Transcript Slide 1

Modern Philosophy since
the Pre-Enlightenment
Presented at
Central University of Finance and
Economics
中央财经大学
Beijing
by
卜若柏
Robert Blohm
Chinese Economics and Management Academy
中国经济与管理研究院
http://www.blohm.cnc.net
June 29 & July 6, 13, 16, 20, 23, 25, & 27, 2008
2008年6月29日和7月6日和13日和16日和20日23
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日和25日和27日
Contents
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Hobbes
Descartes
Spinoza
Leibniz
Liberalism
Locke
English Analytic Empiricism vs
Continental Constructionist Idealism
Berkeley
Hume
Romanticism
Rousseau
The German Subjective Rationalist
Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism
 Kant
 19th Century: German/British
(Ir)rationalism, French Creativism
& US Pragmatism
 Hegel
 Byron
 Schopenhauer
 Nietzsche
 The Utilitarians
 Marx
 Bergson
 James
 Dewey
 20th Century Scientific Philosophy
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Hobbes
 He was an empiricist admirer of mathematical
method
 He was inspired more by Galileo than Bacon
was
 English empiricism was little influenced by
mathematics compared to the Continent and, so,
had the wrong conception of scientific method.
But not Hobbes.
 He was impatient with subtleties
 He proposed logical solutions but omitted
awkward facts.
 He was vigorous but crude
3
Hobbes (cont.d)
 His theory of the state was the most modern of
its time
 His father was an ill-tempered and uneducated
vicar who lost his job. Hobbes was raised by
his uncle
 He had a good knowledge of the classics
 He translated Greek classic poetry into Latin
 He studied scholastic philosophy & Aristotle at
Oxford
4
Hobbes (cont.d)
 He was unhappy with universities: he constantly
criticized them in his writings
 He made the grand tour as a tutor to an English
nobleman
 He became familiar with Galileo and Kepler
 After his patron died he lived in Paris where he
began to study Euclid
 He tutored his patron’s son and visited Galileo
 He wrote Leviathan. It is royalist to the extreme,
to show the evils of democracy
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 He published a translation of Thucydides to
show the evils of democracy when Parliament
drew up the Petition of Rights
 The English Civil War strengthened his opinions
 He commented on Descartes’ Meditations
before they were published, & Descartes
published the comments and his answers to the
comments
 While living in Paris, he
 was welcomed by many leading mathematicians
and men of science
 had associated with a large company of English
Royalist refugees
 taught mathematics for two years to the future King
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Charles II of England
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan’s
 rationalism offended most of the Royalist refugees
 attacks on the Catholic Church offended the French
government
 He consequently fled to England where he
 made submission to Cromwell
 abstained from all political activity
 He overestimated his capacities as a geometer
by imagining he had discovered how to square
the circle
 After the Restoration the King hung Hobbes’
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portrait on his walls
Hobbes (cont.d)
 The King forgot to pay the pension he awarded
to Hobbes
 Legislators were shocked by the favor shown to
a man suspected of atheism
 After the Plague and the Great Fire of London,
the House of Commons conducted an official
inquiry into atheistic writings, specifically
Hobbes’. He was not allowed to publish.
 He had to publish abroad Behemoth, his history
of the Long Parliament which had revolted in
civil war against the monarchy, beheading
Catholic King Charles I.
 He had a bigger reputation abroad
 At 84 years old he wrote his autobiography in
Latin verse. At 87 he published a translation 8of
Homer.
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan
 It’s materialist
 Leviathan is civil society pictured as an artificial
man composed of men
 Sovereignty embodied in Leviathan is an artificial
soul
 Pacts and covenants are the act of creation of the
Leviathan
 Life is motion of limbs. Automata have an artificial
life.
 Sensation is caused by pressure/motions of objects:
colors, sounds, etc. are not in the objects but in the
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perceiver
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 “First law of motion”: imagination is a decaying
sense/motion consisting in
 dreaming when asleep
 religions resulting from confusing dreams with waking life
 heathen creation of gods by human fear
 our God as the first mover
 prophetic content of dreams which is delusional
 Psychological determinism: the succession of our
thoughts is not arbitrary but governed by laws
 sometimes of association
 sometimes depending upon a purpose in our thinking10
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Hobbes is a nominalist: only names are universal
 because we cannot conceive of general ideas without
words, and
 because truth and falsehood are attributes of ”speech“, but
 he confuses propositions (objects) with sentences (names)
 Geometry is the one true science
 Philosophy is inclined to self-contradictory notions in
definitions, for example “incorporeal substance”
which God cannot be
 because God is not the subject of philosophy, and
 despite many philosophers’ conception of God as
corporeal
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 The error of general propositions is due to selfcontradiction
 for example free will, accidents of bread inhering in a substance that is not bread.
 Objection: this is too strong a criterion of error for ignoring
factual error which is empirical and a weaker form of error.
 He disputes Plato’s view that reason is innate:
reason is developed by effort
 Passions are motions directed toward (in desire) or
away from (in aversion) something (good when
desired, bad when being avoided). There is
 no objectivity to passions;
 no resolution to conflicts of passion between men
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Hobbes defines passions in terms of competition:
 Laughter is sudden glory
 Religion is
 fear of invisible power when religion is allowed by the legislature, or
 superstition when religion is not allowed by the legislature
 Felicity is continual progress, prospering. No happiness is
static.
 Will is the dominant passion among people in a conflict
 Despotic government is defended by an “explanatory
myth”
 In a state of nature all men are naturally equal
 Self-preservation drives men both to seek to preserve their own
liberty, and to acquire dominion over others.
 The contradiction drives a war of all against all where
 there is no justice or injustice
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 force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Despotic government is defended by an “explanatory
myth” (cont.d)
 To end the universal war, men combine in communities
subject to a central authority. Under a social contract
among themselves they choose a sovereign or sovereign
body to exercise authority over them
 A covenant
 without power of enforcement by one man or one assembly
is ineffective,
 is made by citizens with each other to obey the majority’s
choice of ruler, not between citizens and the ruling power
per Locke or Rousseau. Once a ruler is chosen, citizens
have no more power, and
 confers no right of rebellion because
 the ruler is not bound by any contract unlike the citizens,
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 rebellion usually fails and, if it succeeds, sets a bad example
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Leviathan is the multitude so united, into a mortal
God.
 Hobbes is thereby the first philosopher to express
the “holism/individualism” problem and the problem
of “social choice”: is group behavior a mere
aggregate of individual behavior (methodological
individualism) or is individual behavior determined
by the individual’s place (role) in a social structure
and group behavior something more than the
aggregation of individual behaviors (and choices as
in Condorcet’s later “paradox of voting” where the
outcome is not majority rule)?
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Hobbes solves the holism/individualism problem in
his usual rash way by simply having the group
appoint an individual to act independently in their
place without accountability or consultation,
collapsing the group into an actual individual. By
this administrative device of conferring individual
agency on a social group by having the group cede
its decision-making to the person of the arbitrarily
acting individual sovereign, Hobbes avoids explicitly
making a conceptual “levels” mistake: confusion of
an individual person’s behavior with social behavior
by a group of individuals
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Monarchy is the best form of “sovereign” or
supreme authority (conceived of as agency by an
all-powerful representative individual), who is not
limited by any legal rights of other bodies, and who
 has the right of censorship over all expression of opinion,
but will not suppress truth, for only a false doctrine can
be repugnant to peace, and
 disposes of all property because it was
 created by government
 is non-existent in a state of nature
 if despotic, is better than anarchy
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Monarchy is the best form of “sovereign” or
supreme authority (conceived of as agency by an
all-powerful representative individual) who is not
limited by any legal rights of other bodies, and who
(cont.d)
 is better than an assembly like the Grand Council of
Venice or the House of Lords (assuming no periodic
elections that could curb or accelerate sacrifice of the
public interest) which
 will follow its private interest if it conflicts with the public interest,
just as a monarch will
 will have favorites of each member, but many more in total than a
monarch
 can hear advice publicly, but only from its own members, while a
monarch can hear advice from anyone and privately
 can reflect a suddenly different majority due to a chance absence
of some members, unlike a monarch
 can be divided against itself, and result in civil war, unlike a 18
monarch.
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 The interest of the sovereign is identical with the
people’s
 He is richer if they are richer
 He is safer if they are law-abiding.
 Power cannot be shared between a King and
Parliament
 This is the antithesis of Locke’s and Montesquieu’s view
of division of powers
 Such sharing between King, Lords, and Commons
caused the English Civil War
 Rejection of Aristotle’s distinction between tyranny
and monarchy. Tyranny is just a monarchy the
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speaker dislikes.
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Democracy was conceived in Antiquity as the direct
participation of every citizen in legislation and
administration
 Succession is determined by the sovereign
 as in the Roman Empire when mutinies did not interfere, &
 who will choose one of his own children or a near relative if
he has no children.
 Liberty
 is absence of external impediments to motion
 is consistent with necessity of movement when there are
no impediments to it
 All volitions and movements have causes and are therefore
necessary
 A man is necessitated to do what God wills
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Liberty (cont.d)
 may be constrained by laws as the sovereign decides but
 of the sovereign is constrained by the laws of God, and not
by contract with his subjects.
 as praised by ancient authors
 has led men to favor tumults and seditions
 but should be interpreted as the sovereign’s liberty from foreign
domination
 St. Ambrose had no right to excommunicate Emperor
Theodosius for the massacre at Thessalonica
 The Pope should not have deposed the last of the
Merovingians in favor of Pepin.
 includes an absolute right to self-preservation even against
a monarch
 including the right to refuse to fight when called by the government
to do so
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 but not including the right of resistance in defense of another party
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Liberty (cont.d)
 Includes the right not to obey a sovereign with no power to
protect you, for example, in Hobbes’ submission to
Cromwell while Charles II was in exile.
 No political parties or trade unions are allowed
 Teachers teach only what the sovereign deems
useful
 Property rights exist only against other subjects, not
against the sovereign
 The Sovereign has the right to regulate foreign trade
 The Sovereign is not subject to civil law.
 The Sovereign’s right to punish derives from the
transfer to him of the liberty that all men had in the
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state of nature to inflict injury on one another
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Reasons for dissolving a Commonwealth
 Giving too little power to the Sovereign
 Allowing private judgment in subjects
 The theory that everything against conscience is a sin
 Belief in inspiration
 Doctrine that the sovereign is subject to civil laws
 Recognition of absolute private property
 Division of the sovereign power
 Imitation of the Greeks and Romans
 Separation of temporal and spiritual powers
 Refusing the power of taxation to the Sovereign
 Popularity of potent subjects
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 Liberty of disputing with the Sovereign
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 The duty of submission is no harder to learn than the
teachings of Christianity
 Days should be set aside for it
 Right teaching of it at universities should be supervised
 Worship should be uniformly according to the religion of the
Sovereign
 The book was intended to inspire a sovereign to
make himself absolute. This was more realistic than
Plato’s objective to make a sovereign into a
philosopher.
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 There is no universal Church because it must depend
on a civil government
 In each country the king must be head of the church.
 The Pope has no overlordship or infallibility
 A Christian subject of a non-Christian sovereign should
yield outwardly. (Like Greek philosophers who practiced
the State religion.)
 The Church of Rome vainly places the spiritual power
above the temporal. That’s vain philosophy.
Aristotle represents vain philosophy.
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Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Central dogma: sovereign absolutism
 developed in the Renaissance and the Reformation
 Feudal nobility were reduced in stature by strong monarchs in
France, England and Spain
 The Reformation increased the power
 of the state over the Church in England until the Puritans, but
 in France, of the Protestant churches who had grown at the
monarch’s expense
 of the monarchy over the Assembly in Spain.
 is justified by the opposite danger: anarchy
 Governments need fear of rebellion to limit the tendency of
government to tyranny
 Governments try to make themselves irremovable
 Officials try to enrich themselves
 Governments try to suppress every new doctrine or discovery that
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menaces their power
 Governments run the opposite risk, of ossification and injustice.
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Leviathan (cont.d)
 Central dogma: sovereign absolutism (cont.d)
 is offset by the doctrine of just division of powers, checks
and balances (subsequently proposed by Liberal
philosophers to avoid the two extremes of anarchy or
despotism)
 in England between King and Parliament
 in the US, among the President, Congress and the Supreme Court.
 Russell expected government to become more centralized and
powerful after WWII
 He was superior to predecessors by
 being free from superstition and the Bible
 being clear and logical
 being, after Machiavelli, the first modern writer on
political theory
 by making errors because of oversimplification, not
27
because of unreal or fantastic assumptions
Hobbes (cont.d)
 Two wrong assumptions. Exclusively
concentrates on national interest by assuming
that:
 the major interests of all citizens are the same & identical to the monarch’s--true only in wartime--, & by
 unlike Marx, ignoring internal class conflict as a generator
of social change, and by
 overlooking that power sharing may be the only way to
avert civil war, like the US Civil War between the industrial
North and the no-wage agrarian South
• the relation between states is international anarchy: a
state of nature, of war and conquest, war of all
against all, where
 improving the fighting ability of states leads to universal
destruction and, so, where
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 only inefficiency can improve the human race
Descartes
 was the first high-capacity philosopher
profoundly affected by the new physics and the
new astronomy
 used a scholastic reasoning style but not
scholastic foundations
 constructs a complete philosophical edifice de
novo
 reflects the new self-confidence resulting from
the progress of science
 was unlike all previous philosophers who were
teachers of prior wisdom, not discoverers and
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explorers.
Descartes (cont.d)
 was son of a counselor of the Parliament of
Brittany with a moderate amount of landed
property
 was educated by the Jesuits, who gave a better
grounding in mathematics than you could get at
most universities
30
Descartes (cont.d)
 contemplated geometry in Paris, then for more
quiet, joined the army of Holland at peace at the
time, subsequently the Bavarian army where he
meditated in an oven and emerged with his
philosophy half finished: “half baked”. Returned
to Paris but, to escape the distraction by friends,
joined the army seige of the Protestant
Hugenots. Then moved to Holland possibly to
escape persecution. Holland was the only 17th
century country with freedom of speculation




Hobbes published his books there
Locke took refuge there
Bayle and Spinoza lived there, but
Descartes was nearly persecuted by Protestants31
claiming that his views led to atheism.
Descartes (cont.d)
 was timid and a practicing Catholic
 but shared Galileo’s heresies and, so
 declined to publish Le Monde containing two
heretical doctrines:
 earth’s rotation
 infinity of the universe
 associated with Jesuits whom he sought to
convince to persuade the Church to be less
hostile to modern science
 corresponded with the Swedish Queen who
commissioned him to give her lessons at 5 AM,
32
and died from cold 5 months later
Descartes (cont.d)
 worked short hours and read little. Great
concentration during short periods.
 in Principia philosphiae, formulated his scientific
theories. There he
 invented coordinate geometry (positioning a point in
a plane by reference to its distance from two fixed
lines), and thereby
 practiced the analytic method of reasoning:
supposing the problem solved, you examine what
are the consequences.
 in Essaies philosophiques, dealt with optics as
well as geometry
33
Descartes (cont.d)
 in De la formation du foetus
 welcomed Harvey’s discovery of blood circulation
 hoped to make a medical discovery
 regarded animal and human bodies as machines
(ignoring growth)
 Animals are automata governed entirely by laws of
physics devoid of consciousness and feelings
 Men have a soul in the pineal gland where it comes into
contact with the “vital spirits” and thereby soul and body
interact
 Total quantity of motion is constant
 so the soul can’t affect it, only the direction of the motion of the
vital spirits and hence of other parts of the body
 but this doctrine was abandoned by his school, including
Malebranche and Spinoza
 Since physicists discovered the conservation of momentum
(not motion) whereby motion in any given direction is
constant wherein change in motion is met by a counter
34
change (action = reaction)
Descartes (cont.d)
 in De la formation du foetus (cont.d)
 regarded animal and human bodies as machines
(ignoring growth) cont.d
 Total quantity of motion is constant (cont.d)
 but this doctrine was abandoned by his school, including
Malebranche and Spinoza (cont.d)
 The Cartesian school assumes all physical action is of the
nature of impact, with dynamical laws
--sufficient to determine the motions of matter, and therefore
--leaving no room for the influence of mind
 Problem: how does a mental phenomenon (my will) affect a
physical phenomenon?
 Guelincx’s (Descartes’ student’s) theory of the “two clocks”:
one points; the other chimes. One does not cause the other:
God keeps both coordinated by means of a “dictionary” of
correspondences so that
--on occasion of your volition, purely physical laws cause
your arm to move, but
--your will has not really acted on your body
--This is called a Deus ex machina solution, by invoking
divine intervention to cross an apparently unbridgeable gap,
also used by Berkeley to explain conformity of the world35as
mental impressions with physical laws
Descartes (cont.d)
 in De la formation du foetus (cont.d)
 regarded animal and human bodies as machines
(ignoring growth) cont.d
 Total quantity of motion is constant (cont.d)
 Problem: how does a mental phenomenon (my will) affect a
physical phenomenon? (cont.d)
 Guelincx’s (Descartes’ student’s) theory of the “two clocks”:
one points; the other chimes. One does not cause the other:
God keeps both coordinated by means of a “dictionary” of
correspondences so that (cont.d)
--New Problem: the mental series is as deterministic as the
physical series, by “translation” of the physical series
through the “dictionary” of correspondences. So, how to
reconcile with free will and punishment for sin?
--Advantages
----It made the soul independent of the body
36
----Two substances, mind and matter, did not interact.
Descartes (cont.d)
 in De la formation du foetus (cont.d)
 regarded animal and human bodies as machines
(ignoring growth) cont.d
 He accepted the first law of motion (inertia): constant
velocity in a straight line, but the soul could change it as
in a body’s momentum exchange with another, and
 He adopted reductionist mechanicism: he ignored
emergence and levels of physical reality, reduced
chemistry and biology to physics, and so rejected
 action at a distance
 all interaction not of the nature of an impact
 So only one of Aristotle’s three souls is needed and exists,
the rational soul, in man
37
Descartes (cont.d)
 developed a theory of the physical movement of
the world: a vortex in a plenum around the sun
carries the planets
 This does not explain elliptical orbits
 This became the generally accepted theory in
France only gradually ousted by Newton’s Principia
philosophiae . Newton’s Principia’s first edition said
 the vortex theory leads to atheism, while
 Newton’s requires God to set the planets in motion in a
direction not towards the sun
.
38
Descartes (cont.d)
 in the Discourse on Method and the Meditations
which overlap, originated the method of
“Cartesian doubt”
 He regulates his conduct by certain rules to resolve
doubts about practice
 He is sceptical regarding the senses
 Components of things in dreams represent real things
 It’s their combination that’s fanciful
 So, general features of physical nature, such as extension,
magnitude, and number are less easy to question than particular
configurations of things.
 Accordingly, arithmetic and geometry, not concerned with
particular things
 are more certain than physics and astronomy
 are true even of dream objects (20th century abstract art
violates this constraint on dreams)
 but are nevertheless subject to persistent calculation or 39
procedural error, perhaps prompted/led by an evil demon.
Descartes (cont.d)
 in the Discourse on Method and the Meditations
which overlap, originated the method of
“Cartesian doubt” (cont.d)
 An evil demon could not deceive me if I didn’t exist. So
 I may have no body and this may be an illusion but
 Thought is different
 So, the I who wants to think everything false, must exist
 “I think, therefore I am” (the cogito) is so solid as to serve
as a first principle of philosophy
 Originally advanced by St. Augustine, who didn’t give it
prominence.
 Descartes discovered its importance
 Should be “there are thoughts”. “I” is unwarranted according to
Russell.
 It describes no datum
 There is no basis, besides grammar, for thoughts to need a
thinker.
40
Descartes (cont.d)
 raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to
the status of metaphysics.
 Mind became more certain than matter
 My mind became more certain than others’ minds
 This prompted subjectivism insofar as matter
became knowable by inference from what is known
of mind.
 Triumphantly in Continental idealism
 Regretfully in British empiricism
 Instrumentalism is a 20th century attempt to escape
subjectivism
 Modern philosophy has accepted Descartes’
formulation of its problems, while not accepting his
41
solutions.
Descartes (cont.d)
 raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to
the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)
 Rebuilt the edifice of knowledge
 I am a substance whose whole nature, or soul, consists in
thinking and who needs no place or material thing for its
existence. So
 The soul is
 Wholly distinct from the body
 Easier to know than the body, &
 Would still be what it is if there were no body
 The cogito is so evident because it is clear and distinct
 All things conceived clearly and distinctly are true
 Knowledge of external things must be by the mind, not
the senses because knowledge of the senses is confused




A piece of wax loses its sensible qualities when melted
The wax is therefore a thing not sensible since it is
Involved in all the appearances but is
Perceived by a judgmental “inspection by the mind” from what
42 I
thought I saw with my eyes.
Descartes (cont.d)
 raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to
the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)
 Rebuilt the edifice of knowledge (cont.d)
 By the “cogito” only my own existence follows with
certainty from my seeing the wax
 Ideas are not “like” outside things
 Three kinds
 Innate
 Foreign and from without
 Invented by me, possibly involuntarily as in dreams
--supposed to be like outside objects because
--come independently of the will (but so do dreams, so
inconclusive), and
--through them the foreign thing imprints its likeness on me
 “Taught by nature” means
 Being inclined to believe what could be false
 Not seeing by a natural light
 Of two different ideas of the same external object
 The one which comes directly from experience must be the
43
less likely of the two
 Both cannot be true
Descartes
(cont.d)
 raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to
the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)
 “Deus ex machina” existence proof: scepticism of
the existence of the external world is countered by
scholastic proofs of God’s existence (best stated by
Leibniz)
 “Deus ex machina” proof of “correspondence” of the
external world with perception: Once God’s existence is
proved, then
 We know he is good and will therefore not act like a deceitful
demon
 Bodies exist, since I have such a strong inclination to believe in
bodies, and God would be deceitful if there were none.
 I have a God-given ability to correct errors, by applying the
principle that what is clear and distinct is true
 Therefore I can know mathematics and physics, by the mind
alone, not jointly with the body
 Further construction is by unsubstantiated scholastic maxims of
Plato, St. Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, such as that no effect
44
can have more perfection than its cause. Not self-evident.
Descartes (cont.d)
 raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to
the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)
 Important results
 For logical and empirical knowledge you need
 Indubitable facts
 Descartes’ own thoughts
 Regarding thoughts rather than external objects, as the prime
empirical certainty, had a profound effect on subsequent
philosophy.
 Indubitable principles of inference
 Brought to near completion the dualism of mind and
matter which
 Began with Plato and
 Was developed by Christian philosophy for mainly religious
reasons
 Introduced “parallelism” versus “interactionism”, a new
conception that the mind does not move the body and the
 Possibility that the body does not move the mind
45
Descartes (cont.d)
 raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to
the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)
 Important results (cont.d)
 Coordination of body and mind as two synchronous
clocks created a religious drawback
 “mechanicist” reversal of Aristotle’s teleological “organicism”
 Rather than inanimate matter being guided by a soul or
purpose
 Organisms were machines the movement of whose parts
were governed by mechanical laws. So, no soul was needed
to explain the growth of organisms otherwise ignored, and
still not explained, by Descartes.
46
Descartes (cont.d)
 raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to
the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)
 Important results (cont.d)
 Coordination of body and mind as two synchronous
clocks created a religious drawback (cont.d)
 One exception was later dropped for violating the laws of
mechanics: the human soul could alter the direction though not
the quantity of motion of the vital spirits
 Which was contrary to conservation of momentum
 Rejecting the exception was detrimental to the concept of
free will already weakened by the parallelism of mental
events with movements of matter as determined by physical
laws.
 Simplified in the 18th century to a consistent materialism of
human not just animal automata.
47
Descartes (cont.d)
 raised epistemology (theory of knowledge) to
the status of metaphysics. (cont.d)
 Important results (cont.d)
 Descartes’ inconsistencies are a product of the encounter
of contemporary science with the scholasticism taught to
him by the Jesuits.
 Consistency would have made him founder of a new
Scholasticism
 Inconsistency made him the source of two important but
divergent schools of philosophy: idealism and materialism.
48
Spinoza
 was the noblest & most lovable of the great
philosophers. Ethically supreme
 was considered wicked for a century
 was excommunicated by the Jews. He was
considered atheistic by orthodox Jews
 was from a family that fled from Spain or
Portugal to Holland to escape the Inquisition
 received a Jewish education
 was offered money to conceal his doubts & was
the object of an assassination attempt
 had a rare indifference to money. He polished
lenses for a living in Amsterdam
49
Spinoza (cont.d)
 sided in a political dispute against the ruling
House of Orange
 wrote the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and
the Tractatus Politicus
• a combination of biblical criticism and political
theory
• in which he correctly assigns much later dates to
Old Testament books than those assigned by
tradition, and
• in which he does scriptural interpretation compatible
with a liberal theology
50
Spinoza (cont.d)
 In the Tractatus Politicus
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
the political theory is mainly derived from Hobbes
there is no right or wrong in a state of nature
the sovereign can do no wrong
the Church should be subordinate to the State
he opposes all rebellion, even against bad
government
the English civil war is seen as evidence of harm
resulting from resistance to authority
unlike Hobbes, he thinks democracy is the “most
natural” form of government
unlike Hobbes, he thinks subjects should not
sacrifice all their rights to the sovereign
gives importance to freedom of opinion, but says
religious questions should be decided not by the
Church but by the State which was much more 51
tolerant than the Church in Holland.
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote a treatise on the rainbow
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death
• in the axiomatic format of Euclid’s geometry
 wherein the propositions are enough to read and
 the proofs (of the unprovable) may be ignored, and which
 reflected the logical & ethical duty to implement the
demonstrability of all truth
52
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• in the axiomatic format of Euclid’s geometry (cont.d)
 as a “unified theory”, which is a truth/category mistake of
assuming that logic expresses all interconnection in the
universe thereby discoverable by reason alone, while
• physical laws need observation to be discoverable
• all physical laws are not axiomatically combinable/derivable in a
single theory, because
 physical theories are partial pictures
 not logically contradictory, but not logically interderivable either
 they may be structurally similar by correspondence-principle
dictionaries between their terms
 they usually involve “primitive” (undefined) concepts not
 found in or derived from another theory
 this is the first attempt in philosophy to derive value from
fact
53
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein, in his metaphysics
 he modified Descartes, as Plotinus modified Plato
• Descartes was not burdened by moral earnestness
• Descartes’ proofs could have just as easily been used to support
skeptics, as Carneades had used Plato
• Spinoza accepted Cartesian materialistic and deterministic physics,
but
• Spinoza sought to find room for reverence and a life devoted to the
good
 as in Parmenides’ metaphysics
• there is only one substance, God or Nature: nothing finite is selfsubsistent
• unlike Descartes’ 3 substances: God, mind and matter,
 although God was the most substantial because of creating
the other two
 but mind and matter were
 --independent apart from God’s omnipotence in deciding their
 existence, and
54
 --characterized by thought and extension
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein, in his metaphysics (cont.d)
 thought and extension are attributes of God who has an
infinite number of attributes unknown to us
 individual souls and pieces of matter are “adjectival”: not
things but merely aspects of the divine being
 immortality is not personal (Christian), but consists in
becoming one with God
 determination is negation: determination of finite things is
by boundaries, physical and logical, separating them from
what they are not
 Pantheism prevails: only one being is wholly positive, so
must be absolutely infinite & omnipresent
55
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein, in his metaphysics (cont.d)
 accordingly everything is ruled by an absolute logical
necessity
•
•
•
•
there is no free will in the mental sphere
there is no chance in the physical world
all events are a manifestation of God’s inscrutable nature
there is only one possible world, contrary to Leibniz’s many
possible
• a mystical concept of evil is proposed: evil is in the eye of the finite
beholder. It is not evil in the wider context of the whole
56
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will
 like Hobbes’
 the human mind has adequate knowledge of the eternal
and infinite essence of God
 passions distract us and obscure our intellectual vision of
the whole, which (I add) is “rationalization”, “explanation”
 everything, in itself, endeavors to self-preservation—the
fundamental motive of the passions—whence love, hate
and strife.
• If the object of our hate is destroyed, we feel pleasure
• We try to prevent someone from possessing something that
cannot be enjoyed by more than one person
57
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 hate is increased when reciprocated, but can be destroyed
by love. This is the Jewish custom of giving kindness in
return for a bad deed (unlike the Christian custom of turning
the other cheek to receive another bad deed)
 enlightened self-preservation realizes that what is real and
positive in us is
• what unites us to the whole, not
• what preserves the appearance of separateness
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding”
• we are in bondage to the extent that what happens to us is due to
outside causes
• we are free to the extent we are self-determined
58
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding” (cont.d)
• as Plato and Socrates hold, all wrong action is due to intellectual
error. If you adequately understand your own circumstances, you
 will act wisely
 will be happy in the face of what is apparent misfortune
• no virtue is prior to self-preservation; so there is no appeal to
unselfishness
• a wise man will perceive his self-interest differently than an ordinary
egoist. For example appreciating the value of reputation:
trustworthiness versus one-time cheating in a market
• the mind’s highest good is knowledge of God
• emotions are passions when they spring from inadequate ideas
59
• men living in obedience to reason will agree together
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding” (cont.d)
• pleasure in itself is good
 but hope and fear are bad, and humility and repentance are bad
 repentance for an action is doubly bad (like the Stoics)
• time is unreal (not in the present) and reason is indifferent to it
 so emotions about a future or past event are contrary to reason
 so are emotions attached exclusively to the present even if
embedded in a belief in progress.
• a wise man tries to see the world as God sees it, sub specie
aeternitatis, under the aspect of eternity
 so there is no need to prioritize the avoidable future
 --because it is not really avoidable
 --whence the futility & evil of hope & fear, which reflect lack of
 wisdom
 knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge
 --God has no such knowledge
 --Evil appears as such because of regarding parts of the 60
 universe as if self-subsistent.
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding” (cont.d)
• men can thus be liberated from the tyranny of death
• a free man thinks nothing of death
• Spinoza practiced the doctrines he preached, always courteous and
reasonable in controversies, never in the anger that he condemned
• what is within (a person) is good; only what comes from without is
bad
• what is bad for us
 is not within ourselves
 does not have man as its efficient cause, but
 comes from without, and
 cannot therefore happen to the universe as a whole which is
not subject to external causes
• we follow the order of universal nature of which we are a part 61
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding” (cont.d)
• we have a clear and distinct understanding of our part/place in
universal nature. The better part of us will therefore acquiesce in
what befalls us & we will endeavor to persist (self-preserve) but,
 if man is unwillingly part of the larger whole, he is in bondage
 if he has grasped the sole reality of the whole, he is free. His
knowledge is (motivational & preparatory) power (in Francis
Bacon’s words)
62
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding” (cont.d)
• unlike for the Stoics, all emotions are not bad, namely those that are
not passions
 In passions we are in the power of outside forces
 Passion ceases once we
 --form a clear & distinct idea of the emotion &
 --understand that all things are necessary
 --ultimately achieve “intellectual love of God” which is wisdom,
 a union of thought & emotion, which is
 ----true thought, plus
 ----joy (superior to pleasure) in the apprehension of truth, in

true thought, and
 ----nothing negative, & therefore truly part of the whole, unlike

knowledge that is apparently bad because fragmented
 --achieve intellectual love by the mind towards God that is63
 part of the infinite love by God of himself.
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding” (cont.d)
• love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind
 because it is associated with all the modifications of the body, &
 because a mental image referred to more objects is more
frequent or more often vivid, &
 because every increase in understanding what happens to us
consists in referring events to the idea of God
 --That referral is love of God
 --When applied to all objects, the idea of God fully occupies
 the mind
 but not for moral reasons but because of how we acquire
understanding
64
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding” (cont.d)
• no one can hate God, but no one can expect God to reciprocate love
This is a logically necessary conclusion, not an ethical precept.
 Goethe called this self-resignation, but
 it is really a logical consequence of Spinoza’s metaphysics.
Spinoza said “can” expect not “ought” to expect
 --because God would be less of a God & that would cause
 pain to the person, and to want his own pain is absurd, and
 --God has
 ----no passions, pleasures or pains, and therefore
 ----loves or hates no one
• the great remedy against emotion is
 clear and distinct ideas of their relation to external causes
 the resulting love towards a thing immutable and eternal doesn’t
65
have the turbulent & disquieting character of love for an object
that is transient and changeable.
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein in the psychology of passions and the will(cont.d)
 in the two last chapters “Of human bondage” and “Of the
power of the understanding” (cont.d)
• something in the human mind is eternal: it is the essence of the
person as an idea in God where it is expressed under the form of
eternity, the person’s impact on life.
• the wise man
 is scarcely disturbed in spirit
 by a certain eternal necessity never ceases to be wise, through
consciousness of himself, of things, & of God, whereby he
always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit
 follows along a difficult path whereby all excellent things are
necessarily difficult and therefore rare
66
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of
his metaphysics
 which is logical monism: the world as a single substance
whose parts are logically incapable of existing alone
• a symptom since Parmenides of conferring on the world the subjectpredicate structure of sentences, whereby the subject is a single
Aristotelian substance in which qualities inhere and that neither
science nor philosophy now accepts
 suggesting that relations and plurality are illusory
 making resignation to events easy if they are logically deduced
from self-evident axioms
• but in which it is futile to try to deduce facts from reasoning alone
without observation. We use empirically supported laws to derive the
67
future.
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of
his metaphysics (cont.d)
 while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits
of human power
• and supposes these limits are narrower than they are, but the
maxims are probably the best possible
 criticizes as slavery the fear of unavoidable death in general,
while
 supporting averting any particular disease
 --but calmly, not in fear of death itself
 --while our thoughts are directed to other matters
68
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of
his metaphysics (cont.d)
 while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits
of human power (cont.d)
• counsels
 consoling others in their misfortunes who should
 --not be withdrawn in their sorrow, but
 --see the misfortune in relation to its causes
 --see the misfortune as part of the whole order of nature, and
 thus “taking things ‘philosophically’”, & even
 --avoid primitive reaction such as revenge
 --that allows a man to judge his own case (action which Locke
 avoids through civil society) and that would
 ----usually prompt him to inflict more punishment than is

desirable (whereas the punishment should suit the crime),
69

and
 ----so narrow his outlook as to preclude any kind of wisdom
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of
his metaphysics (cont.d)
 while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits
of human power (cont.d)
• counsels (cont.d)
 consoling others in their misfortunes who should (cont.d)
 --overcome/destroy/transform hatred by love, not increase
 hatred by reciprocating it, because
 ----love can be stronger than the hatred that preceded it and
 ----surprise at not being punished may have a reforming

effect
 ----but, as Russell says, most wicked people will mistrust

your conciliatory action, so it won’t reduce their power
 not the Christian practice of ardent love even toward the worst
of men
70
 not the Stoic practice of indifference to others’ suffering
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of
his metaphysics (cont.d)
 while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits
of human power (cont.d)
• belief in the ultimate goodness of the universe prompts you to see
your own misfortunes “in perspective”, as part of all the other
misfortunes to all the other people in the universe which have been
passing episodes in a movement to ultimate harmony. So
 events should be evaluated for what they are and not diluted.
Each act of cruelty is eternally a part of the universe. Nothing
that happened later or before should make the act better.
 --Can bad create conditions for the emergence of a greater
 good?
 --This shouldn’t be by design but only as a byproduct.
 ----The end does not justify the means.
 ----Kant’s maxim enjoins treating a person as an end in

