Transcript Yemen: an Ideal Safe Haven for al Qaeda The Security and

Yemen: Fighting al Qaeda
in a Failing State
The Security and Economic Situation and
Considerations for the Way Forward
Presented by Frederick W. Kagan and Christopher Harnisch
of the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project
Slides Prepared by Christopher Harnisch and Katherine Zimmerman
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
1
Topics To Be Covered:
1) The Security and Economic Situation
-Al Houthi conflict, southern secessionists, resource depletion, other
factors contributing to the weak economy
2) Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
-Bin Laden’s view on Yemen, location of AQAP strongholds, history, leaders,
group dynamics, attacks, ideology and rhetoric
3) U.S. Strategy
-Recent U.S. strategy, U.S. cooperation with and support for Yemen,
Yemen’s current strategy for combating AQAP, U.S. considerations for the
way forward
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
2
Yemen Basics
• Area: 203,796 square miles – roughly twice the size of Wyoming
• Climate: Mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in
western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry,
harsh desert in east
• Terrain: Ranges from coastal plains to flat-topped hills and rugged
mountains
• Elevation extremes: From sea level to Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb at 12,030 ft
• Religious composition: 60% Sunni; 30-40% Zaydi Shiite (concentrated
primarily in the northwest)
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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3
Terrain of Yemen
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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Yemen: From Arabia to Africa
• Yemen’s position in the Gulf of
Aden makes it an ideal
location from which to stage
attacks, especially on energy
and shipping targets
• Eritrea has reportedly served
as a staging ground for
weapons-smuggling into Yemen
• Somalia’s al Shabaab have
pledged support for AQAP
• More than 160,000 Somali
refugees reportedly in Yemen
• U.S. military base in Djibouti
Image courtesy of National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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5
Yemen: Basic History and Politics
• Republic of Yemen formed from the unification of the northern
Yemen Arab Republic and the southern People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990
– Yemen Arab Republic (1962-1990)
• Became independent imamate in 1918 upon collapse of Ottoman Empire ruled by
Hashemite Imam
• North Yemen Civil War (1962-1970): Gamal abd al Nasser (Egypt) established the
Yemen Arab Republic, sparking a proxy war when Saudi Arabia supported the
deposed ruler, Imam al Badr
– People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1967-1990):
• Former British colony, known as the Aden Protectorate, that gained independence
in 1967 as the People’s Republic of South Yemen
• 1969 Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) came to power, changed name in 1970 to the
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
• South is characterized by its Marxist roots and is the site of most oil reserves
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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6
Yemen: Basic History and Politics (cont.)
•
•
President Ali Abdullah Saleh
– President of YAR since 1978, only president of the Republic of Yemen
– Last re-elected in 2006 with 77% of the vote for a term of seven years (outside
observers deemed the election relatively free and fair)
– Zaydi Shi’a (but not Hashemite), member of the General People’s Congress party
Yemen’s Political Parties:
– General People’s Congress: northern-based party from YAR, ruling political party that
controls most of the parliamentary seats
– Joint Meeting Parties (JMP): six-party opposition coalition formed 11/2005, supported
Faysal bin Shamlan in 2006 presidential elections
– Al Islah Party: Islamist party whose members formerly were generally members of the
GPC, now member of the Joint Meeting Parties coalition
– Yemeni Socialist Party: southern-based party from the PDRY that constitutes the main
opposition party in Yemen, member of the Joint Meeting Parties coalition
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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7
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
8
Al Houthi Insurgency
(northern provinces)
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President Saleh launched OPERATION SCORCHED EARTH on August 11, 2009
to eradicate the al Houthi rebels
– Operation believed to include anywhere from one-third to one-half of
Yemen’s total military
The current operation is the sixth round of fighting between the rebels and the
government; the current conflict began in 2004
November 4, 2009: Saudi Arabia openly began airstrikes and ground assaults on
rebel targets on the Saudi side of the border; rebels have accused Riyadh of
operating on the Yemeni side of the border and killing civilians
– On Dec. 26, Saudi said all rebels driven from Saudi territory, but strikes
continue
Yemen and Riyadh accuse al Houthis of receiving Iranian support
Numerous previous ceasefires and unilateral Yemeni withdraws have failed
The conflict has generated over 175,000 IDPs
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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9
Roots of the al Houthi Conflict
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Al Houthi family belongs to Zaydi sect of Shiite Islam and the Hashemite line (i.e. traces
bloodline to the Prophet)
– President Saleh is Zaydi, but not Hashemite
– Hashemite Zaydis ruled northern Yemen from 893-1962
– Saleh is a secularist, but fears that Hashemite claims to the Imamate could damage his
legitimacy within the Zaydi community that dominates the government and armed forces
Al Houthis are now led by Abdul Malik al Houthi, the younger brother of the group’s founder
and first leader, Husayn Badr al Din al Houthi
Zaydis have accused Yemeni government of marginalization for decades, and in the mid-90’s
Zaydis founded a political and paramilitary Zaydi revivalist youth group called “Believing
