Transcript Rebuilding Transportation in Iraq

Transportation Engineering In
Iraq
Presented by:
James E. Koch, Ph.D., P.E.
Wisconsin Road Builders’ Association
January 21, 2009
1
Agenda
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Overview of SBH
Contract Information
Operating Environment
Iraq Reconstruction Projects to Date
Overview of Fund Types
Evolution of the Reconstruction Program
Project Lifecycle
Building the Program
Contracting in Iraq
Program Execution
Operating and Maintaining
Future Considerations
Project Profiles
2
Reconstruction in Iraq
3
Overview of SBH
• Joint Venture with:
– Stanley Consultants
– Michael Baker Corporation
– Hill International
• Augmented with multiple subcontractors
Craig Johnson
Managing Director
SBH ORGANIZATION
Ted Williams
Chief Financial
Officer
Contract No. W914NS-04-D-0021
August 6, 2008
Program Manager
Jim Koch
Deputy Program
Manager
Carl Opel
Kathy Christman
In-Country Program
Manager
Dave Schmidt
In-Country DPM
Reporting & Controls
Gary Clardy
Karen Marshall
(107)
GRC Lead
Ben Roos
(1/0)
Config Mgmt/Tech
Experts
Denny Plockmeyer
(4/0)
4
General Contract Information
Contract Title
Contracting
Agency
Contract Type
Award Date
Period
Not to Exceed
Construction Management & General Design Services at Facilities in Iraq
Transatlantic Programs Center - KO
Gulf Region Division - ACO
A/E IDIQ
19 March 2004
Base Year and 4 Option Years thru 18 Mar 09
$300 Million Each for Base Year and Option Year 1
$200 Million Each for Option Years 2, 3 and 4
The Scope of Work includes performance of Architect-Engineer (A-E) services including construction
management, service contract performance management, and design services required under this
indefinite delivery indefinite-quantity contract. The A-E firm will act as an independent contractor
and not as an agent of the U.S. Government and furnishes all labor and supervisory management
required for the performance of the work that is described in separately issued task order scopes of
work.
5
Operating Environment
Complex Program
Constant Rotation of
Government Personnel
Rapid Change
Lack of Experience with
Large Program
Difficulty in Defining
Requirements
Combat Zone
Multiple Programs, Fund Types, and Agencies involved (not always
acting in harmony)
Learning curve restarts every four months and leads to a focus on
short term planning
Pervasive with every aspect of the program - strategic, tactical, and
administrative
Personnel sometimes lacking in program/construction management
background and experience
Often unable to define requirements in a timely manner due to a
combination of the above four factors
24/7 austere extremely stressful environment with occasional close-in
indirect fire impacts
6
Transportation Projects
Reconstruction
Planned
Ongoing
Complete
Total
Village Roads
70
50
1257
1377
Expressways
5
9
58
72
Bridges
16
12
191
219
Airports
4
11
77
92
Ports
1
0
24
25
Railroad Stations
2
3
129
134
Other
28
13
401
442
Infrastructure Security
0
2
8
10
Subtotals
126
100
2145
2371
As of 09 Jan 2009
7
Overview of Primary Fund Types
8
Evolution of the
Reconstruction Program
ORHA
US Mission
Iraq
US Mission
Iraq
US Mission
Iraq
US Mission
Iraq
US Mission
Iraq
IRMO
IRMO
IRMO
IRMO
ITAO
CPA
JTF4 C7
PMO
TF FAJR
Jun 04
Oct 03
PCO
TF RIE
Electricity
PCO
TF RIO
Oil
GRD
GRD
GRD
GRD/ PCO
GRD
GRD
1 Oct 06
8 May 07
2003
25 Jan 04
Iraq
Provisional
Command
FEST A
North
FEST A
South
FEST A
Center
The Gulf Region
Division (GRD)
provides quality,
responsive
engineering
services to MNF-I
and CPA with
planning, design,
and construction
management
support for
military and civil
infrastructure
construction.
Apr 05
Aug 05
The Gulf Region
Division (GRD), United
States Army Corps of
Engineers, provides
quality, responsive, and
full spectrum
engineering services to
Multi-national Force-Iraq
(MNF-I) and the Iraqi
Transitional
Government (ITG) in
support of military and
civil construction, in
order to progressively
prepare the Iraqi
Government to assume
full responsibility for
national reconstruction.
