Transcript Document

Nuclear power in Japan:
Fukushima and after
Richard Tanter
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability
[email protected]
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications
This PPT at
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/talks
University of Melbourne
19 October 2011
Fukushima I NPP, 2004
Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011
1
Outline
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
What happened at Fukushima?
What is the situation at Fukushima now?
What will happen from now on?
What have been the health and environmental consequences?
Why did these events occur?
What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?
What are the implications beyond Japan?
2
Preface
• Nuclear power plants:
– as a machine
– as a socio-technical system
• Endemic unsolved issues relevant to all NPPs:
– High-level radioactive waste treatment and storage
– Operational safety
– Nuclear weapon proliferation potential
• Post-Fukushima: exposure of workers to resolve loss of coolant
accidents
• Otherwise, issues specific to particular NPPs and historically
specific risk management and operational regimes
3
1. What happened at Fukushima?
•
4
A swarm of earthquakes (as of 15 March 2011)
Source: United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), “Japan: Earthquakes Swarm (15 Mar 2011),” Relief Web,
5
Nuclear power plants in Japan
6
Characteristics of Fukushima No. 1 NPP Units 1 - 6
Note: Unit 3 fuel was mixed uranium oxide-plutonium oxide.
Source: Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety - The Accident at
TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, June 2011, Table IV-1-2.
7
Boiling Water reactor System
8
Unit 4 reactor schematic
9
Fukushima
BWR basic
design
Source: M. Ragheb,
Fukushima Earthquake
and Tsunami Blackout
Accident, 24 June 2011,
Figure 21 (from GE and
METI)
10
GE BWR
reactor
vessel
11
Unit 1
schematic
and
inundation
level
Source: Report of Japanese Government
to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear
Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations, June 2011; Figure III-24 (a).
12
RPV water levels and coolant injection times
Source: John H. Large, Update On The Nuclear And Radiological Situation At Fukushima Dai-Ichi, Large & Associates
Consulting Engineers, Nr. R3196-AR2, Greenpeace Germany, May 2011; Data source: TEPCO
13
Unit 1; modelled
status of fuel
assemblies,
melted and
slumped
Source: Report of Japanese Government
to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear
Safety - The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations, June 2011; Attachment
IV-!, Reactor Core Conditions of Units 1 to 3 of
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,
14
Figure 3.1.9.
Spent fuel at Fukushima I NPP
Source: Masa Takubo, cited by David Wright, More on Spent Fuel Pools at Fukushima, All
Things Nuclear, March 21, 2010
15
The proximate source: reactor after-heat following insertion
of control rods without cooling = meltdown
Source: Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, “Containment of a Reactor Meltdown,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, August/September 1982
16
BWR nuclear fuel structure
17
Unit 4 spent fuel pond - apparently not significantly
damaged
Source: “No
significant damage
to fuel at unit 4”,
World Nuclear
News, 30 April
2011
18
Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP: 11 March
Pre-quake:
– Units 1,2,3 operating;
– Units 5 and 6 offline in cold shutdown;
– Unit 4 offline; defueled November 2010
14.46 Magnitude 9 earthquake 135 km offshore
– Automatic shutdown of Units 1,2, and 3.
– Offsite power is lost.
– Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) provide coolant power
15.46 14 metre-tsunami breaches plant seawalls and inundates
most of the plant
– Emergency generators flooded and short-circuited
– Battery powered pumping system starts; fails by March 12.
19.30 Fuel assemblies in Unit 1 completely exposed
19
Station blackout accident:
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System failed with loss
off-site and emergency AC power and DC battery power
• Off-site power lost in earthquake due to damage to a transformer
10 kms from NPP
• 13 emergency diesel generators each “the size of a locomotive”,
each 6 MWhr capacity
– 8 in the basement of the main turbine hall, two at ground level
behind Unit 4
– 12/13 disabled by the tsunami
• Batteries supplying DC power exhausted after 9-12 hours
20
Key sequences at Fukushima No. 1 NPP: 12 - 15 March
• Oxidation of zirconium cladding by steam → hydrogen
– Zr + 2 H2O → ZrO2 + 2 H2
• March 12:
– 15.36 Unit 1 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure
exposing fuel pond; 4 workers injured
• March 14
– 11.01 Unit 3 hydrogen explosion destroys upper structure
exposing fuel pond; 6 workers injured
• March 15
– Fire at Unit 4 spent fuel pond
– Hydrogen explosion in Unit 2; suspected damage to wet-well
in primary containment.