Youth” to counter government
Followers of the Believing Youth – led by Husayn Badr al Din al Houthi – held antigovernment and anti-American protests after Saleh aligned himself with U.S. following 9/11
Government responded by attempting to arrest Husayn Badr al Din al Houthi and his
followers in June 2004 and killing him in Sept. 2004
Fighting has continued on and off ever since
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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10
Grievances and Accusations of
al Houthi Conflict
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•
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Government says that al Houthis plan to reinstate imamate (al Houthis deny this)
Government claims that al Houthis are supported by Iran and has attempted to
claim an al Qaeda connection
Al Houthis blame government for economic and social neglect, corruption, aligning
with U.S. and Saudi, and too much Wahhabi influence
By Aug. 2009, al Houthis had taken control of much of Sa’ada province, blocked
roads, raided and blockaded military installations, arrested soldiers, kidnapped
teachers and foreigners, taken control of 63 schools, attacked mosques and
government buildings
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
11
Al Houthi – Al Qaeda Connection?
•
•
•
•
NO evidence supports this claim
Ideologically, the only common denominator between the groups is that they both
oppose the central government
- Al Houthis have used anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric to garner popular
support
AQAP commander in November called on Sunnis to fight al Houthi rebels
Two AQAP members were found dead in northern Yemen in late September, but
likely not involved in the al Houthi conflict
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
12
Al Houthi – Al Qaeda Connection?
• NO evidence supports this claim
• Ideologically, the only common denominator between the
groups is that they both oppose the central government
- Al Houthis have used anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric to
garner popular support
• AQAP commander in November called on Sunnis to fight al
Houthi rebels
• Two AQAP members were found dead in northern Yemen in
late September, but likely not involved in the al Houthi conflict
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
13
Southern Movement
(southern provinces)
•
•
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Umbrella group for southern-based secessionist movement
Leaders include southern elites and former government figures such as Tariq al
Fadhli and Ali Salim al Beidh (in exile)
– Al Fadhli joined the movement in April, calling for secession
– Al Beidh’s speeches are broadcast from abroad at southern rallies
Characterized by mass anti-government demonstrations in major southern cities
such as Aden, Zinjibar, and Dhaleh
Militant factions of the movement have targeted government personnel and
buildings in the south
Yemeni government has accused the Southern Movement of colluding with al
Qaeda
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
14
Roots of the Southern Movement
•
•
•
•
Secessionist strongholds are located in the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
(PDRY)
The PDRY merged with the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in May 1990 with Sana’a as
the capital
– Power-sharing agreement gave presidency to former YAR president, Ali Abdullah Saleh,
and the vice-presidency to former PDRY president, Ali Salim al Beidh
– 1993 parliamentary elections changed the power dynamics when the southern-based
Yemeni Socialist Party won only 69 of 301 seats
Civil war broke out May 4, 1994 after negotiations collapsed
– July 7, 1994 marked the end of the war, when northern forces entered the former PDRY
capital, Aden, and southern leaders fled
In 2007, southern military officers demonstrated against the government, demanding the
reinstatement of their pensions
– Other southerners joined in the demonstrations to voice concerns over economic and
politic exclusion
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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15
Grievances and Accusations of the
Southern Movement
•
•
•
•
Grievances stem from perceived marginalization by the northern-dominated
government after 1990 unification and include:
– Economic and political marginalization
– Illegal land seizures following 1994 civil war
– Forced retirements from civil and military positions
– Withholding of military pensions from officers
Government has used increasingly repressive tactics against demonstrators,
resulting in several deaths during rallies
Government closed down several media outlets for inciting sedition over the
summer of 2009 and arrested over 500 southern elites
Increased presence of government troops, generally northerners, fuels feeling of
occupation in the south by the north
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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16
Violence in the South,
But Not Yet a Civil War
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Outbreaks of violence and targeted strikes by militant elements of the Southern Movement
have required an increased troop presence in South
March and April 2008: Demonstrations turn violent (fire set to police and army targets)
July 23, 2009: “Zinjibar Massacre” – at least 16 die when police try to break-up demonstration
July 28, 2009: Secessionist militants ambush military convoy killing 4 soldiers, and bomb
headquarters of ruling political party
Sep. 28 – Oct. 5, 2009: Demonstration turns violent leading to days of clashes resulting in
dozens of injuries, a few deaths, and arrests
Nov. 25, 2009: 5 die when police clash with protestors
Nov. 27, 2009: Militant secessionists shut down Sana’a-Aden road
Dec. 4, 2009: 1 dies as demonstration turns violent
Dec. 21, 2009:Yemen demands extradition of former South Yemen presidents
Dec. 29, 2009: 1 dies as demonstration turns violent
Jan. 11, 2009: Secessionists call for labor strikes in Dhaleh and Lahij provinces
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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17
Southern Movement –
Al Qaeda Connection?
