PRIME Inst - S Schondelmeyer - Changes in AMP and best
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Transcript PRIME Inst - S Schondelmeyer - Changes in AMP and best
Changes to
AMP & Best Price:
Impact on 340B Pricing
th
4
Annual 340B Coalition
Winter Conference
February 1, 2008
Long Beach, California
Stephen W. Schondelmeyer, Pharm.D., Ph.D.
Director, PRIME Institute
University of Minnesota
Overview
What will be discussed?
•
Medicaid & AMP
•
Deficit Reduction Act: AMP & the Final Rule
•
Deficit Reduction Act: The Preliminary Injunction
•
Impact of DRA & Preliminary Injunction on 340B
Medicaid & OBRA ’90:
Creation of AMP
[Average Manufacturer Price]
Medicaid & AMP
Medicaid Payment Policy Changes
OBRA ’90 Required Manufacturers to
Pay Rebates to Medicaid
Minimum rebate
Best Price rebate
Inflation adjustment rebate
Veterans Health Care Act of 1992
Set Federal Ceiling Price for Big 4
Established 340B Pricing
Based on AMP (Minimum and Best Price)
Federal Ceiling Price
Negotiated Price
Medicaid Rx Expenditures & Rebates:
1990 to 2002 (Current Dollars)
Expenditures
$29.3 bil.
$30,000,000,000
$25,000,000,000
$5.9 bil.
Total Rx
Expenditures
$20,000,000,000
$23.4 bil.
$15,000,000,000
Rebates
SOURCE: Compiled by the PRIME Institute, University of Minnesota from data found in Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical
Assistance Programs, National Pharmaceutical Council, 1976 to 2002.
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1995
1994
Total Rx
Expenditures
- Rebates
1993
1992
$0
1990
$5,000,000,000
1991
$7.1 bil.
$0.9 bil.
$6.2 bil.
1996
$10,000,000,000
Drug Rebates as a % of
Total Drug Expenditures
% of Medicaid
Drug Expenditures
% of Drug
Product Cost (AMP)
30%
24.9%
25%
22.3%
20%
17.1%
18.8%
15%
12.6%
10%
5%
0%
23.3%
19.4%
23.8%
20.2%
17.9%
% of Total
Drug Expenditures
2.7%
0.0%
2.0%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: Compiled by the PRIME Institute, University of Minnesota from data found in Pharmaceutical Benefits Under
Medical Assistance Programs, National Pharmaceutical Council, 1975 to 1998 and in HCFA Form 64.
Estimated Prices of Selected Public Purchasers
(2001)
% of AWP
100%
100.0%
90%
AMP
80.0%
80%
67.9%
70%
60.5%
60%
51.7%
50%
49.0%
47.9%
44.8%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
AWP
AMP
Medicaid
(Min.)
Medicaid
(Net)
FSS
340B
FCP
VA
Contract
SOURCE: Estimated by PRIME Institute, University of Minnesota and reported in Pharmaceutical Discounts Under Federal Law: State Program
Opportunities, Public Health Institute, May 2001.
Medicaid & the
Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005
Dual Role for AMP
AMP now has 2 roles in Medicaid:
Basis for Manufacturer Rebates to Medicaid
Minimum rebate of 15.1% of AMP
Best price rebate
Inflation adjustment payment
State supplemental rebates
Basis for Setting FULs for Generics
New FULs to begin mid-2007
Lowest AMP of all generic equivalents x 250%
Updated monthly & posted on web site
Applies to any drug with 2 or more equivalents
Medicaid Prescription Payment Gap
AMP
Manufacturer
Rebates
Payment Gap
(Wholesaler Operation
& Margin & other costs)
AAC
Wholesaler
State
Medicaid
Program
Provider/
Pharmacy
Patient
Does AMP = Pharmacy AAC ?
No !
% of
Acquisition Cost
AMP as a % Independent
Invoice Acquisition Cost
(CBO, January 2007)
100%
90%
95.0%
80%
AMP Range
70%
2% to 10%
Below
Actual Cost
60%
50%
88.0%
AMP Range
2% to 27%
Below
Actual Cost
40%
62.0%
AMP Range
8% to 61%
Below
Actual Cost
30%
20%
10%
0%
Single Source
Multi-Source Brands
SOURCE: Independent invoice acquisition cost based on IMS invoice data from CBO January 2007.