– Explosion at Unit 4 spent fuel pond: origin possibly Unit 3
RPV
21
Decay curves of short-lived and long-lived isotopes
Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout Accident,
24 June 2011, Fig. 26.
22
Long half-life fission isotopes
Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami Blackout
Accident, 24 June 2011.
23
Japanese government report to IAEA: Fukushima “worse
than meltdown?”
Source: “'Melt-through' at Fukushima? / Govt report to IAEA suggests situation worse than meltdown”, Yomiuri
Shimbun, 8 June 2011.
24
Fukushima I NPP, 2004
Source: Digital Globe, First Watch, Imagery Report, Japan Earthquake/Tsunami, March 2011 25
March 14
26
Seawater
pump March 17
Source: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Photos 16, Cryptome.org
27
Flooded
electric
equipment
room, Unit
6, March 17
Source:
Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power
Station Photos 16,
Cryptome.org
28
2. What is the situation at Fukushima
now?
29
State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of 14 October:
a. reactors and spent fuel
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4
Core and fuel
integrity
Damaged (core
melt
Damaged (core
melt*
Damaged (core
melt
No fuels loaded
RPV structural
integrity
Partially damaged
and leaking
Unknown
Unknown
No damage
PCV structural
integrity
Damage and
leaking suspected
Damage and
leaking suspected
Damage and
leaking suspected
No damage
292
587
514
Spent fuels in the
SFP
1331
Fuel integrity in
SFP
Unknown
Most spent fuels
not damaged
Unknown
Most spent fuels
not damaged
SFP cooling
Function
recovered
Function
recovered
Function
recovered
Function
recovered
Source: Status of countermeasures for restoring from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 through 4. As of October
14th, 2011. (Estimated by JAIF)
30
Source: Asahi Shimbun 10 August 2011
31
State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of 14 October:
b. contaminated water leakage and water storage
• Contamination of huge volumes of sea-water and freshwater
injected and sprayed into containment buildings and spent fuel
ponds
– Some released to sea
– Most stored onsite in turbine building basement, etc.
– Some stored on floating barges
• Highly radioactive leakages from damaged reactor pressure
vessels and containment vessels
– into sea and into groundwater
32
State of Fukushima No. 1 NPP, as of August 30:
c. Site debris and contamination
Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011.
33
Key current site operations
• Heat exchange of cooling water to CPV/RPV
• Decontamination of radioactive water in containment vessel, in
flooded areas, and in storage
– As of 9 August, 42,000 tonnes processed, but 120,000 tonnes
remained on site; expected end-year goal of 200,000 tonnes now
unlikely
• Reducing/eliminating onsite radioactive hotspots
• Covering all four units with steel and plastic to reduce air-borne
contamination
34
Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule
Source: Fukushima Cold Shutdown Process Behind Schedule, NikkeiNet, 17 August 2011
35
3. What will happen from now on?
• Units 1-4 to be decommissioned; Units 5-6 unclear
• New TEPCO “roadmap” presented to JAEC 31 August
– Plastic covering for Units 1-4 to contain airborne radiation matter
•
•
•
•
– Cold shut down by January 2012 ….?
– By end-2011 will start building ground shield between Units 1-4
and sea
• 800 metres long and 20 metres deep
• possible extension around whole of Units 1-4
Removal of fuel from spent fuel ponds 1-4
Removal of spent fuel from reactors 1-4
Removal of corium from Units 1,2 and 3 - from RPV and/or CPV
– 10-50 years before attempt at reactor/corium removal possible
Decontamination, dismantling and clean-up …. Sometime in the
future …
36
The TEPCO roadmap (as of 17 August 2011)
• Basic objective: reactors and nuclear fuel ponds to a
stable condition and mitigating release of radioactive
materials.
• Step 2:
– Control of release of radioactive materials
– Accelerate processing of water to reduce required
volume
– then increase rate of water injection by continuous
and reinforced circulating injection cooling towards
cold shutdown.
