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International Maritime Security Network, LLC.

MTSA/ISPS Code

CSO/VSO Course

Introduction

Section 1

Please remember to:

• Put cell phones on vibrate • If you need to leave, please do so quietly • If you are tired please feel free to stand • Help yourself to coffee and snacks at any time.

• Bathrooms and fire exits are:

Welcome

• Please tell us a little about yourself – Where are you from?

– What part of the Maritime industry do you work in?

– How long have you been working in this industry?

• What do you hope to get out of this course?

Course Overview

• Provide Knowledge required for both CSO (Company Security Officer) & VSO (Vessel Security Officer) to perform their duties in accordance with; • Amendment to the Annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as amended and; • IMO’s (International Maritime Organization) ISPS Code parts A & B • Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and 33 CFR, Subchapter H —Maritime Security

Competencies to be achieved

• See Handout (1) – Company Security Officer – Vessel Security Officer

Historical Prospective

Terrorism and the Maritime Domain

Why are we here?

TERRORISM

The FBI defines terrorism as

“The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

Maritime Terrorism

“Any person or group, acting outside the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, for a political motive, who (i) executes or plots to execute an attack against a ship, port facility or offshore facility or (ii) attempts to further their political motives by utilizing elements in the maritime environment to execute an act of terrorism.”

The differences between guerrilla warfare and terrorism Defining Terrorism Guerrilla Warfare

Purposeful targeting of Military personnel and installations in order to achieve a political goal

Terrorism Revolutionaries Anarchists

Purposeful targeting of Civilians in order to achieve a political goal

Freedom Fighters

USS Cole on 12-Oct-00 was attacked by 2 suicide bombers.

17 Sailors where killed 39 Sailors where injured By Al Qaeda

The Seaborne Spirit 5 – Nov - 05

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Muhammad Abu Abbas, Oct 7 th , 1985 four PLF militants seized the “Achille-lauro”. These terrorist killed Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly, wheelchair bound, Jewish man, and threatened to blow up the ship. All of this was in effort to negotiate the release of 50 Palestine prisoners.

The Tamil Tigers

The most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka, founded in 1976. Uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons, and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil state. Began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics.

The Tamil Tigers

The world's largest unregistered navy with approximately 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka; about 3,000 to 6,000 form a trained cadre of fighters. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Activities:

Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines.

The attack of the “Limburg”

• Happened 2002 in Yemen • Attack was done by Al Qaeda • Same type of attack as the Cole

F.A.R.C.

• Established in 1964 as a rural based, pro-Soviet guerrilla army. • Has been anti-United States since its inception.

• Located in Columba

Attacks of 9-11

Current security threats & patterns

What’s going on today

Potential maritime targets

LNG tankers Nuclear waste carriers Cargo ships OSC Platforms Oil Tankers

Maritime Transportation Threats

• Piracy and armed attacks • Terrorism • Contraband smuggling • Stowaways and refugees • Cargo theft • Collateral damage

Piracy

Could it be terrorism?

Piracy defined:

• • •

Shipping

robbery on the high seas, especially the stealing of a ship’s cargo

Air

the hijacking of an aircraft or another form of transportation transport robbery committed on board any form of transportation, especially an aircraft.

Murder

on the high seas

Piracy is worldwide

One of the worlds hot spots

Straits of Malacca

Piracy

The Straits of Gibraltar Morocco & Tangiers

Reporting Piracy

•

The Regional Piracy Centre

–

Receives and distributes information

–

Collates and analyzes information and issues consolidated reporting to relevant bodies.

–

Gives guidance on what ship owners and ships operators can do to prevent/suppress acts of piracy

–

Assists owners and crews of ships that have been attacked

–

Locates vessels that have been seized by pirates and recovers stolen cargoes

–

Check out www.iccwbo.org

The Goals of a Terrorists

• Invoke fear and panic • Gain attention both politically and spiritually • Change the world to their religious beliefs • Rid the world of opposing beliefs.

• To gain recognition for their cause

Terrorist Patterns

• Use military type of development and deployment: – Terrorist will pick a target to attack that they feel has a good chance of success – Reconnaissance of the planned target.

– Funding and recruiting.

– Planning and testing.

– Execution and hopeful success.