himself or herself
 ----The end can only “compensate” for the means, ex post71

(by accident), not ex ante (by design)
Spinoza (cont.d)
 He wrote Ethics, published after his death(cont.d)
• wherein his ethics (his innovation) are independent of
his metaphysics (cont.d)
 while his ethics consists of how to live nobly within the limits
of human power (cont.d)
• belief in the ultimate goodness of the universe prompts you to see
your own misfortunes “in perspective”, as part of all the other
misfortunes to all the other people in the universe which have been
passing episodes in a movement to ultimate harmony. So (cont.d)
 Focusing on matters beyond your own grief may be a good way
of enduring something worse than the ordinary lot of mankind
 --and realizing that human life is an infinitesimal part of the
 life of the universe
 --and thereby keeping sanity or avoiding the paralysis of utter
 despair.
72
Leibniz
 was industrious, frugal, temperate, financially
honest
 was destitute of Spinoza’s philosophical virtues
• published to win the support of princes and
princesses
• left his best results unpublished
• therefore created 2 systems
 one optimistic, orthodox, fantastic, shallow
• “The best of all possible worlds”, to which F.H. Bradley added: “&
everything in it is a necessary evil”
• He is Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss
 the other profound, coherent, Spinozistic and logical
73
Leibniz (cont.d)
 was destitute of Spinoza’s philosophical virtues(cont.d)
• was a dull writer who made German philosophy
pedantic and arid. His disciple Christian Wolf
dominated German universities until Kant. Wolf’s
textbook was used in Quebec’s colleges, all
Catholic, until the 1950s.
• had little influence outside Germany
 Locke governed British philosophy
 Descartes dominated in France until Voltaire made British empiricism
fashionable
 born in Leipzig
 was son of a professor of moral philosophy
74
Leibniz (cont.d)
 refused a professorship and served the
Archbishop of Mainz who was fearful of Louis
XIV. So
• For 4 years Leibniz lived in Paris to try persuading
Louis XIV to invade Egypt instead of Germany
 Paris was the philosophical & mathematical capital of the
world
 Leibniz invented the infinitesimal calculus there,
published 3 years before Newton’s
• Louis XIV said war against infidels was out of
fashion
 abandoned the “trivial schools” of scholasticism,
including the Aristotelianism he was taught 75
Leibniz (cont.d)
 visited Spinoza with whom he spent a month in
frequent discussions & from whom he received
parts of the Ethics. Later he joined in decrying
Spinoza when that became popular.
 left Paris to serve the House of Hanover as
librarian, but was not brought by George I to
England when he became king, because
Leibniz made England unfriendly to himself
when he quarreled with Newton.
 wrote Monadology, Principles of Nature &
Grace, & Théodicée (the basis for his
76
theological optimism)
Leibniz (cont.d)
 like Descartes and Spinoza, based philosophy
on the notion of substance
• They differed on the relation between mind and
matter & on the number of substances: Descartes
had 3 (God, mind, matter), Spinoza had one (God
alone)
77
Leibniz (cont.d)
 like Descartes and Spinoza, based philosophy
on the notion of substance (cont.d)
• He claimed extension alone cannot be an attribute
of a substance, contrary to Descartes (for whom
extension was the essence of matter) & Spinoza
(for whom extension & thought were the essence of
God)
 Extension involved plurality and could therefore belong
only to an aggregate of substances
 Each single substance must be unextended (like the
infinitesimally small intervals in an integral in the
infinitesimal calculus)
 Accordingly, there is an infinity of substances, called
“monads”
 Each monad is a soul, which is the only possible
78
remaining attribute of a substance because extension is
rejected as such an attribute.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 like Descartes and Spinoza, based philosophy
on the notion of substance (cont.d)
• Accordingly he denied the reality of matter in favor
of an infinite family of souls (monads)
• He retained from Descartes’ followers the noninteraction but coordination of different substances:
no 2 monads can have a causal relation to each
another: they are thus called “windowless”
• There is a pre-established harmony
 between the change in different monads, as in Descartes’
two clocks, &
 the harmony evidences God’s existence
79
Leibniz (cont.d)
 specified a hierarchy of monads. The monads
composing the human body
• are each immortal souls
• dominated by the monad consisting of the
mind/soul of man
• for whose sake the changes/movements in/of a
human body happen.
80
Leibniz (cont.d)
 made a “monad” the mathematical “dual” of a
property (attribute)
• A property is a class of objects which are the
“extension” of the term denoting a property
A = {a,d,q} , where A is an attribute & a,d,q are the
objects having that attribute
F = {a,g,p} , where F is an attribute & a,g,p are the
objects having that attribute
R = {a,e,n} , where R is an attribute & a,e,n are the
objects having that attribute
• A monad (an object) is a class a of properties
something has
a = {A,F,R} , where A,F,R are the attributes of
81
object a
Leibniz (cont.d)
 made a “monad” the mathematical “dual” of a
property (attribute)
• Physical laws represent relations between attributes.
• Accordingly each monad represents a world
governed by scientific laws. The worlds are
coordinated (under identical laws) by divine
intervention.
82
Leibniz (cont.d)
 declared space as it appears or is depicted is
not real but has a real counterpart, namely
• the arrangement of the monads in a 3-dimensional
order which specifies a unique position from which
each monad mirrors the world
• the peculiar perspective of the world as seen by the
monad is the monad’s spatial position.
• accordingly there is no vacuum: each possible point
of view is filled by a monad, and
• (Identity of Indiscernables:) no two monads can be
exactly alike. None can have exactly all the same
properties, all measured to infinite precision. The
properties will deviate at some degree of precision
measurement, if not because of errors/deviations in
the measurement process itself or the thing being83
measured.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 was the first to use the logic of “implication”
(premise implies conclusion) to allow more free
will than Spinoza did.
• Principle of “sufficient” (vs “necessary”) reason:
“Reasons incline without necessitating.”
s1
s2
s3
sufficient
conditions
reasons
objectives
 a n , where “” is logical implication
action
necessary
condition
ability
 To take an action, a , I don’t need any one particular
reason sn , among the many, s1,s2,s3 , that may bring
about that action.
84
Leibniz (cont.d)
 was the first to use the logic of “implication”
(premise implies conclusion) to allow more free
will than Spinoza did. (cont.d)
• Principle of “sufficient” (vs “necessary”) reason:
“Reasons incline without necessitating.” (cont.d)
 I am only inclined to take that action, a, if I have a choice
of “which one” among several reasons s1,s2,s3 and that
choice is arbitrary or only possible. In other words, I am
not forced by logical necessity to make that choice,
 as Marx would later claim we are, for example, by economic
class (by transformation from the “logical” necessity of Hegel into
the “factual” necessity of empirical law, but derived by logic & not
subject to testable scientific procedure).
 In other words, Marx’s “laws” may serve as logical “axioms”
 not subject to disciplined scientific test,
 but instead to instrumentalist test in the practice of successful
revolution & social transformation, proof “in practice”, in vivo,
85
rather than under scientifically controlled conditions.
Leibniz
(cont.d)
 was the first to use the logic of “implication”
(premise implies conclusion) to allow more free
will than Spinoza did. (cont.d)
• attributed the same kind of freedom to God’s actions
 God acts for the best
 but by choice among sufficient actions
• not by logical necessity
• but not contrary to logic either (in agreement with Thomas
Aquinas)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun
by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the
scholastics, including the ontological argument
revived by Descartes
• God’s existence (at the end of a chain of reasoning)
solved puzzles that prevent understanding the 86
universe
Leibniz (cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun
by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the
scholastics, including the ontological argument
revived by Descartes (cont.d)
• The ontological argument: Only of God does
essence imply existence
 [Leibniz’s innovation: the need first to examine a concept
for consistency] But the idea of God needs to be proved
“possible”, thus:
 No two perfections are incompatible, perfection defined as “a
simple positive and absolute quality expressing without any limits”
 So a subject of all perfections can be conceived.
 Kant correctly countered that existence is not a quality87
Leibniz
(cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun
by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the
scholastics, including the ontological argument
revived by Descartes (cont.d)
• The ontological argument: Only of God does
essence imply existence (cont.d)
 But the “existence” Leibniz proves in the context of his
philosophy is more like mathematical existence: not
existence as a property, but existence in virtue of
 the definition of most perfect as something having all perfections
and
 the modal logic definition of “best possible” as “existence” or
“actuality”, since truth (which here is mathematical, normally
tautological not physical)
 is neither a quality nor “membership in a set”,
 but a quality of qualities, as
88
 --truth is a quality of a proposition, and
Leibniz (cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun
by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the
scholastics, including the ontological argument
revived by Descartes (cont.d)
• The ontological argument: Only of God does
essence imply existence (cont.d)
 But the “existence” Leibniz proves in the context of his
philosophy is more like mathematical existence: not
existence as a property, but existence in virtue of (cont.)
 the modal logic definition of “best possible” as “existence” or
“actuality”, since truth (which here is mathematical, normally
tautological not physical) cont.d
 but a quality of qualities, as (cont.d)
 --“membership” itself is a not a “defining” quality of
 (members of) a set; in other words a set is not
 allowed to be a “member” of itself, with
 {{…}} = {…} = A  A considered to be perverse
 notation not allowed by Russell’s Paradox.
89
Leibniz (cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun
by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the
scholastics, including the ontological argument
revived by Descartes (cont.d)
• The cosmological argument: argument of “first cause”
derived from Aristotle’s “unmoved mover”. It says
the series of causes must be uncaused.
 Objection: the series of proper fractions has no first term
 Leibniz’s improved version:
• Everything is “contingent”: its non-existence is logically possible.
So everything must have a “sufficient reason”
• The sufficient reason for the universe must therefore be outside
the universe and that is God.
 Only necessary propositions follow from the laws of logic while
all propositions asserting existence are contingent except90for
the one asserting existence of God which is “necessary” (a
necessary condition) in order for the universe to exist.
Leibniz
(cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by
Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics,
including the ontological argument revived by
Descartes (cont.d)
• The cosmological argument: argument of “first cause”
derived from Aristotle’s “unmoved mover”. It says the
series of causes must be uncaused. (cont.d)
 Leibniz’s improved version: (cont.d)
• The sufficient reason for the universe must therefore be outside the
universe and that is God. (cont.d)
 Kant claimed this depends on the ontological argument: a
“necessary being” is one whose essence involves existence
 --but now, according to Leibniz, because the
 universe’s existence depends on God’s existence,
 not because God’s perfection requires his existence.
 --But, in the concept of a being necessary even in
 that sense, essence is still involving existence &
 that is what enables us to determine the essence
 independently of experience
91
 --So, Leibniz’s “improvement” to the cosmological
 argument may be somewhat deceptive.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by
Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics,
including the ontological argument revived by
Descartes (cont.d)
• The argument from eternal truths.
 Statements about essence are always true or never true,
unlike statements about existence.
 Eternal truth must be part of the content of an eternal mind.
This is like Plato’s deduction of immortality from the eternity
of ideas.
 For Leibniz
• the reason for the whole contingent world can’t be contingent &
92
must be sought among eternal truths.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun
by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the
scholastics, including the ontological argument
revived by Descartes (cont.d)
• The argument from eternal truths. (cont.d)
 For Leibniz (cont.d)
• But a reason for what exists must itself exist; so, eternal truths
must “exist” and can exist only as thoughts in the mind of God.
Objection:
 This is a category mistake of confusing a state of affairs with
an object whose existence is inclusion in a set defining
(extension of) the state/property. “Existence” of a state of
affairs could be defined only as non-emptiness of that set.
93
Leibniz (cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun
by Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the
scholastics, including the ontological argument
revived by Descartes (cont.d)
• The argument from eternal truths. (cont.d)
 For Leibniz (cont.d)
• But a reason for what exists must itself exist; so, eternal truths
must “exist” and can exist only as thoughts in the mind of God.
Objection: (cont.d)
 However it is not a category mistake in the “dual” logic of
monadology, where existence of a state/property is the
state’s/property’s inclusion in a class of properties defining an
object.
 But there is no practical such formal “dual” logic.
94
 This is just another form of cosmological argument.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 finalized into their best logical form the
metaphysical proofs of God’s existence begun by
Plato & Aristotle & formalized by the scholastics,
including the ontological argument revived by
Descartes (cont.d)
• Argument from pre-established harmony
 assumes the monadology and concludes that
 the coordination between the multitude of monad “models”
of the universe without causal interaction is due to a simple
outside cause.
 Effectively it’s the argument from design: lawfulness of the
universe is hard to explain as a product of blind natural
forces
 Russell finds no logical defect in this argument because it
doesn’t specify metaphysical attributes of God.
95
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed the doctrine of many possible worlds
• “possible”, meaning not contradicting the laws of
logic
• while possible worlds are infinite in number
 all were contemplated by God before creating the actual
one
 Spinozistic: the one chosen as the best was chosen for
having the greatest excess of good over evil, a world with
less evil being not as good because
• Some great goods depend logically on some evils. Some pains
(thirst) are considered worth enduring for the pleasure of their
relief.
• Evil makes good possible.
 It would be logically impossible for God to bestow free will
while decreeing there should be no sin.
 Objection: reverse argument is as conceivable. A Manichean
96
god of evil could have created the worst of all possible worlds
& allowed free will & good to make sin possible.
Probability
Pascal and Fermat, through correspondence in 1654 on a problem in
gambling, began the mathematical study of probability. The problem
concerned the division of stakes between two gamblers who wished to
leave the gambling table before either has scored the n points needed
to win. The solution involved calculating the probability for all possible
outcomes and the associated amount of the winnings. Pascal solved the
problem for two players, but a solution that involved three or more
players had to wait. Pascal also invented a mechanical calculator to
help his father in collecting taxes.
An unpublished piece by Pascal on gambling stimulated Dutch scientist
Christiaan Huygens to publish a small work in 1657 on probabilities in
dice games. Swiss mathematician Jakob Bernoulli reprinted this work in
his Ars Conjectandi (Art of Conjecturing) published in 1713. Both
Bernoulli & French-English mathematician Abraham De Moivre, in his
Doctrine of Chances (1718), applied the newly discovered calculus to
probability. They thus made advances in probability theory, which by
then had important applications in the rapidly developing insurance
industry.
97
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=761578291&pn=9
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that
• he believed would have made his doctrines less
popular
• was published by Louis Couturat 2 centuries after
Leibniz’s death
• was contained in Leibniz’s Letters to Arnaud, first
recognized as important by Russell. Arnaud
responded negatively.
• adopts (Aristotelian) substance (like Descartes and
Spinoza)
 derived from the grammatical category of subject or
component in a relation
 persisting through time
 with all qualities predicated of a substance constituting98the
substance’s identity or essence
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d)
• was the first to explicitly propose logic
 as a basis for metaphysics, and
 in a form of characteristica universalis that could resolve
by calculation all philosophical argument
 enabling reasoning in metaphysics and morals in the same
way as in geometry and analysis
• did work on mathematical logic that
 would have pioneered the field a century and a half sooner,
but that
 he declined to publish because he found evidence of error
in Aristotle’s doctrine of the syllogism, and assumed the
errors were his and not Aristotle’s
99
Leibniz’s Binary Calculus of Thought, and Subsequent Boolean Algebra, were reinforced by Chinese Philosophy
Gottfried Leibniz laid the modern foundation of the movement from decimal to binary as far back as 1666 with his
'On the Art of Combination', laying out a method for reducing all logic to exact statements.
Leibniz believed logic, or ‘the laws of thought’ could be moved from a verbal state - which was subject to the
ambiguities of language, tone and circumstance - into an absolute mathematical condition: "A sort of universal
language or script, but infinitely different from all those projected hitherto, for the symbols and even words in it
would direct the reason, and errors, except for those of fact, would be mere mistakes in calculation. It would be
very difficult to form or invent this language or characteristic, but very easy to understand it without any
dictionaries."
The concept was a bit high-flown for his time, and Leibniz' idea was ignored by the scientific community of his day.
He let his proposition drop - until about ten years later when the Chinese 'Book of Changes', or 'Yi Ching', came his
way. Leibniz found some sort of confirmation for his theories in the Yi Ching's depiction of the universe as a
progression of contradicting dualities, a series of on-off, yes-no possibilities, such as dark-light and male-female,
which formed the complex interaction of life and consciousness. He reasoned that, if life itself could be reduced to a
series of straightforward propositions, so could thought, or logic.
Heartened by his new insights, Leibniz set out to refine his rudimentary binary system, studiously transposing
numerals into seemingly infinite rows of ones and zeros - even though he couldn't really find a use for them.
Leibniz' stepped wheel calculator was built for decimal numbers. Although he apparently gave some thought over
the years to another machine which would incorporate his beloved binary system, the long strings of binary
numbers that replaced single decimal digits must have seemed daunting. Actually, they must have seemed
overwhelming, because Leibniz seemed to lose the plot towards the end of his life, endowing his binary system with
a kind of quasi-religious mysticism. Binary numbers, he came to believe, represented Creation. The number one
portraying God; and zero depicting Void.
Leibniz died without achieving his dream of a universal mathematical/logical language, but leaving the fundamental
idea of the binary yes-no/on-off principle for others to play with, including Ploucquet, Lambert and
Castillon. George Boole picked up their combined efforts roughly 125 years later for another buff and polish. In
molecular biology there are biologiocal switches inside proteins like DNA.
100
http://www.kerryr.net/pioneers/leibniz.htm
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d)
• declared two logical premises
white
 the Law of Sufficient
Reason, which states
that all true propositions
intension
are analytic. An
“Lattice”
“analytic” proposition
 
expresses
 
extension
“decomposition” of
union (of intension) or of
intersection (of extension) white things
man
union 
white man
intersection 
men
101
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d)
• declared two logical premises (cont.d)
 the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic
propositions are true. “A white man is a man”.
• Extensional inclusion: the set of white men is included in (is the
intersection of) the set W of white things and/or the set M of men
W
M
(W  M) M
(a  W  M)  (a M)
• Intensional inclusion (union): White Man = White + Man
102
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d)
• declared two logical premises (cont.d)
 the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic
propositions are true. “A white man is a man”. (cont.d)
• More & more detailed description reduces intersections to a
unitary (infinitesimal) point, a monad, a “proper name”, a
substance, a soul a world apart from everything but God, keeping
in its substance traces of all that happened to it.
() … () …
• That knowledge (perfectly possessed by God) is expressed by a
calculus of characteristica universalis, where all propositions are
analytic. This is the reduction of experience to logic. Factual
becomes “necessary” by having been actualized into the best of
possibles.
103
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d)
• declared two logical premises (cont.d)
 the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic
propositions are true. “A white man is a man”. (cont.d)
• Logical versus factual (empirical) existence
 Logical existence $ is an operator (function) from a name, n,
to inclusion in a set (constituting the observable extension of a
property, all the items having the property). That is standard
extensional logic.

$:n 
 Leibnizian factual/necessary existence
is a logical operator
(function) from possible  (non-contradictory) propositions to
actualized (necessary ) propositions discoverable by logical
analysis. This is a kind of intensional logic.
: 
possible
necessary
The confirmation of “necessary that” is by logical analysis of
concepts and propositions, not by observation. That is a104
prelude to Hegel and Marx.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d)
• declared two logical premises (cont.d)
 the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic
propositions are true. “A white man is a man”. (cont.d)
• Alternative concept of “is” as identity, not inclusion.
 “is” of set inclusion (): Western logic
 “is” of identity (=) Chinese School of Names. “A White Horse
is not a Horse”. W
H
WH
=
H
Narrowing “is” to identity rules out the extreme rationalism of
Leibniz and opens the field to “practicalism”, “instrumentalism”
and autonomy less constrained by logical rules. Accordingly,
105
Chinese Marxism has been less constrained by the logical
“necessity” of Western Marxism.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d)
• declared two logical premises (cont.d)
 the Law of Contradiction which states that all analytic
propositions are true. “A white man is a man”.
• Objections
 The completeness of a monadic substance, in its identity
(notion) including past and future, seemed to Leibniz’s
correspondent Arnaud incompatible with the Christian doctrine
of sin and free will. So Leibniz never pursued/published it.
 Necessity is a logical not an empirical category. Necessity
alone cannot imply physical existence. Physical existence is
an empirical category discerned by observation. Only God
can know existence as creation of the best of possible worlds.
Knowledge of existence derives from knowledge of God’s
goodness derived from necessity.
 The exhaustive knowledge of properties required by Leibniz’s
calculus performed on all true propositions as analytic is106
achievable only by God.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 developed a secret philosophy that (cont.d)
• postulated a struggle for existence
 Creation is a free act of God in Leibniz’s official philosophy.
But
 “Metaphysical perfection” requires that God create as
much as possible. So Leibniz
• rejects a vacuum
• supposes it is better to exist than not to exist
 Everything possible struggles to exist, but not all possibles
are “compossible”. The largest group of compossibles
wins
 Existence of something is “defined” as “being compossible
with more things than anything incompatible with it”. So
• Existence is decided by logic & should be discoverable by a
sufficiently able logician.
• This provided a logical foundation for the theory of evolution107
and
the Hegelian/Marxist dialectic of struggle.
Leibniz (cont.d)
 in his private thinking was the best example of a
philosopher using logic and syntax as a key to
metaphysics & understanding the world, drawing
inferences from linguistic to non-linguistic facts.
• History of this kind of philosophy
 Began with Parmenides
 Continued by Plato’s use of theory of ideas to prove extralogical propositions
 Manifest in Spinoza
 Extended to Hegel.
 Empiricism drove this approach into disrepute.
108
Leibniz
(cont.d)
 in his private thinking was the best example of a
philosopher using logic and syntax as a key to
metaphysics & understanding the world, drawing
inferences from linguistic to non-linguistic facts.
(cont.d)
• All such a priori philosophies have a defective logic,
namely subject-predicate logic which ignores
relations.
 Leibniz achieves the reverse of Parmenides: he combines
subject-predicate logic with pluralism rather than the
monism of Spinoza or Parmenides
 Leibniz is inconsistent because the statement “There are
many monads” is not of subject-predicate form.
 Leibniz rejected monism (staticism of unchanging
substrate, subject) because of
• His interest in dynamics (incrementalism of the calculus)
109be
• His argument that extension involves repetition and so cannot
the property of a single substance.
Liberalism
 began in England and Holland
 as religious toleration by protestants
 While regarding wars of religion as silly
 valued commerce & industry
 favored rising middle class against monarchy &
aristocracy
 had immense respect for rights of property
especially when accumulated by the labor of the
owner
 restricted hereditary rights:
 excluded divine right of kings
 attributed to every community a right to choose its
110
own form of government
Liberalism (cont.d)
 considered all men to be born equal &
subsequent inequality as due to circumstances
 emphasized education
 was biased against government which was in
the hands of kings or aristocracies who little
understood commerce
 was optimistic, energetic & philosophic because
of representing forces likely to become
victorious and bring benefits to mankind
 opposed medieval theories supporting the
Church, kings, persecution, & obstruction of
science
 opposed the modern fanaticisms of Calvinists111 &
Anabaptists
Liberalism (cont.d)
 aimed to end political strife to free energy for
commerce & science
 decreasingly feared Spanish power
 was thwarted by the French Revolution,
Napoleon, and the subsequent Holy Alliance
 was individualist
 not communitarian like Greek philosophers down to
& including Aristotle, and was like
 the individualists since loss of liberty under
Alexander, namely the Cynics and Stoics
 To Stoics social circumstances didn’t matter especially in
the opposite backgrounds of (emperor) Marcus Aurelius
and (slave) Epictetus
 This was also the view of Christianity until it got control
112 of
the State
Liberalism (cont.d)
 was individualist (cont.d)
 like the medieval mystics who kept alive the
individualist trends in Christian ethics amid
 the firm synthesis of dogma, law, & custom which gave
control of beliefs & practical morality to the Church
 the collective wisdom of Councils who substituted for
solitary thought in ascertaining what was true & good
 began with Protestants’ claim that General
Councils may err whence
 determining the truth became an individual
enterprise, not social
 strife resulted as religious disputes became settled
113
by war
Liberalism
(cont.d)
 first sought to reconcile intellectual & ethical
individualism with ordered social life
 was furthered by Cartesianism’s implanting
individualism into philosophy by making each
person the starting point of his or her own
existence, by introspection in the cogito & in
clear & distinct ideas (intuitionism). In science a
discoverer proposes a theory because it seems
right to him, not in deference to authority
 persuades others by reference to generally received
canons of truth
 does not clash with society for long: usually
agreement is eventually reached
 like Galileo who represented individualism, politically
constrained by the authority of Aristotle & the 114
Church
Liberalism (cont.d)
 was manifested in economic individualism
 was not initially assertive emotionally or in ethics
 ceased for a generation during the French
Revolution
 was reasserted
 in England in the Benthamites & the Manchester
School
 in America until today, with no history of feudalism or
state church
 was opposed by Romanticism &
nativism/nationalism which
 Rousseau inaugurated
115
Liberalism (cont.d)
 was opposed by Romanticism &
nativism/nationalism which (cont.d)
 was a self-refuting extension of individualism from
intellect to the passions, including
 anarchy between collectivities
 cult of the hero developed by Carlyle & Nietzsche (who
condemned Greek tragedy for the defeated moralism of the
anti-hero)
 rejection of the ugliness and cruelties of early industrialism
• combined with nostalgia for the pastoral Middle Ages
• joining Church, aristocracy & wage earners against the economic
tyranny of industrialists
 assertion of the right of rebellion in the name of nativist
nationalism and the “liberty” of nations and the individual
will of great men (Byron, Fichte, Carlyle & Nietzsche)
 the despotism of the victorious hero who suppresses 116
in
others his own self-assertive ethic
Liberalism (cont.d)
 combined with empiricism, and
 departed from holistic rationalism that persisted in
Hegel & Marx, and
 was first stated by Locke who
 only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in
England where
• civil war between King and Parliament
 gave Englishmen love of compromise & fear of pushing any
theory to its logical conclusion
 was prompted by the Long Parliament’s intention to
 --abolish the king’s right to grant trade monopolies
 --establish its exclusive right to impose taxation
 --end the Church of England’s persecution of
 opinions & practices
 --end arbitrary arrest
 --end subservience of judges to the king’s wishes
117
• but war against the King appeared to many as an act of treason
&
impiety
Liberalism (cont.d)
 combined with empiricism, and
 was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)
 only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in
England where (cont.d)
• the king
 had a martyr’s stubbornness about bishops
 was defeated only by the Independents who constituted
Cromwell’s New Model Army
 refused to sign a treaty
• The victorious Independents abandoned democracy &
parliamentary government
 Cromwell purged the Independents of opponents &
 achieved a parliamentary majority until he
 dismissed Parliament altogether & replaced it by a military
118
dictatorship
Liberalism (cont.d)
 combined with empiricism, and
 was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)
 only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in
England where (cont.d)
• Restored (Catholic) King Charles II moderated (compared to his
beheaded Catholic father Charles I) by
 claiming no power to impose taxes not sanctioned by
Parliament
 consenting to Habeas Corpus, which deprived the Crown of
the power of arbitrary arrest
 consenting to most of the limitations sought on Charles I’s
power
 receiving subsidies from French King Louis XIV
• Kings were shown to be at risk of suffering at the hands of their
subjects
119
Liberalism (cont.d)
 combined with empiricism, and
 was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)
 only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in
England where (cont.d)
• (Catholic) King James II
 became opposed by Anglicans & Nonconformists despite
granting them toleration in defiance of Parliament
 continued Stuart subservience to Spain (the leading colonial
state) then France (the leading continental state) to avoid
unpopular wartime taxation
 alienated Englishmen when French King Louis XIV revoked
the Edict of Nantes that had given toleration to French
protestants
• The “Glorious Revolution” replaced the (Scottish) Catholic Stuarts
by the Dutch House of Orange
 It was carried out peacefully by the aristocracy and big
business
120
 It secured the rights of Parliament
Liberalism (cont.d)
 combined with empiricism, and
 was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)
 only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in
England where (cont.d)
• The “Glorious Revolution” replaced the (Scottish) Catholic
Stuarts by the Dutch House of Orange (cont.d)
 The monarchy was preserved but based
 --not on divine right
 --but on legislative sanction
 The new king brought Dutch commercial and theological
wisdom
 National debt became a secure investment no longer subject
to repudiation at the monarch’s whim.
 The Act of Toleration disadvantaged both Catholics &
Nonconformists, but ended persecution.
 England became resolutely anti-French & remained so 121
until
Napoleon’s defeat
Liberalism (cont.d)
 combined with empiricism, and
 was first stated by Locke who (cont.d)
 only clarified and systematized prevailing opinion in
England where (cont.d)
• The “Glorious Revolution” replaced the (Scottish) Catholic Stuarts
by the Dutch House of Orange (cont.d)
 The French monarchy responded by supporting the American
Revolution, in a policy not unlike the German monarchy’s
support of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution which returned
to haunt Germany & result in Hitler.
 in France inspired opposition to the regime & to prevailing
Cartesianism
122
Locke
 He was the founder of philosophical liberalism
 He was the founder of empiricism, the doctrine
that our knowledge (except for logic &
mathematics) is derived from experience
 He was the apostle of the Glorious Revolution
which
 was the most moderate & successful of revolutions
 had modest aims
 prompted the need for no subsequent revolution
 His father was a puritan who fought on the side
of Parliament in the Civil War
123
Locke (cont.d)
 When under Oliver Cromwell Locke studied at
Oxford, scholastic philosophy was still taught
there
 He disliked the scholasticism and fanaticism of
the Independents in the Civil War
 Influenced by Descartes, he became a physician
 He fled to Holland with his patron before the
Glorious Revolution
 He published late in life, only after the Glorious
Revolution when he worked at the Board of
Trade for a few years.
124
Locke (cont.d)
 The government shared Locke’s published
opinions
 Locke’s political doctrines, with development by
Montesquieu, are embedded in
 the US constitution
 the French constitution of 1871
 the British constitution until the 20th century
 Voltaire spent time in England and interpreted
Locke in Lettres philosophiques
 French philosophes and moderate reformers
followed Locke. They found an intimate connection
between his theory of knowledge & his politics
125
 Extreme French revolutionaries followed Rousseau
Locke (cont.d)
 In England Berkeley & Hume followed Locke
 but Berkeley was not philosophically engaged
 like Hobbes, Hume was not a reformer
 Kant followed Hume’s philosophy and
 prompted German idealism to support conservative
political positions, while
 the radical Benthamites followed Locke’s tradition
 His philosophical errors were useful in classical
physics
 Primary qualities, defined as inseparable from a
body (solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, &
number) are actually in bodies, while
 Secondary qualities, defined as all other qualities126
(colors, sounds, smells) are only in the percipient
Locke (cont.d)
 His philosophical errors were useful in classical
physics (cont.d)
 Subsequent developments blurred the distinction:
 Berkeley proved that primary qualities are also in the
percipient, as 20th century physics ultimately demonstrated
(in Relativity Theory of position, time, and
interchangeability of matter & energy & Quantum
Mechanics’ Heisenberg Principle of the tradeoff in
precision between position & momentum)
 Meanwhile Locke’s view of the physical world as primary
matter in motion was the basis of physical laws of the
secondary qualities of sound, heat, light & electricity which
the laws derived from primary qualities
127
Locke (cont.d)
 His philosophical errors were useful in classical
physics (cont.d)
 Subsequent developments blurred the distinction:
 Berkeley proved that primary qualities are also in the
percipient, as 20th century physics ultimately demonstrated
(in Relativity Theory of position, time, and
interchangeability of matter & energy & Quantum
Mechanics’ Heisenberg Principle of the tradeoff in
precision between position & momentum)
 Meanwhile Locke’s view of the physical world as primary
matter in motion was the basis of physical laws of the
secondary qualities of sound, heat, light & electricity which
the laws derived from primary qualities
128
Locke (cont.d)
 His Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
his most important book
 is always sensible, always willing to defer to logic
rather than become paradoxical
 states general principles, capable of leading to
strange consequences which Locke desists from
drawing
 Common sense (a form of “intuition”) makes our theoretical
principles not quite correct
 In this Locke displays
• the sound judgement of a practical man
• not the scruples of a logician. A principle may be
 so nearly true to deserve theoretical respect
 yet lead to absurd practical consequences
129
Locke (cont.d)
 His Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
his most important book (cont.d)
 lacks dogmatism. It takes only a few certainties from
predecessors: our own existence, existence of God,
truth of mathematics.
 departs from predecessors where it concludes that
the truth is hard to ascertain, and that a rational man
will hold his opinions with a measure of doubt, as in




religious toleration
parliamentary democracy
laissez-faire economics
the whole system of liberal maxims
 hedges divine revelation with rational safeguards130
Locke (cont.d)
 His Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
his most important book (cont.d)
 states that “enthusiasm” (belief in divine revelation to
a particular religious leader) is very different from
love of truth.
 “enthusiasm”
• is purely personal, because the multiplicity of personal revelations,
all mutually inconsistent, robs enthusiasm of a social character;
• substitutes personal fancy for both reason & revelation
 in melancholy or conceited men prone to communion with the
deity
 in the odd actions & opinions of lazy or ignorant men
• is opposite in attitude to Spinoza’s “equanimity”
 love of truth is not entertaining any proposition with greater
131
assurance than the proofs it is derived by
Locke (cont.d)
 His Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
his most important book (cont.d)
 states that reason
 does not consist of syllogistic reasoning
 consists of 2-fold inquiry into
• what we know for sure
• propositions it is wise to accept in practice, although they have
only probability, defined as degree of conformity
 with our own experience
 with others’ experience (a limited consensus gentium)
132
Locke (cont.d)
 His Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
his most important book (cont.d)
 says agreement
 with any proposition should be in proportion to grounds in
its favor
 based on probability which
• is often the only basis for needed action
• should not entail renouncing with blind resignation
 our own former truths
 the opinions of others we are tying to convince
--who should be allowed leave at their leisure to
----go over the account again
----examine the particulars &
----see on which side the advantage lies
133
Locke (cont.d)
 His Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
his most important book (cont.d)
 says agreement (cont.d)
 based on probability which (cont.d)
• should not entail renouncing with blind resignation (cont.d)
 the opinions of others we are tying to convince (cont.d)
--who cannot be expected to
----give up tenets so settled in their mind by time &
custom to be self-evident or impressions received
from God Himself,
----give them up to
------new opinions taken on mere trust
------or arguments or authority of a stranger or
adversary, especially if there is suspicion of
134
interest or design
Locke (cont.d)
 His Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
his most important book (cont.d)
 says agreement (cont.d)
 based on probability which (cont.d)
• should accordingly prompt endeavoring to remove mutual
ignorance
 in gentle & fair ways of information
 not by denouncing others as obstinate or perverse
 --for not renouncing their opinion & adopting ours
 --when we are likely as obstinate for not adopting their
 opinion
 and should be reached by being busier and more careful
to inform ourselves than to restrain others, because if men
were better instructed themselves, they would be less
135
imposing on others
Locke (cont.d)
 He is contemptuous of Leibnizian metaphysics
because
 the concept of substance then dominant in
metaphysics, was vague & not useful to Locke but
he doesn’t reject it entirely
 Locke allows the validity of metaphysical arguments
for God’s existence, but he doesn’t dwell on them &
seems uncomfortable with them
 Locke conceives new ideas in terms of concrete
detail, not large abstractions.
 Locke’s philosophy is piecemeal, not statuesque &
136
all of one piece
Locke (cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding
 There are no innate ideas or principles, contrary to
Plato’s Theatetus (where knowledge is not
perception), Descartes & Leibniz (for whom the most
valuable knowledge did not come from experience)
& the scholastics
 The mind is a blank sheet of paper
 Ideas come from 2 sources of experience
• sensation
• perception of our own mind’s operations: “internal sense”
(introspection)
 Knowledge is thinking by means of ideas which come only
from experience; so, no knowledge can precede
137
experience
Locke (cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding
 Perception is the first step or degree toward
knowledge
 Metaphysicians’ knowledge about the world is purely
verbal
 Locke is an extreme nominalist concerning universals: all
existing things are particulars and general ideas
representing many particulars are given names, but they
are no more reality than the particulars
 He refutes the scholastic notion of essence
• Essence is
 purely verbal
 is “defining”, is the mere definition we choose of a general
138
term to denote a kind of thing
Locke (cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (cont.d)
 Metaphysicians’ knowledge about the world is purely
verbal (cont.d)
 He refutes the scholastic notion of essence (cont.d)
• Species classification is
 a fact not of nature but of language, rules of definition along
boundaries set by men for sorting things. Objection:
 --Different languages agree on definitions
 --Similarities between particulars are not imagined
 not always clear cut, as
 --in the emergence & classification of mutants &
 monstrosities
 --explained by Darwin’s theory of evolution by
 gradual change, through
 ----mutation and
139
 ----selection by environment & competition
Locke (cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (cont.d)
 Objection: solipsism. Locke does not explain how
we have knowledge of things
 outside ourselves and
 outside operations of our own minds.
• The immediate object of the mind is its own ideas.
• Knowledge is conversant only about the agreement or
disagreement between our own ideas (cognitive
dissonance/consonance); fundamental to programming the
operation of computers: association by similarity or difference:
“if … , then … ; otherwise … ”. Knowledge is agreement of ideas:
“coherence” criterion of truth vs “paradox” criterion of truth, or
“contradiction” or dialectical criterion of truth (in German
philosophy since Hegel)
• We cannot know the existence of the physical world or of other
140
people.
Locke
(cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (cont.d)
 Locke meets the objection by reductio ad absurdum
(the precursor to Karl Popper’s falsification
methodology of scientific proof)
 He recognizes the absurdity of the conclusion and, so
 He revises his premises
• There are 3 kinds of knowledge of real existence
 intuitive knowledge of our own existence
 demonstrative knowledge such as of God’s existence, by
examining agreement or disagreement among ideas
 sensible knowledge of (the existence of) things present to the
senses
 --True ideas must agree with things & not just with
 themselves
 ----All simple ideas must agree with things
 ----Simple ideas are the product of things operating

on the mind in a natural way
141
 ----The mind cannot make by itself any simple ideas
Locke (cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (cont.d)
 Locke meets the objection by argumentum ad
absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s
falsification methodology of scientific proof) cont.d
 He revises his premises (cont.d)
• There are 3 kinds of knowledge of real existence (cont.d)
 sensible knowledge of (the existence of) things present to the
senses (cont.d)
 --Complex ideas of substances consist of simple
 ideas found to coexist
 --Sensations are “deemed” (hypothesized) to
 ----have causes outside themselves [hypothesis

rejected by Hume who replaced it by “no idea

without an antecedent impression” (that would have an
142

external cause)] which
Locke (cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (cont.d)
 Locke meets the objection by argumentum ad
absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s
falsification methodology of scientific proof) cont.d
 He revises his premises (cont.d)
• There are 3 kinds of knowledge of real existence (cont.d)
 sensible knowledge of (the existence of) things present to the
senses (cont.d)
 --Sensations are “deemed” (hypothesized) to (cont.d)
 ----resemble the sensations themselves. This useful

