Transcript RAND Rabasa POW Presentation

The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War
February 2005
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Understanding Emerging Threats:
The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War
• This study has several objectives:
– Develop a typology of tendencies in Muslim world
– Identify key cleavages and fault lines
– Identify the factors that produce extremism and
violence
– Analyze the effects of 9/11, the GWOT and Iraq
– Develop recommendations for a U.S. strategy
• The goals of the strategy are:
– Help our friends and potential allies
– Neutralize our adversaries
– Influence those in the middle
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Muslim Tendencies & Marker Issues
Seven Tendencies
Radical Fundamentalists
Scriptural Fundamentalists
Traditionalists
Modernists (liberal)
Modernists (Islamist)
Liberal Secularists
Authoritarian Secularists
Seven marker issues
Ideology
Political/legal views
Views of government
Human rights
Social agenda
Propensity for violence
Links to terrorism
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Typology of Muslim Tendencies
Radical or neoFundamentalists
Scriptural
Fundamentalists
Traditionalists
Modernists
Liberal
Secularists
Authoritarian
Secularists
Ideology
Emphasis on
obligation of jihad
Literal
interpretation of
Islamic
scriptures
Fuse Islamic
beliefs with local
traditions
Islam viewed as
consistent with
modern world
Liberal
democratic or
social democratic
values
Leader cult and
socialist and/or
pan-Arab
ideologies
Political-Legal
Revolutionary and
anti-status quo
Politically
conservative
Politically
moderate
Politically
moderate
Support secular
law and
institutions
Rely on
authoritarian
structures
Government
Political legitimacy
derives from God
Political
legitimacy
derives from
God
Political legitimacy
derives from the
will of the people
Reject Western
concept of human
rights and individual
liberties
Same
Islam guarantees
human rights and
liberties
Political
legitimacy
derives from the
will of the people
through free
elections.
Primacy of
individual
political and
human rights
Political
legitimacy derives
from state
ideology
Human Rights
Social Agenda
Generally
reactionary
Reactionary
Conservative but
many value nonreligious subjects
in education
Political
legitimacy derives
from the will of
the people
through free
elections.
Islam contains
the basic
concepts of
human rights and
individual
freedoms
Generally
progressive
Progressive in
education and
women’s rights
Inconsistent
Links to
Terrorism
Direct
Generally
indirect
Usually none
Usually none
Usually none
Terrorism an
instrument of
state policy
Propensity for
Violence
High
Situationcontinent
Low
Low
Low
High
Primacy of party
and state and
collective
interests
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Muslim Tendencies:
Radical Fundamentalists
Violence
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Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan
Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan)
Islamic Movement of Nigeria
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1
-
Democracy
Al-Qaida (international)
Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan)
Asnar al-Islam (Iraq)
PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Hamas (Palestinian territories)
Saudi Salafist Groups
IMU - Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan
Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional)
Hizbollah (Turkey)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)
Hib ut-Tahrir (international)
MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia
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1
1
1
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Add Scriptural Fundamentalists
Violence
+
-
Democracy
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1
1
1
Hezbollah (Lebanon)1
Al-Qaida (international)
Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan)
Asnar al-Islam (Iraq)
PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Hamas (Palestinian territories)
Saudi Salafist Groups
IMU - Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan
Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional)
Hizbollah (Turkey)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)
Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan
Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan)
Islamic Movement of Nigeria
Ennada (Tunisia)
Hib ut-Tahrir (international)
MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia
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1
Muslim Brotherhood (regional)
SCIRI (Iraq)
Al-Dawa (Iraq)
1
1
Darul Arqam (SEA regional)
Jamaa-i-Tabligh (international)
1