Current Security Threats and Patterns

Example: Osama Bin Laden & Al Qaeda used U.S. training, U.S. people, U.S. equipment & fuel to kill thousands of people from all over he world. And as you can see, it worked well.

Ship & Port operations and conditions

The Intermodal System

Intermodal; “Door to Door”

Most everything in your home came to your doorstep by way of ship.

Intermodal scenario

• Container is loaded in Taiwan • It has your cargo and the cargo of 10 others inside of it.

• It is placed on a truck and sent to a port facility • It is loaded into a ship • Ship crosses ocean and lands in Long Beach, California, U.S.A. • It is off loaded and placed in a holding area • It is then either loaded onto a railcar or truck • The truck takes the container to St. Louis MO. to a distribution center.

• It is opened and your cargo is placed onto another smaller truck or van.

• Smaller truck brings it right to your door.

• So many hands and still so EZ to slip something through the system

Ship and facility operations

• Discussion about various operations • Your specific operation and the inherent vulnerabilities • No one knows your operation better than you —use this knowledge to carefully evaluate threats and corrective actions to mitigate them

Maritime Security Policy

Section 2

International conventions, codes, and recommendations

• United Nations (UN) – Located in New York • International Maritime Organization (IMO) – Branch of the U.N.

– Located in London – Giving oversight to SOLAS – Controlling safety and security of the high seas

International conventions, codes, and recommendations

• Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) amendments – Chapter V • Reg. 19 – Chapter XI • Regs. 3&5 – Chapter XI-2 • Regs. 1-13

Regulations & Codes

• The ISPS Code – Part A • Sec 1 - 19 – Part B • Guidance given for Part A – Example of how sections are laid out in both parts A & B • Part A – 1 > 1.2 > 1.2.5

– Key words to remember: • “Should & Shall” are mandatory • “May” remains may, not absolute

MTSA Regulations

• 33 CFR—Navigation and Navigable Waters • Parts 101-106 Maritime Security – Part 101—General – Part 103--Area Maritime Security – Part104—Vessels – Part 105—Facilities – Part 106—Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Facilities

Definitions

• SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 1 • ISPS Code A/2 and B/2 • 33 CFR § 101.105

Legal Implications

• Action/non-action by security personnel – 33 CFR § 101.400-420 – ISPS Code A/4, 6 – SOLAS Chapter XI-2 • Entering foreign jurisdictions • Clear grounds

Legal Implications

• Law Enforcement – Vessel, Facility & OCS owners and operators must permit law enforcement personal, in the performance of official duties, who show proper ID to enter/board without delay or obstruction. – Upon boarding or entering, will as soon as possible explain their mission to the master, operator, owner or designated agent.

– This is found in 33 CFR § 101.515(c)

Handling sensitive related information & communications

SSI

Sensitive Security Information

• Definition—49 CFR § 1520 • ISPS Code—Records • Documents / Communications

Handling SSI outside U.S.

• The provisions in the plan relating to ISPC Code, section 9.4 sub. sec. .2, .4, .5, .7, .15, .17 and .18 of this Part of the Code are considered as confidential information, and cannot be subject to inspection unless otherwise agreed by the Contracting Governments concerned.

• Please turn in your ISPS Code to 9.4 and 9.8.1

Security Responsibilities

Section 3

Security Responsibilities

• Contracting Governments • Recognized Security Organizations • The Company • The Ship • The Facility • Vessel Security Officer • Company Security Officer • Facility Security Officer • Vessel and Facility personnel with specific security duties • All other personnel

Contracting Governments

• Specific Responsibilities – ISPS Code A/4, B/1.6-1.8, B/4 – SOLAS , Chapter XI-2, Reg. 3 – 33 CFR, Part 101, 102 • U.S. Coast Guard • Captain of the Port (COTP) • Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC) • Area Maritime Security (AMS)

Recognized Security Organizations

• Specific Responsibilities – ISPS Code B/4.3-4.6

• USCG is the RSO in U.S.—No other entities or companies designated at this time.

The Company

• The Company shall ensure that the VSP contains a clear statement emphasizing the master’s authority • The Company shall designate a CSO and a VSO and ensure they are given the necessary support to fulfill their duties and responsibilities • 33 CFR § 104.200-205

The Vessel

• The Vessel shall comply with the requirements of the VSP as per the security level set —ISPS Part A/7.1

• Compliance documentation— 33 CFR § 104.120

The Facility

• The facility shall comply with the relevant requirements of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS and the ISPS Code —ISPS Code Part A/14.1

• Compliance documentation— 33 CFR § 105.105-150 • Security Requirements— 33 CFR § 105.200

Security Personnel

• Vessel Security Officer • Company Security Officer • Facility Security Officer • Vessel personnel with specific security duties • Facility personnel with specific security duties • All other personnel

Vessel Security Assessment

Section 4

Vessel Security Assessment

• A written document that is based on the collection of background information and the completion and analysis of an on scene survey —see 33 CFR § 104.305a,b, and c • Essential & integral part of developing the Vessel Security Plan • Must be carried out by person(s) with appropriate skills/knowledge as identified in 33 CFR § 104.300d

On-Scene Survey

• Vessel owner/operator must ensure that an on-scene survey is conducted for each vessel • Verify and collect background information • Examines and evaluates existing vessel protective measures, procedures, and operations

On-scene Survey

– On Scene Survey • Supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship’s stores; and • Ensuring that vessel security communication, information, and equipment are readily available. • Using the ship’s GA’s to do the OSS should be done to make sure that parts of the vessel have not been changed and door ways turned into bulk heads.

Analysis and recommendations

• Analyzing background information, the on-scene survey, and other requirements of this part to provide recommendations for the security measures the vessel should include in the VSP —see 33 CFR § 104.305c

• Threat analysis (documentation)

Threat Assessment Methodology

• Reference NVIC 10-02 (hand-out) • Select a scenario • Use the information that you have compiled in the 1 st phase of your assessment • Things to consider: – Your type of vessel – Your cargo – Your crew – Your route

Threat Assessment Methodology

The evolution of Assessment process

Table 1 scenario selections

Score consequence as it relates to your vessel

• Note the fact that the consequence score will not change.

• You need to look at the big picture and understand where your consequence truly scores. Explanation: – Impact of 9-11 – Lose of life – Ecological damage

Table 2

Table 3

Table 4

Computing the scores

• Go to table 5 work sheet • First, plug in the Consequence score • Then, add both of the Accessibility scores together • Take the Consequence score and the total Accessibility score and run them through the Threat Matrix.

• Find out what vulnerabilities you have to Mitigate, Consider, or Document.

Table 5

Mitigation definitions

Mitigate:

Mitigation strategies, such as security protective measures and/or procedures, may be developed to reduce risk for that scenario. An appendix to the VSP may contain the scenario(s) evaluated, the results of the evaluation, a description of the mitigation measures evaluated, and the reason mitigation measures were or were not chosen.

Mitigation definitions

Consider:

The scenario should be considered and mitigation strategies should be developed on a case-by-case basis. The VSP may contain the scenario(s) evaluated, the results of the evaluation, and the reason mitigation measures were or were not chosen.

Mitigation definitions

Document:

The scenario may not need a mitigation measure at this time and therefore needs only to be documented. However, mitigation measures having little cost may still merit consideration. The security plan may contain the scenario evaluated and the results. This will be beneficial in further revisions of the VSP, to know if the underlying assumptions have changed since the last edition of the security assessment.

Security Assessment Documentation

• Use of Assessment checklists • NVIC 10-02 • VSA Report—see 33 CFR § 104.305(d)

Security Equipment

Section 5

Security Equipment

• Personal Identification (ID Badges) – Laminated or secured against tampering – Contain: • Individual’s full 1 st with middle initial name and last names • An accurate passport type photo that is current • Bear the name of the issuing authority • A government authority or organization • The person’s employer, union or trade association must also be on the card • Watermark

Security Equipment

• ID scanners

Security Equipment

Key pad entries

Security Equipment

Screening equipment

Hand Held Scanners Body Scanner Shoe scanner Letter scanner

Security Equipment

• Use of dogs not only works, but is a good deterrent to the would-be attackers that might be doing reconnaissance

Security Equipment

• Adequate lighting is one of the best ways to put up the air of security.

• Remember that bad guys don’t like light • Also a very good counter swimmer device.

