Transcript The ADF Reserves

Defence Reserves Association
2012 Conference
The ADF Reserves
MAJGEN Paul Brereton
HCRESD
Introduction
• HCRESD apologises that he is unable to address the
conference personally this year. He is en-route to the
NATO NRFC in Copenhagen, where he will present to
the NATO nations on how Australia educates, trains and
exercises its Reservists.
• HCRESD wishes to acknowledge the excellent support
provided to CRESD over the last year by MAJGEN Barry
and the DRA, particularly in connection with Plan
SUAKIN and DHOAS.
Scope
• The state of the ADF Reserves in 2012
– Operations
– Strengths
– Community perceptions
– CRESD Strategic Plan and current initiatives
– Reserve support
• Reserve reform – Plan SUAKIN
THE STATE OF THE ADF
RESERVES IN 2012
Operations
• Current operational tempo continues to see the ADF
Reserves delivering capability to current operations,
expeditionary and domestic.
–
–
–
–
–
ANODE – Solomon Islands
ASTUTE - Timor
RESOLUTE – Border protection
CHOGM
Elsewhere
Strengths
MAR 11
AR
CFTS
SBR
TOTAL
NAVY
4493
345
4185
9023
ARMY
16599
528
12031
29156
3556
91
5862
9509
24648
984
22028
47688
AIR FORCE
TOTAL
1 APR 12
AR
CFTS
SBR
TOTAL
NAVY
4821
295
3854
8970
ARMY
16518
717
12914
30149
3802
62
5643
9507
25141
1074
22411
48626
AIR FORCE
TOTAL
Community perceptions
•
Newspoll research outcomes
– Baseline awareness of Reserves is very high (Army 96%, ADF 91%, Air
Force 73%, Naval 71%)
– Overall support for reserves is very strong (92% support: 68% strongly,
24% somewhat, only 4% oppose)
– 82% are aware, and 88% support, that employers are required by law to
release employees for Reserve service
– The “surge” or expansion base role was understood by 88%.
– Most (90%) were aware of Reserve role in HADR domestically (90%)
and expeditionary (77%), but less of regional stabops (57%), and noncombat (49%) and combat (37%) in MEAO.
– Only 37% aware that most of ADF’s specialist medical expertise was
provided by Reservists.
• Implications
– Need to communicate:
• Expeditionary roles, especially in regional stability operations; and
• Health role, especially specialists
CRESD Strategic Plan
• Strategic Objective: Enhance the capacity of ADF
Reserves to contribute to Defence capability.
• Vision and Direction: The contribution of the Reserve
component to ADF capability is increased, through
enhanced availability for and experience of Defence
Service, and improved retention, including through
policies that support the availability of reservists for
operational service and training, and collaborative
relationships (with employers, industry, special interest
groups and educational institutions) that support
Reservists and Defence Service.
Current CRESD initiatives
• Review of post operational welfare support
for and reintegration of Reservists
• DHOAS
• Joint Reserve C&SC
• Reviews of ESPS and Top-up Pay
Reserve support
• Service Protection
– MOUs
• Police and emergency services in all jurisdictions
• QANTAS is first private sector employer MOU
– DRSPA
• Further enhancements to Garde Review amendments
cleared by all stakeholders
• Now potentially Autumn 2013 sittings
• ESP
– Recent amendments to ensure scheme delivers value
for money, particularly with respect to self-employed
reservists
International engagement
• NZ
– DRSC / TFESC liaison
– JRWG
– Tasman Scheme
• ASWPRRCF
– 1-13 Nov 12, Auckland
• ICESR
– Examining possibility of Australia hosting
conference with wider remit in 2013
Challenges & opportunities
•
•
•
In last decade, increased use of Reserves was driven by operational tempo,
and was supported by “no-win no-loss” funding.
As Australia draws down from current deployments, we can anticipate
reduced tempo, and tighter funding.
For next decade, we will have to support use of Reserves on other bases
than tempo. These include:
– Cost. Reserves are cost-effective means of generating and retaining capability.
Previous DWP proposal to transfer high-end long lead-time capability to
Reserves foundered due to perceived problem with maintaining skills and
currency. This does not apply to low-end long lead-time capability, which may be
a better fit.
– Capability. Reserves, with their civilian skills, are well-suited to particular types
of mission, and can free higher readiness and higher trained permanent forces
for the missions for which their additional proficiency is required.
– Culture. In a time when ADF is criticised for what are said to be aspects of its
culture, Reserves serve as a cultural bridge between military and civilian society.
RESERVE REFORM –
Plan SUAKIN
Reserve reform agenda
• DWP, DBA and SRP establish two key reserve reform
strategies:
– Better integration of reserve and permanent components IOT
more effectively utilise RC in generating capability. This means
integration of effects, not necessarily of structures
– Smarter use of RC, including rebalancing capability between PC
and RC, IOT reduce costs.
• PARLSEC directed reviews:
– Develop force rotation model that institutionalises use of RC
– Review conditions of service to optimise RC contribution to Total
Force
Why?
• Reform agenda and COE has different needs from that for which
extant employment model was designed 60 years ago
• Initial SRP RRS initiatives, focussed on savings through workforce
restructure, had limited ability to deliver reform strategies. Focus on
Reserve salary savings meant that these would be achieved through
less, rather than smarter, use of RC.