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Add Traditionalists and Modernists
Violence
+
1
1
1
1
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PAS - Pan-Malay Islamic Party
Prosperous Justice Party
(Indonesia)
-
Hezbollah (Lebanon)1
Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan
Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan)
Islamic Movement of Nigeria
Ennada (Tunisia)
Muhammadiyah (Indonesia)
AKP - Justice and Development
Party (Turkey)
Izala (Nigeria)
Al-Wasat (Egypt)
Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia)
-
Democracy
Party of the Islamic Revival of
Tajikistan
Al-Qaida (international)
Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan)
Asnar al-Islam (Iraq)
PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Hamas (Palestinian territories)
Saudi Salafist Groups
IMU - Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan
Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional)
Hizbollah (Turkey)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)
Hib ut-Tahrir (international)
MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia
Muslim Brotherhood (regional)
SCIRI (Iraq)
Al-Dawa (Iraq)
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Darul Arqam (SEA regional)
Jamaa-i-Tabligh (international)
1
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Add Secularists
Violence
+
-
1
1
1
1
Hezbollah (Lebanon)1
Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan
Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan)
Islamic Movement of Nigeria
Ennada (Tunisia)
Al-Fatah (Palestinian territories)
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Muhammadiyah (Indonesia)
AKP (Turkey)
Izala (Nigeria)
Al-Wasat (Egypt)
Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia)
PDI-P (Indonesia)
Kuwait Nat. Democratic
Movement
Democratic Left Party (Turkey)
-
Democracy
PAS - Pan-Malay Islamic Party
Prosperous Justice Party
(Indonesia)
Muslim Brotherhood (regional)
SCIRI (Iraq)
Al-Dawa (Iraq)
Neo-Destour Party (Tunisia)
Central Asian ruling parties
Party of the Islamic Revival of
Tajikistan
Darul Arqam (SEA regional)
Jamaa-i-Tabligh (international)
Al-Qaida (international)
Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan)
Asnar al-Islam (Iraq)
PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Hamas (Palestinian territories)
Saudi Salafist Groups
IMU - Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan
Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional)
Hizbollah (Turkey)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)
Baath Party of Iraq and Syria
Hib ut-Tahrir (international)
MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia
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The Muslim World Is Far From
Homogenous
Turkic
P e r s i an
Berber–Af rican
South Asian
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Briefing Outline
– The Islamic Landscape
– Fault lines in the Muslim World
– Sources of Islamic Radicalism
– Post-9/11 and Post-Iraq Trends
– Conclusions
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Sources of Islamic Radicalism
Catalytic
Events
Processe
s
Conditions
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Sources of Islamic Radicalism
Conditions
 Failed political and economic models
 Structural anti-Westernism
 Unresolved issues of state and religious authority
Processes
 The Islamic resurgence
 Riyaldiplomatik: external funding of religious
fundamentalism and extremism
 Convergence of Islamism and tribalism
 Growth of radical Islamic networks
 Emergence of the mass media
 The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts
Catalytic Events
 The Six-Day War (in Arab world)
 The Iranian Revolution
 The Afghan War
 The (First) Gulf War
 September 11 and the Global War on Terrorism
 The Iraq War and its aftermath
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Briefing Outline
– The Islamic Landscape
– Fault lines in the Muslim World
– Sources of Islamic Radicalism
– Post-9/11 and post-Iraq Trends
– Conclusions
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The War in Iraq a “Catalytic Event”
in the Middle East
On the order of the 1967 Six-Day War or higher
• Western-led coalition assumed responsibility for
restructuring political system of Muslim country
• Effects of the war can be analyzed at three levels:
– Effects on Iraq
– Effects on Middle East
– Effects on broader Muslim World
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A Strategy for the Muslim World
Needs to Include:
A geopolitical vision of the Muslim world:
What kind of a Muslim world do we want to see emerge
from the current turmoil?
And what are the engagement, military posture, and
access implications of this vision?