•
•
•
•
•
No clear connection, but a potential connection exists, especially if U.S. becomes involved
militarily
Tariq al Fadhli, a recognized leader within the movement was a mujahid in Afghanistan from
1987-1989
– In April 2009, al Fadhli defected from the government, which he supported in the 1994
civil war, to call for secession
– Al Fadhli has been accused of permitting al Qaeda to establish training camps in Abyan
governorate
In May 2009, al Wahayshi called for support for the south’s secession from the north, and the
establishment of an Islamic state
Overlap of strongholds could lead to coordination between Southern Movement and al
Qaeda, especially if the government continues to exact civilian casualties in its pursuit of
terrorism
Some tribes that align with the secessionists also provide shelter to al Qaeda
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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18
Yemen’s Natural Resource Depletion
•
•
Oil accounts for approximately two thirds of public revenue and about 90% of income from
exports
– Weak oil economy has substantially affected Yemen’s oil revenues
– The World Bank predicts that oil resources will run out by 2017
– Natural gas facility opened in October 2009
Water is scarce and resources are strained by a fast-growing population and the increased
growth of qat
– World Bank estimates 125 cubic meters per capita available per year (world avg. is
2,500)
– Recent reports indicate that Sana’a’s wells will be dry by 2015
– Illegal well-drilling, leaky and rusted pipes, contribute to water waste
– Yemeni-Saudi firm began $31 million desalination plant in Hodeidah province
– Qat, considered a narcotic in the U.S. but legal in Yemen, uses about 40% of the available
water in Sana’a and land is increasingly dedicated to growing the plant
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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19
Other Socio-Economic Considerations
•
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•
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Demographics: Population has tripled since 1975 – expected to reach 40M by 2030; 66% of
Yemenis under age 24; less than 1/3 of population lives in urban areas
Poverty: Annual income per capita: $871; almost 50% of Yemenis earn less than $2 per day
Unemployment: 35% (conservative estimate)
Education: National illiteracy - 46%, female illiteracy – 70%; religious conservatives influential
in school system; Saudis fund much of religious education; anti-American tone pervades in
text books
Corruption: Widespread corruption, nepotism, and tribal preferences;Yemen’s audit agency
estimates 30% of government revenue never makes it to government accounts
At least 160,000 Somali refugees in the country
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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20
The Perfect Storm
The combination of Yemen’s numerous security
and socio-economic challenges has allowed al
Qaeda to establish a safe-haven in Yemen and
take advantage of a vulnerable population.
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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21
Bin Laden on Yemen:
•
1997: Reportedly sends an envoy to Yemen to assess if it could be used as a base if the
Taliban expelled him
•
1998: “In Yemen we have strong and old links…besides the fact that my roots and my
father’s roots go back there.”
•
2000: Married a Yemeni woman in Afghanistan
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2000: Appeared in a recruitment video wearing the traditional Yemeni jambiya sword
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2003: “Areas most in need of liberation are Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia,Yemen.”
•
2003: “Youth of Islam…especially in the neighboring countries and Yemen:You must roll
up your sleeves [and] prepare for jihad.”
•
2006: “Abdullah Saleh…is an obedient American agent.”