Security Equipment

• Good fencing and gates

Security Equipment

• Waterside Perimeter security

Security Equipment

Testing, Calibration, and Maintenance

• It is the duty of the VSO to ensure that the security equipment is properly working, operated, tested, maintained, and calibrated • Records of all maintenance, calibration and testing of security equipment See 33 CFR 104.235(b)(5) • This record must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure • These records must be keep for a minimum of 2 years and must be made available to the USCG upon request

Vessel Security Plan VSP

Section 6

Purpose of the VSP

• Address each vulnerability identified in the VSA (VSAR) • Describe security measures for each MARSEC Level • Each vessel must have a VSP approved by the USCG (MSC) • See 33 CFR § 104.400

Contents of the VSP

• General Sections of VSP are listed in 33 CFR 104.405

• Specific details of content that must be included in all Sections, is listed in 33 CFR 104, Subpart B, §§ 104.200-104.297, as applicable • SSAS plan for SOLAS vessels

Confidentiality Issues

• The VSP must be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure!

• The VSP shall be considered Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and must conform to the handling requirements identified in NVIC 10-04 • Contents of VSP are generally not subject to inspection by Port State Control (SOLAS vessels —ISPS A/9.8.1)

Development of the VSP

• The CSO is responsible for ensuring that the VSP is prepared and submitted for approval • Security measured identified in the VSP must be in place by the time the plan is audited by the USCG (local COTP)

Development of the VSP

Discussion and Review Of VSP Development 33 CFR 104.405(b) 33 CFR 104.200-104.297

Approval of the VSP

• The VSP must be written in English and submitted to MSC for approval • 3 Stages of Approval: – General compliance of all main Sections – Compliance with detailed requirements of all Sections – Congruent with area Port Security Plan and practical for nature of vessel • See 33 CFR § 104.410

Implementation of the VSP

• Ensure ALL personnel receive appropriate training and regular drills and exercises • Ensure coordination of security issues takes place between facilities and vessels • Ensure security communications are readily available and that security systems and equipment are installed and maintained • See 33 CFR § 104.200

—additional issues

Maintenance and Amendment of the VSP

• Amendments to the VSP • Records and Documentation • Annual Audit reviews • See 33 CFR § 104.415

Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response

Section 7

Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices

Weapon Identification

Beretta 9mm

• 9mm, Semi, Magazine Fed, Recoil Operated

Colt 1911

• .45 Cal, Semi, Magazine Fed, Recoil Operated

MP 5

9 MM, Semi & Auto, Gas operated, Mag Fed,

M 4 Carbine

• 5.56 MM, Mag Fed, Gas Operated,

AK 47

• 7.62 MM, Semi and Auto, Mag Fed, Gas Operated

AK 47

P 90

• 5.56 MM,

Uzi

PM

Russian “AK” design, assassin's Weapon

Note easy way it breaks down

Can you tell the real one?

Real Air Soft

Can you tell the real one?

Real Air Soft

Can you tell the real one?

Air Soft Real

Can you tell the real one?

Real Air Soft

Can you tell the real one?

Air Soft Real

The right answer is that they are ALL real in the dark!

Ammunitions

Chemical Bomb

Chemical bomb

IED’s

Mail bombs

• Suspicious Mail – Hard or ridged – Oily marks on the outside – The feel of wires – Lots of postage – Directed to a specific person

Methods of physical searches and non intrusive inspections

Practical Exercise

Methods of Physical Screening and Inspections

•

Methods of Physical Screening and Inspections

Implementing and coordinating searches

Implementation and Coordinating Searches

• Planning and practicing searches • Check-card system • Necessary equipment – flashlights and batteries; – screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars; – mirrors and probes; – gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear; – plastic bags and envelopes for collection of evidence; – forms on which to record activities and discoveries

Implementation and Coordinating Searches

• Systematic search procedures – Search teams – Dividing rooms/spaces into sections – Focused attention and clearing areas • Crew members and facility personnel should not be allowed to search their own areas in recognition of the possibility that they may have concealed packages or devices in their own work or personal areas • Known areas for concealment – (See Handout)

Implementation and Coordinating Searches

Room searching

There is a system: from the center up 90 degrees and then up another 90 degrees 2 man teams ALWAYS At HQ keep track of clear areas

Recognition of persons posing potential security risks

Non-discriminatory basis