Source: Summary of Progress Status of Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daichi NPP TEPCO, National
Nuclear Response Headquarters, 17 August 2011.
37
TEPCO: roadmap implementation “issues”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Reactors: confirm functional securiting of water injection
system
SFP: more stable cooling
Accelerate water treatment
Groundwater: design shield
Atmosphere/soil - steel/plastic covering
Measurement of radiation and disclosure
Tsunami reinforcement for Unit 4 SNP
Living/working environment
Radiation control/medical care
Staff training
Source: Summary of Progress Status of Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daichi NPP TEPCO, National
Nuclear Response Headquarters, 17 August 2011.
38
Model of
plastic
coverage for
Unit 1
Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Outline of
the reactor building covering plan of Unit
1 at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station, Press Release
39
Unit 1 plastic cover:
before and after
Source: TEPCO, Attachment,
Outline of the reactor building
covering plan of Unit 1 at
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station, Press Release
40
Seaward-side water shield plan
Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6.
41
Seaward-side water shield - schematic cross-section
(piles: 1 metre diameter, 14-22 mm. thick, 22-23 metres deep)
Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 6.
42
Fukushima No.1 NPP hydrology (pre-quake data)
Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 7.
43
Cross-section of hydrology model (pre-quake data)
Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 7.
44
Underground water trajectory modelling schematic
Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 8.
45
Anticipated underground water levels with seaside-ward
water shield in place
Source: TEPCO, Attachment, Basic Design of Water Shield Wall at the Seaside, Press Release 31 August 2011, p. 8.
46
The corium issue
• Corium = the liquid or solid slag within or below the reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) resulting from a melting of fuel rods,
cladding, steel structures, and subsequent chemical reactions
and physical events
• If the corium melts through the steel RPV to the concrete basemat of the primary containment vessel (PC or PCV), coriumconcrete chemical reactions may include gases including CO,
CO2, H2
• There is a further possibility of corium passing through the basemat if the PCV is ruptured (e.g. by H2 explosion) or if melted by
the corium
47
Debris bed from core melting at Three Mile Island NPP
Source: M. Ragheb, Fukushima Earthquake and
Tsunami Blackout Accident, 24 June 2011,
Figure 43.
48
Fukushima
BWR basic
design
Source: M. Ragheb,
Fukushima Earthquake
and Tsunami Blackout
Accident, 24 June 2011,
Figure 21 (from GE and
METI)
49
The corium issue: corium lava flow at Chernobyl
Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at
http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/corium.html
50
The corium issue: corium “elephant’s foot uranium fuel
flow in Chernobyl NPP basement
Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake & Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/corium.html
51
The corium issue:
Three Mile Island
NPP Core EndState
Configuration
Source: “Corium”, Tohoku Earthquake &
Nuclear Crisis, 3 April 2011, at
http://quakerad.blogspot.com/2011/04/cor
ium.html
52
4. What have been the health and
environmental consequences?
• Immediate injuries and deaths
• Longterm radiation illness and mortality
• Temporary social disruption from accident
consequences
– social, economic, psychological
• Longterm social consequences
– How many former residents can never go back?
53
Schematic of 31 August accident at cesium
decontamination equipment: two workers drenched
Source: TEPCO, 1 September 2011
54
Ionising radiation maximum permissible dose limits
(courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)
• NB: Average background radiation: 2-3 mSv/y; half due to radon
gas
• General population: 1 mSv
– Japan: women regulated at 5 mSv over 3 mo
– 1 mSv/y ~ 0.11 microSv/h
• Radiation workers:
– 100 mSv over 5 y with no more than 50 mSv in any year
• ICRP recommendations accidents/emergencies:
– In lower part of 1-20 mSv range for public
– Workers – 100 mSv, ICRP up to 500 for volunteers in
emergency rescue operations
– Post-Fukushima Japan:
• 250 mSv/y workers
• 20 mSv for public including children
55
Fukushima radiation releases, 11-20 March 2011
(courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal Institute for Global Health)
Source:AREVA
56
Source: TEPCO, Survey map of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, August 22, 2011.
