Transcript Document
The IAEA and the Control of Radioactive Sources
Brian Dodd President-Elect Health Physics Society
International Atomic Energy Agency
138 Member States 2247 Staff from more than 90 countries 6 Departments
“The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.
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Authorized functions (Statute):
To encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses...
To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses...
To encourage the exchange and training of scientists and experts...
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Authorized functions (Statute):
To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable materials...are not used to further any military purpose...
To establish...
standards of safety for protection of health...and to provide for the application of these standards ...
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Six Departments of the IAEA
Management
Policy, Legal Advice, and Administrative Support
Nuclear Sciences and Applications
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology
Safeguards
Verification of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Material
Technical Co-Operation
Technology Transfer
Nuclear Energy
Nuclear Power, Fuel Cycle, and Waste Management
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Six Departments of the IAEA
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
Office of Nuclear Security
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety
Emergency Preparedness and Response Division
Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety
Policy and Programme Support Section
Waste Safety Section
Radiation and Transport Safety Section
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National and Global Infrastructure Enhancement for Radiation, Transport and Radioactive Waste Safety Radiological Protection of Patients Safety of Transport of Radioactive Materials Control of Radiation Sources 6
HIERARCHY OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
underlying principles aimed at politicians and regulators
Fundamentals
specify obligations and responsibilities
Requirements Guides
recommendations to support requirements 7
Other Lower-Level Documents
Safety Reports
Technical Documents (TECDOCs)
Conferences and Symposium Papers Series
Accident Reports
Others 8
‘ORPHAN’ SOURCES are radioactive sources which:
Were never subject to regulatory control; or
Were initially regulated, but then:
Abandoned,
Lost or misplaced,
Stolen, or
Removed without authorization.
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‘VULNERABLE’ SOURCES are radioactive sources which:
Are currently under regulatory control; but
For which the control is insufficient to provide assurance of long term safety and security.
Note: Vulnerable sources could relatively easily become orphaned.
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‘DISUSED’ SOURCES are radioactive sources which:
Are no longer in use or intended to be used.
Note: a disused source may still represent a significant radiological hazard.
It differs from a spent source in that it may still be capable of performing its function; it may be disused because it is no longer needed.
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Concern was raised in Dijon in 1998 because of accidents with orphan sources 13
Goi ânia, Brazil
1985: Private radiotherapy clinic closed down
50.9 TBq (1375 Ci) caesium-137 teletherapy machine left in abandoned clinic
1987: teletherapy head stolen
Unit dismantled, Cs-137 source capsule ruptured causing major contamination 14
Goi ânia, Brazil
Exposure of large number of public:
112 000 people monitored
249 people contaminated
49 people 0.1 - 6.2 Gy 4 people died
6 y old girl
18 y old man 22 y old man 38 y old mother 15
Goi ânia, Brazil
Major contamination of property:
85 houses significantly contaminated 200 people evacuated 7 houses demolished 16
Goi ânia, Brazil
Total volume of waste = 3500 cubic m
3800 metal drums
1400 metal boxes
10 shipping containers 17
Gilan, Iran
1996: Ir-192 source used for industrial radiography falls out of shielded container Manual worker picks up source and puts it in chest pocket 18
Gilan, Iran
Resulting in severe radiation burns to the chest 19
Istanbul, Turkey
December 1998: Two containers sold as scrap and broken open 3.3 TBq (88 Ci) cobalt-60 source unshielded Containers dumped 10 persons with acute radiation syndrome 404 persons medically examined 23.5 TBq (636 Ci) cobalt-60 source unaccounted 20
Istanbul, Turkey
1993: 3 disused teletherapy sources packaged and stored by a private company awaiting return to supplier in USA February 1998: 2 packages transferred to inappropriate storage facilities Inappropriate storage facilities 21
Samut Prakarn,Thailand
October 1999: 3 disused teletherapy sources stored by a private company at unsecured parking lot Jan/Feb 2000 unauthorized removal of one unit - dismantled for scrap 15.7 TBq (425 Ci) cobalt-60 source unshielded
10 people highly exposed
3 of whom died
no contamination 22
Lilo, Georgia
Lilo military training center
1997: 11 Georgian soldiers developed radiation induced skin lesions and acute radiation syndrome Abandoned sources (Cs-137, Co-60, Ra-226) found at various locations:
in coat pocket
on building site
in buildings
buried in grounds
in refuse mound
on soccer pitch… 23
Radiological accidents in Georgia.
Dec.2001, LJA KAHISHI ZUGDIDI SANTREDIA MATKOJI POTI 1997, LILO
December 2001, Lja, Georgia A group of woodcutters find 2 hot ‘objects’ in the forest.
(unshielded strontium-90 sources, each approx. 30,000 Ci !) 25
The back of patient 2 on 6 January 2002 26
… sources later discovered beside a path, under a rock, on the edge of a 50m deep 30 °-slope.
