Transcript Nuclear Weapons & Influence

Nuclear Weapons & Influence
Kevin J. Benoy
Initial Impact
• The bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
made it abundantly
clear that the nature of
warfare had changed
dramatically.
• Now the question was:
“To what extend could
nuclear weapons be
applied directly to
diplomatic influence.”
Initial Impact
• While Politicians drooled
over the possibilities,
many scientists
recommended
international control over
the weapons to prevent
the suicidal possibilities
the new technology
presented – and to
forestall a new and
cripplingly expensive
arms race.
Initial Impact
• Along with the
destructive capability of
this new technology,
there was also an
apparent infinite
potential for energy
generation.
• The matter of control
rested on more than
just military interests.
Initial Impact
• The British and Canadians, codevelopers of the bomb with
the Americans, concluded that
the destructive potential of
the new weapon would soon
spiral.
• The technology would also
spread. It could not be kept
secret. Missile technology was
developing quickly.
• Many experts predicted that
the Soviets would have atomic
bombs of their own in 4 or 5
years.
Initial Impact
• This estimation brought
calls for international
sharing and control of
atomic technology.
• Nothing would be lost
in the long run and here
would be excellent
short term rewards for
such magnanimity.
Initial Impact
• Americans were divided
on the issue:
– One group favoured
international control as
expressed in the AchesonLilienthal proposal.
– The opposing side won
out, as became clear after
Truman appointed Bernard
Baruch to the UN’s Atomic
Energy Commission.
Initial Impact
• The Baruch Plan called for international control international management
of the raw materials and inspection by international agencies of the
facilities.
• It also provided for no vetoes in the UN of these policies and majority rule
in decision making.
• The Atomic Development Authority would establish plants, not national
governments.
• This was unacceptable to the Soviets since it would not be able to develop
facilities where they felt power requirements demanded them.
• The Soviets countered by demanding the destruction of all atomic bombs,
the cessation of production and an international agreement not to produce
them.
• Neither side would moderate their position, resulting in deadlock.
• Canadian representative Andy McNaughton felt that the American
programme was insincere “from start to finish.”
• There would be no international sharing whatsoever. Everyone was
excluded by the Americans who sought to exploit their atomic monopoly.
Initial Impact
• The US atomic monopoly was
countered by large standing
forces on the part of the
Soviets.
• This became institutionalized
in Soviet military thinking.
• In the short run this would
hold American interests in
Western Europe hostage if the
threat of Soviet attack was
credible. When the Soviets
gained their own atomic
bombs, this threat made up
for the American advantage in
delivery systems.
• Large forces on the ground
also helped to maintain
satellite nation loyalty.
Doctrine of Massive Retaliation
• While they had an atomic
monopoly and even after
this, the threat of nuclear
war was employed by the
Americans several times.
• This became increasingly
dangerous as the Soviets
developed weapons and
delivery systems of their
own.
Doctrine of Massive Retaliation
• Gwynne Dyer notes:
– President Eisenhower’s willingness to
use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to
break the stalemate in the Korean
truce talks in 1953, like Churchill’s
expressed willingness to use poison
gas (and anthrax germ warfare
bombs) on Germany in 1944, was
almost natural in an era already
inured to the idea of total war. The
fact that neither Churchill or
Eisenhower had to fear retaliation in
kind also made it easier for them to
think in such terms. The doctrine was
eventually formalized under the title
of “massive retaliation:” if the
Russians attacked in Europe, there
would be no shilly-shallying with
conventionally equipped armies. The
bombers of US Strategic Air
Command would simply destroy the
Soviet Union with nuclear weapons.
Doctrine of Massive Retaliation
• This policy was most
credible from 1945-49,
but still remained US
policy well into the 1950s,
with vestiges still present
as late as during the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.
• The massive Soviet
nuclear build-up of the
1960s rendered it
inconceivable.
Mutual Assured Destruction
• With Americas superiority lost,
nuclear planners needed other
justifications for continuing to
produce new and better
bombs in an era when it was
clear that nuclear war meant
destruction of civilization in at
least the northern
hemisphere.
• The new idea was to ensure
that a credible nuclear
deterrence was maintained.
That one could have enough
weapons survive a first strike
to be able to retaliate
effectively.
Mutual Assured Destruction
• The US came to rely on
what they termed the triad
to ensure a second strike
capability.
• This consisted of the air
force’s strategic bombers,
land based missiles, and
submarine launch missiles
of the navy. In a military
world of competing
equipment demands, this
spread atomic spending
around.
Mutual Assured Destruction
• The Soviets tended to
put most of their
effort into their landbased missiles at first.
• Soviet aircraft were
not thought capable
of effective longrange delivery.
