Transcript Document

International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAMME
FOR NPPS WORLDWIDE
Mamdouh El-Shanawany
Head of Safety Assessment Section
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety
Hierarchy of the Safety Standards
Under its mandate the IAEA has developed a logical framework of
objectives and principles of nuclear reactor safety.
Safety Fundamentals
 Set out general principles for protecting
people and the environment
Safety Requirements
 Establish requirements: what has to be
done (‘shall’) to apply these principles in
meeting objectives
Safety Fundamentals
Requirements
Safety Guides
Safety Guides
 Set out recommended ways (‘should’) of
meeting the requirements
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Examples of Safety Standards
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•
Fundamental Safety
Principles
SF-1
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The IAEA Safety
Assessment for Facilities
and Activities
Requirements
GS-R-Part4
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The Safety of Nuclear
Power Plant: Design
NS-R-1
International Atomic Energy Agency
General Safety Requirements
Part 1 Governmental and
Regulatory Framework
Part 2 Leadership and Management
for Safety
Part 3 Radiation Protection and
Safety of Radiation Sources
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Specific Safety Requirements
1. Site Evaluation for
Nuclear Installations
2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants
2.1 Design and Construction
2.2 Commissioning and Operation
Part 4 Safety Assessment
3. Safety of Research Reactors
Part 5 Predisposal Management
of Radioactive Waste
4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Facilities
Part 6 Decommissioning and
Termination of Activities
5. Safety of Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities
Part 7 Emergency Preparedness
and Response
6. Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
 IAEA has statutory obligation to develop
international standards of safety
Article III.A.6 of Statutes:
• To establish or adopt standards of safety for the protection
of health and minimization of danger to life and property
• To provide for the application of these standards
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International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
Safety Standards represent international
consensus on the best practices to
achieve a high level of safety
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International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
Utilization by Member States
• Formally adopted (i.e. China, Netherlands)
• Direct use of standards to establish regulation (i.e.
Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, India, Korea,
Russian Federation)
• Used as reference for review of national standards
(by all States also by Industry).
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International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
 Peer reviews performed upon request of Member
States.
 Assess compliance with Safety Standards and
provide recommendations for improvements.
 Results publically available (unless formally
requested by Member State).
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International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
 Guidelines based on best international practices
and feedback from long experience
 Phased approach
- Self assessment
- Preparatory mission
- Main mission
- Follow-up mission
• Modular approach to meet needs of Member
States
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International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
 Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
 International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team
(IPSART)
 Review of Accident management Program (RAMP)
 Safety Assessment and Design Safety Review Service (SADRS)
 Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR)
 International seismic safety centre Services (ISSC)
 Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
 Peer Review of Operational safety Performance Experience
(PROSPER)
 Safety aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO)
 Safety Culture Assessment Review Team (SCART)
 Integrated safety Assessment of Research Reactors (INSARR)
 Safety assessment of Fuel Cycle Facilities during operation
(SEDO)
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International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA SAFETY REVIEW SERVICES
 “Customers” of safety review services:
– 50% Regulators
– 50%Industry
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International Atomic Energy Agency
OSART
objectives of the OSART programme
 to provide the host country (regulatory authority,
plant/utility management and governmental authorities)
with an objective assessment of the status of the
operational safety with respect to international standards
of operational safety and performance;
 to provide the host plant with recommendations and
suggestions for improvement in areas where
performance falls short of IAEA Safety Standards and
international best practices;
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Objectives of the OSART programme
 to provide key staff at the host plant with an opportunity to
discuss their practices with experts who have experience
of other practices in the same field;
 to provide all Member States with information regarding
good practices identified in the course of the review;
 to provide experts and observers from Member States
and the IAEA staff with opportunities to broaden their
experience and knowledge of their own field.
