Transcript Commission to Assess the Threat from High Altitude

Commission to Assess the
Threat from High Altitude
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP):
Overview
Dr. William R. Graham,
Chair
Dr. John S. Foster Jr.
Mr. Earl Gjelde
Dr. Robert J. Hermann
Mr. Henry M. Kluepfel
GEN Richard L. Lawson
Dr. Gordon K. Soper
Dr. Lowell L. Wood Jr.
Dr. Joan Woodard
EMP Commission Charter: Title XIV
Duties of Commission
• Assess the EMP Threat to the US:
– Nature and magnitude of EMP threats within the next 15 years
• From all potentially hostile states or non-state actors
– Vulnerability of US military and especially civilian systems
– Capability of the US to repair and recover from damage to military
and civilian systems
– Feasibility and cost of EMP hardening select military and civilian
systems
• Recommend protection steps the US should take
Commission considered:
 Only EMP threats produced by high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon
 Threat assessment based on present and possible future capabilities of
potential adversaries because of 15-year outlook
Commissioners
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Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. (Director LLNL; Director DDR&E)
Mr. Earl Gjelde (Chief Engineer and Acting Director, Bonnevile Power
Administration; Under Secretary Dept of Interior, COO, Dep of Energy)
Dr. William R. Graham (Chairman) (Director, OSTP; Science Advisor to President
Reagan)
Dr. Robert J. Hermann (Director, NRO; Asst Sec USAF; Vice President, United
Technologies)
Mr. Henry (Hank) M. Kluepfel (VP SAIC; Advisor to the President’s NSTAC)
GEN Richard L. Lawson, USAF (Ret.) (DCINC US European Command; Director
Plans and Policy JCS)
Dr. Gordon K. Soper (PDATSD NCB; Director Nuclear Forces C3; Chief Scientist
DCA)
Dr. Lowell L. Wood, Jr. (Director's Staff LLNL; Technical Advisor, SSCI & HASC)
Dr. Joan B. Woodard (Exec VP & Deputy Director Sandia National Labs)
Seven Commissioners were appointed by the Secretary of Defense and
two by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
Threat: Nature and Magnitude of EMP Threats
Within the Next 15 Years
•
EMP is one of a small number of threats that
may
– Hold at risk the continued existence of
today’s US civil society
EMP Coverage for
Bursts of Various Heights
HOB = 500 km
HOB = 300 km
HOB = 100 km
– Disrupt our military forces and our ability to
project military power
•
The number of US adversaries capable of EMP
attack is greater than during the Cold War
•
Potential adversaries are aware of the EMP
strategic attack option
•
Threat not adequately addressed in US national
and homeland security programs
Vulnerability may be an invitation to attack
Surface
Zero
• Wide area coverage
– A million square miles
• Intensity depends on:
– Weapon design
– Height of burst
– Location of burst
• Broad frequency range
• Threat to all electronics in exposure
The Vulnerability and Interdependence
of US Military and Civilian Systems
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One or a few high-altitude nuclear
detonations can produce EMP,
simultaneously, over wide geographical
areas
Unprecedented cascading failure of our
electronics-dependent infrastructures
could result
– Power, energy transport, telecom, and
financial systems are particularly
vulnerable and interdependent
Oil / Gas
Compressor Station
Fuel Supply
•
Both civilian and military capabilities
depend on these infrastructures
Without adequate protection recovery
could be prolonged—months to years
Electric Power
Communications
Switching
Office
End Office
Substation
Traffic
Light
Transportation
Water
Transport
– EMP disruption pf these sectors could
cause large scale infrastructure
failures for all aspects of the Nation’s Banking & Finance
life
•
Power
Supply
Power
Plant
Reservoir
Substation
Hospital
Ambulance
Bank
Check ATM Federal
Reserve
Processing
Center
Emergency
Services
Fire
Station
Legislative
Offices
Pension/Service Payments
Treasury Dept.
Emergency
Call Center
Military
Installations
Government
Services
Vulnerability of US Electric Power Infrastructure
• The Electrical Power Grids are the single most lethal U.S.
vulnerability to EMP effects.
• EMP induced functional collapse of the electrical power grid risks
the continued existence of US civil society
– Immediate EM transients likely to exceed capabilities of protective
safety relays
– Late time EMP could induce currents that create significant damage
throughout the grid
• National electrical grid not designed to withstand near simultaneous
functional collapse
• Procedures do not exist to perform “black start” under severe
damage scenario
– Restart would depend on telecom and energy transport which depend
on power
• Restoration of the National power grid could take months to years
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Typical 500kV transformer is custom tailored to application
Spares are seldom available
Manufacturing performed offshore
Normal delivery time months to more than a year
SCADA/Remote Controls
• Supervisory Control Systems (SCADA)
are the ubiquitous robots of modern civilization
– Process control
– Environmental monitoring and control
– Safety of operation
– Rapid problem diagnosis
– Real time data acquisition
and remote control
Pipeline SCADA components
• Generic SCADA may share many
component commonalities with PCs
– Circuit boards, I/O ports,…
PLC switch activator
Capability of the US to Repair and Recover
from Damage to Civilian Systems
Other Civilian Infrastructures Dependent Upon Availability of Power
• Telecommunications:
– May be significantly impacted,
at least at the outset
– Recovery will be dependent on
prompt restoration of power
• Financial system:
– Vulnerable to an EMP induced disruption of telecommunications and computers
• Remote controls in infrastructures are at risk of disruption and damage
– Transportation infrastructure is vulnerable to disruption.