• A second strike
capability from
submarine launched
missiles was felt
sufficient.
Mutual Assured Destruction
• In theory the possession
of relatively small
numbers of weapons
makes war between
nuclear states
unthinkable.
• Interestingly, neither
superpower extended this
logic to others, opposing
other nations adopting a
similar strategy to
prevent war.
Civil Defence
• The idea of putting in
place defensive measures
for the civilian population
in case of nuclear attacks
runs counter to the
notion of mutual assured
destruction.
• Nonetheless, most
countries did something.
– Efforts everywhere were
more window-dressing
than real.
– The cost of effective
defence measures was
simply too great.
Civil Defence
• In North America, efforts
were almost comic.
– The “Duck and Cover” film
discussed what to do in a
nuclear attack.
– A siren in Victoria Park was
set up to warn of nuclear
attack – though there is
nothing to be done about it.
– Some downtown buildings
had areas designated as
“shelters” – but basic survival
provisions were generally not
stored.
– Leaders and financial records
were often provided for, but
populations were not
Flexible Response
• US Defence Secretary Robert
MacNamara felt that only
about 200 or so “invulnerable”
missiles guaranteed western
nuclear security. Maintaining
submarine launch weapons
alone could do this.
• Others in the triad now had to
justify their spending.
• The result was the
development of plans to fight
and even win a “limited
nuclear war.”
• Allied to the generals in
formulating these plans were
the suppliers of weapon
systems.
Flexible Response
• In his 1961 farewell
speech, President
Eisenhower warned of
the influence of the
“military industrial
complex.”
• In the Soviet Union,
Khruschev also warned
of the power of what he
termed the “metal
eaters’ alliance.”
Flexible Response
• Planners now thought that
because the cost of all-out
nuclear war was so high, perhaps
both sides would shrink from
using such weapons against
enemy populations – since a
similar fate would befall their
own population.
• They suggested a counter-force
strategy, targeting military targets
and dropping counter-value
targets (cities).
• The Doctrine of mutual assured
destruction was dropped.
• New and more accurate weapon
systems made this strategy
feasible; MacNamara bought it.
Flexible Response
• Justification for nuclear
build-ups were on two
grounds:
– Growth in enemy stockpiles
required balanced growth to
ensure parity and that
refinement of delivery
systems was needed to make
the threat of retaliation
credible.
– A variety of nuclear weapon
systems were now required
to ensure an ability to
respond to any situation –
from a local battlefield
exchange to a full holocaust
nuclear exchange .
Flexible Responjse
• When “flexibility” is stressed, the
argument that there are only a
limited number of realistic targets of
all kinds and that the superpowers
have enough weapons to destroy
them all and turn the rubble a couple
of more times no longer holds.
• The numbers of weapons grow out of
all proportion to the number of
targets.
• Furthermore, the deployment of
more intermediate range weapons
and cruise missiles added a further
destabilizing element. For instance,
the warning time to the Soviets for a
Pershing II missile heading from W.
Europe to Moscow is only 6 minutes
(An ICBM takes 30). What kind of
rational decision making can take
place in this time frame?
Flexible Response
• Planning was increasingly
dominated by technical issues,
rather than consideration of
possible end results.
• Daniel Ellsberg, former
American strategic planner
and the source of the leaked
Pentagon Papers described
this kind of work as being
divorced from reality. Dealing
with numbers on paper, the
planners chart mega-death in
the same way that engineers
modify car designs. Ellsberg
resigned when he thought
about the implications of his
work and leaked information
to the press.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 1972
• The Nixon and
Brezhnev governments
recognized that leaps
in defensive
technologies might
destabilize the Cold
War balance as much
as offensive advances.
• In 1972 the US and
USSR agreed to limit
ABM systems used to
defend areas against
missile attacks – thus
ensuring that
deterrence could
operate.
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)
• Americans constantly
sought technological
solutions to the
problems confronting
them.
• The notion of
technically solving
America’s nuclear
vulnerability was
particularly appealing.
Strategic Defence Initiative
• The official line was that a
defensive shield should
be built to prevent the
penetration of enemy
missiles.
• This is a difficult thing to
argue against.
• However, a shield is also a
weapon. Invulnerability
gives the ability to launch
a first strike without fear
of retaliation, making war
more, not less, likely.
Strategic Defence Initiative
• Most independent scientists
(those not employed by
defence contractors) feel that
complete protection is
impossible. Even 95%
reliability allows unacceptable
casualties – enough to destroy
the fabric of American society.
• Some believe that the
technical problems involved in
ultra-sophisticated technology,
using lasers, particle beam
weapons, electromagnetic
cannons and the incredible
computing power needed to
coordinate it all makes the
entire project unfeasible.