“correspondence” hypothesis or principle is held

on grounds wholly independent of experience

itself: on grounds of
 ------common sense and possibly on grounds of
143
 ------frequency of association
Locke (cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (cont.d)
 Locke meets the objection by argumentum ad
absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s
falsification methodology of scientific proof) cont.d
 To avoid the incredible conclusion of solipsism from a selfconsistent set of philosophical tenets, Locke sacrificed
self-[containedness] consistency for the common sense of
• knowability &
• conferring on agency by the external world, the status of mere
hypothesis, nevertheless constraining on, if not inconsistent with,
the otherwise unfettered agency of ideas and logic and their
superiority and determination over my world.
144
Locke (cont.d)
 Epistemology in Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (cont.d)
 Locke meets the objection by argumentum ad
absurdum (the precursor to Karl Popper’s
falsification methodology of scientific proof) cont.d
 Locke thereby established the impossibility of a
metaphysics and epistemology at once credible [not
requiring a hypothesis] (materially) and credible (in ideas).
He emphasized credibility, leaving Russell to note still that
• A philosophy not self-consistent may not be wholly true but
• A self-consistent philosophy can nevertheless be wholly false.
145
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
 Locke anticipates Bentham (utilitarianism of the
greatest good for the greatest number)
 Like Bentham, he has a kindly feeling yet Locke
believed that
 All men act to maximize their own happiness,
reduced to pleasure & pain, and that
 Liberty
 best enables pursuit of happiness
 is limited by the necessity to control our passions
 is best achieved by a belief in reward & punishment after
death, prompting self-interested virtue by the prudent
146
pleasure-seeker
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Virtue
 is difficult to achieve without the belief that sin leads to hell
 less effectively achieved if not self-regarding
 Bentham substituted the human lawgiver (not always
wise, virtuous, or omniscient) for a Lockean God’s
power of hell. The human lawgiver endeavors
 to align incentives of public and private interests in such a
way (incentive compatibility) as
 to minister to the general happiness while pursuing your
own.
147
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Men do not always act according to rational
calculation.
 Men value present pleasure over future. Pleasures and
pains lose their effects the further away they are in time.
• This is a possible psychological foundation for the economics of
discounting or its mathematical inverse, interest payment
• This is exemplified in the effect of postponement in creating
greater (future) satisfaction for something than if it had been
consumed normally.
148
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Men do not always act according to rational
calculation. (cont.d)
 Men value present pleasure over future. Pleasures and
pains lose their effects the further away they are in time.
(cont.d)
• But postponement doesn’t always produce its own natural reward
in greater future pleasure. (Moreover satiation occurs whereby
pleasure from adding a given (incremental) amount of
consumption is greater now than it will be in the future.)
 in that case the greater future reward should take the form of a
future payment or a discount in the price.
 Future consumption of a given quantity has a present value
lower than the value of present consumption of the same
quantity.
 A lower future price also includes an incentive to consumers to
spread consumption over time rather than overconsume149
in the
present.
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Men do not always act according to rational
calculation. (cont.d)
 Men are accordingly more likely to act rationally the more
they are engaged in the long run, where self-interest and
the general will tend to coincide.
 Prudence is acting with the longer term (good) in
mind:
 Accordingly, every lapse from virtue is a failure of
prudence for bringing with it a worse future. Prudence is
 the paramount virtue of liberalism
 connected with
• savings & investment behavior in capitalism: the poor are poor
often because they spend foolishly & do not willingly postpone
• certain forms of piety, of virtue with a view to heaven, associated,
under Protestantism, with saving for investment (as in Max 150
Weber’s Protestantism and the Rise of Capitalism)
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Liberalism has always considered that public &
private interests eventually harmonize
 but on more than the theological basis Locke gave
 Divine laws were enough for Locke if a community is pious
& prudent in the liberty required for pursuit of happiness by
the individual who self-controls passion, where no one
escapes the divine magistrate. Otherwise, criminal laws
are needed.
151
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Moral rules are capable of scientific demonstration
as analytic (à la Leibnizian Characteristica
universalis calculus) from the idea of an infinitely
wise & good God & of ourselves as rational.
 “Where there is no property, there is no justice” is as
clearly demonstrable as any proposition in Euclid.
 There is a need for minimal law because of no liberty in a
lawless universe
 “Prudence” is a sufficient virtue, as expressed in judgment
governed by laws like discounting (which prompt reward
deferment) and other long-term versus short-term
152
considerations.
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Objection: men desire more than pleasure:
 Pleasure attends fulfillment of any desire, that need not
directly pursue that pleasure. For example masochism.
 Pleasure of immediate fulfillment is greater than pleasure
from postponed fulfillment. So
• discounting the present (the future) reward [e.g. the principal
borrowed by you compared to the greater repayment by you]
needs to be implemented (rejected) in the valuation of pleasure or
• discounting the present (the future) cost [e.g fixed-rate interest
payments] needs to be rejected (implemented) in the valuation of
pleasure
 as a means of encouraging/compensating the
153
postponement of pleasure as in the economic practice
of
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Objection: men desire more than pleasure: (cont.d)
 Locke dismisses the tendency to discount the future
(reward) as an absurd conclusion from his ethical theory
and dismisses it as vice in counterexample to his original
assumption of proneness to virtue.
 So, he modifies his theory to account for the
counterexample/absurdity: this called “ad hoc” theorizing.
 It is better to outright replace the theory/hypothesis. Locke
neglected to postulate natural economic mechanisms to
offset/discourage the vice.
154
Locke (cont.d)
 Ethics (doctrines of how men act or ought to act)
cont.d
 Objection: men desire more than pleasure: (cont.d)
 Irrationalism, bounded rationalism, and descriptivism
 German philosophy enriches Leibnizian rationalism by
accommodating “contradiction”. It dismisses falsification as in fact
evidence for the truth of “contradiction”.
 English empiricism follows Locke in recognizing falsification by
experiential and logical evidence as a constraint or “limitation” on
Leibnizian rationalism by forcing at least ad hoc revision of
hypotheses if not their outright rejection/replacement.
 Hume carries empiricism to the extreme of mere descriptivism
(cataloging of descriptions of experience), and rejection of
theorizing, explanation, or attempted prediction by scientific law.
155
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality.
 They are based on the prior doctrine of the divine
origin of natural law. So, natural law is given no
independent logical basis.
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings.
 Robert Filmer, defender of divine right of kings
 said, like Hobbes, that the king alone makes laws proceeding
solely from his will which is perfectly free from human control &
unbound even by predecessors or logic
156
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings. (cont.d)
 Robert Filmer, defender of divine right of kings (cont.d)
 said, unlike Hobbes, that God bestowed the kingly power on the
first humans,
 who were the natural ancestors/parents of the whole people &
 from whom it descended to heirs.
 said, the desire for liberty (from bad) was the cause of God’s
punishment of the first humans in the Bible, and
 thereby provided too strong a defense of the power of Charles I
before the Civil War.
 Previous defense of divine right of kings allowed for limitations
derived from the will of the people
 An English Jesuit (thinking of Protestant Queen Elizabeth) and
a Scottish Calvinist (thinking of Catholic Mary Queen of Scots)
agreed on nothing except that kings may be deposed by157
the
people for misgovernment
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings. (cont.d)
 Robert Filmer, defender of divine right of kings (cont.d)
 thereby provided too strong a defense of the power of Charles I
before the Civil War. (cont.d)
 Kingly power (based on armed force) had been limited by the
pope’s (based on cleverness & sanctity) & the pope’s
philosophical defenders.
--The people could claim the same rights (of self-government)
against the king as the pope had.
--St. Robert Bellarmine had said that the secular power was
bestowed by men, not God, and was “in the people unless
they bestow it on a prince”. So, God is the immediate 158
author
of a democratic state.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings. (cont.d)
 Robert Filmer, defender of divine right of kings (cont.d)
 said that instead the king derives power entirely from the authority
of a father over his children. A similar theory prevailed in Japan
since the Meiji Revolution, & in ancient Egypt & the ancient Inca &
Aztec civilizations in America.
 Divine-right theories were defeated for 2 reasons:
 multiplicity of religions
 Church of England versus Nonconformists
--The Church of England attempted to be a compromise
between the Catholics & the Presbyterians (Calvinists who
battled in the Civil War)
--But the power of the 3rd party Nonconformists was 159
increasing among rich merchants & bankers.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings. (cont.d)
 Divine-right theories were defeated for 2 reasons: (cont.d)
 multiplicity of religions (cont.)
 The English king was head of the Church of England (which
had bishops & rejected Calvinism). The King’s profession of
two religions at once militated against
 --religious zeal and
 --religious claims by the king
160
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings. (cont.d)
 Divine-right theories were defeated for 2 reasons: (cont.)
 conflict between king, aristocracy & merchants.
 In the Renaissance king & middle class combined against the
feudal aristocracy
 In post-Reformation France king & aristocracy combined
against the Protestant middle class.
 In post-Reformation England the Catholic aristocracy & the
Protestant middle class combined against the religious power
of the authoritarian king.
161
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings. (cont.d)
 Locke says
 parental power is not homogeneous: the mother’s power should
equal the father’s power
 primogeniture is unjust &, so, cannot be a basis for monarchy
 theories of divine right neither justify nor oppose usurpers
 Paternal power is temporary and does not extend to life or
property
162
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings. (cont.d)
 In the early 20th century
 according to Russell hereditary power was replaced by
dictatorships in the absence of time to develop the thought habits
needed for the successful practice of democracy
 the Catholic Church is the sole ancient institution not developed
from a hereditary element, and may serve as a model form of
government for dictatorships
 rejection of hereditary governance had almost no impact on
economics where the hereditary principle is allowed, although
decreasingly dominant
163
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 He separates politics from economics in his rejection
of the doctrine of the hereditary power & divine right
of kings. (cont.d)
 The hereditary principle was easy to extend from the
economic power over people’s lives to political power
 The kingdom had been regarded as a landed estate whose owner
can decide who lives there, and give title to land transferred to
another owner (still called “Crown” lands in the UK, Canada &
Australia).
 So, Locke’s rejection of the hereditary principle in politics is an
innovation.
164
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance)
 In the state of nature (before all human government) any
law is divine.
 The law of nature is the same as in Thomas Aquinas, for whom it
serves as the basis from which human laws should be derived.
 Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical
age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age.
 Locke’s state of nature is men living together according to
reason without a common superior on earth with authority to
judge between them.
 --This is Leibnizian rationalist optimism.
165
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 In the state of nature (before all human government) any
law is divine. (cont.d)
 Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical
age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age.(cont.d)
 Locke’s state of nature is men living together according to
reason without a common superior on earth with authority to
judge between them. (cont.d)
 --So, political power should be derived from this original
 natural state of perfect freedom within natural reason
 ----without depending on the will of another man
 ----in equality, where all power & jurisdiction is reciprocal, no
 one having more than another as creatures of the same
166
 species & rank
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 In the state of nature (before all human government) any
law is divine. (cont.d)
 Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical
age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age.(cont.d)
 Locke’s state of nature is men living together according to
reason without a common superior on earth with authority to
judge between them. (cont.d)
 --So, political power should be derived from this original
 natural state of perfect freedom within natural reason (cont.d)
 ----without liberty to destroy themselves or harm another in his
 life, health, liberty or possessions, because we are all God’s
167
 property.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 In the state of nature (before all human government) any
law is divine. (cont.d)
 Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical
age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age.(cont.d)
 Locke’s state of nature is men living together according to
reason without a common superior on earth with authority to
judge between them. (cont.d)
 --So, political power should be derived from this original
 natural state of perfect freedom within natural reason (cont.)
 ----with a right to defend ourselves & our possessions,

including private vengeance & the discretion to decide
the
168

proportionateness of the punishment to fit the crime.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 In the state of nature (before all human government) any
law is divine. (cont.d)
 Goodness, happiness of the state of nature is based on the biblical
age of the patriarchs and the classical myth of a golden age.(cont.d)
 The badness of the remote past became fundamental to the
theory of evolution consistent with Hobbes’ version of the state
of nature as war of all against all.
 Dialectical logic enabled Marx to model his workers’ paradise
on both the golden age (good past) and evolution (bad past)
and may be interpreted as progress in revival of a golden age
after successive negations.
169
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 Objection: in a state of nature each man is his own judge
because he relies on himself to defend his rights
 Locke says the remedy (but not a natural remedy) is a compact to
create a government
 But the state of nature continues among governments subject only
to natural law & ethics in their relations
 Locke recognizes the possibility of evil or a state of war that is not
a tendency in man or in a state of nature.
 Locke (as a prelude to Rousseau) looks at a state of nature as
the biblical Paradise Lost, & is anti-Augustinian and antiCalvinist in his optimism of man’s/nature’s tendency toward
170
good.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 Objection: in a state of nature each man is his own judge
because he relies on himself to defend his rights (cont.d)
 Locke recognizes the possibility of evil or a state of war that is not
a tendency in man or in a state of nature. (cont.d)
 Hobbes looks at a state of nature as war in punishment for sin,
reflecting his pessimism of man’s/nature’s tendency toward
bad.
 Accordingly, progress as recognized by Marx is not nice, and
uses the means of war (but not as enthusiastically as Hegel) to
channel & direct toward progress men’s bad tendencies.
171
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 Accordingly, the social contract which instituted civil
government and constituted emergence from a state of
nature, still bases its laws on nature
 Recording & guarantee of property rights is the main role of
government
 Legal rights & remedies should be derived from natural law, with
remedies decided & performed by the State.
 The Church was a landowner & landowners borrowed money.
 So “usury” or lending money at interest was deemed contrary
to the law of nature.
 Calvinists came from the rich middle class who were lenders
and so viewed usury as compatible with natural law.
 Laissez-faire and the rights of man originated in Puritanism172
where
they were derived from natural law
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 Accordingly, the social contract which instituted civil
government and constituted emergence from a state of
nature, still bases its laws on nature (cont.d)
 Property was due to free exercise of one’s industry & therefore
inheritable.
 Captives in a just war are slaves by the law of nature
 Objection: But there is no longer a clear basis for judgment of the
conformity of laws with moral rules & natural law once no longer
viewed as laid down by God in the Bible.
 Utilitarianism. Secular attempts to develop a doctrine of
inalienable rights resulted in utilitarianism
--which defines acts as good on the basis of their effects,
namely those acts which do most to promote the general
welfare.
--So, utilitarianism may be compatible with natural law, but
173
only because of the good effects of natural law.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 Accordingly, the social contract which instituted civil
government and constituted emergence from a state of
nature, still bases its laws on nature (cont.)
 Objection: But there is no longer a clear basis for judgement of the
conformity of laws with moral rules & natural law once no longer
viewed as laid down by God in the Bible. (cont.)
 Methodological individualism. This makes natural law provide
its own partial solution to the problem by calling for a minimal
set of laws.
 --It is a natural law that everyone will do that which makes for
 his greatest advantage
 --The advancement of private persons will be the advantage of
 the public because
 ----Individual rights enable actions to bring order, equilibrium.
 ----There is no conflict between individual goals and the174
goals

of a group
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 The government is a party to Locke’s Social Contract
 The government may be resisted if it fails to perform its obligations
under the contract
 Citizens are only those with property (with women excluded from
property ownership) because
 the primary purpose of government is maintenance of property
rights
 property is the physical embodiment/history of the individual’s
moral virtue/prudence, certainly in keeping with Calvinist
doctrine that worldly success indicates predestined favor by
God
 otherwise propertiless citizens can use the government to
appropriate the property of other citizens
 for the common good, government
 --makes (by the legislature) & executes (by the executive) laws
 --sets & enforces penalties (by the judiciary)
175
 --defends the commonwealth from foreign injury.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 The government is a party to Locke’s Social Contract
 If the government is party to a dispute
 it is harder for it to be both defendant and judge if it is a
monarchy of one man because
 there is no neutral authority to decide the dispute, &
 accordingly governments should be “civil” & not absolute &
should therefore be separated into independent executive and
judicial branches. Civil/politic society
 --is the product of a social contract between
 government and the governed
 ----It’s origin predates recorded history except among the Jews
 ----The contract is not hereditary, so is renewed by each
 generation
176
 ----The US constitution is such a contract
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Replacement of the hereditary principle by natural
law (as the basis for governance) cont.d
 The government is a party to Locke’s Social Contract (cont.d)
 If the government is party to a dispute (cont.d)
 accordingly governments should be “civil” & not absolute &
should therefore be separated into independent executive and
judicial branches. Civil/politic society (cont.d)
 --is ruled by majority unless a greater number is agreed
 ----Caution: Condorcet’s paradox of non-majority social
 preference produced by voting
 ----Majorities may be tyrannical, and Locke agrees in his
 Letters on Toleration that no believer in God should be
177
 penalized on account of his religious opinions.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Property
 Urban production was by craftsmen who owned their tools
 Locke believed in peasant proprietorship of as much land
as one can till, but not more
 But land was owned by aristocrats
 who received rent (cash in England) often in the form of half
the produce (in France & Italy), or
 who owned the services of serfs attached to the land (in
Prussia & Russia)
 & aristocrats lost their rights when
 The French Revolution & Napoleon
 --ended aristocratic land ownership in France, Italy &
 Germany, &
 --abolished serfdom in Prussia
178
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Property (cont.d)
 Locke believed in peasant proprietorship of as much land
as one can till, but not more (cont.d)
 & aristocrats lost their rights when (cont.d)
 while Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War ended serfdom in
Russia , &
 aristocratic land ownership ended
 --in Russia when the Bolshevik Revolution
 established collective farming, &
 --in Prussia only during WWII.
 heavy taxation in 19th century England forced most aristocrats
to give up their land after 18th & 19th century enclosure for
private ownership of the common land in English towns 179
used
by rural laborers to grow their own food since the Middle Ages.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Property (cont.d)
 Locke formulated a labor theory of value (later attributed to
Ricardo & Marx)
 suggested as early as by Thomas Aquinas in support of Church
landholding to minimize charges by usurer money-lenders (mostly
Jews) for borrowing by rural landowners to plant crops before sale
 in condemnation of the role of traders & speculators (who play a
coordinating, risk-taking, and search role not yet then understood).
Objection:
 labor was a physical not a mental basis for valuation
 The mental basis is willingness to apply labor
 Locke limited his consideration of property to
--agriculture in keeping with the Feudal agricultural
perspective of scholastics,
--not capital-intensive mining & energy resources not 180
amenable to small-scale ownership.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Property (cont.d)
 Locke formulated a labor theory of value (later attributed to
Ricardo & Marx) cont.d
 Ricardo promoted labor-value in opposition to protectionist factorimmobile (labor-immobile and capital-immobile) landowners (landproperty is “immobilier” in French) opposed to labor mobility and
the comparative advantage/benefits of trade.
 Marx promoted labor-value in opposition to attributing value to
capital [know-how (configuration) whose value reflects not labor
input but productive usefulness/contribution of a unit of labor input]
 Locke appreciated the imperishable character of precious
metals & regarded it as the source of money, namely its
ability to
• store value, and therefore
 maintain inequality of fortune
 which Locke didn’t regret and saw
 as the source of gains to civilization.
181
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Checks and Balances in Government
 This doctrine originated in England
 in opposition to the Scottish Catholic Stuart heirs to the English
monarchy
 to prevent abuse of power
 by establishing a legislature having power independent from &
equal to the king’s
 The legislature is virtuous while the executive is usually
wicked
 The legislature must be removable by the community, and should
be elected
 This is inconsistent with the roles of King & House of Lords in the
legislature of modern England
 The king who governs without summoning the legislature, as
Charles I did for 12 years before the Civil War, is at war with182
the
people
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 Checks and Balances in Government (cont.d)
 The legislature is virtuous while the executive is usually
wicked (cont.d)
 Objection: judgment of just & lawful use of force by one branch of
government at the expense of another branch
 is often decided by power, not by justice & law.
 When there is no judge under heaven to decide it, it is
assumed Heaven will give victory in civil war to the better
cause.
 Accordingly, checks & balances require compromise & common
sense to avoid civil war. These are habits of mind not embedded in
the constitution.
 The judiciary is not mentioned.
 Until the Glorious Revolution, the king could dismiss judges.
Consequently judges convicted the king’s enemies and acquitted
his friends.
 Judges became irremovable afterward. The most powerful 183
independent judiciary is the US Supreme Court.
Locke (cont.d)
 His Treatises on Government have little
originality. (cont.d)
 In England the executive became increasingly
dependent on the legislature, & eventually came
from the ruling members of the legislature.
 The French legislative Assembly came to have less
power than the English Parliament but still more than
the executive.
 The principle of checks & balances is best embodied
in the American political system that Locke inspired.
 The US Supreme Court’s powers are limited to interpreting
the constitutionality of laws and this makes political
criticism of them difficult
 The legislature can always reenact a law adjusted to 184
meet
those criticisms.
Locke (cont.d)
 Locke’s political philosophy was adequate until
the Industrial Revolution when
 it became unable to address corporate power while
 the State’s role, for example in education, increased
enormously
 nationalism combined political & economic power
(beginning with German Prussian Prince Otto von
Bismarck), making war the primary means of
competition.
185
Locke (cont.d)
 Locke’s political philosophy was adequate until
the Industrial Revolution when (cont.d)
 the individual citizen lost the power & independence
Locke attributed to him, and got displaced by
“organization”, in
 Augustin Cournot’s mid 19th-century claim that
“administration” replaces politics and marks the end of
history, and
 James Burnham’s mid 20th-century book, The Managerial
Revolution, and the concept of “organization man”
186
Locke (cont.d)
 Locke’s political philosophy was adequate until
the Industrial Revolution when (cont.d)
 at least until the Information Technology revolution of
the late 20th-century reversed the rise of mass and
passive media.
 a state of nature still existed between states, calling
for an international social contract reflected in the
emergence of multiple post WW-II international
institutions.
187
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism
 Locke inaugurated analytic empiricism which
dominated philosophy in England & in the
French Enlightenment for a century before the
French Revolution, because of
 Newton, and the inferiority of Descartes’ theory of
vortices to Newton’s law of gravitation in explaining
the solar system, and the incapability of Descartes’
theory to explain any motion in a system of 2 bodies
 admiration of England by France’s rebellious
intellectuals
 for its freedom &
 for Locke’s political doctrines
188
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 Locke inaugurated analytic empiricism which
dominated philosophy in England & in the
French Enlightenment for a century before the
French Revolution, because of (cont.d)
 Hume’s diplomatic posting in France &
acquaintance with many of the leading intellectuals
 Voltaire’s
 sojourn in England and acquaintance with many there,
and
 role as chief transmitter of English influence to France
189
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 Locke inaugurated analytic empiricism which
dominated philosophy in England & in the
French Enlightenment for a century before the
French Revolution, because of (cont.d)
 the American & French revolutions when England
began to take interest in Locke’s political doctrines
 Berkeley had little interest in politics
 Hume was a Tory skeptical of government
 Locke influenced Shelley’s Necessity of Atheism for
which Shelley was expelled from Oxford
190
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 Kant salvaged the constructionist idealism
pioneered by Descartes & brought to its highest
development by Leibniz, and this dominated in
Germany because subsequent Englishempiricist-inspired French-Enlightenment
“deconstructionist” or “critical” philosophies
were blamed at German universities for the
excesses of the French Revolution because of
their secularism & tolerance.
 Germans sought their own alternative to British
191
empiricism and French-Enlightenment philosophy.
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 Kant salvaged ,,, constructionist idealism…,
and this dominated in Germany … (cont.d)
 Kant provided a constructionist alternative to critical
French Enlightenment philosophy,
 especially, strong protection against moral anarchy, by
picking up the interrupted Cartesian & Leibnizian trend.
Kant was a democrat, liberal & pacifist but
 his philosophy prompted 2 divergent philosophical trends
in both England & on the Continent (but had no influence
in America where political institutions remain today as in
Locke)
 techno-rationalist: Bentham, Ricardo & Marx
 literary-emotionalist: Fichte, Byron, Carlyle & Nietzsche.
192
Coleridge lamented the French Revolution for being atheism
inspired
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 British versus Continental philosophy
 British philosophy is more detailed & developed
piecemeal. General principles are not hypothesized
and proven, but derived inductively by examining
applications.
 Hume
 seeks counterexample: imagining a color never seen between
two colors seen before
 then makes a modest generalization inductively from the facts.
Subsequent criticism triggers modification without total collapse,
while.
 Leibniz
 analyzes that a single component can’t be extended, so can’t be
material and
193
 from that single logical premise deduces/erects an entire edifice.
Criticism makes the entire structure unstable.
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d)
 British since Hume have rejected metaphysics as
an attempt to discover truths about the world
exclusively by deductive reasoning.
 British since Locke tended to be personally
benevolent & therefore regarded
pleasure/happiness as good, not ignoble, while
Continentals who tended to be less personally
benevolent founded ethics on non-utilitarian
principles, including heroism.
 For Kant an act has moral merit only when performed for
the sake of moral law.
 However the good should not suffer/cause pain.
194
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d)
 British since Locke…regarded happiness as good…
while Continentals…founded ethics on…heroism(cont.d)
 For Kant an act has moral merit only when performed for
the sake of moral law. (cont.d)
 Since good often does, God is needed to assure justice after death.
 This is Kant’s unique new “practical” proof of God’s existence.
 As an American pragmatist said: if God doesn’t exist, He needs
to be invented.
 Indeed, Locke implicitly makes such a proof by insisting on the
need for belief in God to drive “prudent” (civil) behavior.
195
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d)
 British since Locke…regarded happiness as good…
while Continentals…founded ethics on…heroism(cont.d)
 For Kant an act has moral merit only when performed for
the sake of moral law. (cont.d)
 This is Kant’s unique new “practical” proof of God’s existence.(cont.d)
 Furthermore, natural law implies another “practical proof” for
(positing) God’s existence: self-subjection by human
institutions to a divine judge/lawgiver, which
--limits their power to do wrong
--or serves as a justification from intervening to do right in
some natural conflict.
196
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d)
 British since Locke…regarded happiness as good…
while Continentals…founded ethics on…heroism(cont.d)
 For other Continentals, contempt for happiness is
accompanied by praise for
 heroism (often as a disguise for impulse to power, & even to cruelty
as, for example, in the unexamplary behavior of Byron’s heros)
 strong emotion, even if hatred or revenge
 In politics
 Locke’s followers were tentative,
 willing to leave every question to be decided by free discussion
 believers in gradual reform (even in socialist revolution, witness the
Fabian (Fabius Cunctor, the procrastinator) Socialists of George
Bernard Shaw who founded today’s governing British Labour Party)
197 by
 experimental in dealing with problems one at a time rather than
big programs cut out of one block.
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d)
 In politics (cont.d)
 Continentals as revolutionaries or defenders of established
authority





attempted to grasp things entire (by intuition)
were willing in turn to shatter it to pieces
reconstruct all from scratch
use violence
condemn peace-loving as ignoble.
198
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d)
 Locke’s support of property
 recognized & motivated the rising commercial class,
 in opposition to the landed aristocracy to whom property
accumulation was both “ignoble” & threatening
 while middle-class writers denounced the commercial class
and
 the inarticulate peasantry rebelled against the aristocracy in
France & Russia.
 The literary-emotionalist opponents of Locke (driven
by hatred, envy & love of power) admired war
(militarism) & self-sacrifice for
 being heroic and
 implementing their contempt for comfort & ease
199
English Analytic Empiricism vs Continental Constructionist Idealism (cont.d)
 British versus Continental philosophy (cont.d)
 The techno-rationalist utilitarians were opposed to
the literary-emotionalists & allied with merchants in
regarding war as
 folly & an
 interference in trade that capitalism has prioritized for the
last 2 centuries,
 elevated enlightened self-interest to where it was
 more conducive to the general interest than the literaryemotionalists’ goals & methods, &
 mitigated within the system the horrors of early industrialism.200
Berkeley
 denied the existence of matter
 said material objects exist only through being
perceived. Once not perceived, they don’t exist
 “Not perceived” can mean
 “not being perceived” now by someone somewhere,
 But continuity in perceiving is assured by God’s perceiving
everything always
 This is a new argument for God’s existence, now by divine
coordination of perceptions between
 the world at instants of time, besides between
 different “substances” at any given moment of time,
 the mental and the physical for Descartes, or
 The infinitely numerous monads for Leibniz
201
Berkeley (cont.d)
 “Not perceived” can mean (cont.d)
 or “not being perceivable including now” because no
one exists any more
 This is a nonsense question: Will mathematics continue to
exist in the absence of human beings? What happens if no
humans exist is useless when there is no one to benefit
from the answer.
 Nonsense like all “what if” questions about the past which
cannot be revisited, unless being asked not for nostalgia
but as evidence for or against present decisions.
 He was an Irishman and fellow of Trinity College,
Dublin, at an early age
202
Berkeley (cont.d)
 He was presented at the English Court by
Jonathan Swift, whose wife bequeathed half her
property to Berkeley
 He was the first philosopher to visit America. He
lived in Rhode Island for 3 years developing a
scheme for a college in Bermuda which he
abandoned
 Berkeley, California, was named after him
because he said (like Hegel said after him of the
movement of world history) the expansion of
empire is Westward.
203
Berkeley (cont.d)
 He abandoned philosophy later in life to develop
tar-water for its medicinal properties and cheerful
effect.
 He wrote his most important work when he was
young & in a charming style
 He wrote The Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous
which contains his most persuasive argument
against matter. But the argument proves a
conclusion different from the one intended:
 Intended conclusion: all reality is mental
 Actual conclusion:
 We perceive qualities, not things
 Qualities are relative to the percipient
204
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Hylas represents scientifically educated common
sense, and Philonous is Berkeley
 Hylas faults Philonous for denying the reality of
matter
 Philonous replies that we do not perceive the causes
of perceptions (an arch-denial of substance). By the
senses we have (relational) perceptions
 But there is no “thing” of which those perceptions are a
quality (whence Leibniz’s “dual” of propositional logic: the
thing is the class of “concrete” things which, in this case,
are perceptions of qualities.)
 The thing (substance) is nothing but a combination of
sensible qualities
205
 The reality (“thing”) being perceived is some quality.
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Hylas represents scientifically educated common
sense, and Philonous is Berkeley (cont.d)
 Hylas distinguishes existence from being perceived.
 Logically (thanks to Leibniz’s dual logic) existing means a
quality is a member of a class constituting a thing
 Especially now, existence is of properties; so existence
itself cannot be a property. Leibniz’s dual logic accordingly
provides the strongest illustration of how existence cannot
be a property (essence).
 Hylas’ argument does not therefore contradict
Philonous, but only demolishes the traditional
Ontological Argument
206
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Hylas represents scientifically educated common
sense, and Philonous is Berkeley (cont.d)
 If Hylas means existence of a substance in which
qualities inhere, then
 Philonous’ response is that the “substance” of perception is
mental
 Philonous cites as evidence
 the case of lukewarm water which feels hot if your hand is cold, &
cold if your hand is hot, & Hylas acquiesces.
 the pleasantness or unpleasantness of flavors & odors
 that the sound we hear is not identically the motion in air of
something
 that the colors of clouds disappear on closer inspection
 that the microscope reveals a perception completely different than
what the naked eye reveals
 Hylas maintains that primary qualities of figure or motion
207
should inhere in external unthinking substances
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Hylas represents scientifically educated common
sense, and Philonous is Berkeley (cont.d)
 If Hylas means existence of a substance in which
qualities inhere, then (cont.d)
 Philonous replies that even figure & motion are qualities
relative to the perceiver: things look big to people near
them & small to people far off, and movement may seem
quick to one man & slow to another.
 Hylas then distinguishes object from sensation, with object
having a real existence in some unthinking substance,
without the mind.
 Berkeley’s logical argument is
 We perceive colors, sounds, etc. which there is no
reason to believe inhere in a single “thing” together
or
208
over time (a correct claim according to Russell), &
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s logical argument is (cont.d)
 these colors, sounds, etc. are mental, not material
things (but a definition of “mental” other than as “nonmaterial” is lacking/needed according to Russell).
Philonous says perceptions are ideas & ideas cannot
exist outside the mind
 He assumes a subject-predicate relation between
thought/mind (subject) & perception (predicate) with no
thing “in” the mind but only things “before” the mind
209
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s logical argument is (cont.d)
 these colors, sounds, etc. are mental, not material
things (but a definition of “mental” other than as “nonmaterial” is lacking/needed according to Russell).
Philonous says perceptions are ideas & ideas cannot
exist outside the mind (cont.d)
 He disputes the need to distinguish between the act of
perceiving, which is mental, and an object perceived which
is not mental by saying that stating any such object should
exist in a non-thinking substance is as logically
contradictory as saying that a nephew can exist without an
uncle. This is too strong an argument according to
Russell: coexistence as both a substance before the mind,
& only as a non-thinking substance when not being an
210
object of the senses, is not logically impossible
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s logical argument is (cont.d)
 these colors, sounds, etc. are mental, not material
things (but a definition of “mental” other than as “nonmaterial” is lacking/needed according to Russell).
Philonous says perceptions are ideas & ideas cannot
exist outside the mind (cont.d)
 He commits the same fallacy when countering Hylas’ valid
argument that a house that no one perceives is
conceivable (not self-contradictory) as for example the
existence of a product (from the multiplication) of 2 integers
not performed yet by anybody among the infinity of
possible products. (This is mathematical existence which
is, at least, conceivable but, by Berkeley’s reasoning,
impossible, at least until Berkeley postulates God’s thinking
211
of it (deus ex machina).
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s logical argument is (cont.d)
 Sensible objects must be sensible. This is an
analytic, tautological statement from which Berkeley
mistakenly derives necessary existence. [See next
slide.] Philonous says distance appears in dreams;
so, distance is not perceived by sight but judged as a
result of experience (in anticipation of Kant’s
postulation of space & time as apriori organizing
principles of experience intrinsic to the mind but the
result of experience acquired by succeeding
generations of humans over biological history).
212
Berkeley’s fallacy of “necessity” of sensibility
T
T T
T
("x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx) or
[Ox: “x is an object”; Sx: “x is sensible”]
("x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx)
‘ ’ and ‘ ’ are necessity and they mean “it is necessary that”:
‘ ’ is logical necessity by standard propositional calculus, and it’s opposite is
‘ ’ “not necessarily”
‘ ’ is “modal” necessity in modal logic[, as distinguished from
‘’ “possibility” which is related to ‘
“impossible that” ( ) 
’ by
( ) “necessarily not that”.
[necessarily (
T
T
T
T
Standard propositional logic has no such operator as ‘’.]
Berkeley commits the fallacy of
“moving the operator to the wrong scope (to within the brackets)”
from : ("x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx)
or
("x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx)
to: ("x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx) or
("x)((Ox & Sx)  Sx)
in other words from logical necessity to factual necessity. The correct conversion is
("x)( (Ox & Sx)  Sx) or
("x)( (Ox & Sx)  Sx)
Any factual necessity is conditional on factual necessity. No factual necessity is
unconditional absolute necessity. For example, a sensible object may, or may not,
be being sensed at a given time. It is not necessary for it to be being sensed, Sx
) as Leibnizian actualization of possibles ()], for it to be a sensible
213
object (Sx  Sx)
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments:
 Heat is painful and therefore cannot be in an
unperceiving thing
 It’s unclear if pain is a sensation being caused
 by a substance (fire)
 which is an unnecessary assumption, but
 which Berkeley now has a compelling reason to call the mind,
 or by another sensation (heat). In that case
 there is no call for a causal substance at all since
 the cause is just another quality, and Berkeley’s argument is
not applicable.
 The same argument applies to pleasantness of odors.
214
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments: (cont.d)
 Philonous’ argument about hot or cold hands in
lukewarm water demonstrates just that it is
“difference” in temperature, not absolute temperature,
that is being perceived.
 Differences are naturally relative (subjective) while
 absolute temperatures are not proved here to be relative.
• Hylas’ argument that sound as motions of air is a
non-relational definition of sound
 relative to source alone, impact of an object on air,
 while Berkeley’s definition is also non-relational, but relative
to sink (recipient) alone, and this is more correct.
215
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments: (cont.d)
• In Philonous’ dismissal of Hylas’ appeal to the
primary qualities of extension & motion as inhering in
an external substance, Berkeley mistakenly affirms
the mental subjectivity of perceived space, instead of
the relativity (objective subjectivity), or intersubjectivity, of perceived space.
• While Philonous claims the possibility of knowing
spirits, knowing them or others’ ideas should be as
impossible as to know matter.
216
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments: (cont.d)
• Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible
qualities that experience has guided us in assuming
belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims.
 The concept of thing, while maybe useful for getting along
in the world, adds nothing to the perceived qualities and
Berkeley is right to reject it.
 Berkeley never defines “perceive”. So, it is a “primitive”,
(which means undefined) concept in Berkeley’s philosophy,
rather than a “substance”, which is a (useless)
(meta)physical counterpart for a place/role in a conceptual
(theoretical) system.
 Einstein made matter & energy
interchangeable/interconvertible under the primitive
concept of “event”. An impact on the senses is (part of)
217 an
event
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments: (cont.d)
• Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible
qualities that experience has guided us in assuming
belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)
 Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation
between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a
substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be
only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s
conceptology).
• Berkeley’s rejection of the substantial ego as agent underlying a
percept was a rejection of the Cartesian cogito
• Accordingly a percept is an occurrence, an equivalence between
“being real” and “being perceived”. This is consistent with
Leibnizian existence as actualization (occurrence, happening,
rather than persisting as a static substrate).
• But Berkeley held that some real spiritual substances also exist
218a
unperceived, but he would hold they are readily perceived by
spiritual God as guarantor of their existence.
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d)
• Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible
qualities that experience has guided us in assuming
belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)
 Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation
between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a
substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be
only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s
conceptology). (cont.d)
• Recollection is mental & connected with habit. So being perceived
and occurring tend to differ: being perceived is remembered while
occurring is not. But physical processes, too, have memory, as
materials do when they revert to their previous shape after being
bent.
219
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d)
• Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible
qualities that experience has guided us in assuming
belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)
 Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation
between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a
substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be
only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s
conceptology). (cont.d)
• A percept is a primitive (undefined) concept in a collection of
propositions that we feel we know without demonstration (know by
hypothesis), & that are usually about past events (memory). There
are 4 ways (the 1st 3 are idealism) that we infer other events from
our own percepts:
 Egocentrism or conjecturalism. So memory enables logical
deduction
 --in my own biography of events from my memory of
 events/percepts, but
 --not of events in the world outside of my biography.
 Instead we postulate events & derive other events in the220
 world from them.
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d)
• Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible
qualities that experience has guided us in assuming
belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)
 Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation
between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a
substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be
only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s
conceptology). (cont.d)
• A percept is a primitive (undefined) concept in a collection of
propositions that we feel we know without demonstration (know by
hypothesis), & that are usually about past events (memory). There
are 4 ways (the 1st 3 are idealism) that we infer other events from
our own percepts: (cont.)
 Solipsism. I can infer events only in my biography and from my
percepts.
 --But we do in fact make assumptions about continuity of
 events, & therefore in inferences about the continuity of
 particular events,
 --before & after we have noticed them. It is common human
221
 practice to infer unreflectingly from what we
 observe.
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d)
• Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible
qualities that experience has guided us in assuming
belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)
 Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation
between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a
substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be
only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s
conceptology). (cont.d)
• A percept is a primitive (undefined) concept in a collection of
propositions that we feel we know without demonstration (know by
hypothesis), & that are usually about past events (memory). There
are 4 ways (the 1st 3 are idealism) that we infer other events from
our own percepts: (cont.)
 Eddington. We can make inferences to other events
 --analogous to those in our own experience, for example to
 perceptions by others like ours
 --but we have no use/right inferring events experienced by no
 one & not forming part of any “mind”, because they are222
not
 sufficiently analogous to my data.
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s empirical arguments are (cont.d)
• Objection: things we know are bundles of sensible
qualities that experience has guided us in assuming
belong to one “thing”, as Kant later claims. (cont.d)
 Berkeley rejected the idea of perception as a relation
between a “substantial” ego (which he believed to be a
substance) and a percept, perhaps because ego would be
only a passive receptor, and lack autonomy (in Kant’s
conceptology). (cont.d)
• A percept is a primitive (undefined) concept in a collection of
propositions that we feel we know without demonstration (know by
hypothesis), & that are usually about past events (memory). There
are 4 ways (the 1st 3 are idealism) that we infer other events from
our own percepts: (cont.)
 Common sense & traditional physics. There are events which
no one experiences & which are still determined by causal laws
A train doesn’t have wheels just inside the station.
 Applying probability theory to an investigation of nondemonstrative inference is needed to decide among the 4
223
preceding alternatives
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley (like Hegel) believes logic alone can
prove that only minds & mental events can exist
 That is much too strong a conclusion: Percepts are
just a certain kind of event.
 Logical positivism. Verifiability (by percepts), or
falsifiability, criteria of meaning confine us to the first
(egocentrism/conjecturalism) interpretation of how we
can infer other events from (or confirm them by) our
own percepts.
 The 4th interpretation may be defended by the
assumption of a causality that is a priori (objectivism,
realism, not Kantian in the sense of organizing
principle a priori to experience) & impossible without
unperceived events.
 All 4 interpretations are defensible. For some people
there is no practical difference between the 4 224
interpretations.
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Berkeley’s general argument
 If we reject substance as cause/source of
perceptions, we reject matter.
 That leaves (our) mind as the unique (mental)
substance, and all that we can know
 By defective logic nothing can be (a product of) both
substances: Berkeley does not make a strongenough rejection of substance, mental & material.
Berkeley makes a logical syntax mistake to
demonstrate that sensibility is a factually necessary
property.
225
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Russell considers
 “matter” as what satisfies the equations of physics.
Without “substance”, matter is therefore a “logical
construction”, actually a “primitive” undefined concept
used to explain or describe in a certain way, for
example by Russell’s “equations of physics”.
 “mind” without substance is just a grouping of events
of a certain kind we call “mental” which is another
“primitive”, undefined concept. Among such relations
is memory:
 a mental event could be one which remembers or is
remembered, and
 “mind” the total interconnection by all memory chains,
226
backwards & forwards.
Berkeley (cont.d)
 Russell considers (cont.d)
 “mind” & “matter” are two kinds of groupings of
events. Empirical (psychological) inquiry may show
that mind/matter dualism may be neither
 exhaustive nor
 exclusive.
227
Hume
 He took empiricism from Locke & Berkeley to its
logical conclusion
 He made empiricism “consistent”, “selfcontained”, but a dead end from where to go no
further
 German metaphysicians failed to refute him
 He wrote one important philosophical book and
wrote philosophical essays afterward
 He failed to obtain a professorship at Edinburgh.
 He became tutor to a lunatic, secretary to a 228
general, & a diplomat.
Hume (cont.d)
 He had a famous quarrel with Rousseau who
suffered persecution mania & insisted on a
violent breach while Hume behaved with
forbearance
 He published posthumously on religion &
miracles, for which he said there can never be
adequate evidence.
 His History of England was very partisan to
loyalists & Scotsmen.
229
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding.
 According to it there are two kinds of perceptions:
“impressions” & “ideas”
 Impressions have more force & violence
 Ideas are the faint images of impressions in thinking &
reasoning.
• Every simple idea
 resembles/corresponds to an impression, & vice versa, but
 is fainter than the corresponding impression
230
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
 According to it there are two kinds of perceptions:
“impressions” & “ideas” (cont.d)
 Ideas are the faint images of impressions in thinking &
reasoning. (cont.d)
• Complex ideas need not resemble impressions. But their
components must derive from impressions. This is
 Modified intuitionism (pioneered by Descartes’ “clearness &
distinctness”): the structure of reasoning is not necessarily
pictorial/”representational” (versus “abstract”, as in art),
contrary to intuitionism. But atomic parts are pictorial.
 This may also be a version of empirical rationalism: theory &
hypothesis (including their terminology) are general but
(should) have observable consequences, instances,
231
“components”.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• Section “On Abstract Ideas” begins by agreeing with
Berkeley’s doctrine:
 All general ideas are particular ones annexed to a certain
term that makes us recall similar particular ideas.
 Abstract ideas are in themselves individual in their being
produced/generated; however they may become general
in their representation.
232
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological
 Logical: we apply a common name to several things when
there is “resemblance” (tantamount to “quality” or class
membership). Objection:
• But a common name, while concrete for being a name, is just as
“unreal” as a universal quality or property is, for being “general”.
• In other words, the theory applies particularism to things, by
representing properties as “words”, but not to words themselves
233
by applying a unique “proper name” to each individual thing.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection:
• If two colors are sufficiently close, any image you form will
equally apply to both of them, or any shade in between that you
234
may never have specifically “seen”.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics.
 There is no impression of self, therefore no idea of self.
 When I enter into myself, I never catch myself without a
perception & observe only the perception. The self is nothing
but a bundle or “collection” of different perceptions
235 a
[collections of properties (not things) you do have as would
Leibnizian monad].
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Objection 1: an idea of your own brain
 --It is complex & a summary or composition by simple ideas
236
 representing particular impressions.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Objection 1: an idea of your own brain (cont.d)
 --Otherwise the idea is not complex but “innate”. This is
 Kant’s idea of space-time, and maybe “self”, as an
 “organizing principle” for ordering/arranging/structuring237
 impressions.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Objection 1: an idea of your own brain (cont.d)
 --Accordingly we can know empirically a priori by composition
 or relation of perceptions without introducing any
 unperceived things as occurrences/properties. You don’t
238
 perceive an “average” but you can decompose the average
 into perceivables.
Hume
(cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Objection 1: an idea of your own brain (cont.d)
 --This introduces a new concept of “relation” or “structure” or
 composition “arrangement”.
 ----So self is more than a mere aggregate but a configuration