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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22
Roots of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP)
•AQAP officially formed in January 2009 with the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi al
Qaeda franchises
•At time of merger, the Saudi al Qaeda leaders pledged allegiance to the al Qaeda in
Yemen leader, Nassir al Wahayshi
•The merger was necessary from the perspective of Saudi al Qaeda leaders because the
Kingdom has effectively denied al Qaeda a haven in Saudi Arabia since 2004
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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23
AQAP’s Presence in Yemen
24
Before the Merger: al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia
•
Saudi had been a place of sentimental and strategic importance for AQ since before 9/11:
bin Laden envisioned it as the seat of a Caliphate, and it received considerable recruits
and funding from within Saudi
•
In mid-2003, AQ’s leadership debated the merits of attacking targets within Saudi:
preserve a safe-haven or destabilize the regime?
•
Al Qaeda in Saudi launched a string of deadly attacks from May 2003-December 2004
sparking a crackdown by Saudi authorities
•
Group’s most effective leader, Abdul Aziz al Muqrin killed in June 2004
•
In mid-2005, a Riyadh daily declared al Qaeda in Saudi eliminated
•
Last major attack attempt in Saudi: suicide bombing foiled at Abqaiq oil facility in February
2006
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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25
Before the Merger: Al Qaeda in Yemen
•
Al Qaeda active in Yemen from 2000-2002: failed USS The Sullivans attack,
successful USS Cole and French Limburg attacks
•
Al Qaeda in Yemen leader and five operatives killed by U.S. drone in November
2002
•
No major attacks from 2003-2005
•
Al Qaeda in Yemen begins to regroup following February 2006 Sana’a prison break
– Among the escapees were Nasser al Wahayshi and Qasim al Raymi (currently
the AQAP leader and a deputy, respectively)
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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26
Before the Merger: Al Qaeda in Yemen (cont.)
•
Nov. 7, 2006: al Qaeda in Yemen takes credit for suicide car bombings at American
and Canadian oil facilities in eastern Yemen
•
June 20, 2007: al Raymi releases audio tape announcing al Qaeda in Yemen will
continue attacks on Peninsula and identifies al Wahayshi as its leader
•
In 2007 and 2008, al Qaeda in Yemen launched a string of small-scale attacks
– Targets included: energy sector, tourists, government buildings, army
checkpoints, and the U.S. embassy (twice)
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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27
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Organization Chart
Sheikh Anwar al Awlaki
(Influential spiritual figure
within AQAP)
Nasser al Wahayshi
(Leader)
Said al Shihri (Deputy AQAP
leader, former Guantanamo
detainee)
AQAP
Deputies
Qasim al Raymi (Deputy
AQAP leader, Arhab cell
leader)
AQAP Cell
Commanders
Potential other unknown cell
commanders
Hizam Mujali (AQAP
commander)
Mohamed Atiq Awayd al Harbi
(Turned self into Saudis, former
Guantanamo detainee)
Former
Senior
AQAP
Members
Mohammed Saleh al
Kazimi (Deceased, Abyan
cell leader)
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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AQAP Group Dynamics
•
Estimates of operatives range from a low of 50 to a high of several thousand
•
The number of sympathizers and supporters is much higher: estimates place the number of
veterans of previous “jihads” in Yemen at 20,000
– AQAP relies on tribal support for shelter; recently has adopted the strategy of marrying
into tribes to earn the loyalty of tribes
•
Operatives work in cells around the country
•
AQAP portrays itself as the protector of the people to win popular support
•
AQAP members come from multiple countries – high concentrations from Yemen, Saudi,
Egypt, Pakistan and Somalia
•
AQAP appears to have operational links – transferring of weapons and fighters – with al
Shabaab in Somalia, and maybe al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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29
2009 AQAP Attacks
•
March 14: Suicide bombing, executed by Abu Obedia al Jarrah, hit a group of South
Korean tourists in Hadramawt
•
March 18: Second suicide attack by AQAP on South Korean diplomatic convoy to
Sana’a executed by Shamel al Sana’ani
•
August 27: Abdullah al Asiri detonated suicide bomb targeting Saudi Deputy
Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef
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November 3: AQAP ambushes and kills seven Yemeni security officials near the
Saudi border, including three senior officials
•
November 26: AQAP released video showing interrogation and execution of
Bassam Tarbush, head of security in Ma’rib
•
December 25: AQAP claims responsibility for Christmas Day attack on Detroitbound Flight 253
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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30
Conservative Estimate of al Qaeda Attack
Casualties in Saudi Arabia and Yemen Prior to
AQAP
* Non-Western
casualties tended
to be foreign
workers, but
were not targeted
by al Qaeda
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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31
AQAP’s Ideology and Objectives
(Historical Perspective)
•
Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia sought to drive U.S. personnel out of Saudi, destabilize the
Saudi regime, and set up a Caliphate
•
Al Qaeda in Yemen sought to drive “Crusaders” off the Peninsula, end Yemen’s
cooperation with the U.S., hurt U.S. economy because of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and set up Caliphate
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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32
AQAP’s Ideology and Objectives
•
Seeks to establish an Islamic state on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP leaders appear
in front of the Islamic State of Iraq flag upon founding)
•
Defeat the “Crusader” occupation and invasion of ALL Islamic lands, especially in
the Arabian Peninsula
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Weaken and overthrow the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia
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Enemies: America, Jews, polytheists, Shiites, any government that cooperates with
the U.S. and any Muslim that works with or protects non-Muslims on the Peninsula
•
Strong emphasis put on the need to support Palestinians and liberate Jerusalem
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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Quotations Reflecting AQAP’s Ideology
(Wahayshi, January 2009)
“….Also, fighting in the Cause of Allah and the oppressed is a necessary condition to spread the principles of Islam, establish the State of Islam,
and preserve the structure of the Islamic Ummah from outside encroachment….”
