Transcript Tempest Emissions - University of Tulsa

TEMPEST EMISSIONS
BY: NICK DOWNER
OVERVIEW
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What are tempest emissions?
Detecting tempest emissions
Security concerns
How to protect against leakage
WHAT IS TEMPEST?
“TEMPEST is the name of a technology involving the
monitoring (and shielding) of devices that emit
electromagnetic radiation (EMR) in a manner that
can be used to reconstruct intelligible data.”
-sans reading room
WHAT ARE LEAKAGES OR
“EMANATIONS”
• Every electronic device gives off some type of
electromagnetic signal, or “emanations”
• A proper design will limit these emanations but
there will always be some level of leakage
• Like crosstalk on phone lines
• Examples
• Shaver
• Radio’s from cellphones
• Hard Drives (like a fingerprint)
THE EARLY YEARS OF TEMPEST
The name TEMPEST has no definite meaning…
• Early government code word
• Telecommunications Electronics Material Protected
from Emancipating Spurious Transmissions
• Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation
STandard
• Also referred to as “Van Eck Phreaking” after the
Dutch scientist Wim can Eck
THE EARLY PROOF
• Wim can Eck demonstrated that he could easily
pick up nearby computer monitor emissions and
display them on a TV monitor
• Used a normal TV receiver made suitable for the purpose of
capturing the emissions
• Was able to display video from a computer monitor on a
separate TV monitor
• May be feasible up to 1km
THE EARLY PROOF
• In his 1986 book, Peter Wright explains how MI5
spied on messages sent by the French during
England’s negotiations to join the European
Economic Community (EEG)
• They were interested in what the French thought of England
entering the EEG
• MI5 tried to break the French diplomatic cypher but failed
• However, they noticed the encipher traffic carried a faint
secondary signal, and constructed equipment to recover it
• It turned out to be plaintext
DETECTING TEMPEST
• TEMPEST eavesdropping reconstructs the
electromagnetic signals put off by electronics
• Equipment needed
• Sensitive receivers are used which can capture a wide
range of frequencies
• Software to turn the raw findings into the original data
• Problems that can occur
• Can contain other EMR/interference from outside sources
TEMPEST TESTING EQUIPMENT
• Codex Data Systems
• Produces a device called D.I.R.T (Data Interception by
Remote Transmission)
• The army buys the $20,000 units but the company agreed to
a Pentagon request to halt sales to anyone else
• Allows stealth monitoring of all activity on one or more
target computers
• No physical access is necessary
IMPACTS OF TEMPEST
• Loss of
• Integrity
• Confidentiality
• Availability
• Reduces effectiveness of encryption
• Can mirror screen
TEMPEST STANDARDS
• National Communications Security Committee
Directive 4 sets TEMPEST standards
• Very costly and classified
• Private sector started ZONE
• More cost effective but less secure
• 3 categories
• 1 is extremely secure and only available to US government
• 2 is somewhat less secure but still requires US government
approval to use
• 3 is for general commercial use
HOW TO PROTECT
• Covering the device/cabling in a faraday cage
• Buy a TEMPEST certified computer
• Purchase equipment that meets modern standards
for emission
• Use only shielded cable for all system
interconnections
• Keep cable runs as short as possible
• Encrypt all information being sent and received
from the device
TEMPEST….FACT OR FICTION
• James Atkinson a telecommunications engineer,
president of Granite Island Group has worked with
TEMPEST for 20 years
• Claims TEMPEST is not a spying technology and anyone who
says it is is misinformed or lying
• Claims todays PC’s are shielded to prevent leakage and
disturbing other connections
• Says taking a peek at someone else's computer screen from
a distance is possible, but its very difficult to do, costly, and
often impractical
MORE EVIDENCE
• Wayne Madsen from the Electronic Privacy
Information Center claims
• Todays computers are unlike that of the old cathode-ray
tube days
• They’re more ruggedized and heavily shielded so these
emissions are a lot harder to pick up/detect
• TEMPEST isn’t as big of a problem as it once was, but
engineers hype the problem
EVIDENCE
• John Young a New York architect says he often
designs TEMPEST security features into buildings for
law firms and banks
• He has an interest in tempest and has filed several
freedom of information requests with the US
government to declassify NSA documents dealing
with TEMPEST.
WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN?
• There is debate among professionals as to the
severity of TEMPEST emanations
• Not much is known since most TEMPEST material is
classified by the government
SO WHAT CAN WE DO
• Use common sense with encryption
• Keep cable runs short
• Buy highly insulated cables
QUESTIONS?
• Any Questions?
RESOURCES
• http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/pri
vacy/introduction-tempest_981
• http://cryptome.org/tempest-fret.htm
• http://users.telenet.be/ws36178/security/topsecret/t
empest.html
• http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/04/nsareleases-se/