Practical steps to:
(1) support friends and potential allies
(2) neutralize enemies
(3) appeal to mainstream Muslims: “The War of Ideas”
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The Centerpiece of the Practical Side of
the Strategy is to Empower Moderates
• Two components of this approach:
– Help to create moderate Muslim networks
– Support “Civil Islam”organizations
• Currently radicals have the advantage
– They are a minority, but have developed extensive
international networks
– Liberal and moderate Muslims have no similar
networks
• Creation of an international moderate Muslim network
would provide a platform to amplify their message
and protection
• However, the initial impulse may require an external
catalyst
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And Disrupt Radicals
• The U.S. and its allies also need to disrupt radical
networks and deny resources to extremists
• The key analytical/intelligence problem is: how can
hostile networks be identified?
• Within Western countries, policymakers need to be
attentive to radical infiltration of prisons and the
military
• Resource denial involves difficult practical problems,
but could be partially addressed through network
disruption
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Influence the Muslim Mainstream
• Obvious attempts by non-Muslims to influence Muslims
would likely backfire.
• U.S. needs to rely on Muslim scholars to delegitimize
radical ideology
• Over the long term, important to promote madrassa and
mosque reform
• What the U.S. and its allies can do:
– Assist moderate madrassas to provide broad modern
education & marketable skills
– Assist governments in developing/strengthening
capabilities to monitor mosques and madrassas
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Seek to Engage Islamists in “Normal
Politics”
• Goal is to influence radicals into moderation
• Always a danger that an Islamist party, once in power,
may move against democratic freedoms
• However, inclusion of such groups within democratic
institutions may over time lessen threat
• An unequivocal commitment to non-violence and
democratic processes should be prerequisite
– Turkey’s AKP an ambiguous model
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Engage Muslim Diasporas
• Engagement of Muslim diasporas could help U.S.
advance its interests in Muslim world
• One possibility is working with Muslim NGOs in
responding to humanitarian crises
• However, efforts to engage diasporas need to be
undertaken cautiously
• Need to be able to distinguish between “benign” and
“malign” diasporan manifestations
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Expand Economic Opportunities
• Will not by itself prevent extremists from striking at
perceived enemies of Islam
• However, might help to indirectly undercut the appeal
of radicals
• Priority on improving the economic/job prospects of
the young
• How international assistance is channeled is critical
• Funding should not be politically neutral
– Should emphasize programs run by secular or
moderate Muslim organizations
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Build Appropriate Military Capabilities
and Posture
• Comprehensive review of U.S. military capabilities and
posture in Muslim world needed
• New challenges require the U.S. to develop different
kinds of military capabilities
– counter-insurgency & stabilization capabilities
– cultural intelligence
• In Iraq, the U.S. faces a dilemma:
– cannot leave without defeating insurgency or leaving
power vacuum behind
– but need to reduce visibility as “occupying power”
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Geopolitical Implications of ProDemocracy Strategy
A pro-democracy strategy implies:
1. Re-examination of the current U.S. military relationship
with authoritarian but “friendly” Muslim states
2. Hard-headed look at benefits/costs of such relationships
What are the alternatives to authoritarian regimes?
What is the risk/benefit balance?
3. Distancing from authoritarian but friendly regimes could
have access implications as well
4. Compensate through closer engagement with countries
undergoing democratic change
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Engagement and Access Implications
• In Arab world, shift focus of U.S. security relationships
from authoritarian states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt) to
democratizing states (Bahrain, Qatar)
• Main operating bases in Iraq not desirable at this time, but
should not foreclose option
• Throughout the Muslim world:
– seek to reduce “ungoverned areas” that can become
havens for terrorists
• Shift from bilateral to regional approaches to what are
essentially transnational problems
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Bottom Line
• Islamic radicalism is driven by complex and interactive
factors
• Some are common to Muslim world; others vary widely
from region to region; regionally-based analysis is critical
• Key challenge for the U.S. is to identify and find common
ground with liberal Muslims and find ways to help them
counter the extremists
• Islamic networks play key role in spread of extremism;
there is critical need to build moderate Muslim networks
• Education a key battlefield: problem is how to move reform
of both secular and Islamic schools
• A democratization strategy will require comprehensive reexamination of U.S. defense relationships in Muslim world
and will have engagement and access implications
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