Transcript The Basics

DOCTORS AND THE
‘TERRORIST BOMB’:
proliferation dangers associated with
radio-pharmaceutical production
A presentation prepared by the Medical Association for Prevention of
War
Bomb-grade uranium in the marketplace
 ‘URGENT…phasing
out the use of highly
enriched uranium in
civil commerce and
removing weaponsusable uranium from
research facilities
around the world and
rendering the materials
safe.’
2
HEU and nuclear medicine
 > 95% of the world’s
radiopharmaceuticals
are derived from
BOMB-GRADE
Highly Enriched
Uranium (HEU)
 ‘targets’ +/- reactor
fuel
Uranium fuel pellets
3
Nuclear terror…
“… terrorist groups have been
trying aggressively to obtain
nuclear materials…”
- From 1993 - 2006, IAEA
recorded over 1000 cases
of intercepted smuggling of
radioactive materials
- By 2005, 18 seizures of
stolen HEU or plutonium
confirmed by states
involved
– Al-Qaida agents have tried
to buy uranium from South
Africa …
Helfand et al. Nuclear terrorism.
BMJ 2002; 324:356-9.
4
Uranium enrichment
 Natural uranium =
0.7% U-235
 Weapons grade usually enriched to
greater than 90%, but
lower percentages still
usable
5
The fission process
 Each nucleus
undergoing fission
must produce a
neutron that splits
another nucleus
 Complete fissioning
of 1 gram of U-235
releases 23,000
kilowatt-hours of
heat
6
Detonation techniques
Gun technique
– Only used with HEU
– Mass of sub-critical
HEU fired (or
dropped) at another
– sum of two masses >
“supercritical”
– Hiroshima bomb
– Simple, robust, no
testing required
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Nuclear consequences
 Within half a millionth of a
second:
– hundreds of millions degrees
centigrade
– pressures - millions of
atmospheres