Source Source
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Source Recovery in Georgia 29
Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) RTG’s were used in various civilian and military applications (e.g. to power navigational beacons and communications equipment in remote areas …) 30
Several 100’s Sr-90 powered navigational beacons operated in the Artic from Novaya Semlaya to the Bering Strait.
These generators also appeared in Belarus …
… and elsewhere in Asia…
… and easily removable by the public! ...
… completely unsecured!…
Radiological Accident Statistics (1944-2000)
~ 400 reported accidents
~ 3000 exposed persons
> 100 deaths, more than half involving patients
In addition, orphan sources can be mixed up with scrap causing contamination problems
Illicit trafficking involves orphan sources but very few orphan source incidents are due to illicit trafficking events 35
Summary so far...
At Dijon it was recognized that inadequate control (safety and security) has caused many serious accidents
Orphan sources were, and are, a major concern
So, IAEA was asked to develop and implement an action plan as well as to develop guidance to begin to address the issues 36
Development of IAEA Guidance Dijon September 1998 Major Findings of the Conference: Investigate formulation of an international undertaking on the safety & security of sources
IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference September 1999
GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10
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Development of IAEA Guidance
IAEA Action Plan for the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material
Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference September 1999
GOV/1999/46-GC(43)/10
SCOPE
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Approved by BoG &
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endorsed by GC Sept 1999 Some issues not resolved 38
Development of IAEA Guidance
REVISED IAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference September 10, 2001 GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12
September 11
Draft REVISED Categorization of Radioactive Sources Draft REVISED Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources GOV/2002/35/Add.1 GC(46)/11/Add.1
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International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources
High-level conference
Held 10-13 March 2003
Over 720 participants
From over 120 countries
Two major findings with other topical findings 40
Development of IAEA Guidance
REVISED Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
Endorsed by GC GC(47)/RES/7 GOV/2003/49-GC(47)/9 Scope IAEA/CODEOC/2004 G8 Evian Summit June 2003 41
Development of IAEA Guidance
Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources
GOV/2004/62 GC(48)/13 Endorsed by GC GC(47)/RES/7 G8 Sea Island Summit June 2004 IAEA/CODEOC/IMP-EXP/2005 42
Development of IAEA Guidance
REVISED IAEA Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources Approved by IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference September 10, 2001 GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12
Discussed making the Code legally binding – but no consensus Many countries trying to implement the Code IAEA to revise Action Plan (again) Next conference in ~3 years 43
Categorization of Radioactive Sources
Category Practice Activity Ratio A/D 1 2 3 4 5 RTG’s; Irradiators; Teletherapy; Gamma Knife Industrial gamma radiography Brachytherapy (HDR/MDR) Fixed industrial gauges with high activity sources (level, dredge, conveyor gauges etc.) Well logging gauges Brachytherapy permanent implants) (LDR except eye plaques & Industrial gauges with lower activity sources (e.g. portable moisture/density gauges) Bone densitometers; Static eliminators Brachytherapy (eye pl. & perm implants); XRF devices; Electron capture devices; Mossbauer sources: PET check sources A/D ≥ 1000 1000>A/D ≥10 10>A/D ≥ 1 1>A/D ≥ 0.01
0.01>A/D and A>Exempt 44
Some D values of interest
Radionuclide D (TBq) Am-241 Co-60 Cs-137 Ir-192 Sr-90/Y-90 0.06
0.03
0.1
0.08
1 D (Ci) 2 0.8
3 2 30
Now published as Safety Guide RS-G-1.9
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Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Nuclear Security Plan of Activities
It has eight topic areas and is mainly focused on nuclear material (SNM); however,
It had two main thrusts for sources…
Remediation of past problems
Prevention of future problems 46
1: Remediation of Past Problems
Collect, dispose of known disused sources Secure vulnerable sources, especially high-risk sources (Tripartite initiative) Search for, recover and dispose of orphan or vulnerable sources 47
Collecting known disused sources
IAEA has for many years had campaigns to collect, properly dispose of, and secure the large number of disused sources around the world
Collection and conditioning of radium sources in Africa is a good example
Return of a 700 TBq (19,000 Ci) 137 Cs source from Cote d’Ivoire to France is another 48
Securing vulnerable sources
Tripartite Initiative secured HIGH activity sources in some former Soviet Union countries:
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Estonia
Kazakhstan
Moldova
Tajikistan 49
Tripartite Partnership
USA brought $ and security team
Russia brought information on sources and technology and possible recycling of some sources
IAEA brought contacts, local knowledge, project management and co-ordination
100 kCi dismantled and transported to safe and secure storage.
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Many high activity radioactive sources are vulnerable...