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Standard OSART review scope: 9 areas
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Management, organization and administration (MOA)
Training and qualification (TQ)
Operations (OP)
Maintenance (MA)
Technical support (TS)
Operational experience feedback (OE)
Radiation protection (RP)
Chemistry (CH)
Emergency planning and preparedness (EPP)
(+ Commissioning [COM] for pre-operational OSART)
International Atomic Energy Agency
Customized OSART review scope
Customized review scope = core areas + selected
optional areas
New optional areas in development:
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Long Term Operation
Transition from Operations to Decommissioning
Probabilistic Safety Assessment Applications
Accident Management
International Atomic Energy Agency
OSART missions 2006, 2007
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2006
Lithuania, Ignalina
Slovakia, Mochovce
Ukraine, S. Ukraine 3
France, St. Laurent
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2007
Finland, Loviisa
Korea, Yongwang
Belgium, Tihange
Germany, Neckarwestheim
Ukraine, Khmelnitsky
France, Chinon
International Atomic Energy Agency
OSART missions 2008, 2009
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2008
Sweden, Forsmark
Russia, Balakovo
USA, Arkansas
France, Cruas
Ukraine, Rovno 3,4
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2009
Japan, Mihama
Sweden, Oskarshamn
France, Fessenheim
Spain, Vandellos 2
Ukraine, S. Ukraine 1,2*
China, Ling Ao 3,4**
* Limited scope
** Pre-operational
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International Atomic Energy Agency
OSART PROGRAMME 2006-2009
5
21 OSART missions:
9
Western Europe
Central Europe
Eastern Europe
Asia
North America
South America
Africa
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5
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3
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International Atomic Energy Agency
OSART Missions for Russian NPPs
A number of OSART missions were requested by Russian
NPPs during the period 1989–1993, which are listed below:
Plant
Gorky (Pre-operational)
Novovoronezh 3/4
Kola 1/2
Smolensk 3
Reactor type
district heating NP
VVER 440/179
VVER 440/ 230
RBMK 1000
Year
1989
1991
1991
1993
All of these missions were combined review of design and
operational safety, not the current standard OSART
programme.
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International Atomic Energy Agency
OSART missions for Russian NPPs
More recently, the Russian NPPs management requested
full OSART and follow up for two more plants:
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Plant
Reactor type
OSART OSART FU
Volgodonsk
Balakovo
VVER-1000
VVER-1000
2005
2008
2007
2010
International Atomic Energy Agency
OSART missions for Russian NPPs
The following points were noted from overall assessment of the
results of OSART missions to Volgodonsk and Balakovo NPPs:
• Evidence of significant efforts were spent by the plants to prepare
for the OSART;
• Relatively low number of areas for improvement;
• Most areas for improvements are suggestions, only a few
recommendations;
• Relatively high number of good practices;
• During the OSART Follow-up missions the team observed that:
• A high ratio of issues fully resolved, the rest progressing
satisfactorily towards completion, with no issues having
insufficient progress;
• The plants responded with corrective actions not only to
recommendations and suggestions but also to encouragements,
which is the lowest category of advice;
• The corrective actions were applied not only at the plant hosting
the OSART but across the fleet of Rosenergoatom.
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International Atomic Energy Agency
OSART missions for Russian NPPs
Future plans for OSART missions in Russia are being
considered. There is an agreement with the utility
Rosenergoatom to organize an OSART mission to a
Russian NPP site every three years:
Plant
Smolensk
Kola
Reactor type
RBMK
VVER 440/213
Year
2011
2014
By completing these reviews the OSART programme will
then have cover all major reactor designs operated in
Russia.
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International Atomic Energy Agency
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA Generic Reactor Safety Review
(GRSR)
May 2010
Nuclear Installation Safety
Generic Reactor Safety Reviews (GRSR)
The IAEA is assisting Member States in their new reactor design
assessments by carrying out reviews of reactor design safety cases
with focus on completeness and comprehensiveness of the safety
.case using selected and applicable IAEA Safety Fundamentals and
Requirements.