– Oil and gas supplies likely disrupted due to failures of pump and valve controls
– Potable water likely disrupted in the region affected by the EMP
– Distribution of food may be degraded
• US scientific and technical capability to address EMP and other nuclear weapon effects has
diminished to the point where continued viability is questionable
No credible capability exists to predict the full response of a single system (e.g.,
national power grid), let alone the highly interdependent US infrastructure
Military Forces
• Strategic Forces
– EMP survivability remains a strategic necessity
• Offensive forces, Defensive forces, Responsive
Infrastructure
– End of Cold War relaxed discipline for meeting
capability for EMP hardness
• General Purpose Forces
– Hardened equipment embedded in soft systems
– Increased dependence on high reliability electronics,
not just components but supporting infrastructure
Danger of EMP Attack Can Be Mitigated
• Our free, modern society has inherent vulnerabilities that
cannot be completely eliminated
• Catastrophe can be averted by practical and affordable
steps to
– Prevent attacks,
– Prepare to recognize and respond to an EMP attack
– Protect critical infrastructure elements and strategic
military capabilities, and
– Recover following attack
• National security and homeland security are Federal
responsibilities that should be funded by the Federal
government
In just a few years we can make significant, affordable improvements to
protect society even if an EMP attack is carried out against us
We Can Do Something About it:
Strategy and Recommendations
• Pursue Intelligence, Interdiction, and Deterrence to Discourage
EMP Attack
– highest priority is to prevent attack
– shape global environment to reduce incentives to create EMP weapons
– make it difficult and dangerous to try
• Protect Critical Components of Key Infrastructures
– especially “long lead” replacement components
• Maintain Ability to Monitor/Evaluate Condition of Critical
Infrastructures
–absence of information can make things worse either through inaction
–or inappropriate action. Salutary example ~ Blackout of August 13, 2003
• Recognize EMP Attack and Understand How Effects Differ
from Other Disruptions
• Plan to Carry Out Systematic Recovery of Key Infrastructures
–demonstrate will and capacity to recover from any attack
Recommendations I
• Protect high value assets through
hardening
• Protect the use of emergency power
supplies and fuel delivery
• Assure adequate communications assets
dedicated or available to system operators
• Separate the present interconnected
systems into several non-synchronous
connected sub-regions or electrical islands
Recommendations II
• Install substantially more black start generation
units coupled with specific transmission that can
be readily isolated to balancing loads
• Improve, extend, and exercise recovery
capabilities
• Understand system and network level
vulnerabilities
• Develop national and regional restoration plans
• Establish installation and system test standards
Is an EMP Attack Likely?
•
The Commission did not try to estimate the likelihood of an EMP event looking
forward 15 years.
– We do not think that is either practical or useful
– The likelihood depends on our actions as well as the actions of others
– We know that there are ways that such an attack could be mounted
– We know there are ways to mitigate the catastrophic impact of an attack
– We know that many of these mitigations apply to other threats as well
(Cyber, Geomagnetic Storms, etc.
•
We do not think it wise to leave this potentially catastrophic vulnerability in
place given that it can be mitigated over time with reasonable resources
•
We believe that if left unaddressed, our vulnerability becomes an invitation to
attack
•
If addressed, our reduced vulnerability helps deter attack, enhances
infrastructure resilience and confers added protection against cyber threats
and damaging geosolar storms.
I
Final Comments
It is mostly about the Electical Grid
For the Grid, it is more about its vulnerability
than the EMP threat. It is vulnerable to
several threats capable of simultaneous,
wide area attack such as CYBER and
physical sabotage.
Responsibility assigned is different than
accountability accepted with authority to
act.
Commission to Assess the
Threat from High Altitude
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP):
Overview
Dr. William R. Graham,
Chair
Dr. John S. Foster Jr.
Mr. Earl Gjelde
Dr. Robert J. Hermann
Mr. Henry M. Kluepfel
GEN Richard L. Lawson
Dr. Gordon K. Soper
Dr. Lowell L. Wood Jr.
Dr. Joan Woodard
BACKUP SLIDES
Strategy and Recommendations – cont.
• Train, Evaluate, “Red Team”, and Periodically Report to Congress
• Define Federal Government’s Responsibility/Authority to Act
–Governance distributed among Federal, State, regional and
variety of non-governmental entities and associations
–DHS has unique responsibility to coordinate homeland response to threat
–DOD has unique responsibility to assure survivability and continued
–Operational effectiveness of our military forces in face of EMP threat
• Recognize Opportunities for Shared Benefits
–planning for rapid recovery/restoraton of key infrastructures confers
protection against other disruptions; natural, accidental, or advertent
–some protective steps may enhance the reliability and quality of critical
infrastructures
• Conduct Research to Better Understand Infrastructure System
Effects and Develop Cost-Effective Solutions to Manage Effects
The Governance and Accountability Issue
• DoD has experience and structure for dealing with its
own systems but is dependent on civil/commercial
sector.
• DHS has responsibility for civil sectors. National
Infrastructure Protection Plan addresses all sectors but
does not provide discipline for resources and authorities.
• Many sectors (e.g. Electric Power, Gas, Financial,
Telecom) are commercial and mitigation will cost
someone.
• Commercial firms unwilling to pay for “National Security”
burden.
• This is true for EMP, Cyber and physical attack, etc.