Transcript From Nordpolitik to the MB Doctrine: South Korean

From Nordpolitik to the MB
Doctrine: South Korean
Perspectives on China
Brian Bridges
Lingnan University
Overview of Sixty Years
• Long historical and cultural linkages between
China and Korea, but the establishment of the
Republic of Korea in 1948 and the People’s
Republic of China in 1949 created a new
relationship which was initially hostile and distant
but which has been transformed in recent years.
• This paper has two objectives: ( i ) to briefly
sketch and analyse the ups and downs of this
relationship over 60 years and ( ii ) discuss the key
elements, internal and external, which are
impacting on this relationship today.
Four Phases
1. 1949-1988
mutual suspicion and restraint
2. 1988-1994
normalization and honeymoon
3. 1994-2004
convergence and cooperation
4. 2004-present
pragmatism and caution
1948-88
Heavily dominated by Cold war politics.
The legacy of the Korean War, PRC ‘volunteers’
intervention, and the role of alliances.
Very limited contacts until 1980s, when economic
interest began to grow and sporting
events (1986 Asian Games
and then 1988 Olympics)
provided catalyst for semi-official
contacts.
1988-1994
South Korean push for normalization of relations
with PRC, achieved in 1992.
President Roh Tae Woo’s ‘nordpolitik’ – road to
Pyongyang led through Beijing and Moscow.
Economic reasons predominated for China (though
Taiwan factor also important), but political and
strategic objectives paramount for South Korea.
1994-2004
Increasingly positive relationship.
Frequent high-level exchanges, strong commercial
links (an ‘emergency exit’ from Asian financial
crisis), and Korean public opinion seemed to be
becoming more pro-China and anti-American.
South Korean expectation of constructive Chinese
role in ensuring stability on peninsula and over
North Korean nuclear crises. President Roh Moohyun’s ‘balancer’ concept exemplified this
rethinking.
2004-present
Economic links remained strong – each became a
major trading and investment partner of the other
(by 2004 China was S.Korea’s largest trading
partner and top investment destination),
but China’s Koguryo project, apparent antiKoreanism in Chinese society, growing concern
about Chinese treatment of North Korean
‘refugees’ and, above all, the spectacular rise of
Chinese economic and military power began to
worry some South Korean elites.
Koguryo controversy
dispute about historical
extent of ethnic Korean
territories in N.E.China,
added to which came
disputes over Mt Paekdu
South Korea as a ‘middle power’
South Korea is an important and
technologically-advanced economy, situated
at a strategic point in North-east Asia,
but conscious of the large and growing
population, economic and military power of
its neighbour China.
How do middle powers deal with such ‘big’
powers?
5 Variables in PRC-South
Korean relations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
South Korean domestic situation
Chinese domestic policies
Alliance with United States
North Korean factor
Role of Japan
South Korean internal situation
(I)
A political system which is still strongly
‘presidential’, so that views of presidents
impact strongly on external policies.
But democratization has opened up the system
to greater diversity of views and inputs –
not just political parties, but also media,
business circles and the public
South Korean internal situation
(II)
South Korea’s strategic priorities during the Cold
War were clear (obtaining support against North
Korean threat), but they have subsequently
become disputed.
Perceptions of China within South Korea now quite
diversified. But the ‘China threat’ argument is a
minority view, and both elite and public opinion is
broadly favourable (although Koguryo
controversy reduced that amity in opinion polls).
South Korean internal situation
(III)
While in 1990s and early 2000s most Koreans
seemed to agree on some form of engagement
with China, they differed on how to balance ties
with it and with United States:
‘conservatives’ prefer to stress the primacy of the US
alliance,
while ‘progressives’ look
for more balanced relations
with the two ‘big brothers’.
Chinese priorities (I)
3 decades of successful ‘open door’ policies have
made PRC a major economic force, strongly
committed to rapid economic development, but
more dependent on outside world economically
(for resources, markets and technology).
- in 1980s and 1990s Chinese wished to learn
from Korea
- aware of appeal of large market for Korean
business community
- but intensified Sino-Korean competition in
third markets for exports and resources
Chinese priorities (II)
China has a continuing political and strategic need
for peaceful environment to allow continued
economic development – but doctrinal shift from
Dengist ‘lay low’ to Jiang’s ‘peaceful rise’ and
now to a more proactive role, under Hu.
China sympathetic to the
‘sunshine policy’ of Kim DJ
and Roh MH, but unwilling to
put as much pressure on North
Korea – over nuclear issues
in particular – as South Korea expects.
South Korea-US relations
A latent anti-Americanism in Korean society,
which surfaces
intermittently. Generally,
a slow decline in public
support for US alliance in
2000s, but governments
continue to recognise
importance of US deterrence (even Roh MH, rather
ambivalent about US, sent troops to Iraq).
MB Doctrine
President Lee came to power advocating two
fundamental pillars to his foreign and security
policy thinking:
(1) reciprocity in relations with North (economic
benefits for de-nuclearization)
(2) revitalising the alliance
with US.
China did not feature
prominently in initial formulations.
US in the MB Doctrine
President Lee puts greater positive emphasis
on alliance with US – an approach which
the recent nuclear/missile tests have
encouraged further
– but the Obama administration
has broader perspectives than
the Bush administration on
North-east Asian affairs.
2 Concerns for Lee
Administration
( i ) Just as Kim DJ and Bush did not see eye-to-eye,
will Lee and Obama also have differing
perspectives, especially if
Bill Clinton visit to Pyongyang
leads to direct US-North Korean
negotiations ?
(ii) Could ‘Korea passing’ occur
as US and China cooperate on solutions
to settle nuclear and other Korea-related issues?
North Korea
North Korea is a difficult neighbour for both
China and South Korea.
China’s centrality in six-party talks and its
strong links with the North
make it necessary for the South
to court China.At the same time,
China is the North’s strongest ally.
Korean reconciliation?
Both the Koreas would like to sort out reunification
between themselves, but they know that China –
like other major powers – cannot be ignored.
China has acted as a conduit or catalyst for interKorean talks from time to time,
but South Koreans (and maybe
North Koreans too) worry that
China prefers two Koreas to
one Korea (or ‘stability’ to ‘reunification’).
Role of Japan
Both Koreans and Chinese have bitter memories of
past Japanese wartime actions – and their
‘nationalisms’ are frequently
‘reactive’ against Japanese
current actions or statements.
But convergence of Chinese and South Korean views
on Japan may be more apparent than real, as China
does see pragmatic reasons for working with
Japan which do not always sit well with more
emotional Korean perspectives.
South Korean Options in China
Policy
1. Bandwagoning
aligning with a threatening state to avoid
potential costs of being attacked
2. Hedging
keeping open more than one strategic
option against possibility of a future
security threat
3. Engagement
rewarding a dissatisfied power to socialise it into
accepting rules and institutions of existing
international order
4. Balancing
against a perceived potential adversary, either
internally (shifting resources to military) or
externally (cooperation with another state which
faces same potential adversary)
South Korea, currently, seems be favouring a
‘low-intensity’ version (Denny Roy’s term)
of external balancing, which implies
keeping some constructive relations with
China while also cooperating with its ally
the United States.