“…. the main supporters of the occupation of Palestine are America and Europe, so we must destroy them and the Crusader interests that are
spread over the Arabian Peninsula, including Yemen.They must be struck to support Palestine….”
“….[Prophet Muhammad said]: ‘Expel the polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula….There cannot be two religions in the Arabian Peninsula….’”
“….whoever thinks that Palestine will be liberated without breaking the siege of the traitors around it is delusional and blowing into
ashes. Salahuddin…began by liberating the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt from the traitors and agents, and the worship of the
polytheistic infidels.After he liberated the internal front, he then went directly to liberate [Jerusalem]….”
“….The Crusader campaign against our people…utilizes the Arabian Peninsula as an area for their bases.The American, British, and French fleets
and bases in the Arabian Peninsula are only protection for the jews….The rulers of the Arabian Peninsula are [complicit], for the ruler of
Yemen....he is a true supporter.Ali Abdullah Saleh supports the Crusader campaign with all forms of logistical and military support to combat our
brothers in Palestine.”
“….More than five-thousand soldiers and others were killed at the hands of the [Shi'ites] in Sa'da, not including inhabitants there!....Others say
that we are infidel-branding renegades! They themselves to do not dare to speak of the truth of the [Shi’ites], and their role in destroying Islam
throughout history….”
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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34
Shift in AQAP Rhetoric Towards
Targeting the U.S.
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Late Oct., Wahayshi calls on followers to attack airports and trains in West using
homemade bombs
Early Nov., Saudi Commander of AQAP identified “Crusaders, among them
America and NATO” as the first enemy
Late Nov., AQAP executes Yemeni spy after forcing him to confess that Saleh is an
agent of America
Following 12/17 and 12/24 airstrikes on AQAP strongholds, AQAP increased its
rhetoric toward U.S.
AQAP warned of more attacks against U.S. in statement taking credit for
Christmas Day attack
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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Notable U.S. Visits to Yemen in 2009
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March 16, 2009: Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan visited to discuss
counterterrorism cooperation
July 26, 2009: General Petraeus met with President Saleh to discuss bilateral relations
August 16, 2009: Delegation of senators, including Senators Joseph Lieberman, Susan Collins,
and Lindsey Graham, led by Senator John McCain, met with President Saleh to discuss
counterterrorism cooperation
October 4, 2009: Vice Admiral William H. McRaven, Commander of U.S. Joint Special
Operations Command, met with President Saleh to discuss U.S.-Yemeni cooperation against
AQAP
November 10, 2009: Representatives from the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Staff, led by Brig. Gen.
