Transcript 20130402-SAMS-Comps_Prep

SCOA
EOA
FOA
TOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
•
•
•
TOA
EOA
•
•
•
•
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian
War
•
•
•
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy:
The Founders
MDW
•
Justice of War and Justice in •
War
DOA
•
Intro to ADM I-III
FOA
•
•
•
Context for Future
Scenario Planning
Past Futures
Ex
•
Intro (River Crossing)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Doctrine and Theory after
Civil War
Philippines, 1899-1902
Meuse-Argonne 1918
•
•
•
SCOA
•
•
•
•
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
•
•
•
•
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/
GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
•
•
•
•
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
•
•
•
•
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
Justice in War: Civilians on
the Battlefield
•
Justice in War: Commander’s •
Moral Dilemmas
Justice in War: Emerging
Technologies
•
Justice in War: PoWs and
Detainees
•
Understand Op Env I-III
•
Understand Op Problem I-IV •
Develop Op Approach I-III
•
Practice ADM I-IV
•
Deter and Defeat Aggression
•
WMDs and Deterrence
Theorizing TOA
•
•
•
•
•
Counter Terrorism and
Irregular Warfare
AirSea Battle and Power
Projection
DARPA and Beyond
Deploy/Employ (Haiti)
•
•
Stability and COIN Ops
Providing a Stabilizing
Presence
Design of Op Art
Staff Ride (Vicksburg)
Practicum (Arab Israel ‘73)
•
•
•
•
Humanitarian Missions
Space and Cyberspace
Strat Context of and
Evolutions of Op Art
MSTP (Amphib Asslt)
•
•
•
Campaign Planning Ex
•
(SWB)
Capstone
SCOA
EOA
MDW
TOA
•
•
•
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
FOA
TOA
•
•
•
•
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Block 1:
T101: Nature and Purpose of Military Theory I
- Maclean, Norman. Young Men & Fire
T102: Nature and Purpose of Military Theory II
- Maclean, Norman. Young Men and Fire
- Reynolds, Paul Davidson. A Primer on Theory Construction
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War
T103: Theory of Theory I
- Gaddis, John Lewis. The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the
Past
T104: Theory of Theory II
- Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
T105: Theory of Operational Art I
- Schneider, James J. Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the
Foundation of the Operational Art
- Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of
Operational Theory
- Swain, Richard M. "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S.
Army."
- Kelly, Justin and Mike Brennan, “The Leavenworth Heresy and the
Perversion of Operational Art,”
T106: Theory of Operational Art II
- Harrison, Richard W. Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life
and Theories of G.S. Isserson.
- Isserson, G.S. “The Evolution of Operational Art,”
- Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought.
DOA
Doctrine
•
•
•
•
•
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 1 (Lessons 101-106)
Action: Analyze scientific method and theory development
Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on
theory, method, military theory, and operational art
Standard:
• Explain the characteristics and practical usefulness of theory
• Describe the scientific method and principles of theory
development
• Assess the similarities and differences between methods used
in the humanities and the social sciences
• Analyze the processes of normal science and scientific
revolutions
• Describe the early development of the theory of operational art
in the Soviet Union and the U.S. Army
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Explain the relevance and usefulness of military theory in
planning for and conducting operational art
TOA
•
•
•
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
•
•
•
•
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
T102) Paul Davidson Reynolds, A Primer in Theory Construction (TOA)
Scientific knowledge must provide: 1. A method of organizing & categorizing things (typology),
2. “Predictions” of future events, 3. Explanations of past events, 4. Sense of understanding
about causal relationships, 5. Potential for control (indep. Variables)
Desirable characteristics of scientific knowledge:
1. Abstractness (independent of space and time)
2. Intersubjectivity (Agreement about meaning among relevant scientists)
3. Empirical relevance (can be compared to “known” evidence)
T103) John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History (TOA)
History ≠ prediction, but helps to broaden experience/knwlge base
Present as a singularity (funnel from past to future)
History is scientific: reality, representation, persuasion
Try not to be reductionist; work w/lmted generalizations, contingent causation, sim’s over
modeling; trace processes to known outcomes.
Fractals: patterns can be found, even in chaotic systems
Immediate, intermediate, distant causes (diminishing relevance)
Exceptional vs. general causes (PH attack example)
Particularization of generalization
History studies phenomena w/which it can’t interact; embraces complexity and enables
pattern recognition w/o singular causes.
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (TOA)
T104) Paradigm: Universally recognized scientific evidence/action (law, theory, application &
instrumentation) that provides models that create new traditions of scientific research.
2 essential characteristics: Sufficiently unprecedented & open-ended.
Paradigms change a group into a profession set rules, starting pt, etc.
Paradigms start with an anomaly, which is explored, leading to an adjusted theory; can be
factual (inductive) or theoretical (deductive).
Remember: not all scientific (or military) knowledge is cumulative; when things are disproved,
they can be thrown out and replaced with new knowledge.
•
•
•
•
•
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
T104) James Schneider, “Vulcan’s Anvil” (TOA)
Am. CW marks departure from classical strategy & mvmt twd op art.