Multi-Source Generics
GAO Study of AMP
(December 22, 2006)
FULs set as 250% above the lowest AMP are:
Below Average Retail Acquisition Cost
65% Below for Highest Spend Generics
15% Below for Most Prescribed Generics
28% Below for Most Prescribed & High Use Drugs
59 of 77 Generics Studied
AMP-based FULs was below average retail
pharmacy acquisition cost
AMP Final Rule
The Final Rule for AMP
The CMS Final Rule:
Proposed Rule published (Dec. 2006)
Final Rule published (July 2007)
AMP Regulation Takes Effect (Oct 2007)
Lawsuit Filed by NACDS / NCPA (Nov 2007)
CMS to Report AMP to States & Website
(Jan 2008)
Winners & Losers with AMP
AMP as defined in the CMS Final Rule
The Final Rule AMP benefits:
Manufacturers with less rebate liability
340B with lower AMP from broad definition of retail
The Final Rule hurts:
Medicaid program with less rebates
Traditional retail pharmacy with AMP-based FULs
(payment below acquisition cost in many cases)
340B rebates lower due to exclusion of
wholesaler prompt pay discounts
CMS Proposed Rule on AMP
(December 22, 2006)
Proposed Rule Expected Impact Includes:
Savings from Use of AMP to Set FULs
$800 million in savings in 2007
$8.04 billion in savings over 5 years
90% of savings would come from pharmacy
Pharmacies Will Feel the Impact
18,000 pharmacies will be significantly impacted
350 pharmacies in Minnesota will have
significant impact
High Medicaid pharmacies will be affected most
Rural & Low-income area pharmacies will be hit
The Lawsuit &
Preliminary Injunction
The Lawsuit Alleges:
Preliminary Injunction Alleges CMS Final Rule:
Violates Admin. Procedure Act
Definition of Retail Class of Trade Violates Statute
Definition of Wholesaler Violates Statute
Prices in Each State, Not “United States”
to be Considered
FUL Used for Non-equivalent Multiple Source Drugs
The CMS Final Rule:
Overly broad & self-styled CMS definitions:
Firms not licensed as wholesalers are wholesalers
Firms not licensed as pharmacies are pharmacies
Physicians, clinics, hospital outpatient, & home
infusion are called “retail pharmacies”
Manufacturers are wholesalers & retail pharmacies
Consumers are wholesalers & retail pharmacies
Exhibit 3C. Pharmaceutical Market Structure:
Distinct Market Segments & Classes of Trade
Manufacturers,
Marketers, &
Distributors
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
Wholesalers
Chain
Warehouse
Chain
Pharmacy
Mass
Merchant
Pharmacy
Regional
Wholesalers
National Wholesalers
Food & Drug Independent Mail Order
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Retail Pharmacy
Health Plan
Pharmacy
Clinic &
Drs’ Office
Mail
Pharmacy Outpatient Providers
Long Term
Care
Pharmacy
Hospital
Government
Facilities &
Other
Institutional Providers
Exhibit 3D. Pharmaceutical Market Structure:
Wholesalers
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
Wholesalers
Chain
Warehouse
Chain
Pharmacy
Mass
Merchant
Pharmacy
Regional
Wholesalers
National Wholesalers
Food & Drug Independent Mail Order
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Manufacturer
Direct Sales,
Pt. Assistance,
Coupons, &
Vouchers
Health Plan
Pharmacy
Clinic &
Drs’ Office
Long Term
Care
Pharmacy
Hospital
Government
Facilities &
Other
Hospital
Outpatient
Non-Profit
Entities
Exhibit 3E. CMS Final Rule:
Wholesalers
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
Wholesalers
Wholesalers
Chain
Warehouse
Chain
Pharmacy
Mass
Merchant
Pharmacy
Regional
Wholesalers
National Wholesalers
Food & Drug Independent Mail Order
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Wholesalers
Manufacturer
Direct Sales,
Pt. Assistance,
Coupons, &
Vouchers
Health Plan
Pharmacy
Clinic &
Drs’ Office
Long Term
Care
Pharmacy
Wholesalers
Hospital
Government
Facilities &
Other
Hospital
Outpatient
Non-Profit
Entities
Exhibit 3F. Pharmaceutical Market Structure:
Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
Chain
Warehouse
Chain
Pharmacy
Mass
Merchant
Pharmacy
Regional
Wholesalers
National Wholesalers
Food & Drug Independent Mail Order
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade
Manufacturer
Direct Sales,
Pt. Assistance,
Coupons, &
Vouchers
Health Plan
Pharmacy
Clinic &
Drs’ Office
Long Term
Care
Pharmacy
Hospital
Government
Facilities &
Other
Hospital
Outpatient
Non-Profit
Entities
Exhibit 3G. CMS Final Rule:
Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade
Drug Manufacturers & Marketers
Chain
Warehouse
Chain
Pharmacy
Mass
Merchant
Pharmacy
Regional
Wholesalers
National Wholesalers
Food & Drug Independent Mail Order
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Pharmacy
Retail Pharmacy Class of Trade
Manufacturer
Direct Sales,
Pt. Assistance,
Coupons, &
Vouchers
Health Plan
Pharmacy
Clinic &
Drs’ Office
Long Term
Care
Pharmacy
Retail Pharmacy by
Final Rule Definition
Hospital
Government
Facilities &
Other
Hospital
Outpatient
Non-Profit
Entities
Preliminary Injunction Order
by Judge R. C. Lamberth
“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits”
“Unless enjoined plaintiffs are likely to suffer
irreparable harm for which no adequate remedy
exists in law”
Preliminary Injunction Order
by Judge R. C. Lamberth
“statute is clear enough”
“does not provide the ambiguity for the
wholesale re-writing of the words by the Agency”
CMS is enjoined from:
“any and all action to implement the AMP rule
to the extent such action affects Medicaid
reimbursement rates for retail pharmacies”
“Posting AMP on a public website or . . . to states”
What Can We Expect?
What Can We Expect?
In the Next Year:
May have settlement of legislative intervention
Without above the lawsuit will proceed to trial
CMS may implement other aspects of DRA & AMP
Manufacturers will continue to report AMP
AMP may be implemented for 340B pricing purposes
PRIME Institute
P harmaceutical
Research
In
Management &
E conomics
University of Minnesota