Flash >>>
Fireball >>>
Blast >>>
Firestorm >>>
Acute radiation >>>
Delayed radiation
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6 August 1945
Hiroshima
15 kiloton bomb
 Immediate deaths –
140,000
 Total deaths:
Hiroshima bomb 6
August 2004:
237,000
 270,000 hibakusha
still living in Japan
(Mayor
Akiba)
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‘MEDICAL MESSAGE’:
12.5 kt explosion: New York City
DON’T BOTHER
RINGING
000
responder access
• essential services
• medical supplies
• hospital facilities
•
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Core requirements
 A 20 kt nuclear bomb requires:
– 4-5 kg of weapons grade plutonium OR
– 10-15 kg of weapons grade uranium
(HEU)
 A 1kt nuclear weapon requires:
– 1 kg of weapons-grade plutonium OR
– 2.5 kg of weapons-grade uranium
12
Suppliers of radiopharmaceuticals
4 major competitors
1.
2.
3.
4.
MDS Nordion (Canada)
TycoHealthcare / Mallinckrodt
(Netherlands)
Institut National des
Radioéléments (Belgium)
NECSA/NTP (South Africa)
–
–
>95 per cent of the
global supply
7 reactors
NRU Reactor at Chalk River,
Canada, where MDS Nordion
irradiates HEU targets to
produce medical isotopes 13
HEU sourcing
 Canada (Nordion): imports ~ 20 kg/year
from USA
 Europe: France, Russia or UK (or US pre1992)
 South Africa: uses HEU it produced for
weapons prior to 1991
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Isotope production
– Neutron bombardment of
HEU ‘targets’
– Process consumes < 3%
of the available U-235
– ‘used’ target = still
bomb-grade uranium
– 85kg/year HEU used
globally
– HEU stockpiled in multiple
commercial locations
Unloading fuel from a research
reactor
15
Medical isotopes
Technetium-99 (Tc99m)
– ‘workhorse’ isotope
– >75% of medical
isotope procedures
worldwide
– 25 million procedures
per year
– Favoured isotope
tracer in bone scans,
thyroid scans
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From HEU to LEU
Low enriched uranium-LEU
– Targets < 20 % U-235
– Suits Mo/Tc-99m
production
– Not viable for weapons
– Argentina, Indonesia
and Australia use LEU
targets (<5% of market)
New OPAL reactor, Sydney:
LEU fuel and targets
17
Cleaning up
 2002, Belgrade: removal
of 48 kilograms of HEU
research reactor fuel
 The fuel in the reactor at
Petten, Netherlands
converted in 2005
18
Conversion
Oslo IAEA symposium, June 2006
‘The conversion of radioisotope production,
specifically Mo-99, to LEU is technically feasible,
and … remaining obstacles to conversion of this
activity are chiefly of commercial nature.’
Prof Jose Goldemberg, International Panel on Fissile Materials
Summary
– Conversion from HEU to LEU is possible
– No future needs for HEU identified
– Current conversion programmes: successful
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Commercial viability
 Cost to consumers in most applications
would be in the order of a 1 – 2 % increase
 A large cost saving: eliminating the high
security costs necessitated by HEU storage
and transport
Kahn LH, von Hippel F. How the radiological and medical
communities can improve nuclear security.
J Am Coll Radiol 2007;4:248-51.
20
Addressing supplier reluctance
None of the 4 big players are currently using LEU targets
Timeline
 1978 - Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor
program
 1992 - US Energy Policy Bill: incentives to convert to LEU
 2005 - Burr Amendment weakens the Bill
Current status
 S.Africa & Netherlands ‘planning’ to convert to LEU: a
decade away…?
 MDS-Nordion (>50% of the global Tc-99m supply)
– stopped co-operating with the RERTR in 2003
– lobbied Congress to pass Burr Amendment
– current stockpile > 45 kilograms HEU
21
Other options: Non-reactor produced
isotopes
 Cyclotrons and other
spallation sources
– fluorine-18: PET scans
– thallium-201
– indium-111
 Potential non-reactor
routes to Mo-99/Tc-99
exist, but no current
commercial projects
22
Imaging alternatives
Technetium-99m
– Retains important role in
medical imaging
– Challenges to Tc-99m:
 Positron Emission
Tomography (PET)
 Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI),
 Helical, multidetector, high
resolution, multislice CT
 Ultrasound (including
echocardiography and
Doppler techniques)
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So … ask:
1. Where do your isotopes originate?
2. Are they derived from HEU?
3. If so, is there an alternative supplier not using
HEU? If so, please use them.
4. If not, what is the current supplier doing to
convert to LEU?
24
Medical strategies
 Educate colleagues
 Encourage clinicians to ask NM-providers where
their isotopes come from, and
 urge a non-HEU source whenever possible
 Optimise use of alternative imaging technologies
 Promote R & D of non-reactor isotopes
 Promote medical association and government
policies encouraging elimination of HEU
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Other strategies




Nuclear physicians seek LEU-isotopes only
Encourage their suppliers to convert to LEU
+/- switch to a non-HEU source asap
Governments of countries with producers using
HEU and governments providing HEU compel
conversion to LEU by big producers
 All new isotope facilities to utilize LEU
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Helsinki 2006: IPPNW campaign
 End medical reliance on HEU
 Eliminate a likely source for the much-feared
’terrorist bomb’
 Block vulnerable pathway to fissile material
 Re-awaken profession to threat of nuclear
weapons
 Encourage health professionals to engage
 Clean-up ‘our own shop’:
First, do no harm
27
The bigger
picture
 Collaborations
 Representation
 Education
talk to
colleagues &
students
www.icanw.org
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Further reading:
– von Hippel F, Kahn LH. Feasibility of eliminating the use of
highly enriched uranium in the production of medical
radioisotopes. Science and Global Security 2006; 14: 151–62.
– Kahn LH, von Hippel F. How the radiologic and medical
communities can improve nuclear security. J Am Coll Radiol
2007; 4: 248–51.
– Williams B, Ruff TA. Proliferation dangers associated with
nuclear medicine: getting weapons-grade uranium out of
radiopharmaceutical production. Medicine, Conflict and
Survival. October – December 2007; 23(4): 267 – 281.
– Williams B, Ruff TA. Getting nuclear-bomb fuel out of
radiopharmaceutical production. Lancet 2008; 371 (8
March):795-7.
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