Transcript ИНДИКАТОРИ НА УЯЗВИМОСТТА НА КРИТИЧНАТА

CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN
BULGARIAN SEA WATERS
as. prof. DS Кiril N. Коlev
аs. Syana B. Lutzkanova
Naval Academy “N. J. Vaptzarov”, Varna
INTRODUCTION
In Greek, the word “crisis” has both the meaning of “emergency”
and “judgment”.
Maritime Security and Maritime Safety are very much
interconnected and although the natural working context of
institution’ and corporation’ activities are both Maritime Security and
Maritime Safety Missions (Tasks) and subsequent their Maritime
Security Crisis Management and Maritime Safety (natural / manmade disaster, etc.) Crisis Maritime Safety Management.
Looking closely, at the definition of Maritime Security (or Safety) it
is easy to appreciate the complexity of such an activity where a
larger number of organizations, working processes and an
ambiguous legal framework are involved. In order to simplify,
Maritime Security (or Safety) is to be considered the combination of
Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) and Maritime Security
(or Safety – SAR, Oil Spill Cleaning, etc.) Operations (MSO).
Theory of MSA and MSO
Maritime Security and Maritime Safety implies information analysis
and action at sea, and both complement each other. Maritime
Security and Maritime Safety requires much more than just two
components but, as far as institution’ and corporation’ participation
in the overall Maritime Security (or Safety) system is concerned,
those are the two main ones to consider and that will require specific
doctrine.
This means that MSA and MSO work together to accomplish
Maritime Security (or Safety) but also that they are two independent
activities. MSA and MSO may be carried out by different authorities
that will in turn depend on a higher authority responsible
subsequently for Maritime Security (or Safety) as a whole. It also
means that they both need specific procedures and doctrine for their
execution.
Theory of MSA and MSO
MSA and MSO, besides being independent activities, ought to be very
closely related and the authority responsible for Maritime Security (or
Safety) must ensure the efficient coordination of both. MSA is related to
MSO because operations at sea must, in most cases, be based on the results
of the information analysis conducted in the maritime domain. MSA
triggers MSO. The information obtained during MSO (mostly Maritime
Surveillance / Monitoring) will be a very valuable input to MSA. MSO
feeds back MSA.
• MSO take place on a case by case, while MSA is a permanent activity
• MSO can be carried out as primary mission, or as secondary mission
• Maritime Security Operation (MSO) may be classified as Surveillance,
Reconnaissance “Scouting” and Maritime Interdiction Operations
(MIO)
• MSO can be carried agency/service alone, in co-operation with other
national agencies/services or in co-operation with other nations or
international organizations.
MARITIME SECURITY AND SAFETY
MARITIME SECURITY
MARITIME
MARITIME
SECURITY
SITUATIONAL
OPERATIONS (MSO)
AWARENESS
ACTION AT SEA
(MSA)
(Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, MIO,
PERMANENT
…)
TRIGGERS
EITHER AS
PRIMARY /
SECONDARY
FEED BACK
MISSION
CASE BY CASE
NAVAL,
INTERAGENCY,
INTERAGENCY OR
INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME SAFETY
MARITIME
MARITIME SAFETY
SITUATIONAL
OPERATIONS (MSO)
AWARENESS
ACTION AT SEA
(MSA)
(Monitoring, SAR
operation, Oil Spill
PERMANENT
Cleaning operation,
…)
TRIGGERS
EITHER AS
PRIMARY /
SECONDARY
FEED BACK
MISSION
CASE BY CASE
INTERAGENCY,
NAVAL,
INTERNATIONAL
INTERAGENCY
CRISIS SOURCES (BACKGROUND)

Border disputes - The disputed area between
Bulgaria and Romania is of seventeen kilometers
the Black Sea waters. The disputed area should be
settled as soon as possible to prevent it before
becoming a problem. The dispute has resurfaced
due to the recent discovery of significant gas
resources by Exxon Mobil and Petrom of the
Romanian coast. Romanian block Neptun
approximately contains 100 billion cubic metres of
natural gas, which may be surrounded by other
attractive areas. For instance, neighbouring
Bulgarian block Khan Asparuh
Continental Shelf & EEZ
Continental
Shelf
Exclusive
Economic Zone
200 nm (+)
200 nm
seabed and subsoil
seabed and subsoil
+ WATER COLUMN
ab initio and ipso facto
(inherent right – no need
for proclamation)
Needs to be proclaimed
for enforcement
most important differences are
Fisheries, Search and Rescue
(SAR) nation responsible zones
Role of Islands in CS/EEZ Delimitation
• Islands do not generate full maritime zones
when they are competing directly against
continental land areas.