57
US
Fukushima
radiation
monitoring,
to April 29
58
Zoning criteria Belarus 1991
kBq/m2
Individual
dose (mSv)
Zone
>1480
>5
Priority resettlement
555-1480
<5
Secondary resettlement
185-555
>1
Resettlement rights
37-185
<1
Periodic radiation
monitoring
Source: ICRP 111, 2009
59
Applying
Chernobyl
evacuation
criteria to
Fukushima
• Red and most yellow is
> Chernobyl relocation
zone (>1480 kBq/m2)
• Rest of yellow, green,
light blue and some dark
blue is > Chernobyl dose
reduction zone
• Cs 137 T1/2 =30 years
(courtesy Prof. Tilman Ruff, Nossal
Institute for Global Health)
60
Protective measures
• Evacuation for est ext >50 mSv
– 20 vs 80 km;
• Sheltering – for ext est >10mSv, esp 20-30 km zone
• Acceptance increased exposures
• Stable iodine – appears not used?
– initial evacuation completed by time instruction
issued VII-9 GOJ IAEA subm 6.11)
• Food and water monitoring and restrictions
• Local monitoring
• Remediation – including local initiative eg schools
• Long-term health assessment planned – details
sparse
61
Killing them softly: radiation exposure limits
for workers and children
•
•
•
•
International Commission on Radiological Protection recommendation for
workers:
– maximum permissible annual dose of 20 mSv averaged over five
years
– no more than 50 mSv in any one year.
Japanese worker exposure standard:
– Pre-crisis: 100 mSv p.a
– Post-crisis “emergency” exposure limits: 250 mSv p.a.
Resignation of Kosako Toshiso, Tokyo University,
– Appointed Special Advisor to Cabinet, March 16; resigned 29 April
– Reported METI now discussing 500 mSv emergency exposure limit for
workers
– Refused to approve promulgation of children’s exposure level at “3.8
µSv per hour” on the basis of “20 mSv per year”
See Tilman Ruff, “Children of Fukushima need our protection”, The Age, 27 April 2011
62
MEXT data on
Cesium-137 soil
contamination,
29-30 August
“According to a soil
contamination map submitted at
a study meeting of the Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology Ministry, six
municipalities recorded more
than 1.48 million becquerels of
cesium 137 per square meter-the standard used for forced
resettlement after the 1986
Chernobyl accident.”
Sources: “34 spots top Chernobyl evacuation
standard”, Daily Yomiuri Online, 31 August
2011; original data: MEXT:
http://radioactivity.mext.go.jp/
63
Social effects
•
•
•
•
•
Short- and medium-term evacuation
Loss of livelihood
Damage to deep cultural roots
No return zones
Compensation
– TEPCO compensation costs for coming year alone expected
to reach 3.6 trillion yen
64
Nuclear labour - the return of the nuclear gypsies
•
Pre-crisis Fukushima NPP 1 labour force
– Regular employees (seisha’in 正社員)= 1,1,08
– Contract employees (hiseisha’in 非正社員) = 9,195 [“day labourers”]
•
2009 worker radiation exposure at Fukushima No. 1 NPP
– “of those who received a dose between 5 and 10 millisieverts (mSv), there
were 671 contract laborers against 36 regular employees.
– “Those who received between 10 and 15 mSv were comprised of 220 contract
laborers and 2 regular workers, while 35 contract workers and no regular
workers were exposed to a dose between 15 and 20 mSv”
•
Post-crisis nuclear gypsy recruitment
– More than 2,000 workers now onsite;
– TEPCO planning to raise to 3,000
– Recruited by construction company:
- jobs advertised for “10,000 yen for three hours work per day”
•
Source: Paul Jobin, “Dying for TEPCO? Fukushima’s Nuclear Contract Workers”, Japan Focus,
2011
65
6. Why did this happen?
• Levels of cause
• immediate/proximate causes :
– Earthquake plus tsunami
– loss of coolant accompanied by after-heat = fuel element
meltdown
– Remediation efforts generating new problems (e.g.
contaminated water)
• Immediate failures in risk assessment and management
– E.g. sea-wall height known to be inadequate since 2008
– E.g. subsequent discovery of five active fault lines
immediately offshore
66
The nuclear alliance, utilities nuclear
manufacturers and the bureaucracy
•
•
•
TEPCO will be bankrupt before the clean-up is complete
Nationalisation as risk displacement onto tax-payers
The clean-up bonus for anyone by TEPCO
•
•
Power companies as fiefdoms;
power grids as islands
•
Industry restructuring:
– Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Hitachi nuclear division merger
– MHI and other nuclear companies also reviewin non-nuclear divisions
– Rapid expansion of solar industries.