• Unique opportunity for deep reform presented by concurrence of
–
–
–
–
Service capability reviews (Plan Beersheba, also WONCR and 1TAF)
CRESD conditions of service review (Plan Suakin)
PSPG workforce initiatives (especially DEO)
Cultural reviews
We said we would deliver…….
Section 1
DETAILED COURSES
OF ACTION*
COURSE OF ACTION SNAPSHOT*
Executive Summary
Problem
and
evidence
Quick wins
(SMART)
Employment
models
Reward
and CoS
Predictive
behaviour model
Personnel cost
model
Change
management &
implementation
Stand alone, SMART approach, implementable, low risk, high gain
Section 2
Evolutionary
reform
Transformational
reform
Leverage quick wins, deliver innovative reform
Deep reform, organisational commitment and strategic courage
COA 1 – Quick Wins
COA 2 – Evolutionary Reform
Section 3
COA 3 – Transformational Reform
*Note - Courses of action may share compatible elements across them.
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How….
Develop a scenario
Combined output
• E.g. Remove the HRR
• Provide superannuation
• Costed through life impact of scenario
on force element or total force
Data
Enter into PBM
Conditions of
service
Employment
models
number of employees, rank and
grade, service days, leave
entitlements, conditions of service
Other ideas
from
stakeholders
Force element cost
cost of deployable and
deployed members
Deployment
f orce group size, deployment mix,
length of deployment
Calculations
Preparedness
readying, ready, reset, pre
deployment training
Universe of options
Through life cost
Research and analysis f ilter
cost of a f ull time member
compared to an active reserve
Risk
Phase II enhancement
Key inf ormant interviews
Engage with personnel
Survey
Output from PBM
Data
• Transition rate
• Retention rate
• Resultant force structure
Behavioural
Profiling and
DST
Enter into PCM
Input to PCM
• HRR changes
• Superannuation changes
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Plan SUAKIN was built on an evidence base
Inputs – Hypotheses
1. Ease of transition
Evidence base
25 focus groups and workshops
1. Service Spectrum
2. Remuneration (inc benefits)
2. Optimised reward
3. Employment continuum
Outputs – Courses of
Action
50+ key informant interviews
3. Transfer processes
4. Workforce funding systems
4. Career management
5. Culture barriers
5. Employment Offer (Whole of
workforce)
6. Opportunity for meaningful work
200+ literature articles reviewed
6. ForceNet (e-Portal)
7. Gender profile
8. Workforce profile
9. Partnership with industry
10,400+ survey responses
10. Training delivery
11. Cumbersome systems
Predictive behaviour model
Plan SUAKIN Supporting
efforts
1. Total Force Culture
2. Flexible Funding
12. Two way employment contract
3. Reserve Training
Personnel cost model
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In 12 month we have…
•
•
•
•
•
•
Consulted Widely (including with the DRA)
Collected a mountain of evidence
Designed a new employment model for Defence
Proposed an integrated framework for Reserve Reform
Moved Defence closer to operating as a Total Force
Commenced building a one-stop internet-based communication
capability (ForceNet) for Reserves (and arguably the FT force)
• Secured agreement at the highest levels of Defence committees
(COSC and SCAC)
• Secured the right level of resources to insure success:
– $30m in funding to implement Plan SUAKIN and ForceNet
– 16 FTE to help us do the work
• Commence the long journey of implementation
Plan SUAKIN Outline
• Employment arrangements and conditions of
service for a Total Force optimally balanced
between Regular and Reserve Components
having regard to capability, cost and culture,
that enables Defence to select the best balanced
force for any mission
Six main LOOs
• Service Spectrum of 7 SERCATs of full, part-time and
casual service across Regular and Reserve
Components, with increased mobility between them.
• Each SERCAT attracts remuneration reflecting the
capability and assurance it delivers.
• Simplified transfer processes.
• Improved career management and opportunities.
• A Defence-wide employment offer.
• ForceNet, an IT solution providing “ information
anytime, anywhere”.
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ForceNet
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Three supporting LOOs
• Total Force culture, remove cultural
impediments to more flexible career patterns.
• Greater assurance and certainty of funding for
Reserve salaries.
• Rationalise individual training for reservists.
Effects





A more flexible workforce to respond to changes in workforce,
security environment and the economy, with economical personnel
structures, increased ability to use Reservists to reduce
hollowness and preserve capability, improved workforce planning,
and access to a wider talent pool
Increased retention of trained personnel on ceasing Permanent
service.
Improved career opportunities for women to serve throughout
career and life stages.
Retention (at lower readiness but also lower cost) of some
capabilities no longer sustainable in the Permanent component.
Minimal increase in cost of Reservist (from Service Allowance
and SERCAT 5 Super), more than offset by economies from HRR.
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Cultural challenges
• Embedding a Total Force Culture will
require determined effort to:
– Institutionalise consideration of
Reserve/integrated options in all operational
planning
– Change attitudes to less than permanent
continuous full-time service, and in particular
to “offering restricted service”
We concluded our presentation in
2011 by saying that we also
needed to address a Total Force
Culture… some of you may recall
this slide
Culture and change management
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