BS311- U6- Challenger Powerpoint
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Transcript BS311- U6- Challenger Powerpoint
(Clockwise starting in left back row)
Ellison S. Onizuka, Mission Specialist
Sharon Christa Mc Auliffe, Teacher
Greg Jarvis, Payload Specialist
Judy Resnick, Mission Specialist
Ron McNair, Mission Specialist
Dick Scobee, Commander
Mike Smith, Pilot
My purpose is to analyze the communication
and organizational behavior components
that played a significant role in the
Challenger space shuttle tragedy.
Image of the Challenger
Space Shuttle crash of 1986.
Where did the communication breakdowns occur in this
tragedy?
What could have been done to have prevented these
communication breakdowns and the ultimate explosion?
How did formal roles and reliance on the chain of
command influence the events?
Are the communication problems that led up to the
launch decisions inevitable in complex, hierarchical
organizations?
What role did structural design play in this event?
Where did the communication breakdowns occur in this
tragedy?
› NASA was unaware of recommendations by MTI (Morton
Thiokol International) advising against the launch.
Temperatures below 53 degrees were deemed unsafe
(NASA, 1986).
Constant opposing views on safety by MTI engineers and
upper management further contributed to the breakdowns in
communication.
› They disagreed over the seriousness of the O-ring problem
› They failed to use the same communication style for better
understanding.
(Winsor, 1988).
Winsor states, “Communication is not just shared
information; it is shared interpretation” (p. 101, 1988).
› Implies that information was received, but there was a
failure by NASA to properly interpret its severity.
› The O-ring failure should not have been as
unexpected as it was.
Management at Marshall appeared to have the
tendency to withhold important information rather than
bringing it forward (NASA, 1986).
› Portrayed Marshall as a part of the system not
interfacing or communicating with the other parts to
produce successful flight missions
What could have been done to have prevented these
communication breakdowns and the ultimate explosion?
› There could have been more coordination between
MTI, Marshall and NASA.
Integration would have ensured that the overall
goals of each organization were achieved (Anthony,
Gales, & Hodge, 2003).
Major goal: To have a safe, successful flight mission
The engineers and managers of MTI could have
developed a communication style that Marshall and
NASA would have been able to interpret and
understand.
How did formal roles and reliance on the chain of
command influence the events?
› Three main organizations put pressure on NASA to
launch the Challenger as quickly as possible.
Military
Congress
Media
(Neuner & Rider, n.d.)
Without the pressure from these organizations, the
Challenger wouldn’t have been rushed to launch.
› May have prevented overlooking technical problems
with the shuttle
Morton Thiokol International (MTI)
› Contractor responsible for solid rocket boosters
(Winsor, p. 101).
Between MTI engineers, management in NASA, and
Marshall Space Center, news moved slowly.
› “News moved slowly among the organizations
because they were in a hierarchical relationship, with
MTI dependent on Marshall for the contract and
Marshall dependent on NASA for funds and career
opportunities” (Winsor, p. 101).
Are the communication problems that led up to the
launch decisions inevitable in complex, hierarchical
organizations?
› Miscommunication is inevitable to some extent when
dealing with different corporate roles, agendas and
personalities.
› Because there are so many levels, communication is
especially vital.
› Unfortunately, in this situation, it was a matter of life
and death.
Differences in corporate roles lead to greater difficulty in
communicating (Winsor, p. 101).
› Concerns and values often differ
› Levels of experience are broad
Lower-level employees are more likely to pass bad news
upward than middle- high level management. Why?
› In this situation, politics were involved at the higher
level.
› Pressure to succeed grows stronger as you go up the
hierarchical ladder.
What role did structural design play in this event?
› The structural design of NASA was lacking..
Adequate planning and control systems
Adequate procedures and policies for safe practices
Structure for centralized decision-making
Decisions were being made at all levels of
employment
The military, Congress, and the media swayed the
decision to launch, thus straying further away from
centralized decision-making
With as big of an organization as NASA, decision-making
should be centralized.
Failure to communicate effectively allowed warnings to
be dismissed on the part of MTI, Marshall and NASA.
Communication breakdowns resulted from opposing
perspectives and mismatched communication styles.
Hierarchical pressure was evident and the decision to
launch was influenced by this pressure.
Structural design impacted the ability to effectively
communicate.
It seems that MTI and Marshall both did not want to
acknowledge safety standards were not all up to par
because of hierarchical pressure to launch on time.
“Even when MTI engineers came to believe that a
problem existed, they had a difficult time convincing
management” of the severity, as well as Marshall, which
both shared the same opposing perspective (Winsor, p.
106).
Although the Challenger crash was the result of various
technical problems, the ultimate cause of the crash was
the communication breakdown.
Anthony, W. P., Gales, L. M., & Hodge, B. J. (2003). Organization
Theory: A Strategic Approach (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Pearson Education, Inc.
NASA. (1986, February 3). Report of the Presidential Commission on
the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Retrieved August 24,
2010, from:
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogerscommission/table-of-contents.html
Neuner, K., & Rider, J. (n.d.). The Challenger Disaster. Retrieved on
August 24, 2010, from:
http://studenthome.nku.edu/~riderj/challenger%20report.pdf
Winsor, D. A. (1988). Communication Failures in the Challenger
Accident. IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication,
vol. 31, no. 3. 101-107. doi: 0361-1434.1988.0900.0101.
Retrieved August 24, 2010, from:
http://people.emich.edu/jsteichma/winsor_challenger.pdf
Cover Image
http://www.starstryder.com/2008/01/28/remembering-the-rolemodels-on-the-challenger/
Seven Astronauts Image
http://www.webbooks.com/eLibrary/ON/B0/B58/070
MB58.html
Challenger Explosion Imagehttp://www.popularmechanics.com/science/space/nasa/
Astronaut in Air Imagehttp://www.allbestwallpapers.com/space-nasa_
_space_shuttle_challenger_astronaut_mccandles_wallpapers.ht
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