• Median / Equidistance line is not applied.
(Islands received partial or no effect / are
enclaved or partially enclaved)
Example: Delimitation maritime CS/EEZ
boundary lines between Turkey, Cyprus and
Egypt.
MARITIME DELIMITATION BETWEEN
ROMANIA AND UKRAINE (Serpent Island)
Maritime boundary lines
Romania claim – RED LINE
Ukraine claim – BLUE LINE
Judgment of International Court of
Justice, 3 February 2009
Line between the claims of each country
EEZ 200 nm LIMIT CANNOT BE
UNILATERALLY APPLICABLE
140 nm
Five of the six Black Sea Coastal states have ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. After the dissolution of the USSR,
Georgia, The Russia Federation and Ukraine confirmed the validity the
USSR-Turkey maritime boundary delimitations. In 1997 Turkey and
Bulgaria agreed upon their boundary. Romania and Ukraine resolved a
long-stated dispute on the delimitation of the continental shelf and their
exclusive economic zones through the International Court of Justice in
2009. The boundaries between Romania and Bulgaria, Ukraine and
Russia, and Russia and Georgia are not agreed upon and are drawn on
the map as median or equidistant lines
CRISIS PRECONDITIONS
The 2008 Russia – Georgia War

Border disputes after armed conflict – Which is
jurisdiction of Abkhazia Black sea waters?
HOW TO ACHIEVE MARITIME DELIMITATION?
Bilateral
Agreement
ICJ or
Arbitration
should be on the basis of international law
 Should not infringe upon 3rd parties’ rights
(Provisional arrangements until final delimitation is also possible)

IF NO DELIMITATION IS ACHIEVED
OVERLAPPING & DISPUTED CLAIMS
Overlapping entitlements to maritime rights and jurisdiction
CRISIS PRECONDITIONS

Illegal activities (illegal fisheries, terrorist activity, organized
crime activity, drug trafficking, illegal migrants, arms traficking,
smuggling,) Illegal fishery case on 30 may 2011. The incident
occurred early Friday (30 may 2011) when the Turkish
flagged fishing boat, intentionally or not unintentionally
– crossed into Romania’s exclusive economic zone for
fishing purposes. The Romanian coast guard spotted
the boat and called on it to stop, but the instead took
evasive action. The pursuit continued for a few hours and ended when
the Romanian coast guard stopped the boat in the Bulgarian exclusive
economic zone. The crew of the fishing boat meanwhile
communicated with Turkish officials, saying their boat had been
seriously hit and was at risk to sinking. After the call reached Ankara,
the Turkish Foreign Ministry contacted Romanian authorities for
information, with the demand of protecting the security of the Turkish
fishermen. Romanian officials confirmed the incident and informed
Ankara that there had been no casualties.
DELIMITATION METHOD IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In state practice and in jurisprudence of
international courts pertaining to CS/EEZ
delimitation,
equidistance line is modified / adjusted by giving due
to a number of circumstances in order to produce an
equitable result.