Post-CW to WWI: Evolution of empty battlefield (more lethal wpns but lower casualty rates =
strgth of the defense)
IOT overcome defense, needed to develop MNVR tactics (3rd dimension)
“OA characterized by employment of forces in deep distributed ops”
OA greatly enabled by RR: logistics, mvmt w/in theater; fresher troops.
Structure of OA: 1) Distrib. ops (various battles in time & space w/single aim), 2) Distrib
campaigns (no single decisive battle), 3) Cont. logistics, 4) Instantaneous C2, 5) Op’ly durable
formations, 6) Op’l vision, 7) Works best against similarly distrib. enemy, 8) Distrib continuous
deployment.
T105) Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (TOA)
Increase in scale of battles required new level of war in 1800s = Op’l Art
Questions for Op’l planners: 1. In what way does this differ from strat.& tact. Levels? 2. How
do we ID op’l problems? 3. How to differentiate bw practical aspects of OA and cognitive
aspects of OL? 4. How do we justify an op’l level of war?
Answer: Use a systems approach; look at components & whole system
Criteria for op’l acts: 1. Cognitive tension bw strat & tact, 2. Based on mnvr & dynamic
interaction, 3. Synergy, 4. Aim should be disruption of ENY systems, 5. Contemplate choas, 6.
Non-linear, 7. Acct for interaction bw mnvr & attrition, 8. Independent entities, 9. Relate to
univ. theory.
SCOA
EOA
MDW
TOA
•
•
•
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
FOA
TOA
•
•
•
•
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Block 2:
T107: Intellectual Context I
- Gat, Azar. A History of Military Thought.
T108: Intellectual Context II
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War.
- Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War.
- Echevarria, Antulio. Clausewitz and Contemporary War.
- Calhoun, Mark. “Clausewitz and Jomini: Contrasting Intellectual
Frameworks in Military Theory.”
T109: Intellectual Context III
- Clausewitz, Carl von. On War.
- Jomini, Antoine Henri. The Art of War.
- Echevarria, Antulio. Clausewitz and Contemporary War.
T110: Theory and Culture
- Lynn, John A. Battle,
- Porter, Patrick. Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes
T111: Chinese Military Theory
- Ames, Roger T., ed. and trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare.
- Griffith, Samuel B., ed. and trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of War
T112: American Military Theory
- Linn, Brian McAllister. The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War.
- Echevarria, Antulio J. II. “American Operational Art, 1917-2008.”
DOA
Doctrine
•
•
•
•
•
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 2 (Lessons 107-112)
Action: Assess military theory in terms of its cultural and
intellectual context
Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on
military theory and operational art in its cultural and intellectual
context
Standard:
• Describe the impact of intellectual context on theory
development
• Analyze the relationship of theory to culture and their influence
on the practice of warfare
• Describe ancient Chinese military theory in the context of its
cultural influences
• Assess the past and present state of American military theory
• Evaluate the applicability of military theory in a context
different from that within which it arose
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Explain the relevance and usefulness of military theory in
planning for and conducting operational art
TOA
•
•
•
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
•
•
•
•
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Clausewitz Book 2 “On the Theory of War”:
Major characteristics of war: 1) Moral forces & effects, 2) Positive reaction (though
unpredictable), 3) Uncertainty of information.
Theory is a study, not a doctrine.
War isn’t art or science; part of man’s social existence.
Historical examples can: 1) explain an idea, 2) apply an idea, 3) support a statement, or 4) be
deduced for doctrine (most difficult is #4 – details!)
Better to study one campaign in depth than many shallowly – you learn more by digging into
the details about successes and failures.
Clausewitz scholars (TOA)
Antulio Echevarria: Cl’s aim was to bring the spirit of inquiry to the subject of war; connection
b/w 8 books = dynamic relat. b/w purpose and means; Form matters as much as content; the
essence of war is violence = center of Cl’s trinity.
Mark Calhoun: Uses Reynolds’s criteria to assess J and Cl’s theories; Concl: J = didactic manual
for conduct of war; Cl: unifying theory to increase CDR’s judgment, but must be understood in
context
Alan Beyerchen:: Seeking exact analytical soln’s doesn’t fit nonlinear reality of war; sensitive
to starting conditions; relat. to chaos theory
John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (TOA)
Warfare practices aren’t evolutionary, but are driven primarily by culture, and secondarily by
technology; military culture reflects civilian life.
Discourse vs. Reality:
D: Ideal war, nat’l interests, last resort, WIN, short wars, state-on-state, “exit strategy,”
decisive battle
R: Non-state actors, info warfare, ill-defined boundaries, messy & lengthy, non-decisive,
economic impacts, risk aversion vs. “risk-all”
•
•
•
•
•
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare William Griffith vs. Roger Ames (TOA)
General principles: Know self, enemy, terrain
CDR must have ch’I (character, moral courage) and ho (harmony)
Hsing: Strategic positioning enabling victory before battle
Shih: Strat. advantage of releasing all latent energy in concentration
Yin-Yang: complimentary opposites; do what ENY won’t expect.
Warfare is the art of deceit; high importance of intel
Griffith trans: (1950s): focused on Sun Tzu’s possible history & intent in writing (systematic
treatise to guide generals); influence on Mao
Ames trans (1980s): More descriptive; possibility of 2 Sun Tzu’s; war tied to eastern
philosophy
Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle (TOA)
The way an Army fights is determined by they way it thinks about previous wars, interprets
curr. threats, and anticipates future wars
Three schools of thought: 1. Guardians: War plans = engr project; using art & science to
predict consequences (Colin Powell). 2. Heroes: War = struggle for intangible martial virtues;
flexible, innovative thinking; neg. view of scient. knowledge & civ. pop. (Patton). 3. Managers:
War = running a corporation; when we fail, it’s time to reorganize; need best wpns, educated
professionals IOT win wars. (Marshall).
All three schools exist simultaneously, w/ strengths & weaknesses, to create Army’s way of
war.
SCOA
EOA
MDW
TOA
•
•
•
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
FOA
TOA
•
•
•
•
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Block 3:
T113: Systems Theory I
- Bousquet, Antoine. The Scientific Way of Warfare.
T114: Systems Theory II
- Osinga, Frans. Science, Strategy, and War: The Strategic Theory of John
Boyd.
T115: Theory of Irregular War
- Daase, Christopher. “Clausewitz and Small Wars.”
- Heuser, Beatrice. “Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed
Between Partisan War and People’s War.”
- Schmitt, Carl. Theory of the Partisan
- Biddle, Stephen. “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.”
T116: Civil War Violence
- Kalyvas, Stathis. The Logic of Violence in Civil War.
T117: Political Geography
- Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa.
T118: Theory and Planning
- Mintzberg, Henry. The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (1994).
- Dolman, Everett Carl. Pure Strategy
DOA
Doctrine
•
•
•
•
•
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
Enabling Learning Objective (ELO) 3 (Lessons 113-118)
Action: Demonstrate the ability to evaluate critically various
forms and uses of military theory
Condition: Provided historical and contemporary references on
theory, method, military theory, and planning
Standard:
• Evaluate the applicability of traditional military theory within
the current operational environment
• Describe the relationship of American military theory to
technology and systems theory
• Describe the emergence of ideology as a component of military
theory and modern warfare
• Analyze theories of political geography and civil war violence
and their relevance to planning for military action in complex
contingencies
• Assess the relationship of military and systems theory to
planning and strategy development
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Explain the relevance and usefulness of military theory in
planning for and conducting operational art
TOA
•
•
•
Nature & Purpose of Mil Theory I & II
Theory of Theory I & II
Theory of Op Art I & II
•
•
•
•
Intellectual Context I, II & III
Theory and Culture
Chinese Military Theory
American Military Theory
Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare (TOA)
Warfare practices reflect the dominant body of scientific ideas within that timeframe (NOT a
causal argument; analogy/metaphor)
1. Mechanistic (Clock): Cause & effect; Enlightenment; Frederick the Great’s “war machine”;
gunpowder
2. Thermodynamic (Engine): Responsive to change; conservation of energy; entropy; Clause
was clock/engine amalgam (Clock: COG, Mass; Engine: Fog, friction, complexity, rejection of
linearity)
3. Cybernetic (Computer): Info = opposite of entropy; importance of feedback loops
4. Chaoplectic (Internet): develop. of ORSA; overreliance & simplification led to failure in
Vietnam (McNamara)
Boyd’s OODA Loop (TOA) Understand this diagram
Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (TOA)
Why is violence prevalent in some cities during CW and absent in other seemingly similar
ones?
Violence is less about collective emotions, ideologies, and culture, and more a process taking
place bc of human aversion to homicidal violence.
Violence is rational if it has purpose; strat. & tact; can obtain compliance.
Control = deciding factor in estab/maintaining collaboration; must be gained through
discriminate violence.
3 zones of control: Incumbent, Insurgent, & contested control
Prop 1: level of control = level of collaboration, rate of defection
Prop 2: Indiscriminate violence is counterproductive in CW.
You don’t know who’s collaborating w/ENY unless you have some level of control; that’s why
we fight in contested zones to gain control.
•
•
•
•
•
Systems Theory I & II
Theory of Irregular War
Civil War Violence
Political Geography
Theory & Planning
Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa (TOA)
Major issues for building states: 1. Cost of expanding dominant pwr infrast, 2. Nature of nat’l
boundaries, 3. Design of state system.
Africa’s current state is NOT based on colonialism; sovereignty issues pre-date colonialism
Africa ≠ Europe: land is abundant, so wars are fought more for people or treasure NOT
territory
Actual “rule” only effective IVO cities and capitols, not in hinterland.
Wars mostly internal = lack of nationalism and tax base
Post-colonial theme = firm boundaries with weak internal control.
Alternatives to current int’l state system: 1. Look at Africa regionally, 2. Decertify nonfunct’l
states, 3. Recognize new nation states (ala Balkans)
Mintzberg’s Concept of Strategy (TOA) Understand this concept
Everett Dolman, Pure Strategy (DOA)
Tacticians look for solutions; strategists look for continuous progress (diff. perspectives.