or arrangement & that arrangement may be the

distinguishing, unique element in the self (& of “capital” in

economics, in addition to the labor inputs, or “atoms”239
or

“substance”) in addition to the mere composition.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Objection 1: an idea of your own brain (cont.d)
 --This introduces a new concept of “relation” or “structure” or
 composition “arrangement”. (cont.d)
240 of
 ----The quality/type of arrangement is certainly a measure

mental health or illness
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Objection 2: Limits of “reductionism” or “atomism”. Reduction
does not explain internal structure, including arrangement of
or relations between the atoms
 --Structure can be emergent at the entity’s particular “level” in
 the hierarchy of complexity of reality, as Kant allowed for in
 the formation of the individual consciousness. In
 psychology the arrangement of the perceptions is “created”
 at that level & internally, & may evolve as tentative
241
 conjectures, modified (in child development for example)
in
 the process of interaction with the world.
Hume
(cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Objection 2: Limits of “reductionism” or “atomism”. Reduction
does not explain internal structure, including arrangement of
or relations between the atoms (cont.d)
 --Humean reductionism may have prevented Marx from
 understanding capital as configuration or arrangement of
 labor inputs, and this may have resulted in Leninist
242
 dismissal of capital as an illusory “substance” or as mere
 mental (& economic) “speculation”.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Self was the last bastion of “substance” in philosophy
rescued/protected by Descartes
 --Rejecting a substantial “self” meant rejecting the soul 243
as
 knowable (considered since Aristotle as a person’s identity).
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• This theory can be construed as (intuitionism, or) a
modern form of nominalism (particularism, or
reduction of qualities/properties to “words”), with 2
defects, one logical, one psychological (cont.d)
 Psychological (rejection of the “self” of the Cartesian
cogito): ideas as (exact) copies of impressions ignores
vagueness (similar to generality). Objection: (cont.d)
• Hume banished substance (self, mental substance, identity) from
psychology as Berkeley banished substance (matter) from
physics. (cont.d)
 Self was the last bastion of “substance” in philosophy
rescued/protected by Descartes (cont.d)
 --Rejecting the self as substance also meant rejecting the
 categories of subject/object & thing/property as no longer
 fundamental to, or a driver in, metaphysics. This was an
244
 advance on Berkeley who did not draw logical
 consequences.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume
 considers as “probable” not consequences of applying
probability theory or statistics, but
 knowledge derived from empirical data by inferences not
definitive or strictly determinative; that is, all knowledge
based not on direct observation or on logic &
mathematics. Such knowledge led Hume to conclusions
still hard to refute.
 Russell performs a standard confusion of metaphysics &
epistemology by using the term “probable knowledge”.
This term is incorrect: events are probable, not
245
knowledge.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)
 Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides
them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality,
or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea &
that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those
(identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation)
changeable without any change in the ideas and that give
only approximately determinate knowledge.
• Only algebra & arithmetic provide concrete determinacy in
reasoning. They are the most determinate of determinate
knowledge. Geometry is less determinate because the axioms
are assumed.
 Objection: but so are algebra’s & arithmetic’s except that
their assumptions are less “intuitive” or “visual”/pictorial (and
therefore perception originated) than geometry’s & it is 246
this
aspect that Hume is trying to express.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)
 Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides
them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality,
or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea &
that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those
(identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation)
changeable without any change in the ideas and that give
only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d)
• Only algebra & arithmetic provide concrete determinacy in
reasoning. They are the most determinate of determinate
knowledge. Geometry is less determinate because the axioms
are assumed. (cont.d)
 Hume is an “intuitionist” in mathematics:
 --Hume disagrees that the ideas of mathematics must be
 understood by a pure & intellectual view of which only247
the
 “superior faculties” of the soul are capable.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)
 Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides
them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality,
or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea &
that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those
(identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation)
changeable without any change in the ideas and that give
only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d)
• Only algebra & arithmetic provide concrete determinacy in
reasoning. They are the most determinate of determinate
knowledge. Geometry is less determinate because the axioms
are assumed. (cont.d)
 Hume is an “intuitionist” in mathematics: (cont.d)
248 of
 --Hume believes that mathematical ideas, too, are “copies”
 impressions.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)
 Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides
them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality,
or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea &
that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those
(identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation)
changeable without any change in the ideas and that give
only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d)
• Only algebra & arithmetic provide concrete determinacy in
reasoning. They are the most determinate of determinate
knowledge. Geometry is less determinate because the axioms
are assumed. (cont.d)
 Hume is an “intuitionist” in mathematics: (cont.d)
 --Objection: Hume is wrong. Mathematics provides a 249
 “structure” or “relationships” between impressions.
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)
 Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides
them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality,
or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea &
that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those
(identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation)
changeable without any change in the ideas and that give
only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (identity, spatio-temporal relation, &
causation) depend not only on ideas.
 Identity & spatio-temporal relations
 --do not go beyond what is immediately present to the 250
 senses,
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)
 Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides
them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality,
or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea &
that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those
(identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation)
changeable without any change in the ideas and that give
only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (identity, spatio-temporal relation, &
causation) depend not only on ideas. (cont.d)
 Identity & spatio-temporal relations (cont.d)
 --are “invariant” to changes in the ideas/perceptions 251
 themselves so related,
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)
 Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides
them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality,
or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea &
that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those
(identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation)
changeable without any change in the ideas and that give
only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (identity, spatio-temporal relation, &
causation) depend not only on ideas. (cont.d)
 Identity & spatio-temporal relations (cont.d)
252
 --and spatio-temporal relations may themselves be perceived
Hume (cont.d)
 His philosophical book A Treatise on Human
Nature, was written in Paris at a young age,
ignored, shortened & republished as An Inquiry
into Human Understanding. (cont.d)
• In…“Of Knowledge and Probability” Hume (cont.d)
 Hume distinguishes 7 philosophical relations & divides
them into 2 kinds: those (resemblance, degree of quality,
or numerical proportion) depending only on the idea &
that give determinate definitive knowledge, & those
(identity, spatio-temporal relation, & causation)
changeable without any change in the ideas and that give
only approximately determinate knowledge. (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (identity, spatio-temporal relation, &
causation) depend not only on ideas. (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
253
immediately present to the senses
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --Causation enables us to infer (the existence of) some thing
 or occurrence from (existence of) some other thing or
 occurrence
254
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --In the subordination of metaphysics to logic by rationalist
 philosophers from Leibniz down to Bergson, causal relation
 has been misidentified with (logical, if…, then…)
 implication (“”) between “antecedent” (sufficient condition)
 and “consequent” (necessary condition), as if being a dog is
 a “cause” of being an animal in ("x)(Dx  Ax).
 Indeed, just this confusion generates/supports Leibniz’s
 belief/dream of a thought-calculus to understand and drive
 the world
 ----No such causal laws occur in science. At best causation

can imply some logical implication (in a general law),255but

logical implication does not imply causation.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume was the first philosopher to point out the

misidentification of logical implication with causation.
 ----The power by which one subject produces another is not

discoverable by reflection from the ideas of the two

objects: it is known only from experience.
 ----By mere reflection on the objects, no object implies the

existence of another.
256
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----The experience revealing causality is constant

“conjunction”, i.e. repeated “association” (the “and”

operator “” in logic).
 ----Perceiving the one makes us “expect” perceiving the other.

Pavlov would later call this “reflex” or “conditioning” or

“conditioned reflex”
 ------Factual “necessity”: Is this conditioning or expectation?

“The mind is determined by custom.” This necessity
257
 --------can be a generalization by induction from (a summary

of) the association, or
Hume
(cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Perceiving the one makes us “expect” perceiving the other.

Pavlov would later call this “reflex” or “conditioning” or

“conditioned reflex” (cont.d)
 ------Factual “necessity”: Is this conditioning or expectation?

“The mind is determined by custom.” This necessity (cont.d)
 --------can be a hypothesis by which the association can be

“explained” by being deducible from the hypothesis, &
 --------is in the mind, not in objects. Objection: it can be

hypothesized of the objects themselves (as much as

between ideas or impressions) subject to confirmation

by impression, or refutation by failure or absence 258
of an

associated impression.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Perceiving the one makes us “expect” perceiving the other.

Pavlov would later call this “reflex” or “conditioning” or

“conditioned reflex” (cont.d)
 ------An additional inference or “hypothesis” is made about

the future: uniformity in nature.
 --------Hume calls these expectations or hypotheses “beliefs”,

themselves directly “groundless” in experience.
 --------They are better called “conjectures”
 ----------Experience provides only indirect experiential

confirmation or refutation, one experience at a time.
 ----------All experience cannot be aggregated into a single
259a

experience. That is the human limitation of being

particular.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s theory of conjunction has an objective part & a

subjective part that conflict
 ------Objective part: we have no right to say the causation

(sequential association) is “necessary”. Objection:
 --------Necessity is lawfulness, the objective category for the

sequential association of perceptions.
 --------It is a hypothesis
 --------Statistics depicts associations, whose strength is

measured by frequency of occurrence in a sample.

Probability is the hypothesized lawfulness, a
260

propensity in an object to associate (as if by gravity),

confirmed or refuted by measuring statistics
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s theory of conjunction has an objective part & a

subjective part that conflict (cont.d)
 ------Subjective part: The Law of Habit, a causal law.
 --------The observed conjunction of impressions creates a

thought/brain habit that causes the impression of A to

cause the idea of the impression of B that is conjoined
261

to A.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s theory of conjunction has an objective part & a

subjective part that conflict (cont.d)
 ------Subjective part: The Law of Habit, a causal law. (cont.d)
 --------Hume contradicts himself by being a causationist in

psychology, in conflict with his objective doctrine that

there is no such basis for “necessity” of association in

the objective world as there is for expectation of

association in psychology.
 ----------In law, the objective doctrine would make all evidence

“circumstantial”, or “coincidental”, not contributive to

any preponderance of “facts” to compel (concluding)

the performance of the unlawful act.
262
 ----------In law a judge or jury makes a judgment. As Hume

says, habit creates an expectation.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by

enumeration” from frequency of association to causation
 ------Empiricists have rejected induction by enumeration,

considered by Francis Bacon the weakest kind of

induction.
 ------Induction by enumeration is verificationism in science

(championed by the 20th-century Vienna School of

logical positivism), like “preponderance of facts” in law.
 --------Sir Karl Popper’s Critical Rationalism countered

verificationism by refutationism, which is the search for

a single counterexample to overturn/nullify
263

“preponderance of evidence”.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum
eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)
 ------Induction by enumeration is verificationism in science

(championed by the 20th-century Vienna Circle of logi
cal positivism), like “preponderance of facts” in law.(cont.d)
 --------Experimental science is not democratic in the sense on

needing only a majority (preponderance) of evidence

to prove something. Science requires
 ----------perfect 100 % of evidence to support hypotheses, or
 ----------absence of refuting evidence in the absence of

supporting evidence, provided the hypothesis is not

designed to be immune to empirical evidence.
264

This is the key difference between science and politics,

with law between science & politics.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum
eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)
 ------Causation implies invariable, repeated sequence. But

invariable sequence only evidences, but does not entail

(prove), causation.
 --------Hume maintains Descartes’ two-clocks separation

between regularity in the senses & regularity in the

world.
 ----------The (added) power & necessity (expectation) of

causation is felt by the soul but not perceived in265
the

bodies themselves.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum
eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)
 ------Causation implies invariable, repeated sequence. But

invariable sequence only evidences, but does not entail

(prove), causation. (cont.d)
 --------Hume maintains Descartes’ two-clocks separation

between regularity in the senses & regularity in the

world. (cont.d)
 ----------Causality is unique among the three philosophical

relations (that can change without the bodies’

changing) for taking us beyond sense impressions &

adding something (as acknowledged by Kant),
266

namely informing us about unperceived existences.

In other words, causality is a hypothesis.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum
eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)
 ------The causal laws in science are so complex that no one

can suppose them given in perception: they are

elaborate inductions from observed courses of nature
 ------In psychology volition or pain followed by action or a cry

seem more than invariable sequence. There are

intervening neurological processes; so,causation could
267

summarize a complex, sequential connectedness.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum
eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)
 ------The hypothesis of regularity (continuity, homogeneity) in

nature (future causation)
 --------requires (factually, probabilistically, not logically,

deterministically, because the course of nature can

change) likely similarity of instances we have not
268

experienced to those we have experienced.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum
eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)
 ------The hypothesis of regularity (continuity, homogeneity) in

nature (future causation) cont.d
 --------Objection: Hume is a Cartesian intuitionist: habit may

be the basis or form of such a hypothesis in everyday

personal behavior, but it is a deliberate, calculated

hypothesis in science not requiring the direct

evidentiary support (Cartesian intuition in “direct

experience” of “clearness & distinctness”) that Hume

was seeking.
 ----------All Hume finds as Cartesian “intuition” is “my feeling”

which he does not analyze down as expressing269
habit

created by repeated association of experiences.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----Hume’s objective doctrine allows for “induction by enum
eration” from frequency of association to causation (cont.d)
 ------The hypothesis of regularity (continuity, homogeneity) in

nature (future causation) cont.d
 --------Objection: Hume is a Cartesian intuitionist: habit may

be the basis or form of such a hypothesis in everyday

personal behavior, but it is a deliberate, calculated

hypothesis in science not requiring the direct

evidentiary support (Cartesian intuition in “direct

experience” of “clearness & distinctness”) that Hume

was seeking. (cont.d)
 ----------Hume is disappointed that the Cartesian “intuition”
270

boils down to an “act of the sensitive, not cognitive,

part of our natures”.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”

supported by habit
 ------in contrast to the objective of Hume’s Treatise of Human

Nature, subtitled “An attempt to introduce the

experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects”.
 ------The conclusion warranted by Hume is: hypothesis is just

a type of belief, namely one that subjects itself to
271

confirmation or refutation according to the experimental

method of science.
Hume
(cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”

supported by habit (cont.d)
 ------Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the

grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,

namely intuition or feeling
 --------Intuitions are not needed, except as the beliefs

supported thereby have bad consequences
 --------So instead, as with scientific hypotheses, we can272

evaluate the practical consequences of beliefs,
Hume
(cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”

supported by habit (cont.d)
 ------Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the

grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,

namely intuition or feeling (cont.d)
 --------as Kant endeavored to do in his Critique of Practical

Reason, by the Categorical Imperative to act as

though a rule describing your action were followed273by

everyone.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”

supported by habit (cont.d)
 ------Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the

grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,

namely intuition or feeling (cont.d)
 --------Kant thereby carried to completion the mission of

Hume’s Inquiry of applying scientific method of
274

reasoning to moral subjects.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”

supported by habit (cont.d)
 ------Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the

grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,

namely intuition or feeling (cont.d)
 --------Hypotheses must just be “taken for granted” in Hume’s

words, because Hume tried vainly the ancient quest of
275a

extending the chain of reasoning ever backward to

“source” as a river would be traced.
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”

supported by habit (cont.d)
 ------Only intuitionism says that hypotheses need the

grounding that remains the only grounding for beliefs,

namely intuition or feeling (cont.d)
 --------Hume’s inability to “defend” causation is just evidence

of that. All chains of reasoning begin somewhere, as if

arbitrarily, and proof or justification is not backward but

forward, in the consequences & their truth or
276

practicability (as necessary conditions).
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”

supported by habit (cont.d)
 ------We believe that fire warms or water refreshes only

“because it costs us too much pain to think otherwise”
 --------not just daily practical pain, but pain in the sense of

logical inconsistency with the rest of science.
 --------Hume ignored the issue of the demands of logical

consistency within science, clearly noticed &

developed by Kant & even Hegel. Logical consistency

both
277
 ----------expands the impact of innovation in science, and
Hume (cont.d)
 His…A Treatise on Human Nature, … (cont.d)
• In the section “Of Knowledge and Probability”(cont.d)
 …distinguishes 7…relations…divide[d] into 2 kinds (cont.d)
• The second kind of relations (cont.d)
 Only in causation does the mind go beyond what is
immediately present to the senses (cont.d)
 --…causal relation has been misidentified with
 implication (“”) cont.d
 ----So, belief has no intuitionist foundation beyond “my feeling”

supported by habit (cont.d)
 ------We believe that fire warms or water refreshes only “be
cause it costs us too much pain to think otherwise”(cont.d)
 --------Hume ignored the issue of the demands of logical

consistency within science, clearly noticed &

developed by Kant & even Hegel. Logical consistency

both (cont.d)
 ----------stifles innovation/discovery because of the cost of

revising the rest of scientific knowledge as a result of

discovery. This cost is outweighed by the greater
278

overall strength & effectiveness of science that results.
Hume (cont.d)
 Hume’s philosophy is a sigh of bankruptcy by
18th-century reasonableness
 Hume declared the death of philosophy, insofar as
it was an attempt to arrive at ultimate principles
driving a chain of reasoning yielding the rest of
knowledge.
 Hume starts out like Locke, discounting &
dismissing metaphysical claims
 Hume left less room for inconsistency or
compromise than Locke.
279
Hume (cont.d)
 Hume’s philosophy is a sigh of bankruptcy by
18th-century reasonableness (cont.d)
 “Rational belief” is an oxymoron (contradiction in
terms): there is no ultimate (intuitionist) logical
ground for hypotheses like causality, other than our
habit or feeling. Objection: but there is a
recoverable rational basis, namely not apriori
antecedents in a chain of logic, but competing
hypotheses/conjectures with observable (aposteriori)
consequences which can be compared for
coherence with perception (verifiability & falsifiability)
or practice (feasibility).
280
Hume (cont.d)
 Hume’s philosophy is a sigh of bankruptcy by
18th-century reasonableness (cont.d)
 Without an apriori basis for beliefs, all are equally
tenable. So we have a “state of nature” among
beliefs. This supports Rousseau’s romanticism of
struggle.
 Hume contradicts himself
 by saying religious errors are dangerous, but
philosophical errors are only ridiculous. “Dangerous” is a
causal word.
 by being insincere in his skepticism which he can’t
maintain in practice and this proves the legitimacy of habit
281
or custom contrary to Hume’s hypothesis.
Hume (cont.d)
 A great outburst of irrational faith led by
Rousseau (who quarreled with Hume)
complemented Hume’s apparent legitimization
of faith (in particular faith in causality) by
attempting to delegitimize rational faith.
 In fact Hume showed only that there was no
deductive justification of faith from prior principles,
or by “rational” (clear & distinct) Cartesian intuition
(as abbreviation of reasoning, or pictorialism)
 Kant subsequently picked up from Hume and
affirmed the possibility of aposteriori scientific
justification for beliefs (in moral rules or scientific
282
hypotheses)
Hume (cont.d)
 A great outburst of irrational faith led by
Rousseau (who quarreled with Hume)
complemented Hume’s apparent legitimization
of faith (in particular faith in causality) by
attempting to delegitimize rational faith. (cont.d)
 Rousseau was mad but influential. Hume was sane
but had no followers.
 Rousseau claimed the heart (feeling, intuition) was
superior to reason as a criterion of value, even if contrary
to reason.
 The result was growth of unreason in the philosophies of
Nietzsche & Schopenhauer.
283
Hume (cont.d)
 Hume rejected the very Principle of Induction,
of formulating hypotheses stating likelihood
evidenced in degree of statistical correlation.
• The Principle of Induction is not subject to itself.
This is normal. Complete self-reference is normally
a logical perversion, not a recursion (which is
feeding back into a formula the value of the formula
itself).
• So, pure empiricism is not a sufficient basis for
science. Science requires extra independent
principles (methodological, metaphysical) not
themselves based on experience. Those principles’
only justification can be the consequence of their
284
absence: no science.
Romanticism
 It was originally a political movement, a revolt
against received value standards
 It encouraged strong emotional feeling &
expression, especially sympathy, and was
admired by cultivated 18th century Frenchmen
 Temper was most admired when direct, violent &
uninformed by thought
 A temperamental man was moved to tears by the
sight of a single destitute family, but cold to well
thought-out schemes to improve the lot of
peasants as a class
 The poor were thought more virtuous than the
285
rich
Romanticism (cont.)
 The sage preferred the pleasures of the
unambitious rural existence (like Stoic Roman
Emperor Marcus Aurelius did) to the corruption
of courts
 The poor were self-sufficient peasants, never in
need of commerce and, until the 19th century,
never urban & never industrial
 The movement was pioneered by Rousseau who
• was a democrat in his theories and in his tastes
• was for long periods a poor vagabond and had the
tastes of a tramp
• had a contempt for convention, over the whole 286
sphere of culture & morals
Romanticism (cont.)
 Romantics made sharp & vehement moral
judgments, in contrast to
• the restrained temperament of the time that
 abhorred
•
•
•
•
the religious & civil wars in France, England & Germany
chaos & the anarchic tendencies of all strong passions
subversive fanaticism
barbarism
 & admired
•
•
•
•
safety & the sacrifices needed to achieve it
intellect
polished manners
Newton’s orderly cosmos as an imaginative symbol of good
287
governance
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantics made sharp & vehement moral
judgments, in contrast to (cont.d)
• the boredom of safety & little excitement, which
society definitely reverted to in the Holy Alliance
reaction to the French Revolution & Napoleon. 19th
century revolt took 2 forms:
 material revolt by industrialism, capitalist & proletarian,
against monarchy & aristocracy. Untouched by
Romanticism, this form reverted to the 18th century & was
represented by
• the Philosophical Radicals
• the free-trade movement
• Marxist socialism
288
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantics made sharp & vehement moral
judgments, in contrast to (cont.d)
• the boredom of safety & little excitement, which
society definitely reverted to in the Holy Alliance
reaction to the French Revolution & Napoleon. 19th
century revolt took 2 forms: (cont.d)
 Romantic revolt both reactionary & revolutionary
• in favor of
 vigorous & passionate individual life, not peace & quiet
 nationalism to free each nation’s corporate soul not free so
long as boundaries of states (“Balkanized” in Europe) were
different from those of nations, and
• in opposition to industrialism because
 it was ugly & money grubbing was considered unworthy of an
immortal soul
289
 modern economic organizations interfered with individual
freedom
Romanticism (cont.d)
 It substituted aesthetic for utilitarian standards.
Darwin praised the earthworm as a survivor.
Blake praised the tiger.
• It preferred gothic architecture and the rural
landscape to a busy downtown
• The countryside became admired for wild torrents,
fearful precipices, pathless forests, thunderstorms &
tempests at sea and other useless destructive &
violent characteristics
 In fashion it favored what was grand & remote,
terrifying, medieval: ghosts, ancient decayed
castles, the last melancholy descendants of
once-great families, falling tyrants, pirates, 290
practitioners of occult sciences
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Originally promoted by young Germans, despite
origins in Rousseau, who were Catholic but
Protestant in their individualizing & the countries
they influenced. Its influence extended to
• English literature in Blake & Coleridge (supported by
Wedgwood China), then in Byron, Shelley & Keats,
• post-Restoration France down to Victor Hugo, & in
• American New-England literature in Melville, Thoreau
Emerson & Hawthorne.
291
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantic psychology, captured in Dr.
Frankenstein’s monster who murders even his
creator because he is not loved, expressed
admiration of
• strong passions, regardless of social consequences,
since most are destructive: hate, resentment,
jealousy, remorse, despair, outraged pride, fury of
the unjustly oppressed, martial ardor & contempt for
slaves & cowards.
• the Byronic hero: a violent, anti-social, anarchic rebel
or conquering tyrant
292
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantic psychology, captured in Dr.
Frankenstein’s monster who murders even his
creator because he is not loved, expressed
admiration of (cont.d)
• the revolt of solitary instincts against social bonds
 By self-interest man has been gregarious (social), but by
instinct he is solitary. Religion & morality have reinforced
(social) self-interest.
 The passions resist the prudent restraint of foregoing
present satisfaction for future advantages
 Passions throw off the restraints in a new energy & sense
of power from immediate temporary cessation of inner
293
conflict.
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantic psychology, captured in Dr.
Frankenstein’s monster who murders even his
creator because he is not loved, expressed
admiration of (cont.d)
• the revolt of solitary instincts against social bonds
(cont.d)
 Godlike exaltation, known to the mystics, reasserts itself in
becoming one with God, absolved from duty to your
neighbor
 Truth & duty, our subjection to matter & our neighbors,
exist no more for the man become God
 If we could live solitary without labor, we could enjoy this
ecstasy of independence, available only to madmen &
294
dictators.
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantic obsession with solitary instincts derives from German philosophy since Kant which
became solipsistic & made self-development the
fundamental principle of ethics
• In order to survive, the self-assertive individual needs
to submit to the ministrations of others, who should
not impinge on his ego, best done if they are slaves.
• Passionate lovers in revolt against social trammels
are admired, but
 in real life the love relationship becomes a trammel, and
the partner in love comes to be hated, more strongly if the
love is strong enough to make the bond hard to break.
 Hence love becomes a battle in which each is attempting to
destroy the other by breaking through the protecting walls
295
of the other’s ego.
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantic obsession with solitary instincts derives from German philosophy since Kant which
became solipsistic and made self-development
the fundamental principle of ethics (cont.d)
• The principle of nationality (Byron) became a means
of self-fulfillment. Friendship becomes possible only
if others can be a projection of one’s self, more easily
done if blood-related, at least of the same race. This
affected Byron in his love for his older sister, love
between brother & sister in Wagner, and Nietzsche’s
preference of his sister to all other women.
296
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantic obsession with solitary instincts derives from German philosophy since Kant which
became solipsistic and made self-development
the fundamental principle of ethics (cont.d)
• Blood-consciousness identified nation with race as
Italians (Mazzini) and Germans asserted their
“nationality” in quest of the unificatiion of their local
administrations into a single government & nation
• Byron conferred on nations a mystical individuality
 attributing to them the kind of anarchic greatness that other
romantics sought in heroic men.
 Liberty now applied to nations & became absolute & that
297
made international cooperation impossible
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Romantic obsession with solitary instincts derives from German philosophy since Kant which
became solipsistic and made self-development
the fundamental principle of ethics (cont.d)
• The aristocratic blood & race origins of Romanticism
made it contemptuous of commerce & finance
 It was a reactionary aristocratic opposition to capitalism, to
economic preoccupations, & Jews were perceived to
benefit from and govern them.
 It was not the socialist proletarian opposition to capitalism.
298
Romanticism (cont.d)
 Christianity had succeeded in taming the ego,
but Romantics brought the economic, political &
intellectual revolt against the Church to morals
• by encouraging a new lawless ego that made social
cooperation impossible & left anarchy or despotism
as the only alternatives.
• When the search for parental tenderness made the
egoist aware of other egos, the disappointment
turned to hatred & violence.
• So long as social life survives, self-realization can’t
be the supreme principle of ethics.
299
Rousseau
 He was father of the Romantic movement and
the philosopher of the French Revolution
 His powerful influence was due to his appeal to
the heart, called “sensibility”
 He inferred non-human facts from human
emotions.
 He invented the philosophy of populist
dictatorships in place of traditional absolute
monarchies
 Reformers followed Rousseau or Locke
300
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Like St. Augustine’s, Rousseau’s Confessions
depicted him as a great sinner destitute of all
the ordinary virtues.
 He considered his redeeming quality to be his
warm heart, which never hindered him from
base actions toward his friends
 He was born in Geneva, educated as an
orthodox Calvinist, & brought up by his aunt
after his mother died.
 He left school at age 12. At 16 he fled Geneva
to Savoy where he sought conversion from a
301
Catholic priest.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 He unjustly blamed a maid who was wrongly
punished for giving him a ribbon he had stolen
from her dead mistress who had been
Rousseau’s patron, on the basis that his
affection for her was so great that she was the
first person he thought to blame to protect
himself.
 He lived for 10 years with a wealthy lady
convert from Protestantism
 He spent periods as a vagabond. At one point
he took advantage of a companion’s epileptic fit
302
to abandon him.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 He became secretary to the French
Ambassador to Venice against whom
Rousseau litigated to recover back pay whose
delay turned him against the form of
government in France.
 An illiterate female servant at his hotel became
his lifelong partner with whom he had five
children & could feel superior.
 Literary success came late in life after he won a
prize for an essay claiming that science, letters
& the arts are the worst enemies of morals and,
303
by creating wants, are the sources of slavery.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 He admired Sparta. He especially admired the
life of Lycurgus (of Sparta). Rousseau took
success in war as the test of merit.
 He also admired the noble savage whom
Europeans could defeat in war.
 He held science to have an ignoble origin & to
be incompatible with virtue.
•
•
•
•
•
Astronomy came from the superstition of astrology
Eloquence came from ambition
Geometry came from avarice
Ethics had its source in human pride
304
Education & printing were deplored
Rousseau (cont.d)
 In his second essay “Discourse on Inequality”
he held
• Man is naturally good & made bad only by
institutions. This was the opposite of the Church’s
doctrine of original sin & salvation.
• The state of nature was just a standard to judge our
present state.
• Natural law should be deduced from the state of
nature, but is impossible to determine as long as we
are ignorant of natural man.
• Private property is the origin of civil society & social
inequalities, due to the first man who enclosed
some land, called it his own, & found people simple
305
enough to believe him.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 In his second essay “Discourse on Inequality”
he held (cont.d)
• A deplorable revolution introduced metallurgy &
agriculture, grain being the symbol of misfortune
• Savage man, once he has dined, is at peace with all
nature. Psychologist Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
would on that account be a product of socialization.
 Rousseau reconverted to Calvinism to accept
honors from his native city, Geneva, & resettle
there where Voltaire had also settled.
306
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Besides his dispute with Hume, he had a
running dispute with Voltaire
• Voltaire treated Rousseau as a mischievous
madman. Rousseau respected Voltaire’s genius
but attacked him for impiety & disrespect.
• Rousseau supported Geneva’s Puritan ban on
theatre, including Voltaire’s plays, on the basis that
savages never act in plays, Plato disapproved of
them, & the Catholic Church refused to marry or
bury actors.
• Voltaire called the “Discourse on Inequality” a book
“against the human race” written with never “such a
cleverness used in the design of making us all 307
stupid”.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Besides his dispute with Hume, he had a
running dispute with Voltaire (cont.d)
• Rousseau attacked Voltaire for doubting
Providential government of the world because of
the Lisbon earthquake
 Rousseau thought it good for large numbers of people to
die suddenly from time to time.
 Rousseau maintained that if people in Lisbon had lived
dispersed in the woods, as people should be, they would
have escaped uninjured.
 Rousseau wrote Emile, a treatise on natural
religion whose chapter “The Confession of Faith
of a Savoyard Vicar” irritated Catholic &
308
Protestant orthodoxy.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 He write The Social Contract which advocated
democracy & denied the divine right of kings.
 He fled to the protection of Prussian King
Frederick the Great after the governments of
France & Geneva condemned his books &
ordered his arrest.
309
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Three years later he fled to England where
• Hume
 assisted him until Rousseau became insane with
persecution phobia
 found Rousseau had a more acute feeling of pain than
pleasure, “like a man who was stripped…of his skin”.
• King George III granted Rousseau a pension
(because Rousseau was a destabilizing
revolutionary force in France)
• Rousseau befriended Sir Edmond Burke until Burke
could not bear Rousseau’s unprincipled vanity.
 He died in great poverty in Paris, of suspected
310
suicide.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 He invented a “private” argument for religion
that provides no ground to another person to
believe in it: it is the defense (now adopted by
most Protestant theologians) of religious belief
on the basis of “feelings” (not intellectual
arguments)
• emotions of awe or mystery
• the sense of right & wrong
• the feeling of aspiration
311
Rousseau (cont.d)
 “Natural Religion” in “The Confession of Faith of
a Savoyard Vicar”. The vicar reveals what the
voice of nature has revealed to a priest
disgraced for seducing an unmarried woman.
• The priest rejects the wisdom of philosophers
represented by Rousseau in not precise or logical
form.
• After deciding God exists, the vicar
• considers rules of conduct which he finds written by
nature “in the depths of my heart”, with “conscience”
as his guide, and thus
• freed from the “terrible apparatus of philosophy” to
be men “without being learned”,
312
Rousseau (cont.d)
 “Natural Religion” in “The Confession of Faith of
a Savoyard Vicar”. The vicar reveals what the
voice of nature has revealed to a priest disgraced for seducing an unmarried woman.(cont.d)
• dispensed from “wasting our life in the study of
morals”, with “at less cost a more assured guide”.
• Our natural feelings lead us to serve the common
interest (no “Original” Sin)
• Our reason urges selfishness (for Locke pleasure
maximizing that when considering the long run
serves the common interest)
• So, we should follow feeling, not reason, to be
virtuous (“genuine”).
313
Rousseau (cont.d)
 “Natural Religion” in “The Confession of Faith of
a Savoyard Vicar”. The vicar reveals what the
voice of nature has revealed to a priest disgraced for seducing an unmarried woman.(cont.d)
• Natural religion needs no revelation
 It is revealed directly to each one
 Revelation only to certain men is known only by fallible
human testimony
• If men listened only to conscience, there would
have been only one religion
• Hell is probably not everlasting
• Since men like Voltaire were now using reason to
reject religion, Rousseau tried to save religion by
314
rejecting reason
Rousseau (cont.d)
 “Natural Religion” in “The Confession of Faith of
a Savoyard Vicar”. The vicar reveals what the
voice of nature has revealed to a priest disgraced for seducing an unmarried woman.(cont.d)
• Rousseau’s fictitious savage was a good husband,
a kind father, destitute of greed, and practiced
natural kindliness
• Objection: the heart
 says different things to different people
 provides no evidence for the existence of anything
outside our emotions including any better life hereafter
 cannot be refuted
315
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution
• It supports a totalitarian state with some democratic
aspects
• It prefers the city state of Geneva & Antiquity
(especially Sparta) to large empires because it
makes democracy more practicable
• Democracy is best in small states, aristocracy in
middle ones, & monarchy in large ones.
• Democracy is direct participation by citizens.
Representative democracy is “elective aristocracy”
316
• It seeks equality at the expense of liberty
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution (cont.d)
• “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”
“One man thinks himself master of others, but
remains more a slave than they are.”
• His social contract is more like Hobbes’ than like
Locke’s, with these characteristics:
 Total alienation of each associate & his rights to the
“general will” of the whole community.
 Since conditions are the same for all, no one has an
interest in making them burdensome to others.
 Complete rejection of the rights of man.
 If individuals retained certain rights, there would be no
common superior to judge between them, & the public,
once it became its own judge on these, would ask to 317
be
so on all
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution (cont.d)
• The sovereign is
 the whole community in its legislative capacity
 not the appointee of Hobbes
 not the government which may become tyrannical
• Individuals are forced to obey the general will,
“forced to be free”. This is the necessity of freedom.
 Hegel defined freedom as the right to obey the police
 It conflicts with the romanticism of the state of nature
• There is no private property (unlike in Hobbes &
Locke): “the State is master of all [its members’]318
goods”.
Rousseau
(cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution (cont.d)
• There is no division of powers (unlike in Locke &
Montesquieu).
• “General Will” is a levels/category mistake: it is the
quality of an individual personality applied to a
group. The general will is not the will of all or a
majority of citizens, but the will of the body politic as
a whole regarded as a person, in this case
figurative compared to the real one appointed in
Hobbes’ theory.
 The will of all becomes the general will (in which all
individual differences cancel out) only if
• in a deliberation
• all have adequate information
319
• none communicates with another (each makes an independent
decision as in China’s voting rules)
Rousseau
(cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution (cont.d)
• “General Will” is a levels/category mistake: it is the
quality of an individual personality applied to a
group. … . (cont.d)
 Aggregation of wills into social choice. Every man’s
political opinion is governed by self-interest (as in Hobbes,
Spinoza & Locke) which has 2 parts: peculiar to the
individual & common to members of the community.
• With no opportunity to bargain & compromise, divergent
individual interests cancel out and the resultant will represents
the common interest. Like terrestrial gravitation toward the
center of the earth resulting from the cancelling out of “selfish”
attractions by every particle in the earth towards itself.
• The general will represents the “largest” collective satisfaction of
self-interest possible, the sum including the zero-sum in the
differences, of the particular wills. Prelude to utilitarianism’s320
“greatest” good to the “greatest number”.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution (cont.d)
• “General Will” is a levels/category mistake: it is the
quality of an individual personality applied to a
group. … . (cont.d)
 Problem: existence of subordinate associations within the
state complicates the aggregation problem.
 The general will of each of these may conflict with the
general will of the greater community as a whole.
• Now, not as many votes as men, but as many as there are
associations.
• So, as in Sparta, there should be no partial society within the
State and each citizen should think only his own thoughts.
321
• If there must be subordinate organizations then, the more there
are, the better so they may neutralize each other.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution (cont.d)
• “General Will” is a levels/category mistake: it is the
quality of an individual personality applied to a
group. … . (cont.d)
 Critique of power.
• The government may have a general will of its own different from
the community’s
• In a large state the government must be stronger than in a small
one.
• So, in a large state there is more need of the Sovereign to
restrain the government
• Each government member has 3 wills: his, the government’s, &
the general will. Usually his individual will is strongest rather than
weakest, reducing the sense of justice & reason of those in322
power.
Rousseau
(cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution (cont.d)
• His theory contributes nothing to solving the old
problems of eluding tyranny, which remain
 He repeats Montesquieu, or
 He insists on the supremacy of the legislature which, if
democratic, is the Sovereign
 Direct democracy is not achievable because people
cannot always be assembled & occupied with public
affairs
 Actual democracies are elective aristocracies, the best of
all governments, but not suitable to all countries. Suitable
to countries
• neither very hot nor very cold
• without surplus production & therefore without the evil of luxury,
323
which should be confined to a monarch & his court & not spread.
Rousseau (cont.d)
 Rousseau’s political theory is contained in the
Social Contract, the bible of most of the leaders
of the French Revolution (cont.d)
• It reintroduced the habit of metaphysical abstraction
among the theorists of democracy
• Doctrine of the general will made possible the
mystic identification of a leader with his people.
Hegel praises Rousseau for this doctrine, and the
distinction between general will & will of all.
324
The German Subjective Rationalist
Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism
 British empiricists: their temper was social, in
favor of a tolerant world, while their philosophy
was subjective, following a tendency from St.
Augustine to Descartes’ cogito, and to Leibniz’s
windowless monads. Inconsistency
• Despite subjectivism, they cared about what was
happening in the world.
• For Locke knowledge is perception only of
agreement or disagreement between ideas. But the
real existence of things “present” to the senses
could be known in simple ideas which are the
product of the operation of things on the mind. 325
The German Subjective Rationalist
Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism
(cont.d)
 British empiricists: their temper was social, in
favor of a tolerant world, while their philosophy
was subjective, following a tendency from St.
Augustine to Descartes’ cogito, and to Leibniz’s
windowless monads. Inconsistency (cont.d)
• Berkeley abolished the physical world altogether,
even as a hypothesis. But he did not deny
knowledge of God whose action substituted in
perceptions for the missing regularity in the physical
world.
326
The German Subjective Rationalist
Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism
(cont.d)
 British empiricists: their temper was social, in
favor of a tolerant world, while their philosophy
was subjective, following a tendency from St.
Augustine to Descartes’ cogito, and to Leibniz’s
windowless monads. Inconsistency (cont.d)
• Hume denied any role for hypotheses although his
philosophy leaves an opportunity for such a role. He
denied the self and any basis for induction (general
statements about perceptions) or causation,
including God’s action retained by Berkeley as a
basis. Because including external “cause” in the
definition of an impression distinguishes it from an
idea, Hume rejected any difference between
between impression & idea. So he abolished any
basis besides degree of logical consistency for 327
distinguishing between rational belief & credulity.
The German Subjective Rationalist
Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism
(cont.d)
 British empiricists: their temper was social, in
favor of a tolerant world, while their philosophy
was subjective, following a tendency from St.
Augustine to Descartes’ cogito, and to Leibniz’s
windowless monads. Inconsistency (cont.d)
• Locke’s “hypothesis” of things “present” to the mind
served to distinguish the enthusiast from the sober
man at a time when people tired of enthusiasm
• Hume’s withdrawal of that hypothesis served to
remove an obstacle to enthusiasm when people
were tiring of reason.
328
The German Subjective Rationalist
Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism
 German philosophy developed to safeguard
knowledge & virtue from the subversive
doctrines of the late 18th century by restoring a
driving role for logic (added to empiricism), and
a focus not on understanding but on will and
action (added to Romanticism)
(cont.d)
• Kant built a rational moral system on Hume’s
subjectivism. He was politically unimportant.
• Hegel extrapolated from the Kantian individual to
the world to develop a rational system of history &
action by the state.
• Fichte & Schelling built on Rousseau’s Romanticism
329
to empower the individual will.
The German Subjective Rationalist
Answer to Empiricism & Romanticism
(cont.d)
 German philosophy developed to safeguard
knowledge & virtue from the subversive
doctrines of the late 18th century by restoring a
driving role for logic (added to empiricism), and
a focus not on understanding but on will and
action (added to Romanticism) cont.d
• German philosophy
 emphasized mind over matter
 rejected utilitarian ethics in favor of abstract logic-driven
systems
 was scholastic in tone as the first product of philosophy
by university professors since later scholasticism, not by
330
worldly or practical men.
Kant
 He is considered the greatest of modern
philosophers
 He was educated in the Wolfian version of
Leibniz’s philosophy but abandoned it because
of
• Hume’s rejection of causality which Kant
endeavored to answer/refute
• Rousseau’s Emile for its appeal to the heart
 He was a pietist & a liberal who sympathized
with the French Revolution at the beginning &
believed in democracy
331
Kant (cont.d)
 His principle that every man be treated as an
end in himself is a form of the doctrine of the
Rights of Man
 He found nothing worse than subjection of a
man to the will of another
 He wrote on physical geography, on the theory
of earthquakes after the Lisbon earthquake, &
whether the Atlantic Ocean made the European
west wind moist.
 He anticipated but without serious arguments
Laplace’s nebular hypothesis in astronomy, but
also conjectured that all planets are inhabited,
with the most distant ones having the best 332
inhabitants
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason to refute
Hume by proving that, while knowledge cannot
transcend experience, part of knowledge is
apriori (including logic) and not based on
experience
333
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• He makes a clear separation between two
distinctions that Leibniz confused: analytic/synthetic
& apriori / aposteriori.
 Analytic/synthetic
• In an analytic proposition the
• subject is part of the predicate:
• “a tall man is a man”

T
M
TM
(a  T  M)  (a M)
(Ta Ma)  Ma
• The negation of an analytic proposition is false:
•
((Ta Ma)  Ma) * ((Ta Ma)  Ma)
 ((Ta Ma)  Ma)  (Ta Ma  Ma)
* Logical rule/identity: (A  B)  (A  B)

(A  B)  (A  B)
334
 A synthetic proposition is a proposition that’s not analytic
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• He makes a clear separation between two
distinctions that Leibniz confused: analytic/synthetic
& apriori / aposteriori. (cont.d)
 aPriori / aPosteriori
• All empirical propositions are synthetic
• But some synthetic propositions are not empirical but a priori.
• In other words, some a priori propositions, provable by reason
alone, are synthetic (i.e. their negations are not contradictory).
• All (a priori) rules of logic are analytic
aPriori
analytic  all rules of logic
synthetic aPriori
335
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• He makes a clear separation between two
distinctions that Leibniz confused: analytic/synthetic
& apriori / aposteriori. (cont.d)
 “A priori” is expanded to mean “deducible from axioms
(rules)”, that are not just logical. For example, axioms of
mathematics, or even scientific hypotheses. So all
hypotheses can be a priori. Statements of specific
observations are a posteriori.
 “Synthetic” is not expanded. Negation of a scientific
hypothesis need not be contrary to logic or mathematics,
only contrary to hypothesis.
336
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• He makes a clear separation between two
distinctions that Leibniz confused: analytic/synthetic
& apriori / aposteriori. (cont.d)
 Hume proved the law of causality is synthetic, so not
provable by logic alone.
• Kant agreed but added that causality is a priori (because
assumed).
• Kant considered all arithmetic & geometry also to be synthetic a
priori.
• The book addresses how a priori synthetic
judgements (assumptions/rules)
 about things that are other than propositions, and
 whose negations do not violate the rules of logic)
are possible.
337
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• Our own mental apparatus orders sensations in
(subjective) space & time & other conceptual
frameworks (12 subjective a priori “categories”) for
understanding/organizing experience.
• Things in themselves are unknowable, & are not
substances
• Experience will not contradict logic: i.e. no empirical
(a posteriori) propositions are analytic. There is no
such thing as an “analytic aPosteriori”.
• Space & time are not concepts but frameworks
defining “intuition” or view (pictorial intuition as a
constructed whole seen in an instant, Gestalt). 338
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• The 12 a priori categories are derived from the form
of the syllogism (4 sets of 3):
 quantity
• unity
• plurality
• Totality
 quality
• reality
• negation
• limitation
 relation
• substance/accident
• cause/effect
• reciprocity
 modality
• possibility
• existence
• necessity
• Like Locke, Kant regards
 Things in themselves as causes of sensations, and
 Volitions (will) as causes of events in space & time.
339
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• Applying space, time & the 12 aPriori categories to
things not experienced produces mutually
contradictory propositions (“antinomies”) each of
which can be proved, for example:
 (quantity) The world has & has not a beginning & limits
 (quality) Every composite is & is not made up of simple
parts
 (relation) There is one kind & there are two kinds of
causality (laws of nature only, or laws of nature and
human freedom)
 (modality) There is & is not an absolutely necessary
Being
340
This use of antinomies prompted Hegel’s dialectic.
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• Kant accordingly demolishes all the intellectual
proofs of God’s existence, citing other (practical)
reasons for believing in God in The Critique of
Practical Reason. There are 3 proofs by pure
reason:
 Ontological proof. Kant’s objection: existence is not a
predicate
 Cosmological proof: since something exists, then an
absolutely necessary Being exists (whose existence must
derive from his nature or role as first cause or being with
all perfections).
• Kant’s objection: this is the ontological argument again.
• Objection to Kant: for Leibniz existence as best of possibles is
not strictly a predicate
 Physico-theological proof: the argument from design, that
341
order evidences purpose (teleology). Kant’s objection:
this calls for only an architect, not a creator.
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote The Critique of Pure Reason…(cont.d)
• He finds the only possible rational theology is based
on moral laws.
 Pure reason produces the ideas of God, freedom &
immortality, but cannot itself prove their reality.
 Purely intellectual use of these concepts leads to fallacies.
So
 The correct use of them is to moral ends.
342
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in The Critique of Practical Reason.
In it he says the moral law demands justice:
happiness proportional to virtue.
•
•
•
•
Only Providence assures this
Providence has evidently not assured it in this life
Freedom is required for virtue
Therefore there is a God, an afterlife, & freedom
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals.
• He rejects utilitarianism (namely the greatest good
for the greatest number) which gives to morality a
purpose outside itself (and could be called
“ulteritarianism”, from “ulterior motives”)
• He seeks a metaphysic of morals isolated from 343
theology or physics, wholly a priori in the reason.
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals. (cont.d)
• Moral action results from fulfillment of a conscious
sense of duty: honesty from self-interest (as in
Locke) or from benevolent impulse is not moral.
• Moral action is based on understanding of the idea
of law, & the exercise of will to action to comply with
that idea of law.
• An objective principle compelling on the will is a
command of reason, an imperative.
• A “categorical” (vs “hypothetical”) imperative is
unconditional to achieving some end/goal.
344
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals. (cont.d)
• The Categorical Imperative is a synthetic (not an
exclusively logical rule; so, its negation is not
logically contradictory) a priori deduced from the
concept of law.
 Duty (the Categorical Imperative) contains the necessity
that a maxim (for action) be in accordance with the moral
law subject to no condition/goal & to no limit to its
applicability to everyone.
 The Categorical Imperative: Act in such a way that the
maxim of your action should become a general natural
law obeyed by everyone.
• Illustration: It is wrong to borrow money because, if all borrow,
there is no money left to borrow. Objection: he did not
understand redeposit in the banking system and the Keynesian
345
“multiplier” which can have precisely the opposite effect!
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals. (cont.d)
• The Categorical Imperative is a synthetic a priori
deduced from the concept of law. (cont.d)
 The Categorical Imperative: … (cont.d)
• Objection: the melancholic could wish everyone to commit
suicide. Kant’s reply:
 adopting a personally acceptably generalizable maxim is not
enough
 The suicide maxim must be checked for logical feasibility, i.e.
impossible consequences, consistency.
 The suicide maxim is an error (logically infeasible, in my
opinion insofar as it is tantamount having a moral society that
is no society: ($x)Sx   ($x)Sx, so not subject to empirical
investigation &, so, cannot be conditional on any intended
results other than non-contradiction (feasibility, such a
346
Leibniz imposed before the Ontological Proof).
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals. (cont.d)
• The Categorical Imperative is a synthetic a priori
deduced from the concept of law. (cont.d)
 The Categorical Imperative: … (cont.d)
• Objection: the melancholic could wish everyone to commit
suicide. Kant’s reply: (cont.d)
 The suicide maxim is synthetic, insofar as its negation is not
self-contradictory. My comment: indeed the negation of a
contradictory statement is not contradictory
 (($x)Sx  ($x)Sx)  ($x)Sx  ($x)Sx
 My observation: So the suicide maxim’s negation “Do not
commit suicide” does not qualify as a maxim, either, because
it is not a synthetic a priori, but analytic a priori as its
negation is a contradiction.
347
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals. (cont.d)
• The Categorical Imperative is a synthetic a priori
deduced from the concept of law. (cont.d)
 The Categorical Imperative: … (cont.d)
• Objection: the melancholic could wish everyone to commit
suicide. Kant’s reply: (cont.d)
 Russell does not see how to derive from the Categorical
Imperative the principle of treating men as ends, not
means.It’s in the very definition of maxim
 --Every maxim is a rule for treatment of men
 --So, since no maxim can be a posteriori
 (conditional) to the achievement of ends, no
 maxim can treat man as a means
 --Accordingly, the very definition of a maxim is
 good treatment of men.
348
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals. (cont.d)
• The Categorical Imperative is a synthetic a priori
deduced from the concept of law. (cont.d)
 The Categorical Imperative: … (cont.d)
• Objection: the melancholic could wish everyone to commit
suicide. Kant’s reply: (cont.d)
 Russell does not see how to derive from the Categorical
Imperative the principle of treating men as ends, … . It’s in
the very definition of maxim (cont.d)
 --So, the Categorical Imperative itself, as an a
 priori, defines the (good) treatment of people as
 treatment of them as ends not means. The
 popular maxim that the end does not justify the
 means seems derivable from this.
 --This is an abstract form of the Rights of Man, but
 without enumerating any rights but stating only
 the generating principle, the Categorical
 Imperative.
349
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals. (cont.d)
• The Categorical Imperative is a synthetic a priori
deduced from the concept of law. (cont.d)
 Objection: the Categorical Imperative & the doctrine of
men as ends not means seem unable to resolve conflicts
of interests each achievable in a maxim that is feasible
except conjointly.
• Neither principle seems sufficient (& each is Lockean for applying
to individual behavior although with a logical social caveat) as a
mechanism for social choice.
• Politics (social choice) requires a group decision rule, like majority voting, to choose the interests of some & overrule others’.
 Accordingly, the end of political ethics should be the good of
the community, man as a community (group) rather than
merely man as an individual. Social philosophers differ over
whether political decision-making should be maximized
(done as much as possible) or minimized (Lockean, Kantian,
350
done only when necessary).
Kant (cont.d)
 His ethics in the Metaphysics of Morals. (cont.d)
• The Categorical Imperative is a synthetic a priori
deduced from the concept of law. (cont.d)
 Objection: the Categorical Imperative & the doctrine of
men as ends not means seem unable to resolve conflicts
of interests each achievable in a maxim that is feasible
except conjointly. (cont.d)
• Politics (social choice) requires a group decision rule, like majority voting, to choose the interests of some & overrule others”.(cont.d)
 Here Kant’s Categorical Imperative & doctrine of man as an
end would only require treating men equally in determining
the actions that affect many, in other words democratic
decision-making without regard to the particular decisions or
issues.
351
Kant (cont.d)
 He wrote Perpetual Peace calling for a federation
of free states against war
• Reason condemns war, which only an international
government can prevent. Kant is the first to propose
this.
• Constitutions of component states should be
“republican”
 in having a separate executive & legislature.
 A perfect government is easiest under a monarchy
• Democracy often leads to despotism, by establishing
an executive power
 The whole people are not all but only a majority
 In that case the universal will (the general will à la
Rousseau) is in contradiction with itself & with the principle
of freedom (needed for the possibility of moral action).
• This book caused Kant’s philosophy to be disfavored
352
in Germany under the Nazis.
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason
• The doctrine of space & time is the most important
part of the book
 All immediate objects of perception (phenomena, as for
Berkeley & Hume not just secondary qualities) are due
partly to external things (“noumena” behind sensations),
partly to our own perceptive apparatus (in the aPriori form
of the phenomena/manifold).
 Intuition is pictorial/sequential. A pure form of sensibility [a
priori, with minimal input (distraction) from sensation] is an
“intuition” of which there are two: space (for the outer sense)
& time (for the inner sense).
• Two proofs of space & time as a priori forms: one
metaphysical (from the nature of space & time), the
other epistemological (from the possibility of pure353
mathematics)
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Two proofs of space & time as a priori forms: one
metaphysical…, the other epistemological… (cont.d)
 4 metaphysical proofs
• Space is abstracted from experiences because it is presupposed in
referring sensations to something external (in a different position
from & beside my body). It makes external appearances possible
by providing a place or medium.
 Russell’s objection: what induces me to arrange objects in
space in a particular order? It can only be because
 --”relative” position exists in things themselves, and
 --human socialization & evolution homogenize the way of
 arranging.
 My objection: why do 2 timeless things produce effects at
different times? Causality seems arbitrary. It can only be
because:
 --”relative” position (sequence but not exact timing) exists in
 events themselves, and
354
 --human convention by evolution, determining which perception
 orderings were successful
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Two proofs of space & time as a priori forms: one
metaphysical…, the other epistemological… (cont.d)
 4 metaphysical proofs (cont.d)
• Space is necessary a priori because we can imagine absence in
space but not of space.
 Russell’s objection: no serious argument can be based on what
is imaginable [my answer:]
 --except arguing for a concept that structures the
 imagination & embodies, for example, the intuitionist
 assumption that the imagination/mind operates on the basis of
 “images” “in space”, mental “pictures”, “photographs”,
 “drawings”, “graphical depictions”.
 --These certainly support intuition conceived as “quickness” of
 grasping an idea or (abbreviating, as Descartes conceived, a)
355
 chain of reasoning as in the Chinese saying “a picture is
worth
 a thousand words”.
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Two proofs of space & time as a priori forms: one
metaphysical…, the other epistemological… (cont.d)
 4 metaphysical proofs (cont.d)
• Space is necessary a priori because we can imagine absence in
space but not of space. (cont.d)
 Russell’s objection: We cannot imagine space with nothing in it.
 --But Russell just denied imaginability-or-not as a possible
 argument!
 --Only absolute Newtonian space would be imaginable as
 empty. Relativity theory conjoins space with (gravitation
 between) the things in it, making it relative & consist of a
 relationship between things & events.
356
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Two proofs of space & time as a priori forms: one
metaphysical…, the other epistemological… (cont.d)
 4 metaphysical proofs (cont.d)
• Space is not a generalization from particular relations of things.
There is only one space, not many. What we call spaces are parts
of the single space, not instances of a general concept of space.
Objection: this argument denies plurality (of composition of) space
itself.
 It states that spaces are not even parts of an aggregate in the
sense that the parts precede the whole or “constitute” it.
 Relativity physics’ view of space as a relationship between
things precludes treating space independently of things “in” it.
357
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Two proofs of space & time as a priori forms: one
metaphysical…, the other epistemological… (cont.d)
 4 metaphysical proofs (cont.d)
• The magnitude of space is infinite and self-contained. A concept
has finite instances. So space is not a concept but an “intuition”.
Objection: modern astronomers view space as expanding (big
bang), so not infinite.
 Space may seem infinite to somewhat like Kant from the flat
land of Königsberg, but not to the inhabitant of an Alpine valley.
 Kant’s limitlessness of an intuition derives from Descartes’
concept of an intuition as “immediate” understanding (an
abbreviated syllogism), “timeless” in the sense of no duration,
358
no process.
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Two proofs of space & time as a priori forms: one
metaphysical…, the other epistemological… (cont.d)
 Epistemological (transcendental) proof of space as a priori.
Derived from geometry (which is synthetic aPriori,
deducible not from logic alone but from additional a priori
axioms).
• Geometry is not derived from experience
• The objects of sense obey geometry because geometry is about
our way of perceiving. We cannot perceive otherwise.
• Russell’s objection: geometry is not synthetic a priori.
 Pure geometry deduces consequences from axioms & Russell
calls these deductions not synthetic [my answer:]
 --because he includes (conformity with) the axioms with
 (conformity with) logic in defining “synthetic” & determining
 “contradiction”,
 --while Kant excludes the axioms in defining “synthetic” but
 does include them in defining “a priori” & so considers the
359
 statements of geometry to be synthetic.
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Two proofs of space & time as a priori forms: one
metaphysical…, the other epistemological… (cont.d)
 Epistemological (transcendental) proof of space as a priori.
Derived from geometry (which is synthetic aPriori,
deducible not from logic alone but from additional a priori
axioms). (cont.d)
• Russell’s objection: geometry is not synthetic a priori. (cont.d)
 Physical geometry, as expressed in the general theory of
relativity, is empirical (not a priori) [my answer: in its discovery
not a priori, but is a priori as a hypothesis] & is synthetic
because
 --its axioms are not included with the logical derivation rules in
 defining “synthetic” except when Russell defines “synthetic”,
 --especially because Russell does not include the axioms with
 logic when defining a priori.
• In the epistemological (transcendental) proof of time as a priori,
arithmetic is substituted for geometry on the basis that counting
360
takes time.
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Objection: The assumption in physics that
perceptions have external material causes implies
that
 qualities of percepts are not identical to those in their
causes, but
 there is a structural similarity between the system of
percepts & the system of external causes, for example
• between wavelengths (as measured by physicists) & the perception
of colors, and
• between space in the system of unperceived causes of percepts
and space as an ingredient in percepts, under the maxim “same
cause, same effect” & “different effects, different causes”. 361
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Objection: The assumption in physics that
perceptions have external material causes implies
that (cont.d)
 there are 2 spaces just like there are 2 of any quality like
color, sound or smell: subjective (known in experience) &
objective (hypothesized both in themselves & as cause of
perceptions)
 but time is different:
• objective & subjective time must be the same since
• the impression is caused at the same time the external event
occurs
• time is sequential
• the sequencing in subjective & objective time must be the same
362 for
sequential interaction to be possible
Kant (cont.d)
 Doctrine of space & time in the The Critique of
Pure Reason (cont.d)
• Objection: The assumption in physics that
perceptions have external material causes implies
that (cont.d)
 however, the assumption of “things in themselves”, like
substance, may be unnecessary
• then subjectivity disappears for lack of anything to contrast with
• but hypothesis does not disappear, and would apply to or imply
statements applying to perceptions (measurements in the world of
logical positivists).
363
Kant (cont.d)
 The “thing in itself” was abandoned by Kant’s
successors who fell into solipsism. For example
Fichte
 held Ego is the only ultimate reality because it posits itself
 held non-Ego has subordinate reality posited by the Ego
 confused Ego with himself and ultimately all Germans,
making Germans superior to all other nations
 is the theoretical founder of German nationalism in
resistance to Napoleon who was admired by youngHegelian revolutionaries as a great national unifier &
modernizer
 developed a philosophy of totalitarian nationalism
 Kant’s inconsistencies drove philosophers in 2
extreme contemplative directions: either the
arch-empirical direction or the logical-absolutist
364
direction under Hegel.
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Europe expanded westward through America &
Eastward through Russia
 Science made new conquests in geology,
biology & organic chemistry
 Machine production profoundly altered social
structure
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought
• Romantic revolt: Byron, Schopenhauer,Nietzsche
• Rationalistic reaction to the French Revolution by the
English philosophical radicals, & Marx
• Emergence of German philosophy dominated by365
Hegel
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Emergence of German philosophy dominated by
Hegel (cont.d)
 Reclaim by a vigorous nation deprived of its natural share
of power
 Germany had been embedded in the vestige of the Holy
Roman Empire, whose last powerful emperor was Charles
V of Germany, Spain & Holland.
 The Reformation destroyed German unity, leaving petty
principalities at the mercy of France until after Napoleon,
except for Prussia under Frederick the Great before
Napoleon.
366
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Emergence of German philosophy dominated by
Hegel (cont.d)
 Prussia’s post-Napoleonic revival under Prince Otto von
Bismarck sought to revive the heroic past of the Holy
Roman Empire, under Charlemagne (considered German
by Germans) & Frederick Barbarosa.
 Prussia was less culturally advanced than Western
Germany: serfdom survived & ignorance prevailed among
the aristocracy & laborers.
367
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Emergence of German philosophy dominated by
Hegel (cont.d)
 Western Germany, subject to Rome in Antiquity & under
French influence since the 17th century,
• had acquired institutions as liberal as France’s, & imitated
Renaissance princes, most notably Weimar’s Grand Duke who was
Goethe’s patron.
• opposed German unity which would destroy their independence,
and
 were therefore anti-patriotic, and
 supported Napoleon who appealed to
 --urbane aristocracy & to
 --revolutionaries
 Against the rural monarchists of Prussia
368
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Emergence of German philosophy dominated by
Hegel (cont.d)
 Protestant culture accordingly became increasingly
Prussian
• Frederick the Great was an “enlightened despot” free-thinker and
admirer of French philosophy
• He struggled to make Berlin a cultural center: the Berlin academy’s
perpetual president was French mathematician Maupertuis, who
came under Voltaire’s ridicule
• Frederick avoided economic & political reform
• Prussia developed a very disciplined & efficient State bureaucracy
serving as the greatest physical embodiment of “the rational” for
Hegel.
369
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Emergence of German philosophy dominated by
Hegel (cont.d)
 Philosophy, unlike the rest of culture, was Prussian
• reflecting/reflected in its scholastic discipline
• Fichte & Hegel were professors at Berlin & mouthpieces for the
identification of German patriotism with admiration for Prussia
carried on by historian Mommsen.
• Kant got into trouble with the Prussian government for his liberal
theology.
370
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Emergence of German philosophy dominated by
Hegel (cont.d)
 Bismarck convinced Germany to unify under Prussia,
against the disposition of internationally-minded Germans
 Kant & Hegel eventually conquered the scholastic-oriented
universities of France & England, where academic
philosophy was often out of touch with the most vigorous
thought of the age.
371
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Philosophers of the French Revolution combined
(Romantic) enthusiasm with science (Rationalism)
 Helvetius
• He followed Locke’s doctrine of mind as a tabula rasa. He believed
differences between individuals are all due to differences in
education
• He thought recognition & encouragement of genius is often due to
chance.
• He said forms of government & consequent manners & customs
are the principal instructors of adolescence
• He said men are born ignorant and made stupid.
• He was a utilitarian in ethics. Like Locke he considered pleasure to
be the good.
372
• He was an anti-clerical deist
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Philosophers of the French Revolution combined
(Romantic) enthusiasm with science (Rationalism)cont.d
 Helvetius (cont.d)
• His epistemology was Lockean
 The sense organs determine our ideas (not just “knowledge”) &
our minds
 Physical sensibility is the sole cause of our actions, thoughts,
passions, & sociability
 He rates knowledge highly, unlike Rousseau
• His doctrine is optimistic for stating that only a perfect education is
needed to make men perfect, and it is easier to find if priests are
not in the way.
• Bentham read Helvetius’ De l’Esprit and determined that what
Francis Bacon was to the physical world, Helvetius was to the
moral world which still awaited its Newton.
373
• James Mill educated John Stuart Mill guided by Helvetius’ ideas.
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Philosophers of the French Revolution combined
(Romantic) enthusiasm with science (Rationalism)cont.d
 Condorcet
• He is like Helvetius, but more influenced by Rousseau
• He said the rights of man derive from one truth: man is a sensitive
rational being capable of moral understanding, and so cannot
rightly be divided into rulers & subjects, liars & dupes.
• He said Locke first showed the limits of human knowledge & his
empirical method, applied to morals, politics & economics, is
almost as sure as when applied in the natural sciences (a vestige
of Leibniz’s Characteristica Universalis calculus).
• He admired the American Revolution for
 basing its constitution on natural rights
374
 making the rights of man known to all of Europe
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Philosophers of the French Revolution combined
(Romantic) enthusiasm with science (Rationalism)cont.d
 Condorcet (cont.d)
• He invented Malthus’ (incomplete) theory of over-population driven
by subsistence wage (versus birth-rate decline due to prosperity),
but Condorcet combined it with birth control.
• He is famous for his “paradox of voting” in the theory of social
choice, illustrating a “general will” different from the will of all.
375
Condorcet’s Paradox of Voting
Preference order
Voter 1: A B C
Voter 2: B C A
Voter 3: C A B
2 voters prefer B to C
2 voters prefer A to B
2 voters prefer C to A
Inconclusive outcome
1. Cyclical non transitivity
A>B>C>A
2. 3-way tie
If Voter 3 was willing to drop his vote for C, then Voter 3 can choose between either A or
B - and become the agenda-setter
There is no fair and deterministic resolution to this trivial example because each
candidate is in an exactly symmetrical situation
376
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_paradox
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• England’s philosophical radicals
 Introduced Helvetius’ & Condorcet’s ideas (mainly the
rationalist parts) to England
 Bentham was leader of the philosophical radicals
 Bentham was originally interested in law. Later he became
•
•
•
•
a republican
a believer in equality of women
an enemy of imperialism, and
an uncompromising democrat.
 Bentham & James Mill shared Helvetius’ belief in the
omnipotence of education
 Bentham rejected the doctrine of the rights of man,
substituting his greatest good for the greatest number,377
perhaps as a result of Condorcet’s paradox.
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• England’s philosophical radicals (cont.d)
 They were patient & fond of working out their theories in
practical detail.
 They attached great importance to economics which they
believed they had developed into a science.
 The enthusiasm of Bentham & John Stuart Mill was held in
check by “science” and Malthus’ gloomy vision that wage
earners must always accept the smallest amount that will
keep them alive. Malthus apparently never foresaw labor
shortage, or the operation of any commodity markets.
 Unlike France, England was beset with violent conflict
between employers and wage-earners who organized
under trade unionism & supported socialism.
 Benthamites ceased to be revolutionary & sided with
employers, thereby converting the British government378
to
some of their views.
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• England’s philosophical radicals (cont.d)
 Socialism (whose philosophy was developed by Marx) was
a rational response to Benthamism
• Romantic revolt
 was personified in Byron in England in unphilosophic dress
 was expressed in Nietzsche & Schopenhauer in
philosophical language in Germany
 emphasized the will (action) at the expense of intellect
(understanding)
 was impatient with chains of reasoning: sloganistic
 glorified certain kinds of violence
379
 was hostile to reason & science
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Revolt against traditional systems of thought (cont.d)
• Romantic revolt (cont.d)
 Was most extreme in Russian anarchism until rationalism
prevailed in Marxism
 Germany proved most susceptible to Romanticism in the
anti-rational philosophy of naked will expressed in National
Socialism.
 Darwin’s Scientific revolution
• Darwin was to the 19th century what Galileo &
Newton were to the 17th. His theory had 2 parts:
 a “what” (that the different life forms developed gradually
from a common ancestor), and
 a “how” (that different life forms emerged as the result of
successful errors, deviations, mutations, in a struggle 380
for
survival of the fittest.
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Darwin’s Scientific revolution (cont.d)
• Darwin’s theory of a common ancestor was not
original. It had been maintained by
 Lamarck
 Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus, & by
 Anaximander
But Darwin supplied massive evidence for the
doctrine.
 Darwin’s theory of struggle for survival of the fittest
describes a material stochastic process
 Species of animals & plants that over-procreate survive
better than those that do not. That creates a struggle
(scarcity).
381
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Darwin’s Scientific revolution (cont.d)
 Darwin’s theory of struggle for survival of the fittest
describes a material stochastic process (cont.d)
 Animals & plants are not exactly like (clones of) their
parents, but
 Differ by excess or deficit in every characteristic
 Those chance “errors”, “deviations”, “variations”, “mutations” best
adapted to the environment will be more likely to survive &
 This likelihood will eventually be reflected in preponderance of
those characteristics in the adults of successive generations.
 This theory was an extension to all of biological reality of
the competitive mechanism that the philosophical radicals
believed drove the process of economics (expressed later
in Bergson’s “creative evolution” & Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction”).
 Malthus’ theory of population growth amid subsistence had
suggested to Darwin the struggle for survival of the fittest
382
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Darwin’s Scientific revolution (cont.d)
 Darwin’s theory of struggle for survival of the fittest
describes a material stochastic process (cont.d)
 This theory was an extension to all of biological reality the
competitive mechanism that the philosophical radicals
believed drove the process of economics (expressed later
in Bergson’s “creative evolution” & Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction”. (cont.d)
 This theory of congenital differences between members of the
same species, like the very notion of evolution,
 violated traditional liberalism’s assumption of equality at birth &
education (conditioning) as the source of all differences
between adults, and
383
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Darwin’s Scientific revolution (cont.d)
 Darwin’s theory of struggle for survival of the fittest
describes a material stochastic process (cont.d)
 This theory was an extension to all of biological reality the
competitive mechanism that the philosophical radicals
believed drove the process of economics (expressed later
in Bergson’s “creative evolution” & Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction”. (cont.d)
 This theory of congenital differences between members of the
same species, like the very notion of evolution, (cont.d)
 made it hard to determine at what stage of evolution men
became equal. An evolutionist could claim therefore
 --that the doctrines of equality of men & of the rights of man are
 unbiological for making too great a distinction between men &
 animals, & that
 --therefore animals be accorded rights, too.
384
 but
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Darwin’s Scientific revolution (cont.d)
 Darwin’s theory of struggle for survival of the fittest
describes a material stochastic process (cont.d)
 This theory was an extension to all of biological reality the
competitive mechanism that the philosophical radicals
believed drove the process of economics (expressed later
in Bergson’s “creative evolution” & Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction”. (cont.d)
 This theory of congenital differences between members of the
same species, like the very notion of evolution, (cont.d)
 also strengthened liberalism’s belief in progress,
 provided new arguments against orthodox theology, &
 made Marx wish to dedicate a book to Darwin.
385
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Darwin’s Scientific revolution (cont.d)
 Darwin’s theory gave prestige to biology & prompted
thinking now in biological rather than Newtonian
mechanistic categories about the world.
 Philosophical thinking shifted back to Aristotelian belief in
cosmic purpose, & that everything is evolving.
 Thinking in terms of organism & growth replaced the
mechanical atomic thinking of the Newtonian era
 Politics shifted focus to the community rather than the
individual, in harmony with the growing power of the State
& nationalism, by applying the doctrine of struggle for
survival of the fittest to nations rather than individuals.
386
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Only with the rise of industrialism did technique &
technology for the first time affect men’s thinking.
• The Romantics were the first to be affected, by
rejecting the
 ugliness of industrialism, the
 vulgarity of those who had made money in “trade”, & the
 emergence of the middle class which pushed Romantics
into an alliance with the socialists
• some of whom were drawn from alienated aristocrats of Russell’s
generation, & embodied in the Cambridge socialists of the 1920s &
30s.
• like Engels who praised Carlyle not realizing that Carlyle wanted
not emancipation of wage-earners, but a return to medieval
387
serfdom.
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Only with the rise of industrialism did technique &
technology for the first time affect men’s thinking.
(cont.d)
• The Socialists welcomed industrialism & focused on
its problems but did not borrow from industrialism
itself any techniques or methods to solve those
problems.
• An immense increase in the sense of human power
emerged
 As when men diminished their fear of wild animals thanks
to the invention of weapons
 As when men diminished their fear of starvation thanks to
the invention of agriculture.
388
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Only with the rise of industrialism did technique &
technology for the first time affect men’s thinking.
(cont.d)
• An immense increase in the sense of human power
emerged (cont.d)
 In past rural customs, not even the Church could eradicate
pagan practices & had to Christianize them as connected
with local saints. Now whole rural populations can be
transformed in a generation.
 A new belief in human power has emerged
• in conflicts with nature, &
• of rulers through propaganda & education over human beings’
beliefs & aspirations
• where no change seems impossible.
389
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Only with the rise of industrialism did technique &
technology for the first time affect men’s thinking.
(cont.d)
• Old conceptions, God & truth, representing men’s
belief in the limits of human power, have tended to
melt away. The whole outlook is new & already
produced immense catyclisms (WWII). Russell calls
for framing a philosophy capable of coping with
 men intoxicated with the prospect of unlimited power
combined with
 apathy by the powerless.
390
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 Only with the rise of industrialism did technique &
technology for the first time affect men’s thinking.
(cont.d)
• 19th century industrial organization was essentially
undemocratic:
 captains of industry versus the mass of workers disrupted
democracy from within as acknowledged since Hegel
 The sharp opposition found expression
• in Nietzsche on the side of the few and
• in Marx on the side of the many,
• with Bentham trying to reconcile them only to be met by the
hostility of both.
391
19th cent: German/British Rationalism,
French Creativism & US Pragmatism
 A satisfactory modern ethic of human
relationships will require recognizing
• the necessary limitations of men’s power over the
non-human environment, &
• the desirable limitations of their power over each
other.
392
Hegel
 A century ago the leading philosophers in
America & Britain were Hegelians
 Many Protestant theologians adopted his
doctrines
 His philosophy of history profoundly affected
political theory
 The young Marx was a disciple of Hegel
 In his youth Hegel despised Prussia & admired
Napoleon & rejoiced in Napoleon’s conquest of
Prussia.
393
Hegel (cont.d)
 In later life he was a patriotic Prussian, a loyal
servant of the State.
 He is the hardest philosopher to understand
 He was attracted to mysticism in his youth & his
later philosophy is intellectualizing of what at first
appeared as mystic insight.
 Since his early mysticism he retained a belief in
the unreality of separateness
• The world was not a collection of self-subsistent
atoms or souls
• The self-subsistence of finite things seemed to be an
illusion
394
Hegel (cont.d)
 Since his early mysticism he retained a belief in
the unreality of separateness (cont.d)
• Nothing is real except the whole
 Unlike for Parmenides & Spinoza, the whole is not a simple
substance but a complex organic system
 The reality of the parts that we see is an aspect of the
whole
 Time & space are accordingly unreal insofar as they
involve separateness & multiplicity
 The real is identical with the rational.
• The empiricist’s facts of perception are not real,
because they are irrational
• Only after they are transformed by being viewed as
aspects of a whole (i.e. in a context, in a system, in a
395
conceptual structure) they become rational/real
Hegel (cont.d)
 The real is identical with the rational. (cont.d)
• Objection: identification of the real with the rational
can lead to the complacent, conservative,
descriptivist belief that “whatever is, is right”
 The Whole in all its complexity is the Absolute. It
is spiritual, but without the attribute of extension
that Spinoza gave to it.
 Hegel’s Logics gave metaphysical agency to two
kinds of logic
• The two kinds of logic
 the classical logic of non-contradiction whereby the nature
of reality can be deduced with the sole restriction that the
account be non-contradictory (logically coherent)
396
 the triadic dialectic.
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s Logics gave metaphysical agency to two
kinds of logic (cont.d)
• Logic is the same thing as metaphysics
 Any ordinary predicate, applied to the whole of reality,
results in self-contradiction,
 Such as Parmenides’ description of the One as spherical,
which means bounded, meaning something more outside it
so that it is not the universe.
• This is like a negative of proof of God’s existence: by ascribing
finite attributes to God, He’s not God.
• Ascribing any predicate usually involves definition in/or relation to
something external and so extra-universal, so contradictory.
• This suggests 3 known facts about theories:
 Logical structure is not identical to physical structure
 A theoretical model can never replicate the entire multiplicity of
reality. What explains everything explains nothing
 Too big theoretical models often result in a contradiction397
somewhere.
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s Logics gave metaphysical agency to two
kinds of logic (cont.d)
• Logic is the same thing as metaphysics (cont.d)
 Such as Parmenides’ description of the One as spherical,
which means bounded, meaning something more outside it
so that it is not the universe. (cont.d)
• The dialectic overcomes the logical contradiction presented by the
existence of something outside the universe (anti-thesis),
 by a new assertion (synthesis) that the universe now contains
both.
 This process makes us successively enlarge/construct the
universe
 until the final conclusion of the dialectic which is the “Absolute
Idea”.
 In this sense, nothing can be completely true unless it is about
the universe as a whole, about all the possible relations
398
something can have with everything in the (Stoic
interconnected) universe.
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s Logics gave metaphysical agency to two
kinds of logic (cont.d)
• Logic is the same thing as metaphysics (cont.d)
 Such as Parmenides’ description of the One as spherical,
which means bounded, meaning something more outside it
so that it is not the universe. (cont.d)
• The dialectic overcomes the logical contradiction presented by the
existence of something outside the universe (anti-thesis) (cont.d)
 A statement about something can be contradicted by a
refinement about an overlooked aspect or detail
 & this process could conceivably be kept up until the whole rest
of the universe were covered.
399
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s Logics gave metaphysical agency to two
kinds of logic (cont.d)
• Logic is the same thing as metaphysics (cont.d)
 Such as Parmenides’ description of the One as spherical,
which means bounded, meaning something more outside it
so that it is not the universe. (cont.d)
• Traditional subject-predicate logic does not allow for relations
involving 2 things, rather than properties involving one, & therefore
regards relations as unreal.
 The subject in itself is unchanged empirically by the presence
of relations as such
 The only way subject-predicate logic can include relations is by
saying that
 --truth is not a property of statements about the subject alone,
 --or the relatives alone,
 --but about the whole composed of both. [But such statements
 about the whole may be “phenomenological”, & not include
 (“mechanistic”) statements about the interaction of
400
 components.]
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s Logics gave metaphysical agency to two
kinds of logic (cont.d)
• Logic is the same thing as metaphysics (cont.d)
 Such as Parmenides’ description of the One as spherical,
which means bounded, meaning something more outside it
so that it is not the universe. (cont.d)
• Since everything except the whole still has relations to outside
things still nothing completely true can be said about things &
 Only the whole is true, real/rational
 There are not as many as 2 things in the world, only
(Parmenides’) one, the whole world itself.
 Objection: there can be diminishing return to truth/accuracy by
adding context after context, & therefore a concept of degree of
reality.
401
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s Logics gave metaphysical agency to two
kinds of logic (cont.d)
• The dialectical method applied in metaphysical
inquiry
 Thesis: the Absolute is Pure Being. But, without any
qualities, pure being is nothing. Therefore,
 Antithesis: the Absolute is Nothing. The union of Being &
Not-Being is Becoming &, so,
 Synthesis: the Absolute is Becoming. But this is still
inadequate because there has to be something that
becomes.
402
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s Logics gave metaphysical agency to two
kinds of logic (cont.d)
• The dialectical method applied in metaphysical
inquiry (cont.d)
 So we build up our views of Reality by continual correction
of previous errors that arose by undue abstraction
• by the application of a finite predicate to the Absolute (like applying
finite qualities to God & continually improving our concept until a
mystical union with Him by understanding the whole (Spinozistically)
• by taking something finite or limited as if it could be the whole
• with each later stage of the dialectic containing all the earlier
stages.
403
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to epistemology
• Thesis. Knowledge begins with sense perception in
which there is only awareness of the object. Then
• Antithesis. Through skeptical criticism of the senses,
knowledge becomes purely subjective.
• Synthesis. Self-consciousness (Hume rejected the
self), the highest form of knowledge. Knowledge
reaches the stage of self-knowledge, in which subject
& object are no longer distinct.
• In Hegel’s system the Absolute, as governed by logic,
is animated & achieves the highest kind of
knowledge for, as the Absolute is the whole, there is
404
nothing outside itself for it to know.
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to epistemology (cont.d)
• Truth & falsehood are never sharply defined
opposites: nothing is wholly false & nothing that we
can know is wholly true: “the truth is the whole”, &
nothing partial (an abstraction) is quite true.
• Reason is the animated Real’s conscious certainty of
being all reality
• In any separateness from all reality Reason is not
quite real, and
 What is real is its participation in Reality as a whole.
 The more rational, the more this participation is increased.
• Objection: information storage & processing
limitations prevent a complete model of the universe
405
from being constructed.
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to epistemology (cont.d)
• What Hegel is suggesting, in practical terms, is a
consistency criterion of truth:
 The broader the scope of a consistent model, the truer.
 The broader the scope of a consistent model that a
proposition can be embedded in, the truer the proposition is
• The Absolute Idea, Spirit, where the Logic ends is
like (Aquinas’ version of) Aristotle’s God.
 It is thought thinking about itself because
 there is nothing else for it to think about.
 Objection: This is a self-referential category/grammar
mistake. Thought is a process conducted by an agent on
something: a process is not its own agent & is not
406
conducted on itself.
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History
• Ultimate reality is timeless
• Time is merely an illusion generated by our inability
to see the whole
• Time sequence has an intimate relationship with the
purely logical process of the dialectic. But no
explanation is given why, if reality is timeless,
temporal progression & the dialectical process need
to coincide, from less to more perfect.
• World history has advanced from the first stage of the
metaphysical dialectic as “Pure Being” (in China) to
the near Absolute Idea realized in the Prussian 407
bureaucracy.
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• So, world history follows the transitions in the
dialectic, giving unity & meaning to the revolutions in
human affairs
 but with some distortion of facts & considerable omissions
in accounts by Hegel. (Marx’s & Spengler’s accounts had
the same shortcomings.) And
 no reason given why this planet should be the object of so
cosmic a process
 nor why most of it should have taken place near the
Mediterranean Sea.
408
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• Perfection is both logical & ethical, consisting in
being a closely knit whole
 Without ragged edges & independent parts
 United like a reasonable mind or the human body into an
organism
 Whose parts are interdependent & all work together
towards a single end
• Mystic anthropomorphism, animation:
 Idea is personification of the Absolute, &
 Spirit is the rational necessitated will of
 that director of the events in world history
409
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• Study of history (a rational process) is therefore the
conceiving of Reason, of its sovereignty over the
world
• While this is a hypothesis
 relative to history as such (which Hegel, as a historian, is
bound to prove by evidence)
 in philosophy it is no hypothesis but proved by Aristotelian
speculative cognition,
• as Reason is (Aristotelian) substance which is infinite “material”
underlying all natural & spiritual life which
• it originates by also being the (Aristotelian) Infinite Form which sets
410
the material in motion.
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• While this is a hypothesis (cont.d)
 In philosophy it is no hypothesis but proved by Aristotelian
speculative cognition, (cont.d)
• Reason or Idea which is the True(st), the Eternal, absolutely
powerful essence,
 reveals itself in the world, and
 makes the world of intelligence & conscious volition
 --not subject to chance, but
 --a manifestation of the self-cognizant idea (becoming “self cognizant” as more & more agents are made to become
 increasingly aware of it)
411
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• While this is a hypothesis (cont.d)
 In philosophy it is no hypothesis but proved by Aristotelian
speculative cognition, (cont.d)
• Reason or Idea which is the True(st), the Eternal, absolutely
powerful essence, (cont.d)
 makes the world of intelligence & conscious volition (cont.d)
 --where individual thought is a mere predetermined agent of
 the universal idea.
 --Objection: “self-cognizant” is a self-referential (recursive)
 category mistake. It means
 ----”the universe” as an agent makes more & more agents who

are part of the universe become increasingly aware of the
412

universe including themselves and,
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• While this is a hypothesis (cont.d)
 In philosophy it is no hypothesis but proved by Aristotelian
speculative cognition, (cont.d)
• Reason or Idea which is the True(st), the Eternal, absolutely
powerful essence, (cont.d)
 makes the world of intelligence & conscious volition (cont.d)
 --Objection: “self-cognizant” is a self referential (recursive) category mistake. It means (cont.d)
 ----in so doing, achieve the universe’s own evolution in the

process since, at each stage, the universe they are

beholding has not been fully realized yet because not

everyone has joined in the process yet by becoming aware
413

of it.
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• While this is a hypothesis (cont.d)
 In philosophy it is no hypothesis but proved by Aristotelian
speculative cognition, (cont.d)
• Reason or Idea which is the True(st), the Eternal, absolutely
powerful essence, (cont.d)
 makes the world of intelligence & conscious volition (cont.d)
 --Objection: “self-cognizant” is a self referential (recursive) category mistake. It means (cont.d)
 ----This is part of a free process but predetermined by the very

agency of itself (the category mistake). “Free” means

“correct”.
414
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• While this is a hypothesis (cont.d)
 In philosophy it is no hypothesis but proved by Aristotelian
speculative cognition, (cont.d)
• The essence of Spirit is “freedom” meaning “self-causation”,
meaning “sequential self-causation”, “recursion” as in recursive
equations, like
 xn = ax n-1
 x = ax , where the solutions are a = 1 or (a = 0 & x = 0)
 x = a/x , where the solutions are (a = 1 & x = 1) or x = a
• Recursive methods may have begun to be used in mathematics &
this may have begun encouraging self-reference in philosophy
which is already strong in Aquinas’ descriptions of God.
• The essence of matter is gravity, causation (y) outside itself (x)
415
 x = ay
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• While this is a hypothesis (cont.d)
 Hegel knows this because he says “I have traversed the
entire field” of speculation, not empirical research.
• 3 stages in the historical development of Spirit:
Orientals, Greeks, Romans, Germans
 The history of the world is the disciplining of the
uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into obedience with a
universal principle conferring “subjective freedom”. 2
interpretations:
• (minimalist) Bringing order (lawfulness, freedom) out of chaos.
416
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• 3 stages in the historical development of Spirit:
Orientals, Greeks, Romans, Germans (cont.d)
 The history of the world is the disciplining of the
uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into obedience with a
universal principle conferring “subjective freedom”. 2
interpretations: (cont.d)
• (maximalist) Bringing action/though into compliance (naturally or by
force) with the dictates of progress. (“Wherever there is law there is
freedom.” “Subjective freedom” is “willingness to comply” with the
law. Whence Engels’ “freedom is the cognizance of necessity”.)
Objection: how to determine in advance
 The end-state of progress?
 The means to that end?
• Do we even have a choice in answering that question? Who
knows? Will progress occur somehow regardless of even 417
addressing those questions?
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• 3 stages in the historical development of Spirit:
Orientals, Greeks, Romans, Germans (cont.d)
 The East first knew & knows that One (the emperor?) is
free. Despotism
 The Greek & Roman world knew that Some (the citizens?)
are free. Democracy & aristocracy.
 The German world knows that All (Germans) are free.
Monarchy.
• The monarch more closely embodies the Spirit as free lawgiver (in
reflecting the “general will”) than does a legislature (in reflecting the
“will of all”) in keeping with Rousseau’s distinction which Hegel
praises
• He rejects liberalism: the press should not be allowed to disrespect
418
the government & police
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• 3 stages in the historical development of Spirit:
Orientals, Greeks, Romans, Germans (cont.d)
 The German world knows that All (Germans) are free.
Monarchy. (cont.d)
• The German Spirit is the Spirit of the new world.
• This is manifested somewhat in
 Max Weber’s identification of the (German) Protestant
merchant work ethic as a driver of capitalism, and
 the Westward movement of history, next, to the United States
where Germans
 --were traditionally the 2nd biggest nationality (after English), &
 --the biggest nationality in Westward settlement in the US
419
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• 3 stages in the historical development of Spirit:
Orientals, Greeks, Romans, Germans (cont.d)
 The German world knows that All (Germans) are free.
Monarchy. (cont.d)
 German history is as taught in German schools & divided into 3
periods corresponding to the Christian Trinity of Father, Son, &
Holy Ghost, before & after Charlemagne, & before & after the
Reformation.
 Until Hegel the Mediterranean nations regarded the Germans
as
 --inferiors in civilization and as
 --enemies of the Church, first
 ----as Holy Roman emperors, then
420
 ----in the Reformation
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• 3 stages in the historical development of Spirit:
Orientals, Greeks, Romans, Germans (cont.d)
 The German world knows that All (Germans) are free.
Monarchy. (cont.d)
 German history is as taught in German schools & divided into 3
periods corresponding to the Christian Trinity of Father, Son, &
Holy Ghost, before & after Charlemagne, & before & after the
Reformation. (cont.d)
 Germans regarded the late Romans as effete & in need of
revivification by German conquest of Western Europe
 Machiavelli & the Italian city-state & secular Renaissance
admired Germans for their independence & as an offset to the
Papacy
 The rise of Prussia was welcomed for unifying Germany under
strong Protestant leadership, as an alternative to feeble421
Catholic leadership by Austria.
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• 3 stages in the historical development of Spirit:
Orientals, Greeks, Romans, Germans (cont.d)
 The German world knows that All (Germans) are free.
Monarchy. (cont.d)
• To accommodate the Westward movement of history America still
required a real centralized State (like Prussia’s) requiring a division
into classes of rich & poor. (Progress did not include reduction in
extreme poverty.)
• Historical development continues further Westward back to Asia, its
origin.
• Entire nations (classes in Marxism) are the historical
agents
 Nations’ success is a reflection of national “genius” (an
422
individual psychology attribute)
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• Entire nations (classes in Marxism) are the historical
agents (cont.d)
 Objection: this is a category/levels mistake of identifying
•
•
•
•
A nation with an individual
History/world with an individual mind
A species with an animal in an evolutionary biological process
An individual with a class
 The main competitive selection mechanism is war
• This facilitates the identification of a nation with a single individual
leader or general
• Who directs all the individual actions in a central corporate
enterprise (an army).
423
Hegel (cont.d)
 The dialectic applied to history in Hegel’s The
Philosophy of World History (cont.d)
• In every “age” of history a single nation has the
mission of carrying the world through the stage of the
dialectic the world has reached.
• “World historical” individuals take leadership of
countries whose personal aims embody the
dialectical transitions and “resolve” the category
mistake in a Hobbesian way by having their personal
wills supplant the nation’s “general will”.
424
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law
• The “science” of administration emerged [hailed by
Augustin Cournot in France as already marking
 the “end of history” of world historical events
 in favor of piecemeal administered outcomes
 according to “scientific” organizational practices & rules
(reminiscent of Leibniz’s Characteristica Universalis
calculus)]
425
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Historical evolution of the State
 The State acquired a sacred character with the deification
of the emperor in the Roman Empire
 In the Middle Ages the State was subordinated to the
Church
 Protestants, with support from princes, reestablished the
primacy of the State by conjoining Church & State
 Hobbes, a protestant, developed the doctrine of supremacy
of the State & Spinoza agreed (because the Dutch State
had protected him & others from persecution)
 Rousseau conferred a monopoly of power on the State by
not tolerating other political organizations
 Hegel was an extremely Protestant supporter of the 426
officially Lutheran absolute Prussian monarchy
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• The State is the realized moral life [Category error:
agent confused with actions]
• The individual is real only in virtue of the State: the
State is the presence to the individual of the
Rationality that is his own essence
• The Universal as the unity of universal & subjective
will [self-reference: “universal”(=objective): same
word in its own definition] is found in the State & its
laws which are the divine idea on earth.
427
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• If the State existed only for the interests of individuals
(as Liberals contend), some might opt out, losing
their objectivity, knowledge & morality possible only
through membership in the State.
• A bad State has no true reality (& would presumably
ultimately disappear)
428
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Hegel’s claim for State supremacy matches St.
Augustine’s & successors’ claim for Church
supremacy except for where the Church’s claim
seems more valid:
 The Church is not a chance geographical association but a
voluntary grouping organized around an “Idea” that the
Church embodies.
 There was one Catholic Church & many States.
429
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Hegel’s claim for State supremacy matches St.
Augustine’s & successors’ claim for Church
supremacy except for where the Church’s claim
seems more valid: (cont.d)
 There seems to be no philosophical principle by which to
coordinate the relations between different states. At this
point Hegel concedes to Hobbes that:
• in external relations the State is an individual &
• there is between States a state of nature and war of all against all.
• duty is solely a relation of the individual to his State, to uphold its
sovereignty in external relations
• there can be no Kantian League for Peace by which the
430
independence of separate states might be limited.
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Hegel’s claim for State supremacy matches St.
Augustine’s & successors’ claim for Church
supremacy except for where the Church’s claim
seems more valid: (cont.d)
 There seems to be no philosophical principle by which to
coordinate the relations between different states. At this
point Hegel concedes to Hobbes that: (cont.d)
• the purpose of the State is not just upholding the life & property of
its citizens, but to engage in war which has positive moral value
 In war we take seriously the vanity of temporal goods & things
(as opposed to the theory that wars support perverse economic
431
interests)
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Hegel’s claim for State supremacy matches St.
Augustine’s & successors’ claim for Church
supremacy except for where the Church’s claim
seems more valid: (cont.d)
 There seems to be no philosophical principle by which to
coordinate the relations between different states. At this
point Hegel concedes to Hobbes that: (cont.d)
• The purpose of the State is not just upholding the life & property of
its citizens, but to engage in war which has positive moral value (cont.d)
 War upsets indifference towards stabilizing finite
determinations, the ossification promoted by peace. A family of
states needs an enemy.
432
 States are not subject to ordinary moral laws.
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Hegel’s claim for State supremacy matches St.
Augustine’s & successors’ claim for Church
supremacy except for where the Church’s claim
seems more valid: (cont.d)
 Objection: in relations between States Hegel’s admiration
for the nation-state
• seems inconsistent with his preference of wholes to parts,&thereby
• provided philosophical support to military aggression by the
Prussian/German state.
433
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Hegel’s claim for State supremacy matches St.
Augustine’s & successors’ claim for Church
supremacy except for where the Church’s claim
seems more valid: (cont.d)
 Objection: in relations between citizens & the State, his
admiration for the nation-state seems to override his
concept of wholes in which
• the individual does not disappear
• but acquires fuller reality through harmonious relation with the
larger organism.
434
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Hegel’s claim for State supremacy matches St.
Augustine’s & successors’ claim for Church
supremacy except for where the Church’s claim
seems more valid: (cont.d)
 Objection: there seems to be no basis in his metaphysics
for exclusive emphasis on the State, compared to other
social organizations.
• The preference of the State to the Church only reflects Protestant
bias.
• For society to be as organic as possible, many social organizations
435
seem necessary. Accordingly,
Hegel (cont.d)
 Hegel’s mystical glorification of the State as the
embodiment of reason in his Philosophy of World
History and his Philosophy of Law (cont.d)
• Hegel’s claim for State supremacy matches St.
Augustine’s & successors’ claim for Church
supremacy except for where the Church’s claim
seems more valid: (cont.d)
 Objection: there seems to be no basis in his metaphysics
for exclusive emphasis on the State, compared to other
social organizations. (cont.d)
• Every interest not harmful to the community which can be promoted
by cooperation should have its appropriate organization.
• While ultimate authority needs to reside in the State, the scope &
mechanism of that authority is a matter of social choice.
436
Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value)
• enabling treating the State (whole)
 as an organism & vital to the life of its members who, if
detached, are dead & cause the State to die
 as the end, not a means to be used for an end which may
be the individual members
437
Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value) cont.d
• Hegel does not clearly separate
 metaphysics & ethics,
 just as he does not separate agent & action
 metaphysics and epistemology
 reality & thought
 animate & inanimate (mysticism)
 human & non-human (anthropomorphism, shamanism)
 psychology & politics
438
Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value) cont.d
• There is no truth but the whole truth
• The whole is an organism
 Isolating a part changes its character
 In social science experimentation is often in vivo & cannot
be in completely controlled conditions because of the
infeasibility of replicating social conditions.
 Even measurement of a part in quantum mechanics
alters/interacts with it, & interaction of observer & observed
is also a problem in social science.
439
Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value) cont.d
• But brain & information storage capacity is limited &
so a model/theory of everything is impossible
 No model reproduces the entire complexity of the part of
the world pictured, but enough of it to depict relationships
under certain conditions (as in economics)
 Every theory/model is a partial picture that is the best
human beings can do
 Attempts at a theory of everything, or theories of too much,
either say nothing (are trivial) or result in contradiction
somewhere.
440
Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value) cont.d
• But brain & information storage capacity is limited &
so a model/theory of everything is impossible (cont.d)
 So Hegel is only half-way correct: the world consists of
knowable systems
• But an entire world system is unknowable
• Our knowledge of the world improves piecewise through partial
pictures
• Organization is good
• Organization of everything is bad
• The world itself evolves through combined processes of
differentiation & consolidation, governed by stochastic laws of large
numbers.
• In social evolution individual-differentiation may drive/propose
441
change while organization guides/selects change.
Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value) cont.d
• Hegel’s confusion of words (concepts) with things
extends to considering words as proper names, each
referring to one thing
 These are Leibnizian monads each having a name “y”
Import:
concepts that include x
 Meaning of proper name “y”
x: set consisting of the extenw(y) =
x
(x : union of all the x)
sion of common name “x”
y=
x
x
(x: intersection of all the x)
y: the unit (1-thing) Intension
Purport:
extension of
concepts that x includes
proper name “y”
w(y): the set of the extensions of all the common
442
names “x” in the definition of proper name “y”.


Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value) cont.d
• Hegel’s confusion of words (concepts) with things
extends to considering words as proper names, each
referring to one thing (cont.d)
 w(y) is the world of y (like a Leibnizian monad) & Hegel
requires it to be exhaustive for knowledge of y, as Leibniz
required.
 Consistently with Leibniz’s Characteristica universalis
calculus of thought, Hegel believed [set w(y) of extensions
x of] all properties of y could be inferred by logic alone from
a subset w(y) large enough
w(y)
unique 443
w(y)
to be unique.
empirically exhaustive
Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value) cont.d
• Hegel’s confusion of words (concepts) with things
extends to considering words as proper names, each
referring to one thing (cont.d)
 Leibniz supported some additional rules of calculation that
would somehow be implicit in the x,
 In Hegel’s case synthetic empirical (a posteriori)
statements are to be replaced by analytic (a priori)
decompositions (by logic alone, supplemented by dialectics)
of meaning, while for Leibniz they would be more like
Kant’s synthetic (by extra-logical rules) decompositions (a
priori) of meaning.
444
Hegel (cont.d)
 The whole dominates parts both in metaphysics
(in reality) & in ethics (in value) cont.d
• Hegel’s confusion of words (concepts) with things
extends to considering words as proper names, each
referring to one thing (cont.d)
 The Leibnizian technique seems exemplified by the
practice of Gedankenexperimente (thought experiments) by
early 20th century physicists who imagined experiments
composed of results of previous experiments.
445
Byron
 Aristocratic British rebel who was influential on
the Continent but not in Britain
 Experience of revolutionary struggle leads to
despair of the power/presence of love among
comrades, leaving naked hate as the driving
force.
 The resulting philosophy, like Marxism, is
concerned less with values, than with
demonstrating the victory of your party.
 He was concerned only with the most primitive
446
value: the good is having enough to eat
Byron (cont.d)
 The aristocratic rebel has other sources of
discontent: love of power & criticism of the entire
world as a form of cosmic self-assertion & even
in the form of satanism.
 Inspired the Carbonari after the fall of Napoleon
 His parents quarreled, he feared his mother for
her cruelty & despised her for vulgarity, & his
nurse was wicked & a strict Calvinist.
 He was a lame child in school and lived in
poverty until inheriting an estate at age 10 from a
447
“wicked Lord” uncle.
Byron (cont.d)
 His mother’s & father’s families had been lawless
and bellicose.
 He had a blend of snobbery & rebellion: his
aristocratic relatives shunned him, and he feared
his mother’s vulgarity in himself.
 If he could not be a modern gentleman, he could
degenerate boldly like the Holy Roman Emperors
or fight like his Crusading ancestors: so, he died
like them, fighting the Moslems.
448
Byron (cont.d)
 He was Augustinian in admitting his own
inherited wickedness &, in shyness, sought
comfort in love affairs where he sought a mother
& ended up loving his older sister partly because
she was of his own blood.
 He wanted to be remarkable, & concluded he
could do so only as a sinner. So, he felt the
Great Man is a titan at war & that he himself was
the equal of Satan but not of God, unlike
Nietzsche who judged the existence of Gods
false because, since he could not be one, their
449
existence would humble his pride.
Byron (cont.d)
 Knowledge is sad because truth is fatal.
 He glorified Napoleon as a force against
(undignified) industrialism (pacifism) &
commerce (shop-keeping).
 Byron inspired the consequent theme of
melancholy in the work of French poets (notably
Baudelaire in Bile et idéal, following the
diagnosis of melancholy in ancient Greek
medicine, and its association with geometry as
depicted in Dürer’s engraving, as portrayed in
Klibansky, Panofsky & Saxl, Saturn &
450
Melancholy).
Byron (cont.d)
 Knowledge is sad because truth is fatal.
 The complex soul of German nationalism,
Satanism & hero-worship is Byron’s legacy.
• Heine saw Napoleon as the missionary of liberalism,
the destroyer of serfdom, & the enemy of legitimacy.
• To other Germans, Napoleon was Antichrist and
destroyer of the Teutonic virtue of a German nation
preservable only by hatred of France.
• Nietzsche compromised, regarding Napoleon as
herald of the classical age of war
• Bismarck compromised, regarding Napoleon as an
Antichrist, but one to be imitated in the other aspects.
451
Byron (cont.d)
 Byron marks a deteriorated stage in the revolt by
unsocial instincts begun by Rousseau:
• Rousseau is pathetic while Byron is fierce
• Rousseau is visibly timid, while Byron conceals his
own timidity
• Rousseau admires virtue as long as it’s simple, while
Byron admires sin as long as it is elemental.
 The Continent simplified Byron, ignoring his halfsincerity: the calculation in his cosmic despair &
his professed contempt for mankind
452
Schopenhauer
 He was the first philosopher of pessimism,
reflecting Nordic Scandinavian/North-German
melancholy amid long Winter nights.
 He dislikes Christianity and prefers Buddhism &
Hinduism. His philosophy is a mixture of Kant &
Indian philosophy.
 He is free of nationalism
 He was the first to proclaim outwardly (on ground
prepared by Rousseau & Kant) that will is
metaphysically fundamental, and superior to
knowledge, but he independently added
453
pessimism by considering will as ethically evil.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 His outlook is tired, like the Hellenistic age of
Alexander, or the Sophistic end of the Golden
Age of the Roman Empire. He sought quiet, not
reform he regarded as futile.
 He descended from 2 prominent commercial
families in Danzig (a city-state).
 His father was a Voltairian admirer of England as
the land of liberty & intelligence who hated
Prussia’s annexation of Danzig which prompted
the family to move to Hamburg.
 Schopenhauer was then sent to school in France,
454
then England.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 His father’s suicide enabled him to abandon
commerce with the support of his mother who
had literary aspirations, had little affection, and
warned him against pretense & empty pathos but
whom he disliked and this lowered his opinion of
women.
 He came under the influence of Hamburg
Romantics from whom he learned to admire
Greece and think ill of Hebraic elements in
Christianity.
 Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schlegel
confirmed his admiration for Indian philosophy,
traced the origin of the Arian race to India, and
praised the German language as closest to both
455
ancient Greek and the original Arian language.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 He despised Fichte and put his own university
lectures at the same hours as Hegel’s.
 He retired to the life of an old bachelor in
Frankfurt, was anti-democratic, and employed
correspondents to find evidence of his fame
 His main work was The World as Will and Idea
where his philosophy is an adaptation of Kant’s
but much different from Hegel’s & Fichte’s
adaptations which rejected the thing-in-itself and
made knowledge metaphysically fundamental.
 Schopenhauer made will the thing-in-itself
(substance). What appears to perception as my
body is really my will.
456
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 Kant maintained a study of moral law, which is
concerned with will, can take us behind
phenomena and give us knowledge (of synthetic
a priori statements like the Categorical
Imperative) that sense perception cannot give.
 So, for Kant, the difference between a good
person and a bad person is a difference in the
world of things-in-themselves and in volitions.
 So, for Kant & Schopenhauer, the phenomenon
(appearance) corresponding to (reality which is)
a volition (the will) is a bodily movement (the
body).
457
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 For Kant & Schopenhauer the will does not
consist of volitions (which are in space & time)
because the thing-in-itself (the will) is not in
space & time which are the source of plurality
(according to the scholastic “principle of
individuation” as Schopenhauer liked to say.) My
will is therefore one & timeless.
 (Schopenhauer’s jump from Kant to Hegel:)
Moreover, my will is actually the will of the
universe & my separateness is an illusion due to
my subjective apparatus of spatio-temporal
perception. What is real is one vast will
appearing in the whole course of nature, animate
458
& inanimate (Spinozistic).
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 But (unlike Spinoza) Schopenhauer identifies
neither the cosmic will with God, nor virtue with
conformity to the divine will. To the contrary,
(unlike Kant & Hegel) he views the cosmic will as
wicked (Manichean). Will is the source of
endless suffering that is essential to life, that is
increased by knowledge, and ends in
death/futility.
459
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 There is no happiness because an unfulfilled
wish causes pain, while attainment brings only
satiety. (This is an acknowledgement/response
to the “diminishing returns” mathematics of “utility
theory” first discovered by mathematician Daniel
Bernouilli in his work on insurance, used by Benthamite utilitarians, & used by economists to the
present day.) This is a restatement of the observation that pleasure resides in the doing (the process) & punishment in the completion (the endstate), a distinction corresponding to a mathematical function y = f(x) viewed on the one hand as
a mapping from a “domain” (a set {x}),to a “range”
(a set {y}), & on the other as the “value” or end460
state (the “range” or set of {y}) of that mapping.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 This also illustrates the sense of guilt
(disappointment) at conclusion of the sex act.
Schopenhauer says the shame is due moreover
to the suffering brought about by procreation
(contributing to what was understood at the time
as the Darwinian, Malthusian struggle for survival
of the species).
 Suicide is useless, a truth illustrated by the myth
that the soul just transmigrates at death.
 He found the escape from this sad inevitability in
the Nirvana of Zen Buddhism (“nirvana”
interpreted as “extinction”), namely the self461
suppression of will.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 The distinction between one man (myself) &
another is part of the phenomenal world and
disappears when the world is seen truly by the
good man whose veil of Maya (illusion) has
become transparent. This insight is reached by
love which is sympathy for the pain of others, a
taking on of the suffering of the whole world
which quiets all volition.
 Schopenhauer sides with the ascetic mysticism
of the Christian monastics epitomized in Meister
Eckhart, as superior to the New Testament.
 Schopenhauer approved of the doctrine of
original sin, invoked against vulgar Pelagianism
462
by St. Augustine & Luther.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 But Buddhism is the highest religion, orthodox
throughout Asia except where the “detestable
doctrine of Islam” prevails.
 The good man will practice complete chastity,
voluntary poverty, fasting & self-torture.
• He will do this not to achieve some positive good
consisting of harmony with God as Christian mystics
do.
• The good that is sought is negative: to banish the
fear of “nothingness” (like children’s fear of the dark)
behind all virtue & holiness as their final goal.
• This (stark, vivid mental) awareness “nothingness” is
at the core of subsequent Western existentialist
philosophy and is viewed as something that Indian
myths, reabsorption into the Brahma, or Nirvana 463
(“nomind”) actually seek to escape.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 The world and all its phenomena are mere
objectification of the will. With surrender of the
will, all that is left is nothingness after all those
phenomena are abolished, such as:
• The constant strain & effort without rest
• The universal forms of this manifestation, time &
space, and its last fundamental form, subject & object,
 The saint’s effort is, accordingly, to come as
close as possible to non-existence, not
achievable (for reason unexplained) by suicide.
464
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 According to Russell this is a Gospel of
Resignation, of Nihilism, of Satanism, contrary to
the mystics’ positive pursuit of contemplation
leading to the beatific vision (of God) which was
the most profound knowledge and the supreme
good.
• Since Parmenides delusive knowledge of appearance
was contrasted with another kind of positive
knowledge, not with something of a wholly different
kind.
• For Schopenhauer we struggle to avoid something
substantial that is not God, but is Satan, the wicked
omnipotent will.
 The Sage becomes terrified of this Diabolic Vision and
seeks refuge in non-existence
 while the classical mystic is seeking/loving the ever
465 of
profounder knowledge borne of contemplation in pursuit
the highest/best state consisting of the beatific vision.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 Russell criticizes Schopenhauer’s philosophy for
being absolutist, all or nothing.
• There seems no relief until final completion: the sage
cannot live a life having some value by achieving
only partial non-existence.
• So long as the sage exists he exists because of will,
which is evil. He may diminish evil by weakening his
will, but he never achieves any positive good.
466
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 Schopenhauer was completely selfish &
insincere for making no attempt to put his own
doctrine of asceticism & resignation into practice.
He
• dined well, had sensual but not passionate love
affairs, and was very quarrelsome and avaricious:
• threw a seamstress neighbor (talking outside his
door) downstairs causing her permanent injury for
which he was ordered by court to support her for the
20 remaining years of her life.
 His only virtue was kindness to animals, to the
point of opposing vivisection in the interest of
467
science.
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 Schopenhauer’s pessimism was useful for
exempting philosophers from having to explain
away evil.
 Both pessimism and optimism are scientifically
objectionable: that the world exists either to
please or displease. They are a matter of
temperament, and the optimistic temperament
has been much commoner in Western
philosophy
468
Schopenhauer (cont.d)
 The doctrine that the will is paramount has been
held by many modern philosophers: Nietzsche,
Bergson, James & Dewey, with will (politics)
gone up in the scale as knowledge (science)
went down, the most notable change over the
temper of philosophy noted by Russell in his
time.
469
Nietzsche
 He considered himself Schopenhauer’s
successor, & is superior in
consistency/coherence.
 He replaced Schopenhauer’s ethical
resignation/suppression of the will by a doctrine
of supremacy of the will, not just metaphysically
as Schopenhauer recognized, but also ethically.
 He was a literary philosopher.
 He invented no new technical theories: his
contribution is entirely to ethics and to historical
criticism.
 His father was a Protestant pastor, & his
470
upbringing was pious.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 As a student he was an accomplished classicist
& philologist and was offered a philology
professorship.
 He retired to Switzerland & Italy after illness.
 He later became insane.
 He admired Wagner passionately, increasingly
quarreled with him for writing operas sometimes
too Christian and full of renunciation, &
eventually accused Wagner of being a Jew.
 His philosophy is mirrored in Wagner’s Ring
whose hero is like Nietzsche’s superman, except
471
Nietzsche’s knows Greek.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He was consciously not a Romantic but a
Hellenist, with the Orphic/mathematical element
removed:
• he admired the pre-Socratics (& considered them
superior to the post-Socratics), especially Heraclitus,
and except Pythagoras.
• he denounced Socrates for
 his humble origins
 corrupting Athenian youth with a democratic moral bias
• he condemned Plato for his taste for “edification” but
excused him for preaching virtue only to keep the
lower classes in order.
• his “noble man” is like Aristotle’s magnanimous man.
• he condemned Greek tragedy for the anti-hero and
the role played by morality as a constraint on the
472
anti-hero’s greatness.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He considers Kant a moral fanatic like Rousseau,
 His philosophy has many elements of
Romanticism
• He shares Byron’s aristocratic anarchism.
• He combines a Renaissance love (à la Pope Julius II
fighting to take Bologna & employing Michelangelo)
of
 ruthlessness, war, & aristocratic pride, with a love of
 philosophy, literature, & the arts, especially music
• He has similarities with Machiavelli
 His political philosophy is analogous to The Prince
 His ethic aims at power & is anti-Christian
 Napoleon was to Nietzsche what Cesar Borgia was to
Machiavelli: great men defeated by petty opponents
 But unlike Machiavelli, Nietzsche was in opposition to the
dominant trends in his time, was a pedantic academic,
473&
had no contact with public business
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He admires qualities he believes possible only to
an aristocratic minority
 The majority are the “bungled & botched” who
should serve only as the means to the
excellence of the few and be regarded as having
no independent claim to happiness or well-being.
 In my opinion this suggests a Darwinian
competition such that the losers serve in making
the winners possible. Without their losing
competition the winners would not be selected.
In such a role losers need to be praised and
encouraged rather than belittled & discouraged
474
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 Nietzsche defends the anarchical collapse in the
French Revolution for making possible Napoleon
to whom the Nietzsche considers the higher
hopes of his century to be due.
 He prefers evil to good. His book Beyond Good
and Evil proposes to change the reader’s
opinion of what is good and what is evil.
 He denounces “human traffic in mutual services”
suggested by moral rules to treat others as you
would like to be treated, and where my good
actions are looked at as a cash payment or
insurance for something done to me
475
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 True virtue is not for all but should be the
characteristic of an aristocratic minority: it
• is not profitable or prudent
• isolates its possessor from other men
• does harm to inferiors.
 Superior men need to make war on the masses
to prevent the mediocre masses from joining
hands to make themselves masters.
476
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He admires Spartan discipline, the ability to
endure & inflict pain for important ends, and
especially strength of will, and denounces the
weakness of compassion.
• Everything that pampers, softens, and brings the
people and women to the forefront, operates in favor
of universal suffrage which is dominion by inferior
men.
• All these should be opposed:
 Rousseau who made woman interesting, then
 the emancipators from slavery, then
 the socialist champions of workers & the poor.
477
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 The endurance he recommends is stronger than
Stoicism which aims at indifference: he aims
thereby at attaining the enormous energy of
greatness which can model the man of the
future by means of
• discipline &
• annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched
• without going to ruin by the sight of the suffering
created thereby.
 He prophesied with a certain glee an era of
great wars.
478
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He is not a worshiper of the State but a
passionate individualist, a believer in the hero.
The misery of an entire nation is less important
than the suffering of a great individual.
 He was not a nationalist & had no excessive
admiration for Germany.
 He wants an international ruling race, a vast new
aristocracy, lords of the earth, philosophical men
of power and artist-tyrants.
 He was not anti-Jewish but believed Germany
479
already had enough Jews.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He likes the New Testament and dislikes the Old
Testament.
 He deplores women:
• In Thus Spake Zarathustra he says
 women are not capable of friendship, & that
 men should be trained for war & women for the recreation
of warriors
• In Will to Power he says
 women have only nonsense & finery on their minds
provided they are kept in order by fear of manly men;
 if they become independent they are intolerable: pedantic,
superficial, schoolmasterly.
• In Beyond Good & Evil he says women should be
480
thought of as property as Orientals do.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He objects to Christianity because
• It causes acceptance of slave morality, submission
to the will of God (which he agrees with the French
philosophes in objecting to) when it should be to
earthly artist-tyrants.
• Far from being allied to tyrants and enemies of
democracy as the French philosophes claimed, it
was identical in spirit to the French Revolution &
socialism.
• While the French philosophes argued that Christian
dogmas were untrue, Nietzsche was interested not
in metaphysical truth but in the social effects of
481
religion.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He objects to Christianity because (cont.d)
• It is nihilistic like Buddhism and much more
objectionable for being driven by the revolt of the
bungled & botched, begun by the Jews, and for
being the most fatal & seductive lie ever because no
one of note ever resembled the Christian ideal.
• It condemns the violent passions he praises, and
aims to tame the heart in man, like a wild beast who
loses splendor when captured.
• It preaches repentance & redemption which are a
circular folly.
• It aims at destroying the strong, at converting their
proud assurance into anxiety, & turning their will to
power inward against themselves, until the strong
482
perish through excessive self-contempt.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 The noble man recognizes duties only to equals
and protects artists & poets who happen to be
masters of some skill, but from a higher order
than those who know only how to do something.
 Almost all higher culture is based on the
spiritualizing & intensifying of cruelty.
 In his daydreams he is a warrior, not a professor,
since all the men he admires were military.
 He feared women because they could disarm
him, and he soothed his wounded pride with
unkind remarks about them.
483
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He condemns Christian love as an outcome of
fear, when display of contempt is stronger &
bolder, & he himself feels no love but hatred &
fear disguised as lordly indifference.
 In Russell’s opinion the lust for power by
Nietzsche’s superman is itself an outcome of
fear: those who do not fear their neighbors (in an
inevitable palace revolution) see no reason to
tyrannize over them.
 Partly as a result of Nietzsche’s teaching, the
world became very like Nietzsche’s nightmare.
484
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 Pascal is a precursor of Nietzsche in holding
that men achieve things in order to forget
themselves. Foremost is the achievement of
power over men, whereby the strong man shows
how many hands he has.
 Nietzsche allows for saints who act virtuously
only out of fear of hell & not because they do not
want to inflict pain. So, Lincoln is abject for
acting from fear of hell, while Napoleon was
magnificent.
485
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 He preaches an aristocratic ethic, not just an
aristocratic political theory that aristocratic
government is the best way to achieve the
general happiness.
• Happiness of common people is no part of the good
per se.
• All that is good or bad exists only in the superior few.
 The superior few are usually (descendants) of
conquering races. Noble caste is always
• at first barbarian, later a product of good birth, &
• a reflection of biological superiority more than
486
environment & education.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 Nietzsche is merely expressing his desire to
have lived at another, greater time and that a
certain portion of his readers will agree &
achieve a fuller life by establishing such an order
 Objection: the attempt to secure his ends may in
fact secure something quite different.
• Aristocracies of birth are discredited for biological inbreeding.
• Instead the only practicable form of aristocracy may
be a political party but, if the leaders live in terror of
assassination, they are not supermen.
• But the Egyptian government operated on
Nietzsche’s principles for several millennia, while the
governments of almost all large states were
487
aristocratic until the American & French revolutions.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 People divide mankind into friends and enemies,
& feel sympathy for friends but not for enemies.
• Christianity & Buddhism preach universal sympathy
as an escape from universal sorrow, even by the
successful haunted by thought of failure & death.
 But they also have their heros: men of science who have
mastered nature, and men of the arts who have caught
glimpses of the Divine beautitude
 Love, knowledge, delight in beauty are not negations.
• Nietzsche preaches universal antipathy.
 Great men suffer greatly, but their suffering is noble &
therefore not regrettable, while trivial people suffer trivially.
 The mere absence of suffering is a negative ideal of
Schopenhauerian non-existence.
• Love is just compassion elicited by pain,
• truth is known only through suffering, while
• nothing is more beautiful than the tiger who owes his splendor to
his fierceness.
 For the sake of positive ideals embodied in great men, any
488
misery is worth while. Without pain, there is no greatness,
only boredom.
Nietzsche (cont.d)
 For Russell the choice for or against an
internally consistent philosophy like Nietzsche’s
is a matter of emotion/disposition.
489
The Utilitarians
 British philosophy completely overlooked
German philosophy.
 Bentham
• was leader of the Philosophical Radicals.
• Bentham and his followers derived their philosophy
from Locke & Helvetius.
 Their importance was more political than philosophical, as
leaders of British radicalism
 They unintentionally prepared the way for socialism
• He was painfully shy and feared the company of
strangers.
• He became a Radical late in life.
490
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• He wrote voluminously but never bothered to publish
• His main interest was jurisprudence which made him
interested in ethics & politics.
• His philosophy was based on two principles: the
Association Principle and the Greatest-Happiness
Principle.
 Locke regarded association of ideas as responsible for
only trivial errors.
491
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• His philosophy was based on two principles: the
Association Principle and the Greatest-Happiness
Principle. (cont.d)
 Bentham made association of ideas (a mental version of
Pavlov’s physiological conditioned reflex) the basic
deterministic principle of psychology (independent of
physiology): if stimulus B produces reaction C, and
stimulus A is frequently experienced at the same time as B
stimulus A will produce the reaction C even when B is
absent.
492
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• His philosophy was based on two principles: the
Association Principle and the Greatest-Happiness
Principle. (cont.d)
 Bentham wished to establish a code of laws that would
automatically make men virtuous. The Greatest
Happiness Principle (“Utilitarianism”) was used to define
“virtue”: what is good is pleasure or happiness. Of all
possible states of affairs, that one is best which involves
the greatest balance of pleasure over pain.
 Bentham’s merit consisted in his vigorous application of
the Greatest Happiness Principle to various practical
problems.
493
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• His philosophy was based on two principles: the
Association Principle and the Greatest-Happiness
Principle. (cont.d)
 The general happiness is the greatest good, but each
individual pursues what he believes to be his own
happiness.
494
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• His philosophy was based on two principles: the
Association Principle and the Greatest-Happiness
Principle. (cont.d)
 The business of the legislator is to produce harmony
between public & private interest.
• Criminal laws make the private interest conform with the public
interest.
• It is more important that punishment be certain than that it be
severe.
 Often minor offenses were associated with the death penalty
 So, juries often did not convict in cases where the penalty
seemed excessive.
 So, Bentham advocated abolition of the death penalty for all
but the worst offenses.
495
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• Civil law should have 4 aims: subsistence,
abundance, security, and equality.
 Like Epicurus, he cared little for liberty, but much for
security
 He admired the benevolent autocrats who preceded the
French Revolution.
 He found the rights of man to be nonsense. The articles in
the French Revolutionaries’ published declaration of
human rights were unintelligible &/or false.
496
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• 2 sources of his gradual evolution to Radicalism
 Belief in equality, deduced from the calculus of pleasures
& pains.
• He advocated equal division of property among a man’s children
• Belief in equality led him eventually to
 oppose monarchy & hereditary aristocracy, and
 advocate complete democracy, including votes for women..
 Inflexible determination to submit everything to the
arbitrament of reason.
• His refusal to believe without rational grounds led him eventually to
 reject religion & belief in God, &
 be keenly critical of absurdities & anomalies in the law.
• From an early youth he was opposed to imperialism & considered
497
colonies a folly.
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• Sentimental & ascetic moralities serve the interests
of a governing aristocratic class
 Those who teach the morality of sacrifice are trying to
convince others to sacrifice to them.
 The moral order results from an equilibrium of interests.
• Reformers try to achieve identity between the
interests of governors and the governed
• Only the principle of utility
 can give a criterion in morals & legislation, and lay the
foundation of a social science.
 is implied by different ethical systems.
498
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 Bentham (cont.d)
• His instinctive benevolence concealed from him the
problem of how to insure that the legislator will
pursue the pleasure of mankind in general? He
apparently thought that democracy combined with
adequate supervision would control legislators in
such a way that they could further their private
interest only by being useful to the general public.
499
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 James MillI
• He influenced Bentham to take sides in practical
politics.
 Mill was an ardent disciple of Bentham’s doctrines, an
active Radical, & an admirer of Condorcet & Helvetius.
 Mill gave Bentham a house and assisted him financially
while Mill wrote a history of India. Afterward the East India
Company gave Mill a post as they did afterward to his son.
• He considered pleasure the only good & pain the
only evil. Like Epicurus he valued moderate
pleasure most.
• He thought intellectual enjoyment the best and
temperance the chief virtue.
• He objected to the modern stress laid on feeling.500
The Utilitarians (cont.d)
 James MilI (cont.d)
• He was opposed to Romanticism
• He thought politics should be governed by reason
and opinions determined by the weight of evidence.
• If opposing sides in a controversy are presented with
equal skill, there is a moral certainty that the greater
number will judge right.
• Within his limited emotional nature he had the merits
of industry, disinterestedness & rationality.
 John Stuart Mill
• Carried on a softened form of Bentham’s doctrine.
• Benthamite influence in British legislation & policy
was astonishingly great, in light of their complete501
absence of emotional appeal.
The Utilitarians (cont.d)

John Stuart Mill (cont.d)
•
He wrote Utilitarianism

It contains a silly attempt to derive fact from value by
proving:
Since pleasure is the only thing desired, it is the only
thing desirable, because
the only things seen are things visible, & the only things
heard are things audible, and visible & audible mean can
be seen or heard.
1. But desirable means not can be desired, but ought to be desired!
So, “desirable” presupposes an ethical theory, and we cannot
derive what is “desirable” (value) from what is desired (fact).
2. Furthermore, Kant urged that “ought to” implies “can”; so, if you
cannot, it is futile to say you ought to
3. If each man must always be pursuing his own pleasure, ethics
(altruism) is reduced to prudence (calculation/self-interest): you
may do well to further other people’s interests in the hope that
they in turn will further yours.
4. This can be a prelude to the 20th-century “Objectivist” (Ayn502
Rand)
virtue of selfishness and end of altruism altogether.
The Utilitarians (cont.d)

John Stuart Mill (cont.d)
•
He wrote Utilitarianism (cont.d)

Moral:
•
•
You cannot derive an “ought to” from an ”is”, the way you can
derive a “can” from an “is”.
Kant derived a “can” from an “ought to”
503
The Utilitarians (cont.d)

John Stuart Mill (cont.d)
•
He wrote Utilitarianism (cont.d)

2 consequent questions: (1) does each man pursue his
own happiness, and (2) is the greatest happiness the
right end of human action?
•
(1) has 2 meanings:
 1 meaning is a truism that I get pleasure from achieving any
wish regardless of what I may happen to desire.
 The other meaning is whether I desire things for/because of
the pleasure they will bring.
• --The answer is usually no. Everyone’s main activities are
•
determined by desires which are anterior to the calculation
•
of pleasure. Self-esteem or satisfying hunger can be the
•
desires.
• --The actions determined by a direct desire for pleasure are
•
exceptional & unimportant
• --We can take moral action to remove cognitive
•
dissonance relative to our pre-existing beliefs about what
504
•
“is”.
The Utilitarians (cont.d)

John Stuart Mill (cont.d)
•
He wrote Utilitarianism (cont.d)

2 consequent questions: (1) does each man pursue his
own happiness, and (2) is the greatest happiness the
right end of human action? (cont.d)
•

In answer to (2):
 Ethics is necessary because men’s desires can conflict & not
just with egoism: non-egoistic desires are frequently involved
in social conflicts. See social choice theory & the Arrow
Impossibility Theorem, Ramsey’s centralized vs
decentralized equilibrium, public goods vs competitive
equilibrium.
 So, ethics has a 2-fold purpose
--to find a criterion for good & bad desires. For utilitarians it
is promotion of the general happiness, which need not be
the intention of an action, but only its effect
--to promote good desires & discourage bad.
The utilitarian ethic is democratic & anti-romantic. But it
cannot refute romanticism by appeal only to facts as505
opposed to desires & valuations.
The Utilitarians (cont.d)

•
•
•
Darwin. He was in general sympathy with the
Philosophical Radicals.
But Utilitarian free competition was more restrictive
than Darwinism for involving rules of the road/game
that Darwinian competition lacks: animal behavior
isn’t subject to any conventional legal framework.
The Benthamite “pleasure” principle may derive
from the sexual population driver of Darwinism.
The “pleasure” principle in emerging psychological
theory contrasts with the “reality” principle, the
process of “sublimation”, an “intellectual” principle,
as in the social psychology of Carl Jung’s Eros &
Civilization.
Darwinian survival of the fittest may lead to
something more like Nietzsche’s philosophy than
Bentham’s by allowing rather than mandating either
Nietzschean or Benthamite practices to counter506the
effect of the other practice.
The Utilitarians (cont.d)

Darwin. He was in general sympathy with the
Philosophical Radicals. (cont.d)
•
•
Nietzschean practices of inbreeding could fail and
face overall diminished gene reserves under
Darwinian competition which requires a deviationenriched gene-pool.
Unlike humans, animals do not reproduce to
maximize individual benefit.


Rather the species benefits and this is not “intended” by
the species but determined by endless statistical
elimination/selection.
Reproduction is an underlying generative process
unmotivated except by individual pleasure/satiation.
507
The Utilitarians (cont.d)

Ricardo.
•
•

He was closely associated with Bentham &
formalized the idea that the exchange value of a
commodity is entirely due to the labor expended in
producing it.
For Ricardo capital could be at most stored labor,
not also the time-value of that stored-labor nor
space-time
configuration/arrangement/formatting/amplification
of labor input.
Hodgkin published the first Socialist rejoinder
to Ricardo, claiming that therefore all reward
(profit) should go to labor, and that the
landowner & capitalist shares of profit are
508
extortion.
The Utilitarians (cont.d)

Owen
•
•
•
Himself a manufacturer, he came to the same
conclusion as Hodgkin and the term “Socialist” was
first used to label his followers.
He believed machinery was displacing labor who
should be protected.
Bentham had invested in Owen’s business, but the
Philosophical Radicals turned away from Owen’s
doctrines. James Mill disliked Owen’s apparent
rejection of private property.
509
Marx


gave Socialism a philosophy.
was a restorer of materialism into
•
“dialectical” (as a Hegelian developmental process)
& “instrumental”/active.


while this is “optimistic” as an ethical or political doctrine,
it risks being teleological (Aristotelian) in the metaphysics
of social development.
•
•
Ethical/political “goals” or “ends” are objectives for directing
action
Teleological/metaphysical “purpose” can serve
 to encourage political/ethical “effort” that is in the same
direction as the overall metaphysical purpose by assuring
that the effort will be successful, but also
 to discourage any such “effort” by demonstrating that is
unnecessary, and to encourage the opposite effort to block
that purpose; and so raises
510
 the question of the need or not to “speed up” the process
Marx (cont.d)

was a restorer of materialism into (cont.d)
•

not 18th century natural (secular) & passive
materialism (physics)
was the last of the great system-builders
•
•
successor to Hegel
believer in a “rational” process driving progress
511
Marx (cont.d)

was born in Treves (Western Germany) which
was
•
•
•

the birthplace of St. Ambrose (baptizer of St.
Augustine and organizer of government in the early
Catholic Church)
profoundly influenced by the French during the
revolutionary & Napoleonic eras
more cosmopolitan than most parts of Germany
was born to parents who had converted to
Christianity from Judaism & he married a
gentile
512
Marx (cont.d)




(according to Lescek Kolakowski, historian of
Marxism) was influenced by Augustinian
Catholicism’s conception of man as unworthy
& prone to sin
at university was influenced by youngHegelianism, & by Feuerbach’s revolt against
Hegel toward materialism
edited the Rheinische Zeitung newspaper until
closed by the government because of its
radicalism
subsequently studied socialism in France
where he met Engels, a factory manager in513
England
Marx (cont.d)



showed no national bias within western Europe
but despised Slavic people
found refuge in England after participating in
the French & German revolutions of 1848
represented the economic claims/welfare of the
wage-earner, versus those of the capitalist
(defended by the utilitarianism-inspired
classical economists) and the landowner
(defended by the Romantics against
industrialism).
514
Marx (cont.d)
introduced “instrumentalism” to philosophy

•
Sensation is not passive, not attributable mainly to
action by the object.




Sensation is “noticing” in the course of acting,
Passive contemplation is an unreal abstraction.
Marx was the first to point out this particular
characteristic, in my opinion more important in
epistemology than in politics or metaphysics, &
exemplified in interaction between observer & observed,
particular to social science where it is pervasive.
Werner Heisenberg later discovered it in quantum
mechanics, expressed in a limit (h) on the covariance of
position (m) & momentum (p) of a sub-atomic particle:
(Dm)(Dp) h , and the sensitivity of the observer’s
measurement of one of these to his own action of
measuring the other (if the measurement of one is 515
precise, the measurement of the other will be vague).
Marx (cont.d)
introduced “instrumentalism” to philosophy
(cont.d)

•
Knowledge is mainly a process of handling things.
Sensation & knowledge are interaction between
subject & object in which the object is raw material
transformed in the process of being perceived &
becoming known. The process is dialectical” for
being:


mutually adaptive, between subject & object, &
& ongoing, progressively completed
516
Marx (cont.d)

•
introduced “instrumentalism” to philosophy
(cont.d)
Truth is the reality and power of thought as
implemented/applied/demonstrated in practice.
Debate over mere explanation (“interpretations”) of
the world is scholastic: the real task is to
affect/change the world.



This does point out the truism that social science is most
valuable if implemented in social policy. The politics of
implementation often requires more effort and attention
than just discovering the solution/policy.
But this also runs the risk of subordinating understanding
to “will”, or politicizing science by subordinating its
development to some calculated social use and impact.
American “pragmatism” (occurring even in physics as the
“operationalism” of Percy Bridgeman) places the same
emphasis on “use”, or getting “results”, but in the
decentralized way of not specifying some particular use
517
or direction for those results other than the individual
agent’s objective.
Marx (cont.d)
introduced “instrumentalism” to philosophy
(cont.d)

•
Truth is the reality and power of thought as
implemented… (cont.d)


Marx is the first philosopher to have criticized the notion
of “truth” from this activist point of view.
Objection: In the truth criterion of instrumentalism truth
may be “self-referential” &, so, potentially logically
perverse.
T(P) = ts(tf(P))
T is truth,
P is a proposition,
ts is social/political (practical) truth (degree
accepted or implemented),
tf is factual truth (by observation), and
518
ts can override tf .
Marx (cont.d)
introduced “instrumentalism” to philosophy
(cont.d)

•
•
Setting T(P) = ts(P) is self-reference
If instead ts is viewed not as the goal of political
action or measure of successful political action, but
as an empirical “feasibility” test subordinate to tf ,
that danger may be reduced.
519
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history
•
“Matter” is the driving force,



not Hegel’s Spirit, & not explicitly logic,
but the matter is not wholly “dehumanized” or “inanimate”
with human “agency”
•
•

having a big role in the material process
& being declared “matter”, yet not reducible to neurophysiology, &
with logical rules, mode of production, economic laws, &
“dialectics”
•
playing in a specifically goal-directed process the same role as the
probabilistic/stochastic laws of error, selection, & large numbers do
in the non-goal-directed process of biological evolution of species.
520
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
“Matter” is the driving force, (cont.d)

with logical rules, mode of production, economic laws, and
“dialectics” (cont.d)
•
specifically “determining” strictly, not even probabilistically, the
individual human processes of reasoning and acting.
 Marx’s philosophy itself is exempted from determination by his
own economic circumstances (to avoid the self-referential
short-circuit implicit in the truth criterion) as
 an objective, meta-historical objective from outside of the
process itself, but nevertheless facilitating & “serving” the
process as if the process “selected” Marx to further itself.
521
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
•
Originated economic determinism: Economics is
the “matter” of human affairs.
First to define production & labor as the exclusive
“matter” of economics.


“Labor” & “production” are primary, and “distribution”,
services & knowhow are incidental/derivative at most, &
are not the primary matter.
Matter is more hardware than software.
522
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
Stages




Greek philosophy reflected the mentality appropriate to
the city-state
Stoicism was appropriate to cosmopolitan despotism
Scholastic philosophy reflects the Church as an
organization (much as Hegel’s Spirit reflected the
Prussian bureaucracy)
Philosophy since Descartes & Locke embodied the
concerns of the commercial middle class.
523
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
•
Marx’s philosophy of history was further explicitly
developed by Engels as “Historical materialism”
Russell’s objection:

Determinant social circumstances are also political, not
just economic, and politics is not subordinate to
economics..
•
•

Wealth is only one form of power.
In centrally-owned economies, political/administrative power is
equivalent to (a share of the) wealth
Social causation ceases to apply once a problem
becomes detailed & technical
•
My comment: political economies operating under “action”/will
524
driven philosophies may sacrifice detailed technical problem
solving to over-emphasis on social causation.
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
Russell’s objection: (cont.d)

Social causation ceases to apply once a problem
becomes detailed & technical (cont.d)
•
Biases influence philosophers, but those biases are perennial,
not economic.
 Example: biases in addressing the problem of universals
have remote connection with the social system:
 --Plato was influenced by Parmenides who wanted an

eternal/fixed/continuous world, not the ultimate reality of an

eternal flux.
 --Aristotle was more empirical & comfortable in the

multiplicity of the everyday world.
 --Modern empiricists are opposite Plato & dislike the thought

of a supra-sensible world.
 --Love of the eternal is not characteristic of a leisure class:
525

Epectetus & Spinoza were not gentlemen of leisure.
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
Russell’s objection:

Social causation ceases to apply once a problem
becomes detailed & technical (cont.d)
•
Biases influence philosophers, but those biases are perennial, not
economic. (cont.d)
 Example: biases in addressing the problem of universals have
remote connection with the social system: (cont.d)
 --In addressing the detail of the problem of universals, each

side has invented arguments that the other side accepts,
 ----Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato have been almost universally

accepted.
 ----the modern technique of logical analysis has solved many

incidental problems to the point where soon definite
526

agreement may be reached on this question.
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
Russell’s objection:

Social causation ceases to apply once a problem
becomes detailed & technical (cont.d)
•
•
Biases influence philosophers, but those biases are perennial, not
economic. (cont.d)
 Example: the Ontological argument.
 --It was invented by St. Anselm, rejected by Thomas Aquinas,

accepted by Descartes, refuted by Kant, & reinstated by

Hegel.
 --Modern logic has proved it invalid by exactifying the concept

of “existence”
Stoicism’s two greatest contemporaries were men of opposite
527
social history & standing: a slave & an emperor.
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
Russell’s objection:

Social causation ceases to apply once a problem
becomes detailed & technical (cont.d)
•
•
The contention of social (but not necessarily economic) causation
is true of the part of philosophy that addresses non-technical
practical questions,
 not amenable to generally-agreed methods,
 of passionate interest to many people, &
 on which there is no solid evidence either way.
Social causation is not exclusively economic. For example war
has its share of non-economic social causation, and victory does
not always go to the side with the greater economic resources.
528
Marx (cont.d)

blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
•
•
A single dialectical triad concerned Marx, unlike
Hegel: feudalism (landlord), capitalism (capitalist), &
socialism (labor)
Classes were Marx’s vehicle of dialectical
movement; nations were Hegel’s
Marx was also unique among philosophers for first
reducing “value” to “fact” as the inevitability of a
specific social structure: he assigned no ethical
preference to labor but was rather predicting it to be
the beneficiary of the dialectic in its wholly goaldirected deterministic movement [that is not
stochastic and undirected like biological evolution
529
(which is still convergent)].
Marx (cont.d)


blended Hegel & British economics in his
philosophy of history (cont.d)
•
But he was not only predicting.


Value (valuation or choice) is implicit. He believed the
dialectical movement to be a progress to a goal better
than the present state, where human happiness would be
(“paradise”) greater than before.
He displayed emotional bias & often abandoned prediction
for a call to action.
was more practical and engaged in the
immediate problems of his time than a
philosopher normally would be, and confines his
530
purview to man & terrestrial affairs.
Marx (cont.d)



was not scientific according to Russell, because
Marx assigns cosmic importance to man that
has been eliminated in science since the time of
Copernicus.
believed the 19th century faith in progress as a
universal law that, according to Russell,
normally only belief in God can justify
owes the unscientific basis of his philosophy
entirely to the elements derived from Hegel, for
which Russell says there is no reason given to
suppose them true.
531
Marx (cont.d)

applied limited rationalism according to Russell
because he
•
•
•
believed his argument would appeal only to those
whose class interest was in agreement with it
expected little from persuasion and everything from
class war
was accordingly for the foreseeable future
committed to




•
class warfare,
power politics,
the doctrine of a master class, and
dictatorship
until after the social revolution classes eventually
disappeared & political & economic harmony 532
Marx (cont.d)

did not need the dialectic to state most of what
he had to say, which were not matters for
philosophy
•
•
•
He was inspired by the cruelty of the industrial
system that he learned from Engels’ first-hand
accounts and from Royal Commission reports.
He saw the system evolving from free competition to
private monopoly, and the prospect of proletarian
revolt.
He saw State ownership of land & capital as the
only alternative.
533
Marx (cont.d)


inspired the program of the German Social
Democratic party which
•
•
secured a third of the votes in the 1912 general
election &
came to power after WW I in the first presidency of
the Weimar Republic under Ebert, but had already
become less orthodox
profoundly influenced large numbers of
intellectuals as Hegel had, but (in my opinion)
because he brought Hegel down to earth
534
Marx (cont.d)

Liberals & Marxists have more in common with
each other, than they have with Fascists
•
Liberals & Marxists

are not very philosophically separated. Both are
•
•

•
rationalistic, and
scientific & empirical in intention
sharply differ in practical politics
Fascists


are anti-rational & anti-scientific, inspired by Rousseau,
Fichte & Nietzsche
emphasize will & will-to-power concentrated in certain
races & individuals with a right to rule (versus the
imperative political “interest” of a class that Marx 535
championed).
Bergson (cont.d)





was the leading French philosopher of the
early 20th century
influenced William James
inspired Sorel’s use of irrationalism in
Reflections on Violence to justify a
revolutionary labor movement with no definite
goal
had a conservative influence that harmonized
well with the movement which culminated in
Vichy (Nazi) France
cuts across the dualisms of action/thought,
536
life/matter, emergentism/mechanicism
Bergson (cont.d)
was a “practical” philosopher of the modern
man of action against the authority of Greece,
especially Plato,

•
•
•

regarding action as the supreme good, with
happiness as a side effect &
knowledge as an instrument.
promoted vitalism, primacy of the life force
climbing upward while matter falls downward.
Life meets the resistance of matter but,
struggling to find new outlets, gradually learns
to use matter by means of organization.
537
Bergson (cont.d)

held evolution is essentially creative, not
selective: it isn’t describable in terms only of
adaptation, which explains only changes.
•
•
Evolution has no pre-set end goal, unlike
mechanicism & teleology which don’t allow for
novelty.
Impulse to action, an undefined want, exists
beforehand:



A vague desire in sightless animals existed beforehand
to be aware of objects before being in contact with them
Sight satisfied the desire but couldn’t have been
imagined beforehand
So evolution is unpredictable, and determinism does not
538
override free will
Bergson (cont.d)

described the stages in the development of life
on earth:
•
•
it divided into plants to store energy, and animals to
use it in quick movements;
instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man.


Instinct is good & intellect is bad.
Instinct at its best is disinterested, self-conscious intuition
539
Bergson (cont.d)

described the stages in the development of life
on earth: (cont.d)
•
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life
•
Solid bodies were created by the mind to apply intellect to them:
intellect & matter grew simultaneously from stuff that contained
both.
540
Bergson (cont.d)

described the stages in the development of life
on earth: (cont.d)
•
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life (cont.d)
•
In reality there are no separate solid things, only an endless
stream of becoming. This is a combination/reconciliation of
Heraclitus & Parmenides, versus the atomists. There is (one)
process, no (multiple) products.
 when moving up becoming is called “life”
 when moving downward, becoming is misapprehended by
the intellect as matter
 so, as if in an inverted cone, the movement upward brings
things together, while the movement downward separates
them, and
 as intelligence formed, the primitive flux was cut up into
several bodies as the mind thread its way up through 541
the
downward motion of the falling bodies
Bergson
(cont.d)
 described the stages in the development of life
•
on earth: (cont.d)
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life (cont.d)
•
Intellect is connected with space and instinct/intuition is
connected with time. Space & time are profoundly dissimilar:
 Space arises from dissection of the flux, which is really
illusory although useful in practice
 Time, in the form of duration rather than mathematical time
which is really a form of space, is the essential characteristic
of life or mind, and the very stuff of reality.
 --Whenever anything lives, a register is opened somewhere

in which time is being inscribed (as described in his earliest

work Time & Free Will).
 --Pure duration is the form our conscious states assume

when our ego lets itself free, with past & present in an

organic whole.
 ----Then our will is strained to the utmost: we have to gather
542

the past that is slipping away & thrust it whole & undivided

into the present.
Bergson (cont.d)

•
described the stages in the development of life
on earth: (cont.d)
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life (cont.d)
•
Intellect is connected with space and instinct/intuition is connected with time. Space & time are profoundly dissimilar (cont.d)
 Time, in the form of duration rather than mathematical time
which is really a form of space, is the essential characteristic
of life or mind, and the very stuff of reality. (cont.d)
 --Pure duration is the form our conscious states assume

when our ego lets itself free, with past & present in an

organic whole. (cont.d)
 ----Duration exhibits itself in memory, which is (in Matter &

Memory)
 ------the intersection of mind & matter &
 ------where the past survives in the present, under 2 forms
 --------in reflex mechanisms, or habit,
 ----------where there is no conscious memory of the past, &
 ----------where memory lapses occur in the motor mechanism

for bringing memory into action (as evidenced 543
by

amnesia)
Bergson
(cont.d)
 described the stages in the development of life
•
on earth: (cont.d)
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life (cont.d)
•
Intellect is connected with space and instinct/intuition is connected with time. Space & time are profoundly dissimilar (cont.d)
 Time, in the form of duration rather than mathematical time
which is really a form of space, is the essential characteristic
of life or mind, and the very stuff of reality. (cont.d)
 --Pure duration is the form our conscious states assume

when our ego lets itself free, with past & present in an

organic whole. (cont.d)
 ----Duration exhibits itself in memory, which is (in Matter &

Memory) cont.d
 ------where the past survives in the present, under 2 forms (cont.d)
 --------in conscious recollections (that are not truly a function

of the brain, & so not an emanation of matter) only of

what is useful, not of everything that has happened to
544

us where
 ----------the past is acted in by matter, imagined by mind
Bergson (cont.d)

•
described the stages in the development of life
on earth: (cont.d)
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life (cont.d)
•
Intellect is connected with space and instinct/intuition is connected with time. Space & time are profoundly dissimilar (cont.d)
 Time, in the form of duration rather than mathematical time
which is really a form of space, is the essential characteristic
of life or mind, and the very stuff of reality. (cont.d)
 --Pure duration is the form our conscious states assume

when our ego lets itself free, with past & present in an

organic whole. (cont.d)
 ----Duration exhibits itself in memory, which is (in Matter &

Memory) cont.d
 ------where the past survives in the present, under 2 forms (cont.d)
 --------in conscious recollections (that are not truly a function

of the brain, & so not an emanation of matter) only of

what is useful, not of everything that has happened to

us where (cont.d)
 ----------matter, grasped in conscious perception, always545

occupies duration
Bergson
(cont.d)
 described the stages in the development of life
•
on earth: (cont.d)
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life (cont.d)
•
Intellect is connected with space and instinct/intuition is connected with time. Space & time are profoundly dissimilar (cont.d)
 Time, in the form of duration rather than mathematical time
which is really a form of space, is the essential characteristic
of life or mind, and the very stuff of reality. (cont.d)
 --Pure duration is the form our conscious states assume

when our ego lets itself free, with past & present in an

organic whole. (cont.d)
 ----Duration exhibits itself in memory, which is (in Matter &

Memory) cont.d
 ------where the past survives in the present, under 2 forms (cont.d)
 --------in conscious recollections (that are not truly a function

of the brain, & so not an emanation of matter) only of

what is useful, not of everything that has happened to

us where (cont.d)
 ----------memory is a power absolutely independent of matter,

where it is in memory that we come into touch 546

experimentally with spirit
Bergson (cont.d)

described the stages in the development of life
on earth: (cont.d)
•
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life (cont.d)
•
Intellect is connected with space and instinct/intuition is connected with time. Space & time are profoundly dissimilar (cont.d)
 Within our ego there is succession without mutual externality;
outside our ego there is mutual externality without
succession.
 --In the duration in which we act, our states melt into each

other. Self consciousness
 --in the duration in which we see ourselves acting, there are

dissociated elements. Self examination
547
 Questions of distinction or union of subject & object should
be put in terms of time rather than space.
Bergson (cont.d)

described the stages in the development of life
on earth: (cont.d)
•
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

Intellect forms a clear idea only of the discontinuous &
immobile, separated in space & fixed in time, &
represents becoming as a series of states. It cannot
understand life (cont.d)
•
Intellect is connected with space and instinct/intuition is connected with time. Space & time are profoundly dissimilar (cont.d)
 Pure perception is ultra-realist, at the opposite end from pure
memory:
 --We are placed outside of ourselves, touch the reality of the

object in an immediate intuition (reflex).
 --Pure perception is so identified with its object that it is not

mental at all (in complete opposition to Berkeley), or is548
mind

without memory
Bergson (cont.d)

described the stages in the development of life
on earth: (cont.d)
•
Instinct developed best in animals (especially ants
& bees) and intellect exclusively in man. (cont.d)

The brain’s function is to limit our mental life to what is
practically useful.
•
•

But for the brain, everything would be perceived.
The body has for its role to limit action inspired by life of the spirit
did not give reasons for his opinions but relied
on their inherent attractiveness accomplished
by
•
•
•
•
the charm of an excellent writing style
picturesque & varied statement
apparent explanation of obscure facts
analogies & similies (the number of similies for 549
life
exceeding that of any known poet)
Bergson (cont.d)

presents a restless view of the world on
apocalyptic scale, for no reason other than
apparently recreating a feeling of simultaneity
and omniscience of all its processes together.
Presents an anti-intellectual philosophy that
thrives on the errors & confusions of the
intellect, by

•
•
•
•
preferring bad thinking to good
declaring every momentary difficulty insoluble
regarding every foolish mistake as the bankruptcy
of intellect & triumph of “intuition”
unlike Kierkegaard’s mission, which was to prove
the inevitability of contradiction and the inability of
the profound intellect to avoid it, especially by 550
becoming profounder.
Bergson (cont.d)

inappropriately alluded to mathematics &
science to appear credible to the careless
reader
•
by presenting

as true, interpretation errors from mathematics already
known about & abandoned for a century.
•
•
In the 18th & 19th centuries many fallacies & confusions
surrounding the foundations of the infinitesimal calculus, since
cleared up by mathematicians, were seized on by Hegel &
followers to prove all mathematics contradictory, &
these obsolete Hegelian claims were repeated by Bergson.
551
Bergson (cont.d)

inappropriately alluded to mathematics &
science to appear credible to the careless
reader (cont.d)
•
by rejecting cinematographic representations of the
world in mathematics because




no series of states used by mathematics to
(“cinematographically”) represent change can represent
what is continuous (duration), and
in change a thing is never in a state at all
past & present are mingled in the unity of consciousness
action constitutes being, but mathematical time is a
passive receptacle, does nothing & therefore is nothing.
552
Bergson (cont.d)

inappropriately alluded to mathematics &
science to appear credible to the careless
reader (cont.d)
•
by rejecting cinematographic representations of the
world in mathematics because (cont.d)

he uses a circular definition
•
•

of “past” as “no longer”, or “that of which the action is in the past”
of “present” as
 “that which is acting”, where “is” introduces just that idea of
the present which was to be defined, or
 “that whose action is neither past nor future”, which means
“that whose action is in the present”.
he really meant present memory of the past when he
spoke of the past as “idea” only, and the present moment
as the only one in the world containing any activity. 553
The
real past does not mingle with the present.
Bergson (cont.d)

inappropriately alluded to mathematics &
science to appear credible to the careless
reader (cont.d)
•
& to show that


nothing can be learned by patience & detailed thinking, &
that
we ought to worship the prejudices of the ignorant
presented as “reason” by Hegelians or “intuition” by
Bergsonians.
554
Bergson (cont.d)


rested his whole theory of duration & time on
confusion between “the present occurrence of
a recollection” & “the past occurrence which is
recollected”.
•
•
He merely gave an account of the difference
between perception & recollection (both present
facts), while he thought he gave an account of the
difference between the present & the past.
His theory of time omits time altogether.
does not depend on argument for much of his
philosophy, probably the most popular part
555
Bergson (cont.d)
physical “time” of
physical impact on the brain
t
now
Bergsonian past, in
present memory only
d
“duration” (as now remembered) in memory
subjective/psychological “time”
556
Bergson (cont.d)
promotes action for action’s sake.

•
•
•
All pure contemplation is dreaming.
“Static”, “Platonic”, “mathematical”, “logical”, &
“intellectual” are condemned
In action, life-force pushes us restlessly &
unceasingly to be slaves of instinct,


with no vision to give value and direction to action
with no prevision of the end which action is to achieve
because
•
•
an end foreseen would be nothing new & because
desire like memory is identified with its object & is not active
557
James
He invented “radical empiricism” & was one of
the three founders of pragmatism or
instrumentalism
He was a founder of modern psychology on
which he wrote a great book after studying
medicine.
Was the first recognized leader of American
philosophers
His two philosophical interests were scientific &
religious.




•
•
His scientific interest inclined him to materialism
His religious emotions were very protestant, but
heretical, very democratic, full of human kindness
(contrary to the snobbishness of his novelist
brother, Henry James, who became a British 558
subject), & kept materialism in check.
James (cont.d)

He had a feud with Santayana, a Catholic free
thinker
•
•
•
•
•
He called Santayana’s doctoral thesis “pure
rottenness”
Santayana liked religion aesthetically & historically
while James liked religion as a help towards a
moral life. By his Puritan ancestry, James valued
good conduct
Santayana preferred Catholicism to Protestantism
Santayana rejected the Christian dogmas, but
appreciated what he considered to be the Christian
myth
To James, Santayana’s attitude was immoral. By
his democratic feeling James could not agree to
one truth for philosophers & a different truth for559the
vulgar
James
(cont.d)
 He was almost universally beloved
He introduced radical empiricism in “Does
‘Consciousness’ Exist?”