The Gulf Region Division
(GRD), United States Army
Corps of Engineers provides
quality, responsive, and full
spectrum engineering services
to MNF-I and Iraqi
Government with planning,
design, and construction
management support for
military and civil infrastructure
construction.
4 Dec 05
The Gulf Region Division
(GRD), provides quality,
responsive, full spectrum
engineering services in
Iraq in support of military
and civil construction,
and logistical services,
and aggressively assists
the Iraqi Government to
assume full responsibility
for national
reconstruction
The Gulf Region Division
provides quality,
sustainable, responsive,
full spectrum engineering
and logistical services in
support of civil / military
construction in Iraq.
Committed to assisting
the Iraqi Government to
assume full responsibility
for national infrastructure.
JCCI/A
Jan 05
9
Project Lifecycle
• GRD, with program support from SBH, manages a
significant part of the transportation reconstruction
program in Iraq from “cradle to grave”
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Identification of requirement from customer
Development of scope and cost estimate
Solicitation
Award
Design
Construction
Beneficial Occupancy
Closeout of the project
Turnover of the asset to the Iraqi Government (ARTOG)
10
Building the Transportation
Program In Iraq
• Determining and Tracking the Requirements
– Projects identified by:
•
•
•
•
United Nations Development Group and the World Bank in 2003
Coalition Provisional Authority
Iraqi Ministries
US Military Civil Affairs Units, USAID, DOS, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, INL, US
Marshals, and other various Coalition partners
– Projects were identified to restore the Iraqi civil aviation
program, the railroad infrastructure, port facilities, and
reliable internal roadway network and bridges
– Data management through the Iraq Reconstruction
Management System (IRMS)
11
Contracting in Iraq
• Translating the Requirements to Projects
– Contracting efforts
• Various agencies provide contracting support, no one lead agency
• Initial push for obligation was in an unknown contracting
environment
– Cost-Plus Contracts shifted the burden from the Government
• Policy changes and anticipated cost savings allowed the
Government to convert to firm fixed price contracts
• Use of Project Partnering Agreements (PPAs) to partner with the
Ministries
12
Program Execution
• Supporting, Managing, and Overseeing Construction
– Design and construction
• Majority of project awarded as design build contracts
• US Government provides review of submitted designs and
schedules; Iraqi Ministries participate in review
• Construction oversight via local engineers and quality assurance
officers, reports received daily
• Participation from Ministries at final inspections, their approval is
required
• Turnover by the Contractor and US Government
13
Operating and Maintaining
• Continuing After Construction
– Lack of skilled personnel due to an exodus of Iraq’s
highly educated and skilled population has caused
many completed facilities to lie unused (e.g. radar
facilities and national railway monitoring systems)
– Training and maintenance plans must be developed
and provided in the area’s primary language
– For an extended period of six months to one year, aid
must be given in the execution of the plans to ensure
future usability of the facility
14
Areas for Future Consideration
• Differences in typical US designs versus locally used can
cause significant construction problems and increased costs
through excessive designs
• Differing work standards and available capabilities
• Availability and quality of locally available resources
• Multiple layers of management and oversight create a lack of
a clear chain of command
• Personnel turnover drains historic knowledge
• Determine and plan for essential utility connections
• Security (travel restrictions)
15
Areas for Future Consideration
• Corruption must be considered
– Bribes and payoffs increase project costs
• Regional Culture and Prejudices
–
–
–
–
Holiday delays
Concept of “Inshallah”; time management
Sectarian differences can cause labor problems
Women owned businesses may have significant problems
with officials
• Security caused damages increase cost, significantly
delay schedule, and may cause the termination of
the requirement (War Clause)
16
Transportation Projects
17
Baghdad Bypass
Pedestrians, Cars, Trucks and Busses
Baghdad Bypass
• Purpose
– Create a route bypassing urban areas for military and civilian purposes
– Improve safety for military convoys and personnel
– Creation of alternate supply routes bypassing Baghdad
• Scope
–
–
–
–
–
30 km of roadway and 0.8 km of bridge and interchange
Construction of new roadway at least 5 km from Baghdad
Widening and improvement of existing roads