Jeffrey Smith, met with Yemeni counterparts to discuss security cooperation
January 2, 2010: General Petraeus met with President Saleh to discuss U.S.-Yemeni relations,
especially regarding counterterrorism efforts
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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2009 U.S.-Yemen Cooperation
•
Yemen is a recipient of Department of Defense Section 1206 funds for building
partnership capacity
– Primary recipients are: Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF), Yemeni Army
11th Brigade, Central Repair Base
– Funds have gone towards cross-border security and counterterrorism efforts,
YSOF development, helicopters with night vision, Coast Guard patrol boats,
and counter-IED training and equipment
•
January 21, 2009: Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI James W. McJunkin delivered
thirty biometric collection systems to Yemen as part of the counterterrorism
initiative
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November 3, 2009: A delegation of Yemeni military officers from the
counterterrorism unit, coast guard and army special forces observed U.S. Marine
Corps training at Paris Island
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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December 2009 Strikes on AQAP
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•
•
December 10: drone strike in North Waziristan, Pakistan
– Shpalga, Pakistan: Saleh al Somali, head of al Qaeda’s external operations and possibly
responsible for transfer of militants to Yemen, killed
Dec.17: strikes in Arhab, Sana’a, and Abyan supported by U.S. missiles and intelligence
– Arhab district:
• Nawbah Operation: killed Hani al Shu’alan (#225) and two others, injured a fourth
• Al Tabbah Operation: Qasim al Raymi, Hizam Saleh Mujali and third escaped
• Bayt Mujali Operation: arrested Aref Mujali and seven others
– Al Majalah, Abyan:
• Targeted house of Abdul Mun’em al Qahtani
• Mohammed al Kazimi, among others, including foreigners, was killed
– Sana’a City: Fourteen arrested with ties to the Arhab cell
December 24: strike in Rafadh area of al Said, Shabwah
– Rafadh: About 30 al Qaeda suspects killed in strike targeting hide-out where Nasser al
Wahayshi, Said al Shihri, and Anwar al Awlaki had been meeting
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Yemen
•
•
Noticeable increase in foreign assistance to Yemen.
– $55.5 million requested for FY 2010, nearly triple the amount requested for
FY2008 – $19.8 million
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) restored to just above FY2007 levels after dropping
considerably in FY2008 and FY2009
Source: Congressional Research Service, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, July 2009
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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Select U.S. Foreign Assistance to Yemen
(2000-2009)
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Database (1999-2007 data); Congressional Research Service, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, July 2009
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
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Department of Defense 1206 Account
FY2009 Budget Breakdown:
$5.9 for aerial surveillance
helicopters with night vision
$30.1 million for Coast Guard patrol
2 boats, radios
$25 million for border security
360 4x4 armored pickup trucks
$5.8 million for IED mitigation
[Yemen]
USD in Millions
FY2006
4.3
FY2007
26
FY2008
0
FY2009
66.8
Source: Congressional Research Service, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, July 2009
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
41
Yemen’s Current Offensive
•
Yemen has deployed “hundreds” of troops in eastern Yemen and has deployed
“thousands” of troops to target AQAP
•
December 30: Mohammed Abdu Saleh al Hawdali arrested in Hodeidah
•
January 4: two al Qaeda militants killed and three injured in Arhab – Qasim al
Raymi and Hizam Mujali likely among dead
•
January 6: three al Qaeda suspects arrested in hospital in Amran after being treated
for injuries sustained in previous clash
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January 8: eight al Qaeda members arrested in Arhab district, one in Majzar district
of Ma’rib
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January 10: seven al Qaeda suspects arrested northeast of Sana’a
•
January 12: reported al Qaeda cell leader in Shabwah, Abullah al Mehdhar, killed
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
42
Need for More Than Just
Counterterrorism
•
Focusing only on precision strikes on terrorist strongholds and leaders has failed
previously
– The U.S., with Yemeni support, killed al Qaeda in Yemen leader in Nov. 2002,
and al Qaeda rebuilt there four years later
– Strategy has also failed in Afghanistan and Pakistan
•
U.S. helped establish and build up capacity of Yemeni Coast Guard, and it has used
Special Forces to train the Yemeni security apparatus
– This did not prevent al Qaeda from settling in the country
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
43
Boots on the Ground???