•
•
•
•
He denied the subject/object relation was
fundamental and called for overhauling the theory
of knowledge as a consequence.
Russell agreed after James convinced him, and
believes James deservers a high place in
philosophy for this suggestion.
James considered consciousness to be a nonentity, a faint echo of the disappeared soul.
There was no aboriginal “stuff” of being out of
which our thoughts are made. Consciousness or
knowledge may be a function performed by
560
thoughts, but it is not a thing.
James
(cont.d)
 He introduced radical empiricism in “Does
‘Consciousness’ Exist?” (cont.d)
•
Neutral monism: All things are made from one
primal stuff, which is “pure experience”, which




•
is the “immediate flux of life which furnishes material to
our later reflection”, and
abolishes the distinction between mind & matter.
was not further developed by James, and philosophers
seldom define “experience”
may be unconscious Berkeleian idealism
Knowledge is a relationship between two portions
of pure experience.


The subject/object relation is derivative of this.
A given undivided portion of experience can be in one
561
context a knower and in another something known.
James (cont.d)
He introduced radical empiricism in “Does
‘Consciousness’ Exist?” (cont.d)

•
Many things occur which are not experienced.


Berkeley & Hegel disagreed and maintained that what
was not experienced is nothing.
James did not have convincing reasons to deny that
unless we can hypothesize from things experienced to
things not experienced, we won’t find grounds for the
existence of anything but ourselves.
562
James (cont.d)
He introduced radical empiricism in “Does
‘Consciousness’ Exist?” (cont.d)

•
There is no experience except where there is life,




but the two are not coextensive according to Russell in
disagreement with James’ radical empiricism only on this
point.
•
•
The coextension may be between things experiencible & life
That would enable recognition of something not previously seen
•
New qualities can accompany experienced recognizable qualities
in events.
Many things happen to me which I do not notice
I experience whatever I remember, but I may still have
habits set up by things I don’t explicitly remember.
An event is experienced when it can trigger/set-up a
563
habit, such as memory, and only in living organisms.
James (cont.d)
Russell disagrees with James’ pragmatism &
“will to believe”.
In The Will to Believe


•
•
Russell believes James uses this concept in a
specious attempt to defend some religious dogmas
James says we are often required to make a
decision



where no adequate theoretical grounds exist
where to do nothing itself becomes a decision,
on religion, for example, where we have a right to adopt
a believing attitude, as Rousseau’s Savoyard Vicar
argues but for different reasons
564
James (cont.d)

In The Will to Believe (cont.d)
•
Moral duty of veracity consists of 2 precepts:
 believe truth. Many less cautious people attend to this.
 BP + B P
0 iff P = 0 P = 0: P false B = 0 Not believe
 1 P + 0 P =
1 iff P = 1 P = 1: P true B = 1 Believe



or shun error. The skeptic attends to only this one.
BP + B P
0 if P = 0
0 P + 0 P =
0 if P = 1

If believing truth and avoiding error are equally important,
I have a 50 % chance of believing truth by believing any
one of the alternatives. If I believe none, I have zero
chance:
p (P) = .5
.5 if P = 0
.5 P + .5 P =
1
0
.5 if P = 1
0
1
565
P P



James (cont.d)

In The Will to Believe (cont.d)
•
Moral duty of veracity consists of 2 precepts: (cont.d)
 [My comment:] 2 special axioms of the logic of belief
•
•
Cannot believe both something and its opposite
BP  BP
Non-belief is not identical to Disbelief:
(disbelief in P)
•
•
BP  BP
BP
v
BP
(disbelief in P)
BP  BP
BP  BP  (BP v BP)
(nonbelief in P)
(nonbelief in P)
566
James (cont.d)

In The Will to Believe (cont.d)
• James’ argument for belief breaks down if there are
more than two possibilities with equal probability:
• P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 pP1) = pP2)+pP 3)
• 1/3 1/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 2/3
2/3
1/3
1/3
• Each Pn is more likely to be false than true.
• James does not fully consider probability, just the
50:50 case. But what about the less than 50 %
likelihood of true belief in


the search for 1 person in a population & belief the
person you meet is he
a choice between 3 religions
567
James (cont.d)

In The Will to Believe (cont.d)
• He doesn’t allow for shades of doubt or likelihood
between belief & disbelief




We act on hypotheses & keep our eyes open for fresh
evidence that changes the likelihood of true belief
Hypotheses warrant a given level of credence
James says to believe indiscriminantly
The Will-to-Believe was transitional to
Pragmatism, a new criterion of truth. Dewey &
James are its champions
•
•
Dewey’s outlook is scientific, derived from
examination of scientific method.
If something makes people virtuous & happy, it’s
568
true.
James (cont.d)

The Will-to-Believe was transitional to
Pragmatism, a new criterion of truth. Dewey &
James are its champions (cont.d)
•
Pragmatism was invented by C. S. Peirce, the
father of modern symbolic modal logic, which
includes the logic of belief. For clearness about an
object, we just need to check what practical effects
the object may involve. This includes social effect,
consensus gentium, conceptual effect of
(in)coherence with the rest of belief/knowledge (a
Hegelian concern)
569
James (cont.d)

The Will-to-Believe was transitional to
Pragmatism, a new criterion of truth. Dewey &
James are its champions (cont.d)
•
3 ideas in Locke’s philosophy prefigure pragmatism:



•
the long-term social harmony motivation for individual
civil behavior. Extra-divine support for “natural” law.
fear of hell to guarantee civil behavior
by assuming subordination to God, governments limit
their own discretion.
Theories become instruments, not answers to
enigmas. They become will-driven (directed to
satisfying will-to-action rather than will-toknowledge).
570
James (cont.d)

The Will-to-Believe was transitional to
Pragmatism, a new criterion of truth. Dewey &
James are its champions (cont.d)
•
Truth (fact, science) & value (ethics, politics) are
not separated.



Truth becomes one kind of good: the profitability to our
lives of considering the proposition true.
An idea is made true by convenience, expediency
Getting a proposition to “agree” with reality is
•
•
•

not copying or “representing” the reality that the proposition
states,
but agreeing with “surrounding” circumstances, with the related
social reality that connects to the proposition the welfare of the
believer “handling” the proposition, where
“agree” doesn’t mean impersonal/physical “correspondence”, but
actual human agreement/consent/convenience.
It is naïve not to recognize science as itself partly a571
“social” activity among scientists themselves at least.
James (cont.d)

The Will-to-Believe was transitional to
Pragmatism, a new criterion of truth. Dewey &
James are its champions (cont.d)
•
Objection: The pragmatic criterion of truth is
complicated and far flung


We must first determine the good, then indirect effects, to
test truth. This is not scientific, but maybe social
because matters extraneous to science/knowledge (and
in the social “environment”/context) are being determined
Then we must
•
•
assess the truth/accuracy of our estimates & estimation-methods,
&
subject this very assessment to James’ own pragmatic criterion
of truth, in an infinite regress.
572
James (cont.d)

The Will-to-Believe was transitional to
Pragmatism, a new criterion of truth. Dewey &
James are its champions (cont.d)
•
Objection: The pragmatic criterion of truth is
complicated and far flung (cont.d)


It discourages “inconvenient” scientific revolutions, like
the heliocentric theory of the solar-system, by expanding
the test of coherence with the whole of science to
accepting the un“willingness” of contradicted theorists to
even allow both the new theory & their own theories to
be mutually tested.
It ignores the factual “causes” of beliefs, in favor of their
effects, when determining what the belief must
“correspond” to. It thereby must replace factual
“statements” whose truth is correspondence with facts,
by “beliefs” whose truth is correspondence with social
573
convention
James (cont.d)

The Will-to-Believe was transitional to
Pragmatism, a new criterion of truth. Dewey &
James are its champions (cont.d)
•
Objection: The pragmatic criterion of truth is
complicated and far flung (cont.d)

This in turn worsens the self-reference danger in the
truth criterion now a “composition” consisting
•
•
•
•
•
•
not of a factual truth in turn submitted to a social-compatibility
truth test,
but of a mere personal belief submitted to a personal
truth/convenience test.
T(P)  t(t(...t(B(P))...))
T(P) is pragmatic truth of proposition P.
t( ) is social/psychological/subjective truth of the truth...of B(P)
which is belief in proposition P
Paradox/breakdown occurs in setting B(P) = T(P), applying the
574
pragmatic criterion of truth to itself.
James (cont.d)

The Will-to-Believe was transitional to
Pragmatism, a new criterion of truth. Dewey &
James are its champions (cont.d)
•
Pragmatism

reflects James’ “psychologism”, or
•
•

attempt to ignore all extra-human facts in philosophy, &
fulfill the role of psychologist by making his patients “feel” good,
 treating “symptom” rather than underlying “illness” (cause,
truth) beyond the power of patients to change.
 supporting the perverse psychological practice of “denial”
was born of his particular interest in religion as a human
activity built around an unavoidable question (God’s
existence),
•
•
but not in the subjects of religion
Objection: the believer wants
 happiness to result from the (objective) truth of his belief,
 not expected happiness to be the reason/basis/cause575
for the
(subjective) truth of the belief.
James (cont.d)

Bergson ignored past & future in the living
present. James ignored the past & the present,
looking only at the future consisting of the
effects of present belief.
576
Dewey



He was considered the greatest American
philosopher in the early 20th century
He reflected the Hegelian influence on
American philosophy due to the very strong
post-Civil-War 19th century immigration from
Germany to the United States to settle the
West & constitute the 2nd most important ethnic
origin of Americans after England
He was strongly influenced by Bergson &
interested in evolution & biology, not
mathematics. As it is for Bergson, all reality is
577
process.
Dewey (cont.d)


Dewey’s chief philosophical contribution was to
substitute “inquiry” for “truth” as the
fundamental concept in logic & epistemology,
To name this, he was the first to use the term
“instrumentalism”.
He was a New Englander, in the tradition of
New England socialist liberalism
578
Dewey (cont.d)

He first taught at the University of Chicago
where he developed the theory of “progressive
education” summed up in The School and
Society and founded a progressive school.
•
•
It was strongly influenced by Bergson in promoting
unstructured, spontaneous creativity & free play in
children in undirected lightly supervised settings.
Since the USSR’s successful launch of the first
satellite in 1958, Dewey’s method was blamed for
the deterioration in US education compared to the
apparent success of classical education in the
Soviet Union to which Americans attributed a
serious threat of future loss of leadership to the579
USSR.
Dewey (cont.d)


Like Russell, he was influenced by visits to
Russia & China in the 1920s & 30s: like
Russell, negatively by Russia, but positively by
China.
He did not support violent revolution &
dictatorship. Having freed himself with
difficulty from New England religious orthodoxy,
he was little inclined to submit to a strict
political doctrine.
580
Dewey (cont.d)
His “instrumentalism”

•
•
rejected the traditional notion of truth as static &
final. Mathematics since Pythagoras & Plato was
seen as perfect & eternal truth, linked with theology
and seen as a sharing in God’s thoughts.
conceives thought as an evolutionary process.
581
Dewey (cont.d)

Surprise is proof of a false belief as when an
organism wrongly anticipates a result. Dewey
makes this
•
•
•
the criterion/meaning of truth
rather than just an “indicator” of truth
Russell’s objection: “what” (proposition, belief) is
true may be a state of the organism, but “that” it is
true depends on occurrences outside the organism
Surprise occurs in the process of an “inquiry”

•
•
•
which is an adjustment process between an
organism & its environment and
replaces truth or knowledge as the essence of logic.
582
Metaphysics becomes epistemology.
Dewey (cont.d)

Inquiry is part of the attempt to make the world
more organic. This is Hegelian & Bergsonian.
•
•
“Inquiry is the controlled...transformation of an
indeterminate situation into...a unified whole...
determinate in its constituent distinctions &
relations”. Objection: according to Russell, this
allows for physical intervention by the inquirer to
“make” the subject matter more orderly & rational.
Successful inquiry is the mutual adjustment of
relations between an organism & its environment in
favor of the organism.
583
Dewey (cont.d)

Inquiry is part of the attempt to make the world
more organic. This is Hegelian & Bergsonian.
(cont.d)
•
Truth is defined as “successful” inquiry (an
indicator of objective truth-finding as much as
successful truth hiding/suppression), rather than
successful inquiry defined as finding the (objective)
truth. In Peirce’s definition, truth is “the opinion
which is fated to be ultimately agreed by all who
investigate”. 2 objections:


This is a consensus gentium social definition of truth.
Fated “by whom or what” is left open to being
•
•
by the ultimate force of objective truth (optimistic) or
by human power/force to make the truth conform/submit to “will”
(pessimistic, Nietszchean) rather than conform/submit the584
will to
truth
Dewey (cont.d)

Inquiry is part of the attempt to make the world
more organic. This is Hegelian &
Bergsonian.(cont.d)
•
This delays the assessment of truth by
(subordinates it to) estimation of it’s effect on other
outcomes desired by the inquirer that are extrinsic
to, although sometimes associated with or an
outcome of, the knowledge-process itself.
Furthermore, that estimation process is itself an
inquiry subject to another estimation, namely
estimation of the effect of the estimation, ad
infinitum.
585
Dewey (cont.d)
Dewey refused to allow a metaphysic of “facts”,
let alone non-human facts.

•
•
•
He judged a belief by its social effects rather than
by its objective cause/source that it represents.
He called truth “warranted assertability”, warranted
on the basis of those social effects.
The past


cannot be affected by what we do, is independent of
present & future volitions
represents limitations on human power.
586
Dewey (cont.d)
Dewey refused to allow a metaphysic of “facts”,
let alone non-human facts. (cont.d)

•
The dependence of “warranted assertability” on the
future enlarges the sense of human power &
freedom to overcome “stubborn facts”


by enabling human power to arrange future events to
warrant any assertion with the strongest political power,
achieve complete politicization of knowledge.
This reflects the hopefulness engendered by machine
production, collective enterprise, and the scientific
manipulation of our physical environment. George
Raymond Geiger accordingly declared Dewey’s method
“would mean a revolution in thought just as...the
revolution in industry a century ago.”
587
Dewey (cont.d)
According to Santayana, Dewey’s Hegelianism


•
•
submerged the individual into his social functions,
laying the basis for the Functionalist school of
American sociology founded by Talcot Parsons.
dissolved everything substantial & actual into
something relative & transitional.
Like Marx’s, Dewey’s thought is wholly
occupied by human beings; the cosmos of
astronomy is ignored
588
Dewey (cont.d)
Dewey’s “Instrumentalism” is a power
philosophy

•
•
in the tradition of Fichte & Nietzsche but, unlike
Nietzsche’s philosophy, it is based on
organizational power not individual power.
focused on man’s new control over natural forces,
not on the limitations to which that control is subject
589
Dewey (cont.d)
Dewey’s “Instrumentalism” is a power
philosophy (cont.d)

•
expressing the “cosmic impiety” of classical
“disrespect toward the universe”



carefully avoided by the Ancient Greeks, with their dread
of hubris
suppressed, along with initiative & originality, in the
Middle Ages where a Christian’s first duty was
submission & humility towards God
carried in human pride by the Renaissance to the point of
anarchy & disaster undone by the Reformation & the
Counter-Reformation
590
Dewey (cont.d)
Dewey’s “Instrumentalism” is a power
philosophy (cont.d)

•
expressing the “cosmic impiety” of classical
“disrespect toward the universe” (cont.d)


by a revived sense of the collective power of human
communities prompted by modern technique, making
man, formerly too humble, think of himself as almost a
God, in “Imitation of God” in the words of Italian
pragmatist Papini in replacement of the individual
Christian’s duty of “Imitation of Christ”.
prompting what, in Russell’s opinion, is the greatest
danger of our time, the intoxication of power, which
•
•
invaded philosophy with Fichte
& removed the necessary element of humility inculcated by
philosophy’s concept of truth as something dependent upon facts
591
largely outside human control.
Dewey (cont.d)

Dewey & James reflected the modern bias
•
•
•
•
of popular French & German philosophy to “will”
and (successful) “action” rather than knowledge
and science,
to “applications” rather than “pure science”,
to technology & engineering rather than basic
science,
to “application” software rather than “operating
system” software.
592
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Two opposite historical trends in scientific
philosophy:
•
•
•
•

those inspired by mathematics:
Pythagoras, Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, &
Kant
those inspired by empirical science:
Democritus, Aristotle, empiricists since Locke
Scientific philosophy has endeavored to
•
•
end the dependence of mathematics on explicit
Pythagorean mysticism by developing the
foundations of mathematics
improve and extend the use of the (empirical)
593
methods of scientific knowledge/proof
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Scientific philosophy of mathematics
•
•
Both the infinitely large and its inverse, the infinitely
small, have caused headaches.
Great mathematicians of the 17th century were
optimistic & anxious for quick results.


That left the foundations of analytic geometry &
infinitesimal calculus insecure
Leibniz & Newton both used “infinitesimals”
•
•
•
•
•
with no sound basis in mathematics
considered by Leibniz to actually exist & this suited his
metaphysics of monads.
An infinitesimal was defined as a quantity so small that although
it is not zero (ε≠ 0 ) its square and higher powers are zero
(ε2 = 0 ). http://www.applet-magic.com/infincalc.htm
 No real number can have that property.
 Nevertheless researchers found the infinitesimal concept
useful even essential for developing the differential calculus.
The concept, while mathematically unsound, proved useful594
to the
rapid development of mathematical analysis
Both the infinitely large and its inverse, the infinitely small, cause headaches.
The first were Zeno’s paradoxes. When Isaac Newton & Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
first formulated differential calculus they made use of the concept of an infinitesimal
(a type of completed infinity), in consideration of magnitudes changing over ‘indefinitely’ smaller intervals of time, & a resulting paradox/inconsistency was identified
by Berkeley, who saw that the infinitesimals (‘the vanished ghosts of departed
quantities’) were treated inconsistently as finite quantities or as nothing, depending
on the exigencies of the argument. http://www.answers.com/topic/infinitesimal
Nevertheless calculus experienced its rapidest development after the methods of
Newton and Leibnitz became widely known. As Newton was the more secretive, the
methods and notation of Leibnitz gained the upper hand. Technique progressed at
a tremendous rate under the great luminaries of this period, the Bernoullis, Euler,
Lagrange, Laplace, and Benjamin Robins who carried on the work of Newton in his
home country using Newton's notation and methods. But the logical foundations of
the calculus remained shaky. Using the apparently fallacious method of
infinitesimals these pioneers obtained profound results - and rarely made mistakes!
But an apparently serious problem with infinitesimals is that there appears to be a
need for an unending chain of these: first-order infinitesimals, second-order
infinitesimals, etc. Between every two "ordinary" numbers (finite magnitudes) lie
infinitely many 1st-order infinitesimals. But, between any two of these lies an infinity
of second-order infinitesimals, and so on. This endless chain brought to mind the
following jingle: Big fleas have little fleas/ Upon their back to bite 'em /And little fleas
595
have lesser fleas / And so ad infinitum.--Ogden Nash
In the Methodus fluxionum Newton makes explicit his conception of variable
quantities as generated by motions, and introduces his characteristic notation.
He calls the quantity x or z = f(x) generated by a motion a fluent, and its rate of
generation a fluxion. The fluxion of a fluent x is denoted by , which is dx/dt,
the rate of change dx with respect to time dt, and its moment, or “infinitely small
increment accruing in an infinitely short time o”, by
o. So the slope of a curve
would be / , what we would call the parametric representation of the
derivative. The problem of determining a tangent to a curve is transformed into
the problem of finding the relationship between the fluxions and when
presented with an equation representing the relationship between the fluents x
and z. Newton uses the "little o" notation, exactly as in Fermat, so o is an
infinitesimal or infinitely small quantity. Thus, for example, in the case of the
fluent z = xn, Newton first forms z + o = (x +
o)n, expands the right-hand
side using the binomial theorem (discovered by Newton), subtracts the equation
z = xn from z + o = (x + o)n to get the actual increment
o = n oxn-1 + [n(n-1)/2]( o)2xn-2 + ..., neglects all terms containing on where
n > 1(assuming on = 0 when n > 1), divides through by o (now assuming o = 0),
and so obtains = nxn−1 . Newton later became discontented with the
undeniable presence of infinitesimals o in his calculus, and dissatisfied with the
dubious procedure of “neglecting” them and afterward not neglecting them
when dividing by them. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/continuity/
596
http://www.maths.uwa.edu.au/~schultz/3M3/L20Newton.html
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Scientific philosophy of mathematics (cont.d)
•
Only by the 19th-century did

Weierstrass show how to establish the calculus without
infinitesimals, by use of ever smaller  & d limits on x &
f(x) to establish the continuity of a function at a point x0.
597
A revolution took place from approximately 1820 to 1870. During this time the foundations of the calculus were completely recast and put on a rigorous basis. The principal
names associated with this phase are Cauchy, Riemann and Weierstrass. The results of
this revolution were that "infinitesimals" were discarded. These were replaced by the
now-familiar epsilon-delta methodology (limits) - a complete triumph for the followers of
Eudoxus! http://astore.amazon.com/sosmath/detail/0486605094 German mathematician Karl T.W. Weierstrauss (1815-97) was concerned that ambiguous definitions regarding the fundamentals of calculus prevented theorems from being properly proven. Mathematicians had only vague definitions of limits and continuity of functions. He introduced the epsilon-delta process and used the notion of a limit, wherein you need refer
only to finite numbers, not the infinitesimal, & mathematics instructors thereafter
discouraged students from using the infinitesimal concept. http://www.appletmagic.com/infincalc.htm http://www.answers.com/topic/infinitesimal Weierstrass defined
f(x) as continuous at x = xo if, for every > 0 , $d > 0 such that |x - xo| < d |f(x) – fo(x)|
<  In other words, if f(x) is discontinuous at xo , then  $such that, "d>0 , |x - xo| <
d |f(x) – fo(x)| < [A large number of recalcitrants kept the comfortable nonsense of
infinitesimals alive. Then in 1960 a consistent non-standard analysis was developed by
Abraham Robinson (1918-74) to provide a foundation for infinitesimals & thus
infinitesimals were acceptable, although not exactly welcome, in mathematical discourse
once again. http://www.applet-magic.com/infincalc.htm Robinson gave infinitesimals the
disturbing property that while they are not nothing, no sum of n of them is ever greater
than any finite number, so the number sequence that includes them is not Archimedian.
http://www.answers.com/topic/infinitesimal] Weierstrass definition of limit is similar to his
definition of continuity, as is his definition of a derivative, & they are still taught today.
With these new definitions he was able to write proofs of several then-unproven 598
theorems. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weierstrass
Two discontinuous functions
f(x)
f(x)
fo(x)

xo
fo(x)
x
xo
x
599
The tangent line as limit of secants.
600
http://content.answers.com/main/content/wp/en/thumb/7/79/300px-Lim-secant.png
Weierstrass’s Definition of Derivative
The slope of the secant line is the difference between the y values of these points
divided by the difference between the x values, that is,
This expression is Newton's difference quotient. The derivative is the value of the
difference quotient as the secant lines get closer & closer to the tangent line. Formally, the derivative of the function f at a is the limit of the difference quotient as h
approaches zero, if this limit exists. If the limit exists, then f is differentiable at a.
Since substituting 0 for h in the difference quotient causes division by zero, the
slope of the tangent line cannot be found directly. So we define the slope of the
secant as a difference quotient that is a function of h:
.
.
Q(h) is the slope of the secant line between (a, f(a)) and (a + h, f(a + h)). If f is a
continuous function, meaning that its graph is an unbroken curve with no gaps,
then Q is a continuous function away from the point h = 0. If the limit exists,
meaning that there is a way of choosing a value for Q(0) which makes the graph
of Q a continuous function, then the function f is differentiable at the point a, & its
derivative at a equals Q(0).
http://www.answers.com/topic/derivative 601
http://www.bolsademadrid.eu/derivative_en.html
Weierstrass’ Definition of Limit
In the 18th century, mathematicians went so far as to proclaim that
rigor was for philosophers and theologians, not for
mathematicians. But with the lack of rigor, contradictory results
cropped up with disturbing frequency—people often arrived at
formulae that were obviously wrong. And, if a particular formula
determines whether or not a bridge collapses, you don’t want it to
be wrong. Weierstraß realized that if calculus was to rest on solid
foundations, its central notion, that of the limit, had to be made
rigorous. He introduced the definition that (essentially) is still used
today in classrooms:
A number y0 is the limit of a function f(x) as x tends to x0 if, for
each  > 0, there is d > 0 such that |f(x) − y0| <  for each x with
|x − x0| < d.
http://www.pims.math.ca/pi/issue4/page07-09.pdf
602
arithmetize”
http://books.google.com/books?id=Eq8ZualfMRkC&pg=PA148&lpg=PA148&dq
=weierstrass+infinitesimal&source=web&ots=Ngm3FKwz8h&sig=O4KSK1Zfcx
_Maa6xO2R3Qod5y0M&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=10&ct=result
603
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Scientific philosophy of mathematics (cont.d)
•
Only by the 19th-century did (cont.d)

Cantor develop the theory of continuity and infinite
number.
•
Continuity had been
 conveniently vague for philosophers like Hegel who liked to
introduce philosophical muddles into mathematics.
 had been the subject of mysticism, like Bergson’s, which was
now rendered antiquated by Cantor’s theorems.
604
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Scientific philosophy of mathematics (cont.d)
•
Only by the 19th-century did (cont.d)

Cantor develop the theory of continuity and infinite
number. (cont.d)
•
Infinity
 Leibniz concluded there are no infinite numbers, only infinite
collections, after he observed that the number of even
numbers is the same as the number of whole numbers, even
though the number of even numbers must be half the number
of whole numbers, and that this was a contradiction..
 Cantor defined an “infinite” collection as one which has parts
containing as many terms as the whole collection contains, &
he developed the mathematical theory of infinite numbers,
taking into the realm of logic a whole region formerly given
over to mysticism & confusion.
 Some Catholic theologians took issue with Cantor’s theory
605
and one bishop attacked it for supporting pantheism.
In one of his earliest papers, Cantor proved that the set of real numbers is "more numerous"
than the set of natural numbers; this showed, for the first time, that there exist infinite sets of
different sizes.
Cantor introduced fundamental constructions in set theory, such as the power set of a set A,
which is the set of all possible subsets of A. He later proved that the size of the power set of A
is strictly larger than the size of A, even when A is an infinite set; this result soon became
known as Cantor's theorem.
He was the first to formulate a mathematically rigorous proof that there was more than one
kind of infinity. This demonstration is a centerpiece of his legacy as a mathematician.
Previously, all infinite collections had been implicitly assumed to be equinumerous (that is, of
"the same size" or having the same number of elements). He then proved that the real
numbers were not countable. Prior to this, he had already proven that the set of rational
numbers is countable. [Uncountability could be considered a “micro” characteristic
expressing the existence of infinities embedded between points.--my comment RB]
Cantor looked for a 1-to-1 correspondence between the points of the unit square and the
points of a unit line segment. He proved a far stronger result: for any positive integer n, there
exists a 1-to-1 correspondence between the points on the unit line segment and all of the
points in an n-dimensional space. About this discovery Cantor famously wrote to Dedekind:
"Je le vois, mais je ne le crois pas!" ("I see it, but I don't believe it!"). The result that he found
so astonishing has implications for geometry and the notion of dimension.
He introduced the notion of "power" (a term he took from Jakob Steiner) or "equivalence" of
sets: two sets are equivalent (have the same power) if there exists a 1-to-1 correspondence
between them. Cantor defined countable sets (or denumerable sets) as sets which can be
put into a 1-to-1 correspondence with the natural numbers, and proved that the rational
numbers are denumerable. He also proved that n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn has the
same power as the real numbers R, as does a countably infinite product of copies of R. [So,
606
countability could be considered a “macro” characteristic involving addition, subtraction,
a
product or a quotient of infinities.--my comment RB] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Cantor
“Intuitionists” opposed Cantor
Kronecker, now seen as one of the founders of the constructive viewpoint in
mathematics admitted mathematical concepts only if they could be constructed in a
finite number of steps from the natural numbers, which he took as intuitively given. He
disliked much of Cantor's set theory because it asserted the existence of sets satisfying
certain properties, without giving specific examples of sets whose members did indeed
satisfy those properties. Intuitionists like Kronecker hold that mathematical entities
cannot be reduced to logical propositions, originating instead in the intuitions of the
mind. Secondly, the notion of infinity as an expression of reality is itself disallowed in
intuitionism, since the human mind cannot intuitively construct an infinite set.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Cantor
607
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Scientific philosophy of mathematics (cont.d)
•
Only by the 19th-century did (cont.d)

Frege
•
develop his definition of number, not as mere “plurality” as the
ancients had done, but thus
 a set of three items (not sets) as “a plurality” & an instance of
three:
{a,b,c}



•
1 bracket
number 3 {{a,b,c}, { , , }, …, { , , }}
2 brackets
the set of all numbers as the set of all such sets, as “a
plurality of pluralities of pluralities”, & as number in general.
{{{a}, { }, …, { }}, {{a,b}, { , }, …, { , }}, …}
3 brackets
make number a prolongation of deductive logic, but with some
extra rules as Russell’s paradox later showed, disproving Kant’s
608 a
theory that arithmetic propositions are synthetic for involving
reference to time.
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Scientific philosophy of mathematics (cont.d)
•
By the 20th-century

Russell & Whitehead
•
•
showed the specific derivation of mathematics from pure logic.
Showed the essential unity of logic & mathematics: from a
restricted set of logical symbols (including {, {{, {{{ ) , they proved
the truth of Peano’s axioms for basic arithmetic.
& developed symbolic/formal logic serving as the basis for the
later 20th century’s IT revolution.
609
(Avoidance of) Russell’s Paradox:
A =x|x  x) (A  A &A A)
Solution:
Russell's Theory (Rule) of "Types":
"" is defined only "between" successive
"type" (level, order) of items defined as
"'sets {...} ' of items of the previous type".
"No class can contain any class of its own order/type"
2-Level Functional "Composition" Rule:
(f g)(x) =df F(x) df f(g(x))
where f g =df F df f(g).
○
○
The "arguments" x of functions f( ) are always only items
of the first level (" numbers"), not other functions!
Functions "compose" around first level arguments x; they
610
do not "nest" across levels into functions "of" functions.
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Scientific philosophy of mathematics (cont.d)
•
By the 20th-century (cont.d)

Godel’s theorem & metatheory emerged
•
•
Russell’s Paradox illustrated a situation that Godel proved in his
“theorem”, namely that some (necessary) propositions about a
theory remain undecidable/absent within the theory
 Any consistent formal system powerful enough to contain
arithmetic must contain one proposition whose truth or
falsehood cannot be proved/derived within the system. An
example of such a proposition is Russell’s Theory-of-Types
rule which is needed to prevent a certain kind of
inconsistency but is an added axiom, not a proveable
theorem.
 In general, the consistency of a theory cannot be
asserted/evaluated/proven within the theory itself; it can only
be disproven within the theory, as by Russell’s Paradox, for
example.
611
Godel’s theorem is the founding theorem of the new discipline
called meta-theory (of completeness, consistency, and simplicity).
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Scientific philosophy of mathematics (cont.d)
•
By the 20th-century (cont.d)

Mathematics was dethroned from its lofty place occupied
since Pythagoras & Plato, as was the presumption
against empiricism that had been derived from it.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Mathematical knowledge is not obtained by induction from
experience.
It is not a priori either.
It is “verbal knowledge”, or “rule knowledge”:
By a unit-addition rule, “2” means “1 + 1”
“3” means “2 + 1”
“4” means “3 + 1”
So (by substituting “2 + 1” for “3”), “4” also means “2 + 1 + 1”
which (by substituting “2” for “1 + 1”) means “2 + 2”
612
20th Century Scientific Philosophy
 In the 20th-century
• Formal logical syntax was deployed to
resolve/clarify fundamental metaphysical issues,
beginning with the problem of universals &
particulars. This began with Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions [“the...”] which
 was formulated to avoid Parmenides’ problem of
• how particulars partake of a universal, without a universal being a
“proper name” of a particular.
 For Parmenides everything is denoted by a “name” (“proper
name”). So, all statements about things use their names and
thus already assert/assume existence of the thing named.
613
20th Century Scientific Philosophy
 In the 20th-century
• Formal logical syntax was deployed to
resolve/clarify fundamental metaphysical issues,
beginning with the problem of universals &
particulars. This began with Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions [“the...”] which (cont.d)
 was formulated to avoid Parmenides’ problem of (cont.d)
• how particulars partake of a universal, without a universal being a
“proper name” of a particular. (cont.d)
 A definite description “the …”
 --is not a “name”
 --asserts that a property or properties, if it exists, applies to
 only one individual & no others (asserts that the reference
 class is a “singleton” if non-empty), without asserting that
614
 the specific individual exists.
20th Century Scientific Philosophy
 In the 20th-century
• Formal logical syntax was deployed to
resolve/clarify fundamental metaphysical issues,
beginning with the problem of universals &
particulars. This began with Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions [“the...”] which (cont.d)
 was formulated to avoid Parmenides’ problem of (cont.d)
• how particulars partake of a universal, without a universal being a
“proper name” of a particular. (cont.d)
 According to Russell’s & Whitehead’s principle of abstraction,
“properties”/”qualities”
 --are not “names”
 --denote classes of objects that “possess”/share the property
615
 as the property’s “extension”.
20th Century Scientific Philosophy
 In the 20th-century
• Formal logical syntax was deployed to
resolve/clarify fundamental metaphysical issues,
beginning with the problem of universals &
particulars. This began with Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions [“the...”] which (cont.d)
 was formulated to avoid Parmenides’ problem of (cont.d)
• improperly deriving existence from (definite) descriptions.
Accordingly
 It is improper to explicitly assert or deny existence of
something denoted by a proper name which already
assumes existence of that something.
 Existence can be asserted or denied of a definite description
which does not itself assert existence
616
20th Century Scientific Philosophy
 In the 20th-century
• Formal logical syntax was deployed to
resolve/clarify fundamental metaphysical issues,
beginning with the problem of universals &
particulars. This began with Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions [“the...”] which (cont.d)
 was formulated to avoid Parmenides’ problem of (cont.d)
• difficulty denying the existence of fictitious individuals. Otherwise
 if it is a fictitious name, the name is a definite-description in
disguise and existence or non-existence can be asserted
because existence is not presupposed.
 enables statements about things
 --without making unwanted philosophical commitment to their
 existence, or
617
 --by allowing us to assert non-existence
20th Century Scientific Philosophy
 In the 20th-century
• Formal logical syntax was deployed to
resolve/clarify fundamental metaphysical issues,
beginning with the problem of universals &
particulars. This began with Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions [“the...”] which (cont.d)
 was formulated to avoid Parmenides’ problem of (cont.d)
• no “excluded middle” (“excluded middle”: true or false, no
“middle”) in equally false assertion or denial of something about a
fictitious individual.
618
20th Century Scientific Philosophy
 In the 20th-century
• Formal logical syntax was deployed to
resolve/clarify fundamental metaphysical issues,
beginning with the problem of universals &
particulars. This began with Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions [“the...”] which (cont.d)
 does not commit to the existence of the thing described
 but allows the thing’s (non)existence to be asserted but
not as a property
 and contrasts definite descriptions with proper names
whose referents’ existence is presumed & should not
properly be stated
619
20th Century Scientific Philosophy
 In the 20th-century
• Formal logical syntax was deployed to
resolve/clarify fundamental metaphysical issues,
beginning with the problem of universals &
particulars. This began with Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions [“the...”] which (cont.d)
 considers ($x)(x = a) [“a exists”] as bad grammar: “a” is a
proper name.
 considers ("x)(Wx  x=a) or
 ($y)(("x)(Wx  x=y)) [“The author of Waverly exists”]
as good grammar
 considers ("x)((Wx  x=a) & a=s) or
 ($y)(("x)(Wx  x=y) & y=s)
 [“Scott (=s) is the author of Waverly”] as asserting the
620
identity of “x” as the author of Waverly
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

In the 20th century
•
The Vienna Circle developed logical positivism.
Carnap developed its strict philosophy of logical
“syntax” based on


the proposition that all philosophical problems are really
syntactical and, thereby, soluble or known to be soluble.
radical empiricist rules/”protocols”, called
“verificationism” or the “verifiability criterion of meaning”,
that
•
•
forbid terms & propositions that are not descriptions of a specific
empirical scientific measurement.
encourage experiment & description at the expense of scientific
theory/hypothesis.
621
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

In the 20th century (cont.d)
•
The Realist school led by Popper & Bunge


defended theoretical hypothesis, conjecture, and
empirical “falsifiability” as the basis for scientific
methodology,
while encouraging “exact” mathematical philosophy in
pursuit of Hilbert’s 19th century Erlangen Program to
apply the methods & tools of axiomatic mathematics to
the construction of philosophical, including metaphysical
(metascientific) theories.
622
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

In the 20th century (cont.d)
•
Physics changed the concepts of space & time



•
•
Things don’t persist in time & move through space
Einstein changed material/particles to “events” having a
relation to each other called an “interval”.
“Matter” is just a convenient way of collecting events into
bundles (in a manner reminiscent of Leibniz’ monads).
Quantum mechanics has given unique real status
to “covariance” and stochasticity in relation to
continuity of motion
While physics has made matter less material,
psychology has made mind less mental. Mind &
matter have become convenient ways of grouping
623
events.
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

In the 20th century (cont.d)
•
Perception has become seen as a means of
confirming or falsifying objective relative
relationships

Modern physics & psychology recognize
•
•
•

the interactive effect on perceptions
 by the perceiver
 of surrounding objects, such as the effect, shown by Einstein,
of gravitation on light rays, in violation of Euclidean geometry
thought to govern the space-time of perception
causality by the object perceived
the knowability of certain abstract properties of structure
Modern empiricism differs from Locke, Berkeley, & Hume
by incorporating mathematics & powerful logical
techniques, with the advantage of dealing with one 624
problem at a time.
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Conclusion: two main parts of philosophy have
been inharmoniously blended
•
•
theories of the nature of the world
ethical doctrines of the best way of living



Philosophers from Plato to James were tempted to
construct arguments to prompt beliefs that would make
men virtuous
Philosophers have been dishonest for using their
professional competence for other than disinterested
search
Philosophy becomes limited in scope & trivial by
choosing in advance beliefs (true or false) to promote
good behavior. For example, proofs to defend God’s
existence falsified logic & made mathematics mystical.
625
20th Century Scientific Philosophy

Two main parts of philosophy have been
inharmoniously blended (cont.d)
•
ethical doctrines of the best way of living (cont.d)

The objective, rational approach to knowledge has led to
•
•
•
•
the realization that there is no higher way of knowing truths
inaccessible to science & intellect
the reward of discovering that many questions, formerly obscured
by the fog of metaphysics, can be answered with precision
development of a reliable method in science to make successive
approximations to the truth
recognition of the need
 to divest local & temperamental bias, &
 for a habit of careful veracity, in order to extend the whole
scientific practice to the whole sphere of human activity,
lessening fanaticism.
626