Circumstances taken into account for
DELIMITATION
GEOGRAPHICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
 general configuration of the coasts,
 location of the coasts and their relationship (oppositeness and
adjacency)
 the length of the coastlines
 distance between the respective coasts
 the location of the land frontier/its direction towards seaward
extension
 the presence of islands and their size and positions
Circumstances taken into account for
DELIMITATION
NON-GEOGRAPHICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
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geological and geomorphological factors
fishing resources and history of fishing
environmental facts
navigational rights and interests
defense and security interests
economic circumstances
historical rights
Common mineral deposits and history of oil/gas development in
the area
CRISIS PRECONDITIONS
Illegal activities (illegal fisheries, terrorist activity, organized
crime activity, drug trafficking, illegal migrants, arms traficking,
smuggling,)
Terrorist Attack during Maritime Transport Ships at sea
are at risk becoming targets for a terrorist attack for several
reasons:
a)security countermeasures on board are usually limited to
high-pressure water hoses or high-powered sirens to ward off
potential attackers
b) the number of crew available for defense is rather low
c) external security support is only available with considerable
time delay, if at all.

CRISIS PRECONDITIONS
Coordinated
Terrorist
Attacks
on
Multiple
Development and Exploration Sites Oil or gas exploration
occurs usually in fields encompassing many individual
exploration sites, stretching over large distances in remote
areas. It is difficult to prevent intrusion from the outside, since
attackers can use speed-boats (e.g. Nigeria), 4 WD vehicles (e.g.
Saudi Arabia) or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Consequently
terrorists can carry out coordinated attacks on individual oil
and gas exploration sites within the field. The amount of
explosives required for such an attack is relatively small (e.g., it
has been shown that 5 kg THT for a single site is sufficient),
enabling one individual to carry several such devices at once
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE (OVERPRESSURE ISO-CURVES)
RESULTING FROM THE DETONATION OF A SHAPED CHARGE
(5kg TNT) ATTACHED TO A PIPELINE SECTION
The destruction of a pipeline resulting from the detonation of a
shaped charge: the pipeline is totally destroyed (red and yellow
contours).
LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A COORDINATED
ATTACK ON MULTIPLE OIL-/GAS EXPLORATION SITES
TERRORIST ACTION
LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS
1. Kidnapping/murder of employees
• >5 armed terrorist
•4WD vehicle
• apartment as hide-out
2.Suicide truck bomb/car bomb convoy against
drilling station
• > 2 terrorists
• Truck
• 4 WD vehicle
• 2500 kg ANFO
3. Destruction of pipeline and compressor station
• > 2 terrorists
• 4 WD vehicle
• Shaped charges
CRISIS PRECONDITIONS
Suicide Attack of an Offshore Platform Offshore
platforms are subject to increased protection as a part of the
national framework of critical infrastructure, i.e., the airspace
and the approach by sea is subject to continuous surveillance
and optional military intervention. However, as the terrorist
attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 demonstrated, even a
battle ship with enhanced technical and operational capabilities
to ward off an enemy attack has proven to be vulnerable to a
suicide boat attack.
OFFSHORE PLATFORMS AND FPSO (Example)
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE (OVERPRESSURE ISO-CURVES) TO AN
OFFSHORE PLATFORM RESULTING FROM A SUICIDE BOAT
ATTACK WITH 1,000 kg TNT ONBOARD
The damage to an offshore platform due to the attack with a boat
detonating 1,000 kg TNT upon impact at one of the columns carrying the
structure. The platform suffers extensive structural damage (red and
yellow overpressure iso-curves), rendering it inoperable.
LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUICIDE
TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST AN OFFSHORE PLATFORM
TERRORIST ACTION
LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS
1. Suicide attack with light general aviation (GA)
aircraft with explosive onboard
• 2 pilot terrorist
• > 400 kg of explosives
• chartered / diverted GA aircraft
2.Suicide attack with three high speed boats with
explosive onboard
• 3 chartered high speed boats
• 3 terrorists
• > 1000 kg explosives in each board
3. Covert underwater attack with divers and
explosives
• 5 specially trained terrorists
• 100 kg explosives (shaped charges)
• Mini-submarine or suicide torpedo
CRISIS PRECONDITIONS
Illegal immigrants The routes used for smuggling and trafficking people
to Europe are not exactly clandestine in nature; they can be mapped quite
well combining various types of materials available. These routes overlap,
in part, those used to smuggle drugs, cigarettes, and stolen cars.
