Transcript ARkStorm - University of California, Berkeley

Dale A. Cox, Anne Wein, and Keith Porter
Sept. 30, 2009
NSF RESIN
Multi-Hazards Demonstration Project
• Fire / Debris Flow
2007 and Station Fire Post
Fire Coordination
• Earthquake / Tsunami
ShakeOut Earthquake
Scenario and Tsunami
Scenario
• Community Interface,
Implementation, Tools and
Training, Great Southern
California ShakeOut
• Winter Storm
ARkStorm Scenario
Building a Winter Storm Scenario
POLICY
Economic
Impacts
Casualties
Emergency
response
Lifelines
Flood
Management
Social Sciences
Engineering
Structures
Earth Science
Infrastructure
Floods, Coastal Erosion,
Landslides, Environmental
The Storm
Forecasting
Social
Impacts
The ARkStorm Team
•
Atmospherics: Marty Ralph, NOAA Research/ESRL/PSD
•
Atmospherics: Mike Dettinger, USGS Scripps
•
Floods: Bill Croyle, DWR Flood Operations Center
•
Floods: Justin Ferris, USGS California Water Science Center
•
Landslides: Chris Wills, California Geological Survey
•
Landslides: Jon Stock, USGS Earth Surfaces Processes Team
•
Coastal: Patrick Barnard, USGS Coastal Marine Geology
•
Coastal: Dan Hooover, USGS Coastal Marine Geology
•
Physical Damages: Keith Porter, University of Colorado
•
Environmental: Geoff Plumlee, USGS Minerals Program
•
Environmental: Charles Alpers, USGS California Water Science Center
•
Emergency Response: Mitch Miller, CalEMA
•
Policy: Ken Topping, California State Polytechnic, San Luis Obispo
•
Economics: Anne Wein, USGS Western Geographic Team
•
Economics: Adam Rose, University of Southern California
Text
The ShakeOut Scenario
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Road closures over time and % average trip time increase
3 days
21%
12 days
17%
13-49 days
12%
50-140 days
8%
San Pedro Port Operation
Cranes use
power off the
grid
Cannot
Separate
Regional
Goods
•Ships wait
•Few divert
•Months to
clear the
back log
Port has
1 week
Storage
Commuting
Total commuters out of PS: 8084
850 commuters to unincorporated
-758 within Riverside county
Total commuters into PS: 18051
3888 commuters from
unincorporated
9290 live and work in Palm Springs
Majority commute to and from Coachella Valley and Riverside
Commuters to and from Kern and San Diego counties ignored
Source: SCAG commute data based on 2000 Census Transportation Planning Package
Electric power – revised estimates
Utility Service Outage and Restoration
% customers with service
High Impact County
120
100
Telecom
80
Gas
60
Power
water
40
20
0
0
50
100
150
200
Telecom: up to 4 days, but congestion and delays
Power: up to 1-4 months, Gas: up to 2 months, Water: up to 6 months
Power,Water Telecommunications Water,Power,Gas,Transportation
Exposure: % employment located in MMI9+
Exposure
Utilities
Manufacturing
Wholesale Trade
Transportation/Warehousing
Retail Trade
Agriculture etc.
Public Adm inistration
Health Care and Social Assistance
Construction
Accom odation and Food Services
Other Services
Adm in, support, w aste m gm t, rem ediation services
Mining
Educational Services
Managem ent of Com panies and Enterprises
Real Estate/Rental & Leasing
Finance and Insurance
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
Arts, Entertainm ent, and Recreation
Inform ation
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
EDD 2006 4th
quarter data,
Ben Sherrouse &
David Hester
(USGS)
Exposure Analysis
ShakeOut Economic Costs and Impacts
• Damage to Structures
and Contents ($112.7b)
• Fire is biggest cause
• Business Interruption
($96.2b)
• Water is biggest shock
• Additional Costs
• Relocation ($0.1b)
• Traffic Delay ($4.3b)
Disaster Recovery
• Phases (restoration, temporary, permanent)
• Tasks, subtasks, and interdependencies
• Time (pressure to return to normalcy vs. betterment)
Day
Tasks
Damage Assessment and
Repair
Damage Assessment
Closure and Relocation
Demolition
Geologic Evaluation
Repair Permitting
Infrastructure and Public
Services Recovery
Infrastructure Repair
Public Facilities Repair
Housing and Social
Recovery
Emergency Shelter
Temporary Housing
Repairs and Rebuilding
Business and Economic
Recovery
Temporary Business Sites
Repairs and Rebuilding
Recovery Management and
Financing
Planning
Recovery Management
Recovery Financing
1
2
3
4
5
6
Week
1
(Sources: Williams Spangle and Associates 1991; Spangle Associates 1994)
2
3
Month
1
2
4
6
8
10
Year
1
2
4
6
8
10
Housing and Social Recovery
region
SEVERE RESIDENTIAL
DAMAGE
Timeline Summary of
ShakeOut Recovery Issues
Time line of ShakeOut Earthquake Scenario Recovery
Day
Tasks
Damage Assessment and
Repair
Damage Assessment
Closure and Relocation
Demolition debris removal
Geologic Evaluation
Repair Permitting
Infrastructure and Public
Services Recovery
Infrastructure Repair
Infrastructure Service
Telecom service restoration
Power service restoration
Gas service restoration
Water service restoration
Rail repair
Highway repair
1
2
3
4
5
6
Week
1
2
3
Month
1
2
4
6
8
10
Year
1
2
4
ATC-20 inspection exceeds local capacity in high impact areas
Building closures, transportation disruption, rail damage backs up ports
Debris removal is challenged by documentation, right of entry to private property,
competition for contractors & storage locations, environmental regulations
Shortages of repair permitting staff shortages in high impact areas
Infrastructure repairs depend on debris removal (incl. hazardous material), personnel shortages, mutual aid arrangements, site access
availability of repair parts, competition for materials, financing, management skills, design process (incl. mitigation plans)
Lifeine service restoration affected by rationing & priorities, lifeline interdependencies, environmental restrictions
Days to restore service
Weeks to construct temporary towers for power imports, reliance on internal
generation, months to bring power plants back on-line
Weeks to months for repairs and to service restorable customer gas shut-offs
Few large & many small water providers. Days-weeks: water conflicts for fire suppression, water contamination, chemical shortages
water orders & testing, months of bottled water distribution, months-years to repair aqueducts and rationing groundwater supplies
1 week to repair, 1 week of slow service, aftershock damage
Days to repair moderate damage, weeks to remove landslide debris and repair liquefaction damage
months to repair surface rupture and extensive bridge damage
Public Facilities Repair
Public Services
Housing and Social
Recovery
Emergency Shelter
Temporary Housing
Repairs and Rebuilding
Operations affected by unanchored and unbraced equipment
Building use conflicts in schools
Depends on residential vacancy rates,
Disproportionate need for individual assist. by low income pop.
Fire following damage peaks requires complete rebuilding and
low residential earthquake insurance penetration in areas of concentrated damage
Business and Economic
Recovery
Economic Resilience
(static)
Temporary Business Sites
Repairs and Rebuilding
Disrupted supply chains and commuter routes, low inventories, personnel trauma, lifeline outages, vulnerability of many small businesses,
vulnerable economic sectors, ripple effects through the economy
Depends on commercial vacancy rates
Fire following peaks need for complete rebuilding
Uninsured commercial earthquake losses
Recovery Management and
Financing
Planning
Recovery Management
Recovery Financing
Pressure to rebuild as before, mitigation opportunities
redevelopment zones create opportunities different from plans
Disaster management relearning, programs developed for more moderate diasters
inadequate management system, uneven local recovery planning
Uninsured losses, nonreimbursible losses, reduced income from taxes
6
ShakeOut Engagement of Stakeholders:
Did they listen, think, act?
Level
Type of Decision-making
Emergency
Response
Federal
GG
Resilience
(effective
post disaster)
GG
State
GG
GG
Region
SW GG
County
GG
Local
GG PS
District
Industrial Sector
Mitigation
(effective
pre disaster)
SW
GG
SW GG
PS
SW GG
PS
SW GG
Business
PS
Individual
PS
SW
SW
SW
SW: ShakeOut Scenario Workshops, GG: Golden Guardian, PS: Public ShakeOut
Category 4
CAT 4 is > 40
cm (~16
inches) in 3
days
Jan. 1969 Precipitation
Jan 25, 1969 Monthly
Jan. 1969 (doubled Jan. 25)
Feb. 1986 Precipitation
Sum Feb. 1986 and Jan. 1969
Economics
of a
Natural
Disaster
Economic
Activity
Projected
activity
Stabilized
activity
‘Disaster’
(a few yrs.)
‘Catastrophe’
(decades)
Impacted
economic
activity
Time
MITIGATION
Cumulative
Losses/costs
$s
EMERGENCY
RESPONSE
PREPAREDNESS
RESILIENCE
Physical damage replacement
Emergency Response
Recovery
Business interruption
BridgeRESULTS
Damage Zones
Zones show estimated locations of severely
damaged bridges (roadway closures ≈ 5-7 months)
Zone 4
Roadways crossing the fault will be severely
damaged (roadway closures ≈ 2 months or more)
Palmdale
Landslide and liquefaction damage to pavement
San Andreas
Fault
San
Bernadino
Zone 3
Zone 2
Baldwin
Park
Riverside
Long
Beach
Corona
Zone 1
Palm Springs
Indio
Zone 5
San Juan
Capistrano