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Generic Reactor Safety Review
Objectives
The aims of the review are to:
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Determine whether the reactor design safety case follows the
IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles,
Determine whether the selected safety requirements defined in
GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 are being addressed in the design safety
case and identify any that have been omitted,
For those requirements that are addressed, form a view on
whether they are being addressed in a way that is consistent with
the spirit of the IAEA requirements,
For the safety requirements that are not being addressed or are
partially addressed, form a view on their relative significance and
highlight their importance to safety.
Identify if the supplied documentation includes proper
references/evidence as technical supporting information.
International Atomic Energy Agency
Generic Reactor Safety Review
Area and Scope
The review focuses on:
A. Completeness
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Does the documentation provide a complete overview of the safety case or are
there gaps?
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if so are these made explicit and is there any indication of what is being done to
fill them (NB this applies to both the safety of the design and the safety case
itself)?
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Is evidence provided that substantiates the safety claims and arguments being
made?
B. Comprehensiveness
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Are all modes of operation covered, e.g. outages, refuelling, maintenance, startup, shutdown?
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Are all features of the facility included e.g. fuel stores, spent fuel storage,
auxiliary systems, steam turbines?
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Are lifetime issues covered e.g. ageing management; provision for maintenance,
repair, replacement with respect to radiological risks/doses; decommissioning;
radioactive waste minimisation in maintenance, repair and replacement?
Assisting Member States to implement
the IAEA safety standards
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Generic Reactor Safety Review
Safety Fundamentals and Safety Requirements
Safety Standards used in IAEA generic evaluation of
safety of new reactor designs :
Fundamental Safety Principles, SF-1
Safety Assessment Requirements, GS-R-4
Safety Standards
against which the
reviews are
conducted
Design Safety Requirements NS-R-1
Design Safety Guidelines
Safety Assessment Guidelines
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Supporting
guidance
documents
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA Safety Requirements and
Generic Reactor Safety Review
LICENSING
FUTURE STATE
LICENSING
IAEA
SAFETY STANDARDS
REQUIREMENTS
HARMONIZING SAFETY
ASSESSMENTS
GLOBAL NUCLEAR
SAFETY REGIME
FUTURE MDEP CONTRIBUTION
LICENSING
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International Atomic Energy Agency
LICENSING
Generic Reactor Safety Review
Report Contents
The Executive Summary :
General Reporting:
• Description of the review’s scope, objectives, implementation, and safety
requirements selected for the review
Review Results:
• General comments on the quality and completeness of the documents
screened
• A review of selected design features with observations and
recommendations highlighting specific findings on technical topics (e.g.
safety functions, reactor core and associated features, reactor coolant
system, containment, I&C, human factors defence in depth, use of PSA and
DSA, etc.)
Review Sheets for each Safety Requirement :
• Detailed screening comments on each requirement and sub-paragraph of
GS-R-4 and NS-R-1 reviewed
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Generic Reactor Safety Review
2006-2009 Activities
ACR 1000 - AECL
AP1000 - Westinghouse
EPR - AREVA
ESBWR – GE Hitachi
ATMEA 1 – AREVA – MHI
APR1400 – KHNP
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Generic Reactor Safety Review
2006-2009 Activities
2006-2007 - Concept Development and Planning
2007-2009 GRSR Reviews Conducted :
UK HSE
Screening of Four New Reactor Safety Cases submitted for the
consideration of the UK Health and Safety Executive/ NII against DS348:
ACR1000, AP1000, ESBWR, EPR
(initiated September 2007 – completed March 2008)
ATMEA1
Screening of Conceptual Design Safety File and its innovative features against
DS348 and NS-R-1 of new AREVA-MHI Reactor ATMEA1
(initiated 10 December 2007 – completed June 2008)
AP1000
Screening of AP1000 Safety and Environmental Report and its innovative
features against DS348 and NS-R-1
(initiated 13 February 2008 – completed January 2009)
APR1400
Screening of KHNP APR1400 Safety and Environmental Report against GS-RPart 4 and NS-R-1
(initiated 15 October 2008 – completed August 2009)
Projects in the planning stages:
APR1000
Screening of the Korean APR1000 has been requested and initial discussions
with KEPCO are ongoing.
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International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEA
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY
CENTRE
(INSC)
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International Atomic Energy Agency
BACKGROUND
• There are 436 nuclear power reactors in operation
worldwide, and over 50 reactors are under
construction.
• Large number of countries without any previous
nuclear experience considers implementation of
nuclear power programmes in the next decade.
• Safety assessment capacity is the primary means for
decision-making in support of design, licensing and
operation activities.
Building
Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Assessment provides the foundation for:
• SUCCESSFUL DESIGN,
• LICENSING, AND
• OPERATION
Safety cannot be assured without robust safety assessment
The development of an efficient and competent safety infrastructure in all
Member States with nuclear power programmes or planning deployment
of nuclear power system for the first time is a must!
A significant element of the safety infrastructure is the safety assessment
capability:
there is no safety without safety assessment!
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International Atomic Energy Agency
• Hence: comes the need to increase global safety
assessment capacity for new nuclear power plant,
• and the need to assist Member States in the
applications of integrated safety assessment
approach in order to reach informed safety decisions
based on IAEA safety standards.
• The IAEA is establishing the International Nuclear
Safety Centre (INSC).
Building
Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment
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International Atomic Energy Agency
OBJECTIVES of INSAC
1/2
Implementing integrated and harmonized methods and
approach to safety assessment of nuclear installations
and to assist in its applications.
The INSC framework and platforms will be used to:
1. Support safety standard preparation through
providing for technical bases;
2. Provide comprehensive IAEA advisory and review
services;
Building
Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment
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International Atomic Energy Agency
OBJECTIVES of INSAC
2/2
3. Support Member States in safety capacity building,
maintenance and knowledge management;
4. Provide networking systems and facilitate effective
knowledge and information sharing and
collaboration.
Building
Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Advanced Education
and Training
Reviews and
Advisory Services
IAEA
SAFETY
STANDARDS
HARMONIZING SAFETY
ASSESSMENTS
Advanced Safety
Assessment
and
Engineering Tools
International Network
COMPETENCY AND CAPACITY
BUILDING
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International Atomic Energy Agency
EXPECTED RESULTS
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The INSAC will harmonise safety assessment
competency and capacity building efforts.
•
It will provide leadership and management of safety
assessment methodologies based on an integrated
structured approach.
Building
Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Examples: PERFORMANCE MEASURES
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The number of developed Technical Documents and
Guides related to the interpretation of safety
assessment requirements. Development and
application of Generic Reactor Safety Review
methodology,
•
Development and application of methods/guidance
documents for;
- Integrated Risk Informed Decision Making
process,
- Safety Performance Indicators and applications,
- “Safety Goals” and its applications.
Building Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment
International Atomic Energy Agency
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
•
Implementation of integrated safety review services of safety
assessment approach developed. Number of advisory service
conducted per year
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Development of safety assessment knowledge requirement &
implementation of capacity building. Number of training
courses and workshops prepared and conducted per year
•
Development and use of e-platform such as CASAT. To foster
collaboration and network platform promoting harmonization of
nuclear safety assessment concepts and approaches
worldwide in operation. Web-bases system setup for
collaboration and networking, data base for training and
methods validation.
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Capacity and Competency in Safety Assessment
International Atomic Energy Agency
Concluding Remarks
 The IAEA is willing and ready to support safety enhancements through
the establishment and application of Safety Standards, Safety Review
and Advisory Services and International Instruments.
 The IAEA is successfully performing safety assessments of new reactor
designs using the current Safety Standards.
 Current Safety Standards are a first basis for harmonization.
 All IAEA publications are available at:
http://www- pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/publications.asp
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International Atomic Energy Agency