Transcript Speech 131018 Helsinki South Africa

South Africa – Verification Lessons Learned
from the Dismantled Nuclear Weapons
Programme
Olli Heinonen
Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School
18 October, 2013
Path to Nuclear Weapon Capability
 Nuclear weapons programs took place
parallel to civilian programs.
 Nuclear power alone is not a stepping stone
to weapon capability, but mastering of
sensitive technologies is:
- Reprocessing
- Uranium enrichment
(South Africa considered both, but opted for
the uranium enrichment)
 Nuclear know-how ; technologies cannot be
un-invented and special skills fade away
slowly.
South Africa’s Nuclear Milestones - 1
• 1969 – A committee to study peaceful nuclear
explosions for mining.
• 1971 – R&D for nuclear explosives starts.
• 1978 – Pilot uranium enrichment plant starts the
operation.
• 1978 – Armscor takes the responsibility the
development for a deliverable nuclear weapon.
• 1989 - Pilot uranium enrichment plant ends the
operation.
• 1990 – President de Klerk instructed to terminate
the production of weapons and dismantle them
and the infrastructure.
South Africa’s Nuclear Milestones - 2
• 10 July 1991 – South Africa accedes to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
• 16 September 1991 – A comprehensive safeguards
agreement with the IAEA enters into force.
• 25 March 1992 – South Africa submits the complete
inventory of its nuclear material holdings to the IAEA.
• 24 March 1993 – President de Klerk announces that
South Africa has had nuclear weapon program, which
had been dismantled before joining the NPT.
Nuclear Weapons Program
• The development and production of a number of
deliverable gun-type devices.
• Lithium-6 separation for the production of tritium
for possible future use in boosted devices.
• Studies of implosion and thermonuclear
technology.
• Research and development for the production and
recovery of plutonium and tritium.
IAEA Safeguards in South Africa
Under INFCIRC/66 safeguards before
September 1991:
- SAFARI-1 research reactor, Pelindaba.
- Hot cell complex, Pelindaba.
- Koeberg nuclear power reactor units 1
and 2.
Note: These installations had not contributed
to the weapons program.
IAEA Safeguards in South Africa
Additional installations from September 1991 under a
INFCIRC/153-type agreement
- Uranium conversion plant (UF6).
- Pilot enrichment plant (HEU).
- HEU metal/alloy production plant.
- HEU fuel fabrication.
- Semi-commercial enrichment plant (LEU).
- MLIS laser enrichment R&D facility.
- LEU fuel fabrication plant.
- Natural uranium/depleted uranium metal plants.
- Decontamination plants and waste storages.
Note: Also R&D on centrifuge enrichment, but without using nuclear
material.
Verification
 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
 Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Africa.
The Treaty requires the dismantlement of nuclear weapons
programs in a verifiable manner.
 Resolution of the IAEA General Conference
NPT Safeguards
NPT model safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153
Corrected):
-Purpose: verifying that nuclear material is not
diverted.
-Verify that State declarations about their nuclear
material holdings are correct and complete.
–Technical objective: timely detection and deterrence
of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear
material.
–Focus on declared facilities and material.
–Fundamental safeguards measure is nuclear
material accountancy, with containment and
surveillance as complementary measures.
Verification - 1
Taking into account the past weapons program, the
objectives of the IAEA inspections were to:
- Gain assurance that all nuclear material used in the
program has been placed under IAEA safeguards and is in
peaceful use.
- Assess that all non-nuclear weapons specific components
of the devices had been destroyed, all laboratory and
engineering facilities had been fully decommissioned and
abandoned or converted to non-nuclear or peaceful nuclear
usage, all weapons-specific equipment had been destroyed
and that all other equipment had been converted to nonnuclear usage or peaceful nuclear usage.
Verification - 2
Assessment of the completeness of the declared nuclear
inventory:
-The inventory was first evaluated with respect to
production, imports, and usage of uranium, and then
the isotopic balance of the inventory was calculated
and compared with the use of natural uranium.
- Entire operating history of the enrichment plants
was assessed by analyzing of data from several
thousand operating records including detailed the
plant status, on a daily basis.
- All nuclear wastes were characterized, repacked
and verified.
Verification - 3
• The objectives of the IAEA inspections were to:
- Assess the completeness and correctness of the
information provided with respect to the timing and
scope of the program, and the development,
manufacture, and subsequent dismantling of the nuclear
weapons.
- Maintain assurances that the nuclear weapons
capability would not be restored.
These objectives were based on the IAEA's rights and
obligations under the safeguards agreement and on the
stated policy of the South African Government for full
transparency with respect to the country's former nuclear
weapons program
] Implementation of Safeguards
• Full and complete initial declaration:
- Scientific seminars and visits conducted to explain
the scope and content of the civilian and military
elements of the nuclear program.
- All nuclear material and facilities including test and
dismantled facilities were declared and verified.
- Verification proceeded in steps as nuclear material
and information became available.
Dilemmas of Verification - 1
The
overlap
between
the
equipment,
knowledge
and
materials required to develop
nuclear weapons and to conduct
civilian nuclear research or
develop nuclear defense limits
the effectiveness of verification
measures
and
complicates
information acquisition and
analysis .
Dilemmas of Verification - 2
• Dismantlement includes access to
proliferation sensitive information.
• It takes time.
• It requires access to sites and
information of importance to national
security.
Dealing with Discrepancies
• First analysis revealed discrepancies with respect to
HEU produced by the pilot enrichment plant ,and
with respect to LEU produced by the semicommercial enrichment plant indicating that
substantial amount of uranium-235 was
unaccounted for.
• Re-examination of records, and further sampling
lead to adjustments of nuclear material in wastes,
tails , and hold-ups; problems were resolved.
Keys to Success
• Openness and Cooperation:
- Unfettered access to relevant people and
sites
- Visits: Any time, any place with a reason
• Cooperation.
• Trust and verify.
• Each country is an unique case; no one
size fits all.
• Special verification teams.
Reading Material
• Waldo Stumpf, Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear
Weapons Program, 50 Years after Hiroshima, Castiglioncello, Italy,
28 September 1995.
• Zondi Masiza, A Chronology of South Africa’s Nuclear Program,
The Nonproliferation Review Fall 1993, p. 35-55.
• Adolf von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos,
Nuclear Verification in South Africa, IAEA Bulletin, 1/1995, p.4248.
• David Albright, South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons, A Report
of the Institute for Science and International Security, 1 May 1994.