Transcript The Reagan Doctrine and the Fall of the Soviet Union

On the Offensive: The
Reagan Doctrine and the
Fall of the Soviet Union
PO 326: American Foreign Policy
The Carter Administration
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Carter’s approach to foreign policy seems, at the outset, to
represent an important break from predecessors
 General view: Détente and SALT proved that amicable relations
between US and USSR were possible; US had responsibility not to
perpetuate Cold War by overtly antagonizing USSR
► Desires
to reduce defense budget, eliminate nuclear weapons, take
new diplomatic approach reflecting the diminished importance of USSoviet rivalry
 In the wake of increasing interdependence, Carter sought to
construct a foreign policy that took seriously the humanitarian
welfare of 3rd world countries
► Choice
of staff (Vance, Brzezinski, Young) reflects the goals of human
rights protection, economic interaction and humanitarian aid, etc.
► Moralistic foreign policy (Wilsonian)
The Carter Administration
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This change in approach was problematic from the outset. In essence,
Carter’s turn away from containment was complicated by indications
that the traditional (containment) approach was still necessary
 Communist involvement in Angola, Ethiopia, elsewhere in 3rd World,
reinforces longstanding notion that communism is dangerously
expansionist
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Rise of anti-Americanism and Fundamentalist Islam, culminating in Iranian
Revolution and Embassy crisis, also indicates that greater focus on 3rd World is
more demanding than expected
 Several problems regarding Soviets
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Problems with Carter’s human rights stance in 3rd World
Problems with continued China normalization
In SALT II, initially unwilling to submit to far-ranging bilateral cuts in nuclear
arsenals – compromise leads to domestic opposition
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 discredits the initial notion
that Soviet aggressiveness is largely imaginary
The Carter Administration
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The Soviet invasion, combined with Iranian hostage crisis
and domestic pressures, leads Carter to revert to a much
tougher approach to the USSR and the world
 “Personal animus” at betrayal leads to increased defense spending,
diminished economic assistance, and resumed arms race with USSR
 Provision of Afghan rebels with arms, establishment of rapid
deployment force and naval presence in Persian Gulf, economic
sanctions in retaliation to OPEC embargo
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In the end, despite resulting in some successes outside of
the US-USSR rivalry (Camp David Accords), Carter’s overall
approach to FP is seen as a dismal failure – Reagan’s
overtly hard-line view of the East-West rivalry resonates
The “Reagan Revolution”
► From
the outset, Reagan’s approach to foreign
policy is reminiscent of the early Cold War
 Treatment of Soviets as monolithic enemy that must be
defeated through increased military preparation –
negotiation (including SALT) seen, as in NSC 68, as
means to buy time
► Vast
increase in defense spending – domestic ramifications
 “Radical conservatism,” “evangelical” approach to the
rivalry
► Interestingly,
Nathan and Oliver note that the
groundwork for the “Reagan Revolution” was laid
by Carter’s reversion (including Persian Gulf policy)
Reagan and the Soviets
► Reagan
sought to revive the notion that the
Soviets were irresponsible at best, and that they
sought only conquest and domination
 Questioned intentions in international negotiation
(SALT) and weapons development; made severe
demands and overstated actual Soviet military buildup
 Portrays KAL shootdown as indicative of Soviet
barbarism; provides fuel for rhetoric
 Fostered belief that nuclear war was more likely –
increased international (impact on NATO) and domestic
preparations (MX, FEMA)
Reagan and the Soviets
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Given the view that USSR was a dangerous nuclear threat
and that parity had been reached, Reagan seeks to gain an
advantage via SDI (Star Wars)
 Success highly improbable, but absorbed most of Defense’s
discretionary funds and 48% of research budget
 Violation of ABM Treaty, destroyed stability provided by MAD
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In the end, Reagan’s approach solidified Soviet insecurities
about US and relative capabilities; led a nearly bankrupt
country to devote more resources to buildup
When Gorbachev comes to power advocating glasnost,
perestroika, Reagan can no longer play the “evil empire”
card
 Soviets accept US SALT demands, and Reagan is forced to
negotiate; portrays Soviet change as resulting from American
pressure (psychology)
 Demise of USSR thus largely credited to Reagan
Reagan on the Periphery: “The
Enterprise”
► Reagan’s
old-style view of containment extended
to the periphery as well, and he sought to actively
defeat communist elements without reverting to
large-scale intervention. However, his approach
was problematic and, in some cases, illegal
 Communist movements in other regions (esp. Latin
America) were symbolic of Soviet strength, must be
countered
 “Decisional Autonomy”: CIA, others bolstered, given
greater discretion in action – little accountability
 Secretive; manipulated flow of information
Reagan on the Periphery: “The
Enterprise”
► In
Nicaragua and elsewhere, Administration
conducted covert conflict, waged domestic
propaganda campaigns, and backed authoritarian
leaders to stem communist tide
 CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors; backing and
bolstering of Contras (unsavory) – backing continued
even after defeat certain
 Actions lead to destabilization of friendly governments in
region (Honduras)
 Even after Congress cuts off funding, Administration
continues effort – illegality and Iran-Contra
 Nearly destroys Administration, colors posterity’s view
American Foreign Policy in the Cold
War – A Review
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American foreign policy in the Cold War is seemingly
consistent, but appears to be a confusing mélange of
realist power politics, idealistic Wilsonianism, and
overtones of traditional isolationism
Beginning with Kennan and NSC 68, the necessity of
countering Soviet expansionism is undoubtedly the top
priority of nearly all US administrations
 By and large, the general foreign policy outlooks of each postwar
president are very similar (strong, shared worldview); the only real
variation we see is in approaches, which are determined by factors
such as the level of Soviet activity, economic concerns, and
domestic pressures
American Foreign Policy in the Cold
War – A Review
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However, Wilsonianism occupies an uneasy position in this outlook –
the moral responsibility of American foreign policy is alternately
ignored, thrust to the fore, or used for power political purposes
 American contestation of USSR is, from the Truman Doctrine, predicated
on the threat it poses to “free peoples,” though the form of that contest is
power political
 To confuse matters, even when humanitarianism is the stated keystone of
foreign policy plans (as with Carter), its implementation is unpopular and
counterproductive when it ignores or minimizes the importance of the USUSSR power rivalry – which is itself (at least theoretically) based on the
ideal of safeguarding freedom
 American involvement in the periphery is seemingly predicated on power
politics in the larger rubric of containment; but the justification for these
actions derives from Wilson’s idealistic view of a world “safe for
democracy”
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When it cannot be used as justification (e.g., when the US must back
authoritarian regimes to counter Soviet expansion), Wilsonianism is left aside –
ideals such as self-determination are sacrificed in the name of power politics
American Foreign Policy in the Cold
War – A Review
► When
specific approaches to the rivalry prove
costly – especially limited war – we see popular
opposition that is largely based on a weaker
version of isolationism
 Example of general opposition to Vietnam War is
between Vietnamese, and US has no place – inherently
isolationist
► In
sum, though the US successfully defeats USSR
without war, the microfoundations of USFP are
muddled – this problem becomes more
pronounced when the US lacks a powerful,
identifiable enemy in the 1990s and beyond