Implementation of check points and fencing to maintain security
Validation of survey data
19
Baghdad Bypass
Phase I
• Started 24 Feb 07
• Completed 23 Oct 07
• Funding: $6.6M MILCON
•
•
•
Phase II and III
• Started 22 Jul 07
• Completed Aug 08
• Funding: $25.7 MILCON
Route selection based on land ownership
Avoidance of water due to bridges’ vulnerability to IED
Private security for surveyors due to violence in area
20
Baghdad Bypass
21
Baghdad Bypass
Problems
•
•
•
•
Existing routes in Iraq travel through highly populated areas
Convoys that service the logistics hubs throughout Iraq are subject to IED attack while
traveling along these routes
– ASR/MSR supporting final consolidation bases and logistics hubs pass through numerous
IED Hotspots
– The majority of IED activity occurs within 5 km of built-up areas (past 1,000 events)
– Nearly all IED activity is concentrated in the areas identified above with the majority in
Baghdad
Geospatial analysis shows significant density of IEDs along urban routes
Suspicious activity is difficult to detect in populated areas
– Heavily populated areas can more easily support enemy attacks Large convoys present
dangers and inconvenience to residents of urban areas
– Hard to defend against/identify threat in urban areas
– More collateral damage to noncombatants in more densely populated areas
– Likely to get “tied up” in city traffic
22
Baghdad Bypass
Solutions
•
Route Construction
– improves both IED device and IED Emplacer detection, allows for increased traffic ability
and supports all military transport load classes
•
Locate routes away from urban areas
– access to the roadway is made much more difficult by the large distances IED Emplacers
will have to travel and thereby increasing their probability of detection
•
Road design and clear zone
– inherent design to the road surface and to the surrounding area improves safety of
route by increasing the difficulty and complexity of IED device emplacement
•
Reinforce with route security operations
– Cameras, lighting, checkpoints, fencing, patrols, clear zones, and access denial to
bridges and culverts substructures
Baghdad Bypass
Reducing Construction Costs
Route improvement costs vary greatly while Urban Bypasses can expect
to cost an average of $600K to $1M per Kilometer to construct:
• Two Lane verses four lane
– significant cost reduction
• Widening of existing roadway
– less expensive than building new roadway
• Culverts
– using of simple box culverts where possible reduces overall cost of project
• Overpass
– the one overpass spans a single railroad track. The design of this overpass was simplified by the Iraqi
railroad clearance requirements
• Security Engineering requirements
– simple checkpoints, cameras, lighting, culvert and bridge security grates are built in defense features that
were installed at minimal costs
• Land acquisition is an unknown factor which will raise costs per kilometer
– Iraqi Government has rights to all public deeded lands for public projects. Private property acquisition
experience is limited but did not add significant amounts compared to the overall project costs
Aspen Road
•
•
•
Started:
Completed:
Total Cost:
August 20, 2005
May 14, 2007
$33 Million +
•Basic Scope:
–Connects Southern Iraq to Kuwait
–180 Kilometers, 2-lane asphalt road through Iraq’s
southern desert
–85 Kilometers of existing road repaved, widened
–Ease military transports and free up civilian traffic
25
Baghdad-Kirkuk Carriageway
• Started:
March 1, 2005
• Est. Completion: March 2009
• Cost:
$28 Million +
•Basic Scope:
−Connects Baghdad to Kirkuk
−Total length 2,186m
−Two (2) major structures: (1) .6Km and (1) 1Km bridge over Tigris River
−Build one more lane each way on the 90km highway between Baqubah and
Baghdad
−Work to include proper drainage, culverts where necessary, signage,
road markings
−Allows safe and efficient movement of people, goods and traffic
26
Al-Sharqat Bridge
•
•
•
•
•
Started:
Est. Completion:
% Complete:
Cost:
June 16, 2005
March 31, 2009
75%
7 Million+
Basic Scope:
– Construction of a 400m pre-cast
concrete bridge
– Reinforcement work for
returning wall in right side of
bridge
– Install wooden form for cross
beams
27
Al-Sharqat Bridge
• Issues:
– Delayed due to site security
– Checkpoints delay materials
delivery
– Threats and intimidation
– Unreliable Bedouin workforce
– Hired crane was not capable of rising
girders to required level
Al Khidr – Al Warkaa Ruins Rd.
•
•
•
•
Started:
Est. Completion:
% Completed:
Cost
July 2006
June 2009
72%
$1.6 Million
Basic Scope:
• Pave road from Al Khidr through to Al
Warkaa Ruins with asphalt
• Road is 6 meters wide and runs 11Km
Project Status:
Current: Paving and Spreading sub-base layer
Issues: Materials issues, long delays while
contractor awaited the delivery of bitumin.
Questions?
30