or package meetings sometimes
take place. Both aim at improving the implementation
of EUdirectives in the Member States and are clearcut examples of co-operation instruments that fall
under the category of management logic set up
single co-ordination points responsible for the
application of Community law (ex:single market).
• Capacity building Particularly relevant :
EU candidate countries
Non-EU regional organizations (States with very weak
administrative capabilities)
Persuasion
• Normative Logic-promote values and
ideas
• Compliance “logic of appropriateness”
• Ex: financial support of actors promoting
new ideas that may influence the national
discourse and in so doing change in the
medium to long term.
• Processes of socialization
Policy convergence
• 'the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to
develop similarities in structures, processes and
performances “ (Bennett, 1991)
• Policy convergence is of importance given
trends towards regional integration , particularly
in the debate on the EU.
• Policy convergence may be the outcome of
implementation of regional regulations, but not
necessarily so (lessons drawing etc.).
What is policy convergence ?
• “Policy convergence probably means one of five things.
1. it can signify a convergence of policy goals, a coming
together of intent to deal with common policy problems.
2. it can refer to policy content, defined as the more formal
manifestations of government policy - statutes,
administrative rules, regulations, court decisions and so
on.
3. there may be a convergence on policy instruments, i.e. the
institutional tools available to administer policy, whether
regulatory, administrative or judicial.
4. convergence may occur on policy outcomes, impacts or
consequences - the results (positive or negative, effective
or ineffective) of implementation.
5. there may be a convergence of policy style, a more diffuse
notion signifying the process by which policy responses
are formulated (consensual or conflictual, incremental or
rational, anticipatory or reactive, corporatist or pluralist,
etc.). “(Bennett, 1991, p.218)
Convergence is a process
• “Convergence should be seen as a
process of 'becoming' rather than a
condition of 'being' more alike:
'Convergence means moving from
different positions toward some
common point.” (Bennett, 1991, p.219)
Policy convergence def .
• “any increase in the similarity between one or
more characteristics of a certain policy (e.g.
policy objectives, policy instruments, policy
settings) across a given set of political
jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states,
regions, local authorities) over a given period of
time. Policy convergence thus describes the end
result of a process of policy change over time
towards some common point, regardless of the
causal processes “(Knill, 2005, p. 5).
How does convergence occur?
Bennet 1991
• EMULATION-lessons-drawing
• THROUGH ELITE NETWORKING AND POLICY
COMMUNITIES –given the existence of shared ideas
amongst a relatively enduring network of elites
(political, technical, bureaucratic) regularly interacting
at the transnational level.
• THROUGH HARMONIZATION –as a consequence of
authoritative action by responsible intergovernmental
organizations , rising from the perception of
interdependence and willingness to cooperate.
• TROUGH PENETRATION when states are forced to
conform to actions taken elsewhere by external actors.
Debate on policy convergence in
the EU Does OMC work?
• In what conditions does the OMC provide
policy convergence towards common
goals?
Factors explaining policy
convergence (Citi, Rhodes 2007)
• In a multi-level policy, convergence
depends both on:
• Supra-national factors : common
institutions, goals and policy instruments
• Domestic factors : preferences and
interests of domestic actors, the costs of
domestic implementation and the
openness to policy transfer
External (EU level) factors
explaining policy convergence
•
Potential for policy convergence depends on the instruments
available in the different OMC processes to promote compliance.
Policy instruments can be used in combination to produce policy
convergence .
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SIMPLE BENCHMARKING AND RECCOMENDATIONS
•
VOLUNTARY POLICY OBJECTIVE+BENCHMARKIG AND PEER
PRESSURE
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VOLUNTARY POLICY OBJECTIVE+BENCHMARKIG AND PEER
PRESSURE+STRUCTURED COORDINATION PROCESS
•
LEGALLY BINDING POLICY OBJECTIVE+ BENCHMARKIG AND PEER
PRESSURE+STRUCTURED COORDINATION PROCESS
•
LEGALLY BINDING REGULATIONS
SIMPLE BENCHMARKING AND
RECCOMENDATIONS
• The weakest convergence potential
• Recommendations of the Commission
no strength to compel, at best ‘moral
suasion’.
