Transcript The Relation between Ethics and Metaphysics in Pragmatism

Pragmatism and the Ethical
Grounds of Metaphysics
Sami Pihlström
Professor of Practical Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä, Finland
E-mail: [email protected], [email protected]
Introduction
• Pragmatism: between metaphysics and antimetaphysics.
– Pragmatists have been both metaphysicians (e.g.,
Peirce) and critics of traditional metaphysics.
• Anti-metaphysical interpretations of classical and
contemporary pragmatism:
– Pragmatism as a mere precursor to logical positivism
and verificationism?
– Rorty’s neopragmatism: beyond traditional
epistemology and metaphysics?
Metaphysics: Aristotelian vs.
Kantian
• The conception of pragmatism as essentially antimetaphysical presupposes a traditional Aristotelian,
metaphysically realistic conception of metaphysics as an
inquiry into the world’s ”own” fundamental categorial
structure (as seen from an imagined ”God’s-Eye View”).
• An alternative conception of metaphysics (Kantian
instead of Aristotelian): an inquiry into how we
(necessarily) structure the world within our conceptual
schemes, frameworks, practices, etc. – into our
categories instead of the world’s ”own”.
• Pragmatists can be sharply critical of metaphysical
realism while maintaining the possibility of metaphysical
inquiry in a (historicized, naturalized) Kantian sense.
Metaphysics and ethics
• Traditionally, metaphysics and ethics are regarded as
distinct philosophical sub-disciplines.
• However, if we cannot separate the ”human contribution”
(cf. James) from the way(s) the world (for us) is – that is,
if we can engage in metaphysical inquiry only in a
Kantian instead of an Aristotelian sense – the question
arises whether our ”human reality” is inevitably valueladen, not just conceptually but morally and valuationally
structured by us.
• Pragmatism leads to an entanglement of metaphysics
with ethics. (Cf. Putnam’s neopragmatism: the fact/value
entanglement.)
Metaphysics and ethics (continued)
• The criticism of metaphysical realism (in pragmatism and
more generally, e.g., in Kant) naturally leads to the
blurring of the boundary not only between metaphysics
and epistemology but also between metaphysics and
ethics: since the world is always interpreted in terms of
our human categories, based on our practices, it is not
ethically irrelevant how we ”structure” it, or which
categories we employ.
• Some metaphysical problems are more obviously
ethically relevant than others (e.g., the metaphysics of
the self, personal identity, etc., vs. the problems of
universals and modalities), but in principle the core of
every genuine metaphysical dispute is ”practical” – i.e.,
moral (James, Pragmatism, 1975 [1907], ch. 2).
Metaphysics and ethics (continued)
• Modest (weak) hypothesis: metaphysics and ethics are
(deeply, inextricably) entangled, assuming a Kantiancum-pragmatist conception of metaphysics.
• Radical (strong) hypothesis: metaphysics and ethics are
(deeply, inextricably) entangled, assuming any
conception of metaphysics (including even metaphysical
realism).
• Only the modest hypothesis is examined here.
• It is crucial to understand ”entanglement” in a sufficiently
deep sense: the claim is not the uncontroversial one that
different metaphysical views may have different ethical
implications but that metaphysics is impossible without
ethics (and vice versa), i.e., that there can be no inquiry
into the structure of reality in abstraction of moral values.
Historical examples
• James on ”some metaphysical problems
pragmatically considered” (Pragmatism, 1975
[1907], chs. 3-4).
–
–
–
–
–
Substance (material & spiritual)?
Materialism vs. theism (spiritualism)?
Design in nature?
Free will vs. determinism?
Monism vs. pluralism?
• Peirce vs. James on realism, nominalism, and
the reality of ”generals” – ethical (not just
epistemological or metaphysical) relevance!
Contemporary examples
• Putnam: against the fact/value dichotomy – the
entanglement of facts and values.
• What is the specific nature of this entanglement (and of
the analogous entanglement of metaphysics and
ethics)?
– Metaphysical, epistemic, conceptual? (Timmons)
– Transcendental?
– These different entanglements may themselves be entangled in
a pragmatist construal of the ”entanglement thesis”.
• Pragmatists (early and late) on hope – a paradigmatic
metaphysico-ethical concept.
– Rorty’s deflationist vs. James’s more metaphysical (yet ethically
grounded) treatment of hope.
Further reading
• James, W. (1907/1975), Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old
Ways of Thinking, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
• Pihlström, S. (2005), Pragmatic Moral Realism, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
• Pihlström, S. (2008), ”The Trail of the Human Serpent Is over
Everything”: Jamesian Perspectives on Mind, World, and Religion,
Lanham, MD: UP of America.
• Peirce, C.S. (1992-98), The Essential Peirce 1-2, The Peirce Edition
Project, Bloomington: Indiana UP.
• Putnam, H. (1990), Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard UP.
• Putnam, H. (2002), The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and
Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
• Putnam, H. (2004), Ethics without Ontology, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard UP.
• Rorty, R. (1999), Philosophy and Social Hope, London: Penguin.