Women in the Global Corporate Elite: Evidence from the

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Transcript Women in the Global Corporate Elite: Evidence from the

Women in the Global Corporate Elite:
Evidence from the 2006
Global Fortune 500
Clifford L. Staples
Heather Jackson
Department of Sociology
University of North Dakota,
USA
Purpose of Research
• Study the rise of the Transnational
Capitalist Class or Global Corporate Elite
• Explore the role of women in the Global
Corporate Elite
• Specifically, explain variation in the
presence, or absence, of women on FG500
boards
Previous Research
• Most work has been descriptive and/or
normative
• No studies specifically of the FG500
• Need to understand and explain diversity in
the global power elite and its consequences
Data
• Fortune Global 500 (498) for 2006
• Director names from company web-sites
collected in late 2006-early 2007
• Sex coded from name, photos, press
coverage, web-searches, etc.
Descriptive Findings
• 6,633 directors, 5,743 individuals
• Consistent with previous research on top
corporate boards, we find only a small minority
are female. Of the 5,743 individual directors
584, or 10.2% are women
• There are, however, differences by the country
in which the corporation is headquartered
Country
Norway
Sweden
Australia
Denmark
United States
Finland
Canada
United Kingdom
Netherlands
France
Brazil
Germany
Switzerland
Ireland
Hong Kong
Thailand
Turkey
Belgium
Russia
China
Spain
South Korea
Mexico
Italy
India
Japan
Malaysia
Venezuela
Saudi Arabia
Austria
Taiwan
Men
60.87%
75.61%
77.89%
79.31%
83.31%
85.00%
85.43%
88.03%
90.12%
90.27%
.
90.32%
90.44%
90.45%
90.91%
92.86%
92.86%
93.75%
94.05%
94.55%
94.57%
97.28%
97.46%
97.67%
97.97%
98.61%
98.96%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
Women
39.13%
24.39%
22.11%
20.69%
16.69%
15.00%
14.57%
11.97%
9.88%
9.73%
9.68%
9.56%
9.55%
9.09%
7.14%
7.14%
6.25%
5.95%
5.45%
5.43%
2.72%
2.54%
2.33%
2.03%
1.39%
1.04%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
Number of
companies
2
6
8
2
171
2
14
39
14
35
1
12
38
4
1
1
5
5
1
5
21
9
12
10
6
69
1
1
1
1
1
Descriptive Findings
Number of Women on Board
Frequency
Percent
0
155
31.1
1
138
27.7
2
122
24.5
3
47
9.4
4
26
5.2
5
4
.8
6
4
.8
8
1
.2
9
1
.2
Total
498
100.0
Descriptive Findings
• On average, there are 1.38 women per board as
compared to 11.94 men per board
• Proportionally, women represent from 0% to
50%, with an average of 10.55% per board.
Royal Ahold
Statoil
La Poste
Albertson's
Nordea Bank
Sysco
Sara Lee
AT&T
CFE
Aetna
J.C. Penney
Merrill Lynch
Xerox
McKesson
Office Depot
Wellpoint
Electrolux
Johnson & Johnson
Washington Mutual
TIAA-CREF
Norsk Hydro
U.S. Postal Service
Cigna
3M
Accenture
UnitedHealth Group
Coles Myer
Netherlands
Norway
France
United States
Sweden
United States
United States
United States
Mexico
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
Sweden
United States
United States
United States
Norway
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
Australia
50.00
46.15
42.85
42.85
36.36
36.36
36.36
35.29
33.33
33.33
33.33
33.33
33.33
33.33
33.33
31.25
30.76
30.76
30.76
30.76
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
Descriptive Findings
• The correlation between number of women on
the board and proportion of women on the
board is quite high (.908), suggesting that the
boards that do include women are replacing
men rather than simply adding women and
increasing board size
• Consistent with this interpretation, the
correlation between board size and
proportion of women is relatively low (.190)
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• While in the aggregate the proportion of women
in the Global Corporate Elite is quite low (1015%), there is considerable variation in the
proportion of women on FG500 boards
• How can we explain this variation?
• How might the Global Corporate Elite become
less male-dominated?
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• Proponents of increasing the number of women
on corporate boards stress the importance of
“networking,” but there is little empirical
research on how, or if, social networks might
play a role.
• While we do not have data on personal
networks, because of director interlocks we do
have network data for the corporations and
directors of the FG500 (ex. Anne Mulcahy)
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• Corporate boards are interested in minimizing
uncertainty and discomfort and maximizing
comfort and predictability (Kantor)
• Women in the heretofore all-male world of the
corporate elite are seen as a threatening and
potentially disruptive to this world
• Given that women on corporate boards are few
and far between many boards and most male
directors have little or no experience with
female colleagues on boards
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• Thus, knowledge of what it is like to serve on a
diverse board is a bit of social capital that is
unevenly distributed across this community
• Given that possession of this knowledge will
tend to reduce uncertainty, we would suggest
that the inclusion of women on corporate
boards within the community will generally
follow the diffusion of such knowledge
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• And given that the diffusion of such knowledge
is likely to be transmitted via both formal and
informal connections, we would predict that,
other things equal, the most connected firms–
the firms with the most ties to other firms—will
be more likely to have any women directors as
well as a greater proportion of female directors.
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• First we treat both independent and dependent
variables as dichotomous (interlocks/no
interlocks by women/no women)
Director none
Interlocks
one or
more
Total
Count
% within
Director
Interlocks
Count
% within
Director
Interlocks
Count
% within
Director
Interlocks
Chi-Square 90.71, 1df, sig. .000
Board Composition
one or more
no women woman on
on board
board
Total
82
44
126
65.1%
34.9%
100.0%
73
299
372
19.6%
80.4%
100.0%
155
343
498
31.1%
68.9%
100.0%
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• Shifting to measuring the dependent variable as
the proportion of women on the board, and
controlling for the size of the company– a
variable thought to be important by some– the
results are substantively the same, with a
substantively and statistically significant effect
(.313) for having any connections.
• Though smaller (.216), the effect when using the
number of links as the independent variable
holds up.
Model
1 (Constant)
Fortune
Global 500
Rank 2006
Director
Interlocks
Regression Coefficients
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
Beta
5.774
1.190
t
Sig.
4.850 .000
-.002
.003
-.031
-.726 .468
7.120
.980
.313
7.266 .000
Dependent Variable: Percent of Board Female R-square .102
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• The extent to which firms with women are
connected, and to each other in particular, can
be seen from two contrasting network diagrams
• The first diagram shows the connections, or
lack of connections, between firms that no
women on the board. Of the 155 firms without
women, only 57 have a tie to another firm, the
majority (63.2%) are “isolates.” And as is
evident, the network is very fragmented.
Companies with no women on Board
Accounting for Women on
FG500 Boards
• The second diagram shows the network
produced by corporations who have women on
board. Of the 343 firms with women, all but 49
are connected to another firm, and, in fact, 291,
or 84.8%, are connected in one network. Thus,
it is not only the case that connected firms are
more likely to have a woman on the board; most
of the firms with women on board are
connected to each other.
Companies with women on Board
Interlocks and Networks
• An interlock occurs when an individual
corporate director serves on the boards of
two or more companies
• Such an interlock connects the companies
and individuals involved into a network.
• Anne Mulcahy, for example, as of 2006
served on the boards of Target, Xerox, and
Citigroup
Interlocks and Networks
• Probably the most connected corporate
director in the world is a Frenchman by the
name of Louis Schweitzer. He serves on the
boards of 8 different corporations from 4
different countries.
Two Kinds of Networks
• From corporation by director networks you
can create corporation-corporation
networks and director-director networks
• Both kinds of networks are of interest to
researchers
FG500 corporate
network 2006
FG500
directors 2006
Women in the FG500
• Also consistent with previous studies, we find
that women constitute a very small proportion
of CEOs
• There are just 8 women CEOs out of 505 (some
companies have dual CEOs).
Women CEOs of FG500 2006
Name
Nationality
Hayashi, Fumiko
Japan
Daiei
Lund, Helge
Norway
Statoil
Sammons, Mary F.
U.S.
Woertz, Patricia A.
U.S.
Rite Aid
Archer Daniels
Midland
Barnes, Brenda C.
U.S.
Staples
Sara Lee
Idrac, Anne-Marie
France
Dexia Group
SNCF
Mulcahy, Anne M.
U.S.
Citigroup
Target
Xerox
Lauvergeon, Anne
France
Suez
Total
Vodafone AREVA
Women in the FG500
• On the other hand, women are just as likely to
serve on multiple boards as are men (men 1.15
boards on average; women 1.18 boards on
average)
• Just as likely to serve on a foreign board (men
11.4%, women 10.8%)
• And just as likely to link two boards from
different countries (men 3.0%, women 3.3%)
Women in the FG500
• The emergence of a transnational corporate
network, or community, that transcends both
company and country is a notable feature of
globalization
• We are not aware of any studies, however, that
explore the position of women within the
transnational corporate director network
• A critical question is whether the women who
have made it into the network have access to
each other and to positions of power within it.
A Man’s World
• As the two previous graphs show, the women are
largely superfluous to the network– most men are
connected to other men in the network whether or not
the women are present.
• In contrast, only some women are connected to each
other without “going through” men. Their network is
much more fragmented, and many women are cut off
completely from the other women in the network.
• In short, in the world of the global corporate elite,
women need men far more than men need women.
A Man’s World
• This is also evident in the “brokerage” scores for the
men and the women
• Brokerage (number of pairs not directly connected).
The idea of brokerage is that ego is the "go-between"
for pairs of other actors. In an ego network, ego is
connected to every other actor (by definition). If these
others are not connected directly to one another, ego
may be a "broker" if ego falls on a the paths between
the others. One item of interest is simply how much
• potential for brokerage there is for each actor (how
many times pairs of neighbors in ego's network are not
directly connected). In
• our example, actor number 5, who is connected to
almost everyone, is in a position to broker many
Power in Networks
• Power is based on the possession or control of
resources
• In networks, information is a resource, and so
whoever has access to information has power
relative to other actors in the network
• In networks, not all actors have equal access to
other actors, creating inequality in resources
and thus inequalities in power.
• Independent of the number of women in the
network, are they positioned in a way that gives
them less power than men?
Sisterhood
• Since women are
• In networks, information is a resource, and so
whoever has access to information has power
relative to other actors in the network
• In networks, not all actors have equal access to
other actors, creating inequality in resources
and thus inequalities in power.
• Independent of the number of women in the
network, are they positioned in a way that gives
them less power than men?
Brokerage in Networks
• B is acting as a “coordinator” between actor’s A
and C, because all three actors belong to the
same group.
Brokerage in Networks
• B is acting as a “consultant” between actor’s A
and C, because B does not belong to the same
group as A and C.