• Benchmarking-national performances
compared among themselves and with
standards  ‘naming and shaming’
• Ex: Education
VOLUNTARY POLICY OBJECTIVE+BENCHMARKIG
AND PEER PRESSURE
• M.S. have explicitly committed themselves to
pursue collectively defined objectives and their
performance is assessed with reference to
those commitments .
• Performance is assed through monitoring at the
highest political level , in principle implying
reactions from other national leaders (peer
pressure) .
• Ex : research and innovation, pension policy
VOLUNTARY POLICY OBJECTIVE+BENCHMARKIG
AND PEER PRESSURE+STRUCTURED
COORDINATION PROCESS
• Mechanisms of peer review and peer pressure
regarding the comparison of national performance
take place within a system of structured coordination
of national policies according to common guidelines
and national reform plans.
• European Employment Strategy 1997-annual cycle
starting with guidelines adopted by the European
Council after which every state develops a National
Action Plan of reforms whose outcomes are assed by
the Commission and the Council in an Employment
Report including recommendations (although legally
non binding) to the single states
LEGALLY BINDING POLICY OBJECTIVE+ BENCHMARKIG
AND PEER PRESSURE+STRUCTURED COORDINATION
PROCESS
• The strongest of non-legislative methods.
• Policy objectives are legally binding although
states can choose their policies for
convergence.
• Stability and Growth Pact in view of the EMU:
ex: maximum threshold for national deficits at
3% of GDP
LEGALLY BINDING REGULATIONS
• Beyond open coordination- community
method (implementation of legally binding
rules)
Domestic factors explaining policy convergence
In which conditions is it rational for domestic
actors to transfer a policy in absence of
coercion?
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POLICY FAILURE,UNCERTAINITY AND INSECURITY
EXTERNAL CONDITIONALITY
FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE
CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE CONSITENCY
DOMESTIC RECEPTIVITY
And in which conditions is it not rational for
domestic actors to transfer a policy in
absence of coercion?
•
WHEN THE COSTS OF POLICY TRANSFER ARE
HIGHER THAN THE EXPECTED BENEFITS
POLICY FAILURE,UNCERTAINITY AND
INSECURITY
• Politicians look elsewhere for solutions
when they perceive that a policy is failing
or they don’t know how to proceed.
• Or when their perceive that their support is
evaporating and they want to assure
themselves legitimacy through imitating
successful models
• (lessons-drawing)
EXTERNAL CONDITIONALITY
• When they have been promised benefits in
exchange for policy transfer .
• Enlargement of the EU, ENP
conditionality crucial tool for influencing
domestic policy
FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE
• When two countries or more adopt policies
that can be harmful for their neighbor : ex.
decreasing the tax burden for enterprises
to attract foreign capital, reducing
workforce’s rights  “race to the bottom”.
• This can justify the adoption of common
regulations
CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE
CONSISTENCY
• Depends on the clarity of the model (ex:
high for autonomy of Central Banks, less
so for EES).
DOMESTIC RECEPTIVITY
• Diversity of national contexts regarding
cultural and institutional differences .
• Domestic receptivity may be enhanced
with processes of elite socialization. OMC
processes created pan-European
epistemic communities (expert sharing
ideas about policy areas)
Reasons for not transfer policies:WHEN THE COSTS OF POLICY
TRANSFER ARE HIGHER THAN THE EXPECTED BENEFITS
• Costs may be :
• Financial
but also
• Political (unpopularity, powerful groups
defending the status quo)
References
• M.Citi, M. Rhodes, Policy convergence in
the EU: Common Objectives vs. national
Preferences, European Governance
Papers, n.7, 2001
• http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/New%20O
MC%20links/egp-newgov-N-07-01.pdf