Turkey is one of the main gateways to Europe for immigrants from Syria,
Iraq (especially Kurds), Iran, Afghanistan, and many other Asian countries,
including China. The smuggling routes go either overland to Bulgaria and
Greece, and from there to Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia, or directly by
sea to Greece. In Italy, the destination is more often than not the open
coast of Apulia in its southeastern corner. This area can be easily reached
by speed boats from the other side of the Adriatic Sea from which the
shortest distance is some 60 miles.
CRISIS PRECONDITIONS
Oil Spills There are 1000 offshore installations in the EU
(including Norway), and nearly half are in the UK. Most
offshore oil and gas installations in Europe are in UK,
Norway, the Netherlands and Italy. Denmark, Germany,
Ireland, Spain, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland have
fewer, and more are planned in Cyprus and Malta. (Photo V.
Dimitrov, Bulgarian maritime gas drilling installation)
THE MARITIME SECURITY/SAFETY
SPECTRUM
The international and interagency dimension of
Maritime Security/Safety is strategic in nature because of
the global effects of the existing risks and threats and the
enormous amount of security/safety activities that need to be
coordinated. The allied (NATO, EU) navies need to agree on a
common concept of use for naval assets, gather expertise and
develop specific capabilities to confront their responsibilities in
the field of Maritime Security/Safety.
THE MARITIME SECURITY/SAFETY SPECTRUM
Involvement
of navies
TRADITIONAL
NAVAL
WARFARE
STANDING
SECURITY
CONTROL
MEASURES (ISPS
Code, MARITIME
SURVEILLANCE)
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
OPERATIONS
AGAINST
ORGANISED CRIME
MARITIME
SECURITY
AGAINST
GLOBAL
THREATS
HIGH
INTENSITY
LOW
INTENSITY
Port Activity
Shipping, Trade, Energy Transport
Search and Rescue
Environmental Protection
Fisheries Inspection
Border Police
Illegal Immigration
Drug trafficking and smuggling
Piracy
International Terrorism
Proliferation of WMDs
Threat level
THE MARITIME SECURITY/SAFETY
SPECTRUM
There are a common relationship between navies’
involvement in Maritime Security/Safety missions and level
of the risks and threats; the higher the risks and threats the
more likely it is navies will be involved in maritime
security/safety missions. Therefore can establish three
basic levels:
 Standing Security Control Measures;
 Law Enforcement Operations against Organized crime
 Maritime Security against Global Threats
STANDING SECURITY CONTROL
MEASURES
In this regard, navies should consider :
 Orientating traditional surveillance missions into the field of
Maritime Security.
 Orientating the structure, procedures and systems of
existing Maritime Surveillance Centers to the management
of Maritime Situational Awareness.
 Developing, national legislation permitting, interagency cooperation agreements and mechanisms in order to enhance
the co-ordination of the different Maritime Security
activities.
 Actively co-operating with each other, from the
international perspective.
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME
This type of operation is normally under the responsibility of
Police Forces, Coast Guard or the like, especially inside
territorial waters. There are some consideration that should be
taken into account:
 A close relationship should be maintained between navies
and Law Enforcement Agencies, either to provide the
required support or at least to avoid interference by any
naval asset in the area of operations for other reasons.
 Consider the possibility and convenience of developing
interagency agreements for the execution of joint civil and
military Maritime Security Operations.
MARITIME SECURITY AGAINST
GLOBAL THREATS
The navies must prepare to act:
 Developing
Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO)
capabilities.
 Engaging with national legal and jurisdictional structures in
order to establish the appropriate links to enable such
operations to proceed as required.
 Actively participating in those international force created for
the enhancement and promotion of concepts and measures
related to the fight against this specific type of risk and
threat, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
POSSIBLE MARITIME SCENARIOS
FOR NAVAL FORCES
There are four types of Maritime Security Scenarios:
 Baseline Maritime Security.
 Pre-planned Maritime Security.
 Maritime Security in Support of Existing Security Strategies
 Maritime Security as part of Another Operation
Arrested group illegal immigrants (Joint Naval-Border Police Exercise SEEBREEZ)
PRE-PLANNED MARITIME SECURITY
MSO may take different forms. Depending on the desired end
state, they may range from simple reconnaissance, to marking
or shadowing up to MIO or neutralization of the threat. All
these different types of operations, triggered by MSA results,
are termed Pre-planned Maritime Security Operations. The first
two scenarios described above apply to regional and subregional theatres, whether national or international.
