Political Dynamics in the New European Union

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Transcript Political Dynamics in the New European Union

Political Dynamics in the
European Union
Factors driving political dynamics
The political dynamics of the EU are in constant
evolution. Factors driving the evolution include:
Treaty changes
Enlargements
Unfolding policy responsibilities
Pressures from the institutions
Evolving attitudes towards the institutions
Examining the changing nature of
EU political dynamics
The dynamics will be examined here under four
headings:
The roles and influence of the EU’s institutions
Inter-state relations
The role of ideology
Provision of leadership
The roles and influence of the
EU institutions
Key Questions
As we proceed, students are encouraged to be
thinking about the roles and influence of the EU’s
main institutions. Key questions include:
Has there been a decline in the pioneering role of the
Commission and an increase in its managerial
roles?
Have the agenda-setting and decision-making roles
of the European Council increased, and if so why?
Has the perceived increase in the decision-making
role of the European Parliament been exaggerated?
The roles and influence of the EU
institutions
1: The Commission
Functions
Initiator and proposer (especially in pillar one).
Executive functions: a few are direct (notably
competition), but most involve overseeing national
agencies.
Guardian of the legal framework.
Mediating and brokerage functions.
1: The Commission –
the academic debate
There is an extensive academic debate regarding
the extent to which the Commission undertakes
its leadership and other roles in an independent
manner. Broadly speaking, there are two ‘polar’
views, with variations stretched out in between:
The ‘intergovernmentalist’ view (Moravcsik, Magnette):
the Commission is essentially an ‘agent’.
The ‘supranationalist’ view (Beach, Schmidt, Sandholtz
and Stone Sweet, Pollack): the ‘agent’ is not controlled
completely by its ‘principal’; the focus should be on
decision-making and not just on decision taking.
1: The Commission –
the ‘supranationalist’ case
Those who argue the Commission exercises
considerable independent influence point to:
- its many power resources;
- its many functions.
They suggest practice shows it be a central
player not only in ‘routine’ decision-making but
also in respect of such major EU initiatives as:
• Enlargement
• The SEM programme
• The Lisbon Process
1: The Commission – the
‘supranationalist’ case
Case studies by those who take a ‘supranational’
perspective show that the Commission’s
potential for influential and independent action is
normally greatest when:
- it has strong and clear powers
- QMV applies in the Council
- control mechanisms are weak
- there is uncertainty of information amongst the
member states
- there is the possibility of exploiting differences
between member states
1: The Commission – ‘Evidence’ of and
reasons for its alleged decline
- The ‘pioneering’ days are arguably over.
- The increasing influence of other institutions, notably the European
Council and the European Parliament.
- Loss of status: the 1999 crisis, internal divisions, the 2004 EP
‘hearings’.
- Concerns that as the College has become larger then so has it
become less cohesive and less efficient.
- It has suffered some ‘defeats’ and failures in recent years.
- The growing importance of ‘non Community’ policy areas and of
new modes of governance.
2: The Council of Ministers –
Functions
Used to be the legislature of the EU; now shares
this function with the EP.
Takes most of the EU’s ‘governmental’ policy
decisions:
- Commission proposals for legislation
- CFSP common positions or actions
- Noting progress reports
- Requests to the Commission for information
Prepares ground for European Councils.
2: The Council of Ministers –
Operational Problems
The central difficulty arises, of course, from the diversity of the
needs and preferences of Council participants.
The diversity means there are particular difficulties when:
unanimity still applies; a state expresses a strong national
interest.
But QMV is now used in about 40% of the cases where it is
available.
Meetings are now so large as to sometimes make ‘real’
negotiations almost impossible.
The rotating presidency
2: The Council of Ministers –
Questions for Consideration
Has the Council declined in importance?
Can it be viewed as still being primarily
intergovernmental?
Have recent (Seville) reforms arrested its alleged
inefficiency?
Is there a lack of transparency and legitimacy?
3: The European Council –
Functions
Most major (‘history making’) decisions are
‘made’ at summits.
Some contentious matters are ‘referred up’.
Helps to provide strategic direction.
A forum for exchanging ideas at the highest
political level.
3: The European Council –
Operational Problems
There are many weaknesses in the European
Council’s decision-making capacity:
As with the Council, the diversity of interests and
preferences, but these are often ‘elevated’ at summits
Agendas often are too weighty
Infrequency and short duration of meetings
Unanimity remains the prevailing decision-making rule.
3: The European Council –
Questions for Consideration
Is it a decision-maker, or an approver of
decisions made elsewhere?
Has it strengthened the intergovernmental
nature of the EU?
Is the ‘media circus’ aspect of summits
helpful to the formation of a European
identity and polity?
4: The European Parliament –
Functions
Legislator
It co-legislates with the Council on most legislative proposals.
Scrutiniser of the executive
It operates in various ways, ranging from the power to approve and
dismiss the College to establishing investigatory committees.
Budgetary authority
It is the co-budgetary authority, but its powers are circumscribed by:
- it is largely excluded from deliberations on the multi-annual
financial perspectives;
- it can do little about ‘obligatory’ expenditure.
4: The European Parliament –
Operational Difficulties
It is by far the largest legislature in the democratic
world, with 732 members.