Strategic Defence Initiative
• Not the least of the
problems associated with
anti-nuclear defence work
is the difficulty in actually
testing it.
• No above ground testing
of nuclear explosions
have happened since the
early 1960s.
• We have no idea of the
effect of even a small
number of exploding
weapons.
Strategic Defence Initiative
• SDI comes with a very high
price tag.
• Critics point to relatively
cheap ways of counteracting it.
– Massive use of decoys could
overwhelm command and
control.
– Preliminary strikes against
multi-billion dollar space
platforms would obviously
precede any attack.
– Sailing weapons into enemy
ports in freighters easily
circumvents space based
defence measures.
Nuclear Proliferation
• Even when the USA had a
nuclear monopoly, it was
clear that it could not last.
• Next to join the nuclear club
was the USSR in 1949.
• They were followed by the
British, French and Chinese.
• All justifications mirrored
earlier claims that the
weapons were purely
defensive and intended to
promote peace.
Nuclear Proliferation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
This club hoped to remain exclusive. It didn’t.
Even countries that signed the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty sought the
technology.
Israeli technician Mordechai Vanunu blew the
whistle on his country’s successful
programme.
India exploded a bomb in the 1970s – and
Pakistan eventually followed suit.
South Africa and Iraq nearly acquired
weapons.
Canada, Japan, Argentina, Iran and Brazil can
do so.
North Korea is certainly a member of the
nuclear club.
Even organizations could build simple
weapons if they had fissionable material. ABC
television hired to Physics Grad Student to
build a mock up with fake material, using plans
available on the Internet.
Nuclear Proliferation
• Even delivery systems, from
fighter-bombers to missiles
are available in the
international market place.
Despite an embargo, Iraq
was able to build missile
guidance systems from
Playstation components.
• Potential nuclear powers
wonder why some countries
seem to be allowed them
and others not.
Arms Limitation Agreements
• The Cuban Missile Crisis
alerted the world to the
danger of all-out conflict.
• The potential for accidental
war was too high; both powers
sought to diffuse the problem.
• The US leaked its fail-safe
technology to the Soviets and
both sides took the installation
of a telephone hotline
between the two national
leaders very seriously.
• The threat of war between the
super-powers remained
dangerously high.
Arms Limitation Agreements
• The first important treaty
was signed in 1963 – the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
which ended aboveground testing of nuclear
weapons.
• China and France did not
sign at the time – but
they too took to
underground testing only.
Arms Limitation Agreements
• After the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (negotiated in 1968 and
put into force in 1970) came
the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT 1) in 1969.
• Both sides agreed to limit the
number of launchers they
would employ.
• Though a good first step,
technology outran diplomacy.
Soon new multiple-warhead
weapons arrived – as well as
mobile launch systems and
cruise missiles – which
rendered the agreement
practically useless.
Arms Limitation Agreements
• SALT 1 was signed in
Moscow in 1972 and
extended in Vladivostok in
1975.
• In 1979 President Carter
and Leonid Brezhnev came
to a more comprehensive
agreement, SALT 2, in
Vienna.
• Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan led to the killing
of the deal by new
President Ronald Reagan
and his conservative Senate
supporters.
Arms Limitation Agreements
• Even the cooling of great
power relations did not
stop other talks.
• In 1982 the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START)
began.
• Though there was little
initial progress, a
breakthrough was
eventually reached when
Mikhail Gorbachev
established a trusting
relationship with the
American President.
Nuclear Winter
• Arms talks were difficult,
often bogging down over
minor points and evading
major ones.
• As we noted, technology
often outran diplomacy.
• In the end it was
technology that provided
a way out of the impasse.
• Progress came from a
seemingly unrelated field.
Nuclear Winter
• In 1971, scientists
examined meteorological
data from Mariner 9 s trip
to Mars.
• Dense dust clouds
frustrated them as they
sought to study the
planet.
• They concluded that
these long-lasting dust
storms significantly
lowered surface
temperatures.
Nuclear Winter
• Vulcanologists also
considered the effects of
volcanic ash and dust
spewed into earth’s
atmosphere.
• It was well known that
the 19th century eruption
of Krakatoa depressed
global temperatures.
Scientists wondered if
prehistoric extinctions
might not have been
generated by such a
catastrophe.
Nuclear Winter
• In 1982 other scientists considered the dust and smoke
effects of a potential nuclear war – in light of this
knowledge.
• They concluded that massive forest fires would be
ignited in such a conflict, sending hundreds of millions of
tons of smoke into the atmosphere that “would strongly
resist the penetration of sunlight to the earth’s surface.”
• The result would plunge the world into darkness for as
much as 6 months.
• A drop of 40 degrees centigrade was predicted in the
continental interiors,.
Nuclear Winter
• In 1983 a symposium of
40 scientists met to
further probe
possibilities.
• Carl Sagan and his
colleagues concluded
that fighting even a
limited nuclear war
could be suicidal – even
if one side was not
directly hit.
Nuclear Winter
• Their conclusions were
further test by a study of
the Soviet Academy of
Sciences.
• They felt that a war in which
5,000 megatons of weapons
were exploded (57% as
groundbursts over
hardened targets and 20%
as airbursts over cities)
could end most life on the
planet. Smaller conflicts
would also devastate the
world.
• Nuclear war on any but very
small scale, is, therefore,
suicidal.
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty
• In 1988 the US and USSR
signed the first treaty
banning an entire category
of weapons.
• Allowing only a tiny
response time, these
weapons had the world on
a hair-trigger.
• The elimination of Pershing
IIs showed that Reagan was
serious about dealing with
Gorbachev and that he
trusted the Soviet leader.
Statue at the UN in New York. St. George
Slaying the Dragon – made from Pershing
II missile parts.
The Current Situation
• Talks and more talks in
the 1980s brought some
progress.
• More important were
developments in the
Soviet Union, where
Gorbachev sought to fix
the systemic problems
plaguing the country.
• His playing down Cold
War tensions and his
valiant attempts to
modernize his country
vastly reduced the danger
of war.
The Current Situation
• In the end, it also brought
complete collapse in
1991.
• At first the Soviet collapse
seemed to make the
world more, not less
dangerous, as huge
stockpiles of weapons
were outside the Russian
Republic.
• Khazakhstan held many
ICBMs and the Ukraine
had a vast arsenal.
The Current Situation
Soviet missile silo, now a Ukrainian museum
• Fear of the Russians initially
complicated things, but
generous American aid
eventually greased a deal
ensuring the patriation of
old Soviet nuclear weapons
to Russia.
• The Ukraine became a
poster country for
voluntarily
decommissioning its large
nuclear arsenal (3rd largest
in the world) – the cost to
the US was estimated at
$630 million.
The Current Situation
• The US & Russia signed the Mutual Detargeting Treaty
(MDT) in 1994.
• They agreed to stop automatically targeting the other
country, assuming that it was an enemy.
The Current Situation
• As Russia looked inward,
sorting itself out in the postSoviet world – it looked as
though the Cold War threat
of nuclear annihilation was
gone.
• The post 9-11 world
brought new fears,
however. Governments
everywhere worry about
the unsecured and missing
fissionable material – that
rogue countries or terrorist
organizations might use.
The Current Situation
• Fear of “rogue states”
developing Nuclear
weapons and delivery
systems were huge
worries in the early 21st
century.
• North Korea clearly had
such weapons and they
possessed IRBMs and
were working on ICBMs –
though to this point they
have not had a successful
test.
The Current Situation
• In 2002 George W. Bush announced that the US would
develop and deploy anti-missile systems and withdraw
from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This was
ostensibly to counter the threat from rogue nations – but
it marked a dangerous shift in policy to the Russians.
• Discussion of an American plan to place anti-ballistic
missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic continue to
worry the Russians and have, at times, seemed to risk
sparking a new Cold War. In 2011, at the time of writing,
the Obama administration remains committed to putting a
system in place.
• The Obama government has tried to minimize Russian
fears. At joint NATO-Russian talks in late 2010 the
Russians said that they would agree to a unified European
missile defence system, but not to two systems – one
Russian and the other NATO, as they considered any NATO
system merely a “US missile shield in disguise.”
Current Situation
• Iran’s nuclear
capability was another
concern – particularly
for the USA.
• The Iranians claim they
only want to generate
power.
• The US fears weapon
development is the
real agenda.
• There was talk of an
Israeli pre-emptive
strike against Iran – as
they had attacked
Iraq’s Osiris facility in
1981.
The Current Situation
• In July, 2010 Iran’s nuclear
facilities were crippled by a
computer virus.
• In what has been called a
“weaponized computer
virus”, Iran’s nuclear
programme was set back
several years.
• The source of the Stuxnet
Virus appears to be Israel’s
top secret Dimona Complex.
The developers appear to
be Israeli and American.
The Current Situation
• 2010 also saw international
cooperation between the two
main nuclear powers as they
went to Prague to sign the
New START agreement -- a
follow-up agreement to the
START agreement, agreeing to
cut their weapons numbers
by 1/3.
• It was finally ratified by the
US Senate on Dec. 30, 2010.
• President Obama is on record
as hoping for a nuclear
weapon free world – though Obama & Medvedev After Signing New START
he does not expect it in his
lifetime.
finis