Complexity is an attempt to understand the chaos; deal with systems of indep but interrelated
parts where inputs ≠ outputs; must try to avoid overly disruptive inputs (over correction –
Dorner).
Chaos & Complexity = biggest influence on modern war/OA (net-centric)
Quantum physics – prediction much easier at tactical level than strategic
We work mostly in complex, adaptive systems – no final state & in state of perpetual flux
(Does this negate the Element of OA for End State?)
SCOA
EOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
EOA
•
•
•
•
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian
War
•
•
•
FOA
TOA
Doctrine and Theory after
Civil War
Philippines, 1899-1902
Meuse-Argonne 1918
•
•
•
•
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/
GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
E101: Course Introduction
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War
- ADP 3-0
- ADRP 3-0, Chapter 4
- Bruscino, “The Theory of Operational Art and Unified Land Operations”
- JP 3-0, Ch 1, 2, 5A, 5B.
E102: The Campaign in America: 1776
- Fischer, Washington’s Crossing
E103: Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
- Epstein, Napoleon’s Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War
- Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon
E104: Mexico City, 1847
- Johnson, A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign
- Scott, “Vera Cruz and Its Castle”
E105: Moltke & Franco-Prussian War
- Wawro, Franco-Prussian War: German Conquest of France in 1870-1871
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of
operational art.
•
•
•
•
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
•
•
•
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
OBJECTIVES
• Understand Op’l Art and Op’l Level today and since Clausewitz
• Revisit Clausewitz’s: classical strategy, campaigns, theaters of
operations, marches, supply, terrain, lines of operation and
communication, offense, defense, and culminating point.
• Use Clausewitz and contemporaries to set theoretical
foundation for campaign analyses throughout EOA.
• Practice campaign evaluation methods: MC, Elements of Op
Art
• British operations in 1776 are the standard for understanding
campaign art at end of 18c, prior to Napoleonic warfare:
included ground and naval components, a mix of regular and
guerilla forces, and coalition warfare on both sides.
• For our classical theorists, Jomini and Clausewitz, Napoleon’s
wars were never far from their minds. The 1806 war between
France and Prussia, a classic example of large-unit operations
in a conventional environment.
• Scott’s campaign demonstrated joint aspects, logistics and
intelligence, and synchronized conventional and pacification
operations.
• Battle of Königgrätz (1866): best example of military
commander and politician terminated a conflict and restored
the political dialogue. Franco-Prussian War (1870-1): German
military victory did not immediately translate to political
victory. A stubborn defense, an uprising in Paris, a hybrid war
in the countryside nearly broke up Bismarck’s coalition.
SCOA
EOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
EOA
•
•
•
•
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian
War
•
•
•
FOA
TOA
Doctrine and Theory after
Civil War
Philippines, 1899-1902
Meuse-Argonne 1918
•
•
•
•
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/
GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
E106: Doctrine and Theory after Civil War
- John Bigelow, Principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American
Campaigns
- Arthur L. Wagner, Strategy: Lecture by Col Arthur L. Wagner, Asst AdjtGeneral, U.S.A., to Officers of Regular Army and National Guard at
Maneuvers at West Point, Ky., and at Fort Riley, Kansas, 1903
- Matthew F. Steele, “The Conduct of War,”
E107: Philippines, 1899-1902
- Ramsey, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in
Philippines, 1900-02
- Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in Philippine War, 1899-1902
E108: Meuse-Argonne 1918
- American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and
Battlefields in Europe, 1992
- Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918
•
•
•
•
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
•
•
•
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
OBJECTIVES
• Late 19c American theorists studied Civil War and other
American wars, Napoleonic Wars, and German Wars of
Unification. Understand their perceptions of operational
dilemmas.
• American intervention in Philippines, beginning with end of
conventional fight with insurrectionists and continuing through
declared end of insurrection in 1902. Explore Op art in a
counterinsurgency or counter guerrilla war
• WWI, US suffered at Cantigny. After several months of
supporting operations and smaller offensives, Pershing
assaulted Metz and German frontier at end of Sep1918.
Meuse-Argonne was largest campaign in American military
history. This lesson investigates this operation's design.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of
operational art.
SCOA
EOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
EOA
•
•
•
•
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian
War
•
•
•
Doctrine and Theory after
Civil War
Philippines, 1899-1902
Meuse-Argonne 1918
•
•
•
•
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/
GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
E109: Interwar Operational Art
- Matheny, Carrying War to Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945
E110: NW Europe: OVERLORD
- Pogue, The European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command
- D’Este, Decision in Normandy
E111: NW Europe: COBRA/ GOODWOOD
- Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,
- D’Este, Decision in Normandy
E112: Eastern Front, 1944
- Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped
Hitler
- Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
Terminal Learning Objective (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of
operational art.
FOA
TOA
TOA
•
•
•
•
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
•
•
•
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
OBJECTIVES
• The origins, building blocks, and thought processes behind
American doctrine, education, and planning in interwar
period, and how that led to American concept and
understanding of op’l art.