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~2,000 Ci Cs-137 ~40,000 Ci Sr-90 53 ~10,000 Ci Co-60
~3,500 Ci Cs-37 each 54
Several disused teletherapy heads 55
Other Projects
EU funding for work similar to Tripartite:
Balkans
Armenia
Six disused medical irradiators secured in:
Tanzania
Philippines 56
Active Searches for orphan sources
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Surveyor Rappelling into Ravine
Passive searches for sources
IAEA published guidance on prevention, detection and response to illicit trafficking and inadvertent movement of radioactive materials (TECDOCs 1311, 1312, 1313)
ISO, IEC are each developing standards based on this earlier work
IAEA has a research project aimed at capability improvements: 28 labs and 18 countries are involved
IAEA, USA and EU have all provided equipment and training for border monitoring, with concentration in Eastern Europe and NIS countries 60
IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database
As of Dec. 2003:
335 incidents involving non-nuclear, radioactive materials have been confirmed
However, more than 75% of these involve Category 4 & 5 sources
At least 50% of 335 appear to entail deliberate criminal activities, including about 20 incidents with Category 1-3 sources
Most of these seem to be amateurish groups motivated by financial gain 61
Post 9/11 The IAEA Developed a Nuclear Security Plan of Activities
It had two main thrusts for sources…
Remediation of past problems.
By end of 2005:
Dismantlement and relocation of the highest risk sources (~35) in 6 countries to be completed
Eleven high activity sources (~29,000 Ci) and 58 neutron sources recovered from Africa and Latin America
Prevention of future problems 62
2: Prevention of Future Problems
Improve legal and regulatory infrastructure
Implement the Code of Conduct, including: import/export controls on high risk sources strengthen or regain control with a National strategy increase security of sources as needed Involve manufacturers and distributors with issues such as source redesign, return of sources… 63
Legal and regulatory controls
IAEA has published a large number of standards, regulations and guidance
Model Project for Strengthening Radiation Protection Infrastructure helps developing countries put these into practice
Radiation Safety Infrastructure Appraisals (RaSIA), now modified to include security of radioactive sources (RaSSIA)
>100 missions completed by end of 2005 64
Code of Conduct
High level document to governments and regulatory authorities to serve as “guidance for the development and harmonization of policies, laws and regulations on the safety and security of radioactive sources” 65
As of Oct 2005, 77 countries, G8 and EU have endorsed the Code
States committed States not yet committed 66
Scope of Code
Focus on sealed, high risk radioactive sources (essentially Cat. 1-3, with some provisions only for Cat. 1 and 2)
Excludes nuclear materials , as defined in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
Excludes military radioactive sources within the or defense programs 68
Contents
Built on existing International Standards Legislation Regulations Regulatory body Examples… Import/export controls 69
Strengthening Control over Sources States should develop: National strategies for gaining or regaining control over orphan sources National register of radioactive sources for “at least Cat. 1 & 2”
(~58 Countries trained in IAEA’s RAIS)
Source Register 70
Security Measures
Security measures needed to deter, detect and delay unauthorised access, removal of source, etc Maintain confidentiality of sensitive information Countries should define domestic threat, and assess vulnerability 71
Disused sources can be particularly vulnerable Disused sources should be managed safely & securely (including financial provisions where appropriate) 72
Import and Export of Radioactive Sources
Export
Authorization from exporting state’s regulatory body Notification of importing state’s regulatory body Consent of importing state’s regulatory body (Cat. 1 sources)
Import
Authorization from importing state’s regulatory body
But, so far only a few (11) countries have recommitted 73
Co-operation with Manufacturers and Suppliers of Sources
The IAEA has encouraged the development of
ISSPA is drafting a Code of Good Practice for the industry (http://www.isspa-org.com/)
Manufacturers are participating in IAEA meetings to ‘minimize the consequences of malicious use’ through improved design and construction.
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Conclusions - USA
The USA has been actively engaged in the international effort, and has been leading on many fronts
Several NRC orders, rulemakings and parts of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 are the direct result of the USA’s commitment to the Code of Conduct
The USA is funding many multi- and bi lateral efforts to help ensure the safety and security of radioactive sources 79
Conclusions - IAEA
The IAEA’s work on the safety and security of radioactive sources has been quite extensive
However, it has no authority except over its own programs
So ultimate control of sources depends on each country and ultimately on the person with the authorization…So… 80
Conclusions - HPS
It’s time for a renewed vision for the Radiation Safety Without Borders program
Chapter to Country – Long term - years
Person to person – Relationship based
Professional support – Multiple mode
Resources, advice, experts on IAEA missions, funds to attend meeting
Help seed a foreign chapter, that develops into an independent national society that becomes an IRPA Associate Society 81
Talk to me…
(702) 254-2346 (Pacific) BDodd.com
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Supplementary Ionizing Radiation Warning Symbol
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