•
AQAP already portrays itself as the “protector of the people”; a U.S. invasion would only
enhance this image
•
Tribal conflict: some tribes – most which are heavily armed – would remain loyal to Saleh,
others would support AQAP
•
Potential alliance between AQAP and southern secessionists --- south would likely break
away from Sana’a
•
Iran could increase support of al Houthis
•
Large naval contingency required to prevent arrival of new mujahideen and support from
state actors, such as Iran
•
Harsh fighting conditions: very hot (often humid), very mountainous
•
Rebuilding a country plagued by corruption, weak security apparatus, and a lack of natural
resources would be challenging
•
Heavily armed population with extensive experience in guerilla warfare
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
44
The Way Forward
•
•
•
•
•
Comprehensive strategy focused on enhancing security, preventing Yemen from becoming a
failed state, and alleviating the conditions conducive to a terrorist safe-haven
– Saleh is not an ideal partner, but he is who we have to work with; a failed state would
nearly guarantee an al Qaeda safe-haven
Must work to increase security and intelligence capabilities of Yemeni security apparatus
Must help Saleh defeat the al Houthi rebels and address other perceived threats
– Cannot tie aid to only targeting al Qaeda
Must work to prevent a military conflict with southern secessionists and disentangle
southern tribes from AQAP
Must enhance aid and development support to Yemen
– Aid should focus on increasing economic opportunities, addressing resource depletion
(including the qat addiction), reforming and improving education, democracy and
governance (including ending corruption)
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
45
Appendix to Yemen Brief
AQAP Leader Profiles and List of Major al Qaeda
Attacks in Saudi Arabia and Yemen Prior to Formation
of AQAP
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
46
AQAP Leaders and Figures:
Nasser al Wahayshi (Abu Basir)
Leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
•
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•
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•
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Served in Afghanistan as bin Laden’s aid
Fled to Iran after fighting in the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001; arrested in
Iran in early 2002
Extradited to Yemen in 2003, with eight others
Escaped in the February 2006 prison break
Officially recognized as al Qaeda in Yemen’s leader June 21, 2007 (although was
likely serving as its head by mid-2006)
Became leader of AQAP in January 2009
Issued multiple statements calling on Muslims to rebel against Arab regimes,
especially in Saudi Arabia and Yemen
Said to have survived the 12/24 strike, unconfirmed
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
47
AQAP Leaders and Figures:
Said al Shihri (Abu Sufyan al Azdi)
Guantanamo #372
Deputy Leader of AQAP
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Captured in Pakistan in December 2001 and later sent to Guantanamo
Transferred to Saudi Arabia’s terrorist rehabilitation facility on November 9, 2007
Believed to have coordinated the September 2008 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in
Sana’a
January 2009 became the deputy leader of AQAP
May 27, 2009 listed by Defense Intelligence Agency as “re-engaged in terrorism”
September 27, 2009 called for donations to AQAP
Said to have survived the 12/24 strike, unconfirmed
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
48
AQAP Leaders and Figures:
Mohamed Atiq Awayd al Harbi
(Abu Hareth Muhammed al Awfi)
Guantanamo #333
•
•
•
•
Captured in Pakistan in 2001
– name found on document recovered from former residence of bin Laden
– member of “al Irata and mujahid” at Kandahar
Transferred to Saudi Arabia’s terrorist rehabilitation facility on November 9, 2007
January 2009 spoke in initial AQAP video
February 17, 2009 turned himself in to the Saudi authorities (allegedly pressured to
by female members of his family)
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
49
AQAP Leaders and Figures:
Qasim al Raymi (Abu Hurayrah)
AQAP Arhab cell leader
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Arrested and escaped in the February 2006 prison break
Became deputy leader of al Qaeda in Yemen
His June 21, 2007 audio statement announced al Qaeda in Yemen’s reestablishment
with al Wahayshi as leader
Believed to have masterminded July 2, 2007 suicide car bomb that killed eight
Spanish tourists in Ma’rib
Appeared in January 2009 initial AQAP video
Reportedly running a training camp in Abyan
Reportedly killed in 1/4 raid in Arhab, unconfirmed
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
50
AQAP Leaders and Figures:
Hizam Mujali
AQAP Commander
•
•
•
•
•
Reportedly member of 15-man cell that launched the attack on the French tanker
Limburg on October 6, 2002
Resisted arrest in 2003 and killed a Yemeni police officer
Escaped in the February 2006 prison break
Turned himself in to authorities and struck a deal renouncing al Qaeda in exchange
for his freedom
Reportedly reconnected with Qasim al Raymi
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
51
AQAP Leaders and Figures:
Mohammed Saleh al Kazimi
AQAP Abyan cell leader
•
•
•
Named as suspect in July 2, 2007 suicide car bomb that killed eight Spanish tourists