Boarding team in the action.
Bulgarian Navy exercise
MARITIME SECURITY IN SUPPORT OF
EXISTING SECURITY STRATEGIES
In this regard navies should consider activity to:
 Determine and analyze which scenarios are more vulnerable
from the Maritime Security point of view and more critical
to the national and international interests.
 Study and engage in possible international initiatives to apply
Maritime Security to such scenarios.
 Study and consider the scope and development of
appropriate Maritime Security capabilities to complement
those traditionally provided by naval forces.
 Be prepared to participate in Capacity Building initiatives as
a prerequisite to being able to extend Maritime Security.
MARITIME SECURITY AS PART OF
ANOTHER OPERATION
The following guidelines could be used by all navies:
 Fit all units (surface and air) with AIS receivers in order to
be able to create a local MSA picture, especially in those
areas where the required coastal infrastructures are not
available.
 Consider the possibility of liaison with theatre coastal
authorities in order to support the development of such
capabilities (MSA Capacity Building).
 Consider the particular Maritime Security requirements of
such deployments (systems, training, etc), not only during
the planning phase of the mission but also during the design
of future naval units (MIO personnel and material oriented
compartments, communication systems, etc).
FRONLINE IMPLICATIONS OF MSO
There are a number of areas inn which units can take action in
support of MSO:
 Planning.
 Posture at Sea.
 Action Required
 Understanding Maritime Law
 Capability
 Equipment and Training
Bulgarian oil spill
cleaning ships in the
action
CONCEPT OF INTEGRATED PHYSICAL
PROTECTION
Concept of Integrated Physical Protection on maritime assets
includes:
 State-of-the-Art technical and operational countermeasures,
enabling the management to reduce the probability of success of a
terror attack.
 Increased emphasis on Institutional and Corporate Security/ Safety
Culture
 Continuous Security and Safety Training at all levels of personnel.
 Regular Threat and Risk Assessment in order to identify, qualify and
quantify risks and countermeasures in a changing environment
 Evaluation and update of strategies and countermeasures based on
risk analyses by considering the cost-benefit factor
 Strengthen the co-operation with related government security/safety
agencies and first responders
OPERATIONAL SECURITY/SAFETY MEASURES

Technological developments: Build Multifunctional Maritime
Crisis Management Centre (of course in Naval Academy) with
integrated 3D-Vulnerability Assessment using advanced geographical
information systems and combining satellite monitoring data with
ground-based data sets; Real-time information exchange capability for
instant notification of rapid-response teams (counter-terrorist unit,
emergency medical care teams, fire-fighting brigade, oil spill cleaning
units, SAR units, border police mobile teams, etc.), deployment and redeployment UAV equipped with automatic weapons and unmanned
helicopters capable of image processing (monitoring maritime spaces
OPERATIONAL SECURITY/SAFETY MEASURES
•
Logistics: Shortening lead time between beginning of crisis event and
restoration; Maintaining adequate inventory of custom-made spare
parts; Strengthen physical protection at critical functions, based on 3D
Vulnerability Analysis; Enhanced physical access control (e.g. intelligent
smart cart-based systems); Secure data communication (e.g.
encryption); Progressively restricted access areas upon approaching high
value target areas (Onion skin principle); Enhanced GPS-3 or Galileobased positioning devices for vehicle fleet; Real-time vehicle monitoring
(vehicle movement data; vehicle tampering alert; open voice
communication between dispatchers, drivers and customers).
Bulgarian fire-fighting team in the action
OPERATIONAL SECURITY/SAFETY MEASURES
•
Training and Policy: Implementation of Industrial Corporate Security/
Safety Awareness Programs (ICSAP) to develop a security/safety culture
and policy; Security/Safety training for all personnel, security/safety
strategies for human resource management and administration; Insider
identification strategies and co-operation with First Responders (drills,
exercises and training); Contingency emