(ISPR) Major Findings & Recommendations

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Transcript (ISPR) Major Findings & Recommendations

BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR)
Major Findings & Recommendations
Mr. Bob Pond
USCG Headquarters (CG-533)
Office of Incident Management & Preparedness
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Summary
Dates:
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20 APR 10; Explosion
22 APR 10; NRT Conf Call Start
23 APR 10; RRT VI Conf Call Start
27 APR 10; RRT IV Conf Call Start
28 APR 10; 5,000 bbls per day
29 APR 10; SONS Declaration
30 APR 10; LA EMAC Request
14 MAY 10; Subsea Dispersants
22 MAY 10; POTUS Commission
23 MAY 10; HSIN / ERMA
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27 MAY 10; 12,000+ bbls per day
28 MAY 10; WH Triple Forces
14 JUN 10; ISPR Chartered
10 JUN 10; 25,000+ bbls per day
30 JUN 10; Emergency Rule Making
15 JUL 10; Wellhead Secured
2 AUG 10; 62,000 bbls per day*
19 SEP 10; Well Sealed
18 MAR 11; ISPR Complete
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Summary
Response
Statistics:
 Total Spilled 4,928,100
bbls
 Total Responders 48, 200
 Total CG 7,000
 Total Vessels 345
 Total Aircraft 127
 Total VOOs 3,200
 Total Hard Boom 3.8m
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Total Soft Boom 9.7m
Total Dispersants 1.8m gal
Total In Situ Burns 411
Total Command Post 4
Total Branches 17
Total Staging Areas 32
Total waste 93.4 tons
ISPR Background
 The Commandant chartered the ISPR Team to conduct
an assessment of preparedness and response issues
from the Deepwater Horizon incident.
 Members included Federal and State Government
representatives.
 Advisors to the Team represented the environmental,
oil industry, and OSRO communities.
ISPR Report
General Findings
 The OPA90 response structure under the NCP is
fundamentally sound.
 The size and duration of the incident magnified
shortcomings in dealing with a SONS.
 Intersection of the NCP and NRF affected relationships
outside the oil spill response community
 The intensity of political demands was unprecedented
and unanticipated.
Spills of National Significance (SONS)
Recommendations
 Declaration of a SONS should carry more weight and
meaning, including designation of a National Incident
Commander (NIC) by President
 Roles and authorities of the NIC should be enhanced
and better defined
 Relationship between the NIC & DHS Secretary
should be better defined
 The integration of SONS Doctrine with the NRF is a
major issue
Focus Areas
 AREA COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION &
ACTIVITY
 ACP POLICY & IMPLEMENTATION
 IDENTIFICATION & PRIORITIZATION OF
ESAs
 INTEGRATION OF OIL SPILL
CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A
REGIONAL RESPONSE
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WCD SCENARIO
QUANTIFICATION
USE OF DISPERSANTS
USE OF IN SITU BURNING
COMMON OPERATING PICTURE
EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS
 INTERSECTION OF THE NRF &
NCP
 CHARACTERISTICS & QUALIFICATIONS
OF AN EFFECTIVE CRISIS LEADER
 POLITICAL DEMANDS
 ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF
HOMELAND SECURITY UNDER HSPD-5
 ROLE OF THE NATIONAL INCIDENT
COMMANDER AND THE NATIONAL
INCIDENT COMMAND
 ROLE OF THE NRT & RRTs
 UAC & ICPs
 SUSTAINABILITY OF RESPONSE
PERSONNEL
 CONTAINMENT & SUSTAINABILITY OF OIL
RECOVERY OPERATIONS
 CASCADING OF RESPONSE RESOURCES
 USE OF VESSELS OF OPPORTUNITY
 APPLICATION OF LESSONS LEARNED
FROM PRIOR SPILL RESPONSES &
EXERCISES
Intersection of the NCP & NRF
Key Findings
 Coast Guard, BP, & SOSC’s responded to the incident
under the NCP’s regulatory authority
 Many senior government officials were initially unclear
as to the federal government’s role
 State & Local EMA’s pointed to the NRF as their
system for disaster response
 Most affected States’ Governors invoked Disaster
Declarations, typically a precursor to Stafford Act
declaration
Intersection of the NRF & NCP
Notable Lessons Learned
 Senior officials at the Federal, State, & local levels
do not know the NCP – lack of engagement for
catastrophic oil spill plans and exercises with
 High-level senior & elected official
 Local communities outside immediate port areas
 State emergency mgmt community
 Integrated Federal doctrine (e.g., NCP/NRF) is
needed for all significant incidents (including oil
spills)
Intersection of the NRF & NCP
Key Recommendations
 USCG, FEMA, & EPA conduct joint review of the NCP
and NRF
 Incident Mgmt: define and socialize roles of the White
House, PFO, National Incident Commander, NIC
organization, NRT, and UAC
 Funding: OSLTF vs Stafford Act
 RRTs and Area Committees should engage state and
local Emergency Management Communities as well
as environmental communities.
Role of the NRT
Role of the NRT
Key Findings
 The NRT was not used in accordance with NCP
doctrine.
 The program and policy experience of NRT
members should be fully integrated with the
incident’s response organization
 The establishment of the Interagency Solutions
group (IASG) showed value of a coordinating group
at the national level, a role for which the NRT may be
well suited.
What is the role of the NRT
during a SONS?
Platform for
Principals’
Information
Sharing
Support the
Response
Organization’s
Needs
NRT
Role of the NRT
Key Recommendations
 The Coast Guard and EPA should ensure that the
standing NRT has appropriate representation.
 The USCG & EPA should determine the value of
embedding an action officer level team (e.g., the
IASG) at the NIC to facilitate information sharing and
resource identification/allocation at the national level.
Role of the RRTs
Role of the RRTs
Key Findings
 The program and policy experience of RRT
members are important resources that should be
fully integrated with the incident’s response
organization, and leveraged during a major oil spill
response.
 The RRTs involved were not fully prepared manage
the surge of alternative response technologies
proposals.
Role of the RRTs
Key Recommendations
 USCG and EPA should ensure that standing RRTs
have appropriate representation.
 Regional type 2 incident management planning
 The Coast Guard and EPA should review the
authorities of RRTs with regard to their role in
alternative response technologies.
Integration Of Oil Spill
Contingency Plans for a
Regional Response
Integration Of Oil Spill Contingency Plans for a Regional Response
Key Findings
 Few linkages between State and local contingency
plans, industry plans, and the One Gulf Plan
 Confusion as to which plan should be the principal
response plan for the DWH incident
 Regional level planning is necessary for the coastal
zone but RCPs for the Coastal Zone may not be
appropriate if developed for standard Federal
regions
Integration Of Oil Spill Contingency Plans for a Regional Response
Key Recommendations
 USCG should work with EPA to develop the
concept of RCPs and provide guidance on RCP
development
 Coast Guard Areas and Districts should be more
involved in the contingency planning process to
ensure high-quality regional plans that encompass
coastal regions.
QUESTIONS?
Mr. Bob Pond
COMDT (CG-533)
Office of Incident Management &
Preparedness
202-372-2240
[email protected]