67
Inculcating “a false sense of TEPCO’s competence”
“It is not clear why TEPCO chose not to release the key instrumentation
records of RPV and fuel core conditions during and immediately following the
tsunami strike until 15 May. Certainly, TEPCO would have had access to these
records at the time…
The role and judgment of NISA in presenting the daily updates of reactor
conditions is also questionable, particularly in that it must have been aware
that Unit 1, at least, had undergone a full melt within 16 hours or shorter of the
earthquake but then, even in this certain knowledge, why it continued to
publish its daily but unrelated readings of the RPV shell temperatures is
baffling.
At best, what must be construed as mismanagement of information has
frustrated observers and analysts following progression of the Fukushima Daiichi incident.
At worst, the information withheld most likely resulted in ill-informed and
incorrect decision-making and management both on and off the Fukushima
Dai-ichi nuclear site.
Source: John H. Large, Update On The Nuclear And Radiological Situation At Fukushima
Dai-Ichi, Large & Associates Consulting Engineers, Nr. R3196-AR2, Greenpeace Germany,
May 2011.
68
Corruption, collusion and impunity in the nuclear
state-corporate-scientific complex
•
GE corruption and impunity in the original construction of Fukushima No. 1
BWRs Mk I and II
– Exim Bank indemnification required for nuclear export licence
– Korean corruption experience with GE/Bechtel BWR import
– Japan?
•
•
•
•
•
•
TEPCO 2002 mea culpa over hundreds of unreported or mis-represented
incidents
March 1, 2011 - TEPCO admitted falsification and suppression of faults data
t NISA
1997, and 2009 repression of minority reports on seismology warnings
– Huge Jogan earthquake hit Tohoku coastline 869
Amakudari and Amaagari: the revolving door between bureaucracy,
regulators and industry
Four decades of intimidation of critics, including senior LDP politicians
The Kan government as a break?
– ‘Kan said "the myth of the safety of nuclear energy" was prevalent among
government and utility officials.’ (Japan Times, April 30, 2011)
– Kan: ”Fukushima was a man-made disaster”
69
Distant/ultimate causes
•
•
•
•
•
•
Gradations of strength/salience
Inadequacies of Japanese nuclear industrial regulation and safety
regimes
TEPCO as a repeat offender/rogue company
Weakness of Japanese political structures
Japanese pursuit of energy security via a plutonium economy built around
future breeder reactors and reprocessing
Japan’s “construction state” and ongoing loss of state system steering
capacity
– >>> national herd of white elephants
– Rokkasho reprocessing plant and Monju breeder reactor as the whitest of
white elephants
•
•
•
Global acceptance of “nuclear sovereignty”
Weakness of global nuclear governance
Fantasies of nuclear sustainability
70
7. What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?
71
The forgotten side of Japan as a nuclear power: as
many planned NPP as succeeded were abandoned due
to widespread and long-lasting local opposition.
Source: courtesy Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, Tokyo
72
Nuclear facilities: actual
Source: CNIC, 原子力市民年鑑2008年
Nuclear projects abandoned
73
6 months after Fukushima three-quarters of Japan’s
nuclear power plants offline or shut-down
Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake
as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum
74
Nuclear Power Plants in operation, as of 4
September, 2011
Hokkaido Electric
Tomari-3
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-1
Tokyo Electric Power
(TEPCO)
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-5
Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6
Mihama-2
Takahama-2
Kansai Electric Power
Takahama-3
Ohi-2
Chugoku Electric Power
Shimane-2
Shikoku Electric Power
Ikata-2
Genkai-1
Kyushu Electric Power
Genkai-4
Source: Japan's NPP Status before and after the earthquake as of August 29, 2011, Japan Atomic Industry Forum
75
What is the future of nuclear power in Japan?
•
•
•
Expansion of output from remaining thermal and hydro- power plants.
Note only 13 NPP online as at early September
Great success of energy conservation and efficiency measures in
Tokyo and Tohoku
– E.g. TEPCO capacity fell from 64,000 MW to 56,400 MW; but peak summer
demand has been 49,000MW
•
•
Spotlight on utility regional monopolies and regional “islands”
Alternative energy pathways:
– Energy efficiency
– Renewable energy
– Distributed generation
•
Note: all three require construction of smart grids
76
The utilities as islands
77
Japan effects: nuclear power mortally wounded
• Release of previously suppressed information
– Safety
– Costs
– spent fuel cul de sac
• Politicians will never again trust the nuclear alliance to keep them
safe
• Public trust
– likelihood of corruption revelations over Fukushima NPP I
• design and construction and operation
• the failure of the plutonium project: Rokkasho reprocessing facility
and the fast breeder reactors
• >> support for “once-through” NPP process as first step.
• Non-nuclear energy producers
78
Regulatory changes
• Dismissal of senior METI and NISA personnel
• Replacement of NISA
• Cabinet ratification of reduction of role of nuclear
energy in national energy policy
• Cabinet regulation requiring revision of costing
procedures in comparative evaluations of energy
sources to include accident compensation, clean-up,
and full decommissioning costs.
• Much now depends on fights over implementation
under new Noda administration
79
Public opinion: April-August 2011, Mainichi Shimbun
Source: Updated Graphs - Public Opinion Survey by Japanese Mass Media (April – August, 2011), Japan Atomic Energy Forum, 23 August
802011
Real world energy alternatives for
Japan:
Energy efficiency
Renewable energy
Distributed generation
Available from:
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richardtanter/publications
Real world energy alternatives
• Energy efficiency
• Renewable energy
• Distributed generation
81
Key questions for Japan
• Will serious liberalisation of nuclear energy production help?
• Are the utilities locked into nuclear trajectory?
• Are the nuclear manufacturers (Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba)
locked into nuclear power?
– Export future (cf NPP deals with Vietnam and and Jordan)
• Can an elected government gain control of nuclear policy?
• Can an elected government force the abandonment of the
plutonium economy?
• Can a Japanese government breakthrough politically to direct
new energy policy?
82
Collective international regulation for
nuclear safety
•
•
•
•
Notice international responses from China, Korea and United States
– Very slow release of US data and imagery
IAEA: Why so silent?
– Mission statement: conflict of interest:
• Promoting nuclear power
• Regulating nuclear power
– Capture by major nuclear states and public-private nuclear alliance
IAEA lack of effective powers
Liability regime limitations
– The farce of the Convention on Nuclear Safety
83
Convention on Nuclear Safety
•
Need for fundamental challenge to nuclear sovereignty embedded in
Convention on Nuclear Safety
– CNS parties last week deferred Fukushima review meeting till
August 2012
•
•
IAEA on the Convention:
“The Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to ensure
fulfillment of obligations by Parties through control and sanction but is
based on their common interest to achieve higher levels of safety which
will be developed and promoted through regular meetings of the
Parties. The Convention obliges Parties to submit reports on the
implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings of the
Parties to be held at the IAEA. This mechanism is the main innovative
and dynamic element of the Convention.”
– http://www-ns.iaea.org/conventions/nuclear-safety.asp
84
Global civil society response ?
• Energy and climate change interconnection central:
– Need for parallel and inter-linked responses
• No energy regime is without costs
• Global public right to information and transparency
– Intelligence information access.
• Rebuilding of transnational networks
85
Nautilus Institute
early response
reports on on
Fukushima
Available from:
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richardtanter/publications
86
•
EnerWebWatch's Special Nuclear Situation in Japan
–
•
http://www.enerwebwatch.eu/webwatch?page=EarthQuake&id=update17
The Fukushima Project: SimplyInfo
–
http://www.simplyinfo.org/
•
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 5 2011: (see Von Hippel, Suzuki,
Takubo, and Lyman)
•
After the Deluge: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage Caused
by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, Special Report, Nautilus Institute for Security
and Sustainability, March 17, 2011
–
•
The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impacts of the Reactor Damage
Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami on Japan’s Electricity System,
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, April 11, 2011
–
•
http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications
http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications
TEPCO Country after Fukushima, Arena Magazine, June 2011 [footnoted version]
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http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/publications
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Richard Tanter
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability
[email protected]
[email protected]
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/publications
This PPT at
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/richard-tanter/talks
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