• 1. How allies understood problem, visualized end state, and
described it to subordinates. 2. German plan to defeat Allied
invasion: High Command’s vision of how to defend western
coast and how subordinates implemented vision.
• Branches and sequels: when successful, not successful, or
enemy surprise? E.g., Commonwealth unable to capture Caen
b/c German defenders dominate terrain. American advance
delayed b/c Wehrmacht infantry and armor master defense in
bocage. German perspective, defense continued despite Allied
aircraft dominating airspace b/c reinforcements continued to
arrive. Unable to destroy Allies on beach, limit Allied advance
to narrow enclave. As V1 and V2 rockets attack England, jet
aircraft and better tanks enter battle, still hope that Allied
invasion would progress no farther. Focus on what happened,
and what should have happened.
• Soviet operations in spring/summer 1944. German Army
effectively shattered and only capable of conducting op’l
delay. How did that happen? What was Soviet operational art?
Understand specific campaign, nature of Soviet op’l art, and its
influence on development of U. S. Army doctrine in the 1980s.
SCOA
EOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
EOA
•
•
•
•
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian
War
•
•
•
Doctrine and Theory after
Civil War
Philippines, 1899-1902
Meuse-Argonne 1918
•
•
•
•
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/
GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
E113: Philippines, 1945 I
- Smith, Triumph in the Philippines – U.S. Army in World War II
- Sixth U.S. Army, “Report of Luzon Campaign”
- Reports of General MacArthur: Campaigns of MacArthur in Pacific
E114: Philippines, 1945 II
- Smith, Triumph in the Philippines – U.S. Army in World War II
- Sixth U.S. Army, “Report of Luzon Campaign”
- Reports of General MacArthur: Campaigns of MacArthur in Pacific
E115: Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
- Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North
E116: Vietnam Escalation
- Cosmas, MACV : Joint Command in Years of Escalation, 1962-1967
E117: Cambodia, 1970
- Shaw, Cambodian Campaign: 1970 Offensive & America’s Vietnam War
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of Op Art.
FOA
TOA
•
•
•
•
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
•
•
•
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
OBJECTIVES
• Discuss strategic setting, command structure at national and
theater level, resource allocation, and course of Philippines
campaign to end of 1944. Prepare a single, integrated and
synchronized, joint (SAL) op’l approach for lodgment on Luzon.
• Discuss follow-on op’ns to Luzon landings. Address a review of
op’ns, any potential or real points of departure from plans,
decision-making that went into (or should have gone into)
those departures, ease or difficulty in deviating from plans in
general, and role of strategy in op’l reframing.
• Understand relationship between policy, strategy, and
operations: What guidance did Pres Truman and UN Security
Council give to MacArthur? How did MacArthur, as an
operational commander, coordinate forces under his
direction? How did he anticipate and respond after Chinese
intervention? How did 8th Army conduct this period of war?
• Explore escalation in Vietnam to see intersections of strategy
and operations in a conflict with simultaneous conventional
and COIN elements.
• Balance b/t COIN and conventional ops, changing strategic
guidance, Vietnamization, and evolving (or devolving)
American forces in Vietnam. How did commanders arrange
tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to pursue strategic
objective in 1970?
SCOA
EOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
EOA
•
•
•
•
Campaign in America, 1776
Napoleon’s 1806 Campaign
Mexico City, 1847
Moltke & Franco-Prussian
War
•
•
•
Doctrine and Theory after
Civil War
Philippines, 1899-1902
Meuse-Argonne 1918
•
•
•
•
Interwar Operational Art
NW Europe: OVERLORD
NW Europe: COBRA/
GOODWOOD
Eastern Front, 1944
E118: 1973 Arab Israeli War
- Gawrych, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory
- Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991
E119: AirLand Battle
- FM 100-5 (1976)
- FM 100-5 (1983)
- Bronfeld, “Did TRADOC Outmanoeuvre the Manoeuvrists? A Comment,”
E120: Nixon’s War
- Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam
Lost Its War
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Assess development of theory and doctrine of operational art.
• Analyze planning & execution of historical campaigns and opns.
• Examine historical changes & continuities in American Op Art.
• Apply operational art to historical scenarios.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate the historical and contemporary practice of Op Art.
FOA
TOA
•
•
•
•
Philippines, 1945 I & II
Korea (Oct50-Mar51)
Vietnam Escalation
Cambodia, 1970
•
•
•
1973 Arab Israeli War
AirLand Battle
Nixon’s War
OBJECTIVES
• This conflict ended hostilities along Egyptian-Israeli Border,
and cemented gains along Israel-Jordan border, Israel has
been involved in almost constant conflict with several
Palestinian nationalist organizations. Victory did not bring
lasting peace. Conduct and outcome of conflict largely
depended on client state’s relationship with sponsoring
superpower, US and USSR, and other interested parties, such
as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Lesson examines op’l approach of
three main participants in a war that influenced America
military development and Op Art in last decades of 20c.
• US Army engaged in deep reflection on where it stood in
world. Result was formal introduction of operational level of
war and Op Art into Army thinking and doctrine. Lesson
revisits major doctrinal publications of post-Vietnam era to
discuss complex intersections of history, theory, institutional
culture, strategic context, and doctrine.