in Ma’rib
Reportedly ran a training camp in Abyan province
Killed in 12/17 strike in Abyan, confirmed
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
52
AQAP Leaders and Figures:
Sheikh Anwar al Awlaki
Influential figure in AQAP
•
•
•
•
•
•
Influential American-Yemeni whose radicalized teachings are readily available online
and who is accessible via his blog
– Connections found to 9/11 hijackers, the Virginia 11, 7/7 bombers, Toronto 18,
Fort Hood shooting, and Christmas day attack
– “44 Ways to Support Jihad,” calls on all Muslims to engage in jihad
FBI opened inquiry into activities in 1999-2000
Investigated for connection to two 9/11 hijackers
Arrested in Yemen for al Qaeda ties in 2006, supposedly at the U.S.’s behest,
released 18 months later
Indications that he is a recruiter and is “operational”
Said to have survived the 12/24 strike, unconfirmed
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
53
Major al Qaeda in Yemen Attacks (AQIY)
Prior to 2009
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9/17/2008: U.S. Embassy targeted by VBIED in Sana’a
8/7/2008: Police convoy targeted in grenade attack in Hadramawt
6/25/2008: Oil refinery hit in rocket attack in Ma'rib
5/30/2008: Aden’s oil refineries and pipelines targeted in mortar attack
4/30/2008: Italian embassy targeted in mortar attack in Sana’a
4/23/2008: Police station damaged in grenade attack in Hadramawt
4/16/2008: 3 police officers killed, 4 civilians wounded in landmine explosion by suspected
AQIY in Ma'rib
4/12/2008: Water tank damaged in mortar attack by in Sana’a
4/6/2008: Several houses damaged in mortar attack Sana’a
3/18/2008: 1 police officer, 1 child killed, 22 civilians, 5 police officers wounded in mortar
attack in Sana’a
1/18/2008: 5 civilians killed, 3 others wounded in attack in Hadramawt
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
54
Major AQIY Attacks Prior to 2009 (cont.)
•
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11/5/2007: Oil pipeline damaged in IED attack in Ma'rib
8/9/2007: Government building, police checkpoint, and power station damaged in armed
attack by suspected AQIY in Ma'rib
7/2/2007: 10 civilians killed, 8 others wounded in VBIED attack by suspected AQIY Ma'rib
9/15/2006: Synchronized car VBIEDs targeting American and Canadian-owned oil facilities
attempted in al Dhaba, Hadramawt and Safir, Ma’rib
12/4/2003: Assassination of the director of intelligence of ‘Ibb province
12/30/2002: 3 American missionary doctors killed and another wounded in Jibla by Islamic
extremist who spoke with al Qaeda members before attack
10/6/2002: Attack on MV Limburg reminiscent of attack on USS Cole
4/4/2002: Small explosion near U.S. embassy in Sana’a
10/13/2000: Bomb exploded at UK embassy in Sana’a, no casualties
10/12/2000: Attack USS Cole killed 17 American sailors
1/3/2000: Failed attack on the USS Sullivans in Aden similar to USS Cole
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
55
Al Qaeda attacks in Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia Prior to 2009
•
2/24/2006: 2 security guards wounded in suicide VBIED in Abqaiq
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6/30/2005: Security officer killed in armed attack by suspected al Qaeda near Mecca
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12/29/2004: 4 civilians wounded in VBIED attack in Riyadh
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12/29/2004: Civilian killed in VBIED attack in Riyadh
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12/6/2004: 5 government employees killed, 3 others, 4 civilians, 2 soldiers wounded in armed
attack and bombing in Jiddah
9/26/2004: contractor killed in armed attack by suspected al Qaeda in Jiddah
9/15/2004: UK citizen killed in Riyadh
8/30/2004: Civilians targeted in attack by suspected al Qaeda in Jiddah
8/3/2004: Civilian killed by suspected al Qaeda in Riyadh
6/12/2004: Contractor kidnapped, then killed in Riyadh
6/12/2004: Contractor killed in armed attack in Riyadh
•
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•
•
•
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
56
Al Qaeda attacks in Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia Prior to 2009 (cont.)
•
6/8/2004: Government contractor killed in armed attack in Riyadh
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6/6/2004: Journalist killed, another wounded in attack by suspected al Qaeda in Riyadh
•
5/30/2004: 22 civilians killed, 25 citizens wounded in armed attack and hostage attempt al
Khobar
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5/1/2004: 6 civilians killed, 19 police officers wounded in IED and armed attack in al Madinah
•
4/21/2004: 5 civilians killed, 148 wounded in suicide VBIED attack by suspected al Qaeda in
Riyadh
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4/13/2004: Militants open fire on checkpoint killing four police officers
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11/8/2003: Suicide car bombing in Riyadh housing complex killed 17 people and wounded
over 120 others
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9/14/2003: Saudi marijuana trafficker beheaded
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5/12/2003: Synchronized suicide car bombings at three foreign compounds killed 26 people,
including 9 U.S. citizens
Frederick Kagan and Chris Harnisch, January 12, 2010
Contact CTP Manager: [email protected]
57