The lack of a ‘government’ is fundamental to the ways
in which the EU is organised and conducts its
business.
Language is a real problem: there are now 20 official
EU languages (380 possible combinations).
The multi-site problem.
4: The European Parliament –
Influence: where it has increased
EU influence has clearly grown over the
years especially in regard to:
the Commission
the content of legislation. (The former
Commission-Council tandem has been
replaced by an institutional triangle, which
operates via both formal and informal
channels.)
4: The European Parliament –
Influence: over legislation
Most non administrative legislation is now subject to co-decision (it
was scheduled to become ‘the ordinary legislative procedure’ under
the Constitutional Treaty).
Co-decision can be cumbersome, which has encouraged the
institutions to agree much legislation at first and second readings:
only about 15% goes to a conciliation committee – and in these
committees over 80% of second reading EP amendments are either
accepted or are adopted in a form that is acceptable to the EP.
Only two legislative proposals were rejected by the EP in the 19992004 session.
Legislative wheels are being oiled by informal trialogues and even
conciliation meetings at first and second readings.
4: The European Parliament –
Influence: limitations
But, the EP exercises little influence over:
- ‘history making’ decisions – such as enlargements,
EMU, financial perspectives, or treaty reform;
- external policies;
- policy implementation (comitology disputes).
But then, what is the influence of national parliaments in
these areas?
4: The European Parliament –
Questions for Consideration
Should the EP be given more powers?
Should the EP share its powers with
national parliaments?
Is the EP necessarily the main channel for
addressing the ‘democratic deficit’?
Inter-state relations
1: the nature of alliances
Cleavages in the EU have been mostly cross-cutting
rather than cumulating. This has resulted in a
changing and flexible internal alliance system, which
has been important in promoting (relatively)
harmonious inter-state relations.
This pattern of cleavages and alliances – with states
coming together in different combinations on different
issues – is broadly continuing in the enlarged EU.
The new member states are not acting as a ‘bloc,
except partly on budgetary and spending matters.
Inter-state relations
2: key issues that divide states in
the EU
There are several divisive issues, some of which are
touch on different visions of the nature of the EU ‘project’.
These issues include:
How should decisions in the EU be made?
How liberal (non interventionist) should EU economic policies
be?
What should be the size of the EU’s budget?
Where should the spending priorities be?
How independent should EU foreign and defence policies be of
the Atlantic Alliance?
The importance of ideology: 1
The established view is that ideology is not as important at
the EU level as it is at the national level in shaping EU
policy-making, because of:
The supposedly ‘technical’ nature of many EU policies.
The requirement on the main proposer of policies – the Commission
– to act in a non partisan manner.
The emphasis on consensus that so characterises EU policy
processes.
The dispersal of power between institutions means there is not a
majority/minority cleavage between left and right..
The importance of ideology: 2
But, there is a contrary view:
Many policies are clearly highly ‘political’, and in any event what is
‘technical’ for one may be highly politicised for another.
The Commission usually has alternatives available when initiating
policies: it must choose.
Studies reveal a growing importance of ideology (as measured by
political group membership) in determining voting in the EP.
There have been periods when a near ’ideological’ majority has
existed across the policy-making institutions.
The importance of ideology: 3
One of these periods of a near majority existing across the
Council, the Commission, and the EP opened in late
2004. What are the policy implications of this?
- greater emphasis on liberalisation of key sectors,
such as financial services?
- greater prospects of real action to achieve the
Lisbon goals?
- less focus in the post-2006 financial perspective on
social re-distribution measures?
Leadership: 1
In states, there normally is a (reasonably) clear focus of political
leadership – provided by a combination of constitutional stipulations
and electoral outcomes.
In the EU, there is no such clear focus: leadership is dispersed and
is contested. There is no ‘government’ and no party political system
grouped into ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ camps.
The main potential sources of leadership are the Commission, the
European Council, the Council Presidency, and groups of member
states. All of these potential leadership sources have potential
power resources, including:
-
treaty powers
political status
information and expertise
political skills
Leadership: 2
These competing sources of leadership have resulted in
leadership within the EU shifting :
- Between types of leadership:
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To frame public discourse
To set policy agendas
To make policy proposals
To drive decision-making
- Over time
- Between issue areas
Leadership: 3
But, though leadership is dispersed, the argument that
the EU lacks leadership or driving-force would appear to
be undermined by the clear leadership that has been
offered on many important issues since the mid-1980s.
For example: the SEM (Commission and UK?); EMU
(France and Germany?); enlargement (Commission?);
ESDP (France and UK, plus the High Representative for
CFSP?); Lisbon Process (European Council and
Commission?).
But, does the EU of 25 plus, with its greater diversity and
with the declining force of the Franco-German axis, not
need stronger institutional leadership than has existed in
the past?
Leadership 4
The Constitutional Treaty’s ‘solution’
The Treaty’s provisions arguably made the existing
situation even worse. There would be four main
institutional sources of leadership:
- the European Council President
- The Presidency of the Council of Ministers
- The Commission President
- The Union Foreign Minister
This ‘solution’ clearly demonstrated the reluctance of (a
sufficient number) of member states to create strong
overall ‘supranational ‘ leadership in the EU.