• Discuss operational problems attendant to ending wars, and
what lessons of past say about conflicts of present and future.
SCOA
EOA
FOA
TOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
SCOA
•
•
•
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy:
The Founders
•
•
•
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
•
•
•
•
S101: From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
- Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Spec Ops as Instrument of US Foreign Policy
- Cogan, “Desert One and Its Disorders,”
- Roman and Tarr, “Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness”
- MacKubin Owens, “Hollow Promise of JCS Reform,”
S102: US Policy Process
- McDougall, Const’l History of U.S. Foreign Policy: 222 Years of Tension in
Twilight Zone
- Federalist Papers
- No.10: “Union as Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and
Insurrection”
- No.15: “Insufficiency of Present Confederation to Preserve the Union”
- No.24: “Powers Necessary to Common Defense Further Considered”
- No. 51: “Structure of Government Must Furnish Proper Checks and
Balances between Different Departments”
- No.69: “Real Character of Executive”
- JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (2011), Chapter II, Section A
- Hammond, “Development of Nat’l Strategy in Executive Branch: Overcoming
Disincentives”
- Lord, “Crisis Management: A Primer”
S103: US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy: The Founders
- Herring, From Colony to Superpower
- Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: Economic Foundations
of Military Power”
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
•
•
•
•
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
OBJECTIVES
• Explore dynamics of Op EAGLE CLAW and its reverberations in
years that followed. This period help us understand worldview
of men and women who served since that time.
• McDougall surveys executive & legislative tension over
foreign policy. Does JP 5-0 reflect an idealized process or not?
Hammond & Lord discuss how executive develops policy and
strategy.
• Understand US foreign policy tradition and American practice
of political economy in early Republic. Provides background for
subsequent discussion of IR theory and tendency to lump
American statesmen into camp of realists versus idealists.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Analyze impact on Op Art of:
• Past/present American statecraft
• Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships
• Analyze strategy and strategic culture
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art
SCOA
EOA
FOA
TOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
SCOA
•
•
•
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy:
The Founders
•
•
•
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
•
•
•
•
S104: Perspectives on IR Theory
- Thucydides, “Melian Dialogue,”
- Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,”
- Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,”
- Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and rebuilding Order
after Major Wars
- Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: Introduction to Strategic History
S105: Alliances and Institutions
- Walt, “Alliance Formation and Balance of World Power,”
- Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and Rebuilding of Order
after Major Wars
- (Theory)
- Lake, “Beyond Anarchy: Importance of Security Institutions”
- Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World”
- (European Practice)
- DeVore, “Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and British and
French Responses to 1991 Gulf War”
- Techau, “No Strategy, Please, We’re German—Eight Elements that Shaped
German Strategic Culture”
- (Asian Practice):
- Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia”
- Nam, “Relocating US Forces in South Korea: Strained Alliance, Emerging
Partnership in Changing Defense Posture”
S106: IR: Special Topics
- Brodie, “Anatomy of Deterrence”
- Schelling, Arms and Influence
- Freedman, Deterrence
- Kroenig and Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism”
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
•
•
•
•
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
OBJECTIVES
• Background on alliances, deterrence, and state power in int’l
arena. Understand realist, liberal int’list, and constructivist
schools. Proto-realist Thucydides “coercive diplomacy.” Snyder:
overview. Jervis, Gray, and Ikenberry provide extra depth.
• Alliance theory and perspectives of trad’l allies. After WWII,
Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Asst, NATO, Aus-NZ-US, and
bilateral alliances in Asia. NSS 2010: “Start point for collective
action will be with other countries” based on relationship b/t US
and close friends/allies in Europe, Asia, Americas, Middle East”
• Deterrence and compellence: Brodie and Schelling are classics.
Freedman: Cold War strategy about nuclear weapons and
deterrence, critiques contemporary concepts. Kroenig and Pavel
discuss approach to deterrence of terrorism. Deterrence
supplanted strategy in national security. NMS 2011 discusses
deterring terrorism and nuclear weapons: “preventing war as
important as winning, so deterring nuclear attack on US,
allies/partners is role of US nuclear weapons.” “Adapt deterrence
to countering extremists: difficult, but they make cost/benefit
calculations and depend on states and others we can influence.”
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Analyze impact on Op Art of:
• Past/present American statecraft
• Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships
• Analyze strategy and strategic culture
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art
SCOA
EOA
FOA
TOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
SCOA
•
•
•
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy:
The Founders
•
•
•
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
•
•
•
•
S107: Pol-Economy: Cold War
- Gray, War, Peace and International Relations
- Truman:
- NSC 68
- Gaddis and Nitze, “NSC 68 and Soviet Threat Reconsidered”
- Fatua, ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, Korean War &Creation of Cold War Army
- Eisenhower
- NSC 162/2
- Metz, Eisenhower as Strategist: Coherent Use of Military Power in War
and Peace
- Bacevich, “Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and
Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-55”
S108: US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
- Herring, From Colony to Superpower
- Leffler, “9/11 and Past and Future of American Foreign Policy
- Obama: "Address Accepting Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway“
- Lizza, “Consequentialist: How Arab Spring remade Obama’s Foreign Policy
S109: Pol-Economy: Base Force
- Jaffe, Development of Base Force 1989-92
- Rothmann, “Forging New National Military Strategy in Post-Cold War World:
Perspective from Joint Staff”
- Brown, Kevlar Legions: Transformation of US Army, 1989-2005
S110: Post-Gulf War Army
- Brown, Kevlar Legions: Transformation of US Army, 1989-2005
- JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations
- Angstrom and Widen, “Adopting a Recipe for Success: Modern Armed Forces and
Institutionalization of Principles of War,”
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
•
•
•
•
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
OBJECTIVES
• Understand intersection b/t political economy & nat’l strategic
guidance (SCOA 9 &13). Two appreciations of political economy
(“grand strategy”) in Cold War. After WWII, Truman demobilized
and converted US industry for domestic needs thru balanced
budget & reduced defense budgets. After Korean War, Truman’s
NSC 68 rapidly mobilized based on Keynsian economics. Ike’s NSC
162 focused US defense on “long haul” Cold War with USSR.
• Establish broad context for discussions of political economy,
military affairs, smart power, and strategic culture.
• By late 80s, Carter/Reagan military buildup contributed to budget
deficits. End of Cold War, Bush reduced military expenditure b/c
1989/91 and not sustainable. CJCS Powell’s Base Force for postCold War (political economy and strategy). Jaffe: Powell‘s
attempt to shape future defense. Rothmann: J5 formulation of
NMS 1992 to complement Powell’s Base Force. Kevlar Legions:
how US Army coped with Cold War end.
• Understand how inst’l Army adapted to ‘90s financial and op’l
demands. Includes first iteration of JP 3-0 and history of
principles of war to better understand current doctrinal debates.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Analyze impact on Op Art of:
• Past/present American statecraft
• Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships
• Analyze strategy and strategic culture
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art
SCOA
EOA
FOA
TOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
SCOA
•
•
•
From Desert 1 to Defense Reform
US Policy Process
US Foreign Policy and Pol-Economy:
The Founders
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Perspectives on IR Theory
Alliances and Institutions
IR: Special Topics
S111: StratComs vs. Smart Power
- Armitage and Nye, Jr., CSIS Commission on Smart Power
- Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of
Policy in 21st Century
S112: Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
- Strachan, “Lost Meaning of Strategy”
- Mackubin Owens, “Strategy and Strategic Way of Thinking”
- Petraeus, “Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam”
- McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned”
- Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Decade of War, v.I: Enduring Lessons
from Past Decade of Operations
S113: Contemporary Strat Guidance
- JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning
- Kugler, New Directions in US National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and
Diplomacy: Review of Official Strategic Document
- Panetta, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense
- Dempsey’s Address at Duke University
S114: Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
- Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: Introduction to Strategic History
- Freedman, “Escalators and Quagmires: Expectations and Use of Force”
- Lake, “Limits of Coercive Airpower”
- Strachan, “Strategy and Limitation of War”
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Analyze impact on Op Art of:
• Past/present American statecraft
• Examine DIME, Int’l Order & Security relationships
• Analyze strategy and strategic culture
Pol-Economy: Cold War
US Foreign Policy: Reagan to Obama
Pol-Economy: Base Force
Post-Gulf War Army
•
•
•
•
StratComs vs. Smart Power
Strat Thinking and Lesson Learning
Contemporary Strat Guidance
Ltd War and Utility of Force in 21c
OBJECTIVES
• Juxtapose smart power and hard power. Use of ideas and
information as power. Lesson builds on “power” (SCOA 4/5). 21c
nature of power & use of force (SCOA 14).
• Understand lesson learning, strategy and strategic theory.
Mahan: Art of War rests on a few principles and application to
history… when principles and precedents mastered, student is
ready to begin. After WWII, FM 100-5 included Pearl Harbor
lessons; after ‘54, lessons dropped. SCOA 1: lessons of Ops EAGLE
CLAW and URGENT FURY on ‘80s Defense Reform. SCOA 11:
principles of war—ultimate lessons learned. Currently, Afghan
and Iraq lessons. Do we learn lessons? Who learns lessons,
people or institutions? How are right lessons determined? Are we
at beginning of our labors? Strachan & Owens provide
perspective on current understanding of strategy; subsequent
readings ask which lessons should be learned for future strategy.
• Builds on SCOA 2, US policy process and development of strategy
within executive branch and SCOA 7, 9, and 12 on political
economy and strategic thinking. Basis for FOA strategic guidance .
Does everything work as JP 5-0 process charts suggest? How do
we understand strategy in 21c?
• Brodie believed atomic-bomb/tech-revolution threatened to
make war unlimited and absolute. Gen Smith believed West
accepts limits on warfare. Consider utility of force as a member of
profession of arms and Op’l Artist.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Evaluate strategic context for contemporary operational art
SCOA
EOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
MDW
•
Justice of War and Justice in •
War
FOA
TOA
Justice in War: Civilians on
the Battlefield
•
Justice in War: Commander’s •
Moral Dilemmas
M101: Justice of War and Justice in War
- Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration
- McCreedy, “Ending the War Right: Just Post Bellum and Just War Tradition”
M102: Justice in War: Civilians on Battlefield
- Walzer, Just and Unjust War: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration
M103: Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas
- Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: History and Moral Legacy of WWII Bombing
Campaign of Civilians in Germany and Japan
- Morris, Fog of War: Robert S. McNamara, Whole New Story
M104: Justice in War: Emerging Technologies
- Arkin, “Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems”
- Tonkens, “Case Against Robotic Warfare: Response to Arkin”
- Strawser, “Moral Predators: Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles”
- Galliott, “Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles and Asymmetry Objection: Response to
Strawser”
- Dipert, “Ethics of Cyberwarfare”
- Cook, “‘Cyberation’ and Just War Doctrine: Response to Dipert”
M105: Justice in War: PoWs and Detainees
- Gillman and Johnson, Operational Law Handbook
- DiMeglio, Law of Armed Conflict Desk Book
- Gillman and Johnson, Law of Armed Conflict Supplemental
- Sadat, “Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under
International Law”
Justice in War: Emerging
Technologies
•
Justice in War: PoWs and
Detainees
OBJECTIVES
• Evaluate moral constraints and moral implications of op’l actions
in war using theory and history to evaluate moral dilemmas in
war. Three theories: justice of war -in war; and -in peace.
• Analyze moral arguments for justice of war and justice after war;
explain moral justification for war.
• Analyze moral dilemmas posed by presence of civilians in war
• Analyze moral arguments of British and Americans for
firebombing German and Japanese cities in WWII; explain moral
dilemmas faced by commanders in war.
• Analyze moral arguments for and against using autonomously
manned systems in war; explain moral dilemmas faced by
commanders in war.
• Analyze moral and legal arguments re PoW and detainee rights;
explain moral dilemmas faced by commanders in war.
ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES
• Analyze moral dilemmas re
• “justice of war” and “justice after war”
• posed by presence of COBs (justice in war)
• faced by commanders in war (justice in war)
• emerging technology presents in war (justice in war)
• PoWs and detainees on battlefield (justice in war)
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE (TLO)
Judge the moral implications of operational actions in war.
SCOA
EOA
DOA
Doctrine
MDW
DOA
•
Intro to ADM I-III
•
FOA
TOA
Understand Op Env I-III
•
Understand Op Problem I-IV •
D401: Intro to ADM
- ADRP 5-0. Ch 2. Pay particular attention to Value of Planning (p2-1) & ADM (p2-4)
- TRADOC Pam 525-5-500 CDR’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, Ch 1 & 2
- Gregor, William. “Military Planning Systems and Stability Operations”
- Evans, “Centre of Gravity Analysis in Joint Military Planning and Design:
Implications and Recommendations for the Australian Defense Force”
- Adamson, An Asymmetric Threat Invokes Strategic Leader Initiative: The Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.
D402: Intro to ADM
- Swain, “Commander’s Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design.” Op
design is commanders business and all successful commanders practice it.
- Schoen, Educating the Reflective Practitioner. Ch 2, 4, 5, 7. Modern world needs
reflective practice; difference in educating applied practitioners and theoretical
scientists; pay attention to reflection in action and reflection on action.
- Lawson, How Designers Think. Ch 1, 6, 7. Design in architecture. Model of design
problems in ch6.
D103: Justice in War: Commander’s Moral Dilemmas
- Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: History and Moral Legacy of WWII Bombing
Campaign of Civilians in Germany and Japan.
- Morris, Fog of War: Robert S. McNamara, Whole New Story.
D104: Intro to ADM
-
Develop Op Approach I-III
•
Practice ADM I-IV
OBJECTIVES
• Explain: doctrinal explanation of ADM and relationship to military
planning; ADM development; and ADM key components.
• Describe purpose, use and audience of ADM and MDMP; what is
narrative construction and its purpose; is a Frame the same as a
theory; explain reframing and provide historical example
• Purpose of commander’s appreciation and campaign design;
what are products; explain how complexity, complex adaptive
systems, and ill-structured problems are important to Cdrs;
explain how discourse, narrative, and systemic understanding
support commander’s appreciation; understanding of problem
frame; how does commander’s appreciation link to detail
planning?
• What are benefits and limitations of various approaches
discussed by Gregor? Importance of formal methods of analysis;
importance of evidence; Difference and purposes of inductive
and deductive approaches?
• Describe Swain’s definitions of design and planning, why do op’l
design, describe his design methodology, why lead design, and
what are links b/t Op Art and design?
• Schoen, explain: reflection in action; reflection on action;
importance of reflective practitioner; why design before knowing
what to do; importance of dialogue between coach and student?
• Lawson, explain: design is noun & verb; drawing is important to
design; purpose for & military equivalent of presentation-,
production- & design-drawings; how model of design problems
helps mil-planners think about op’l environment; how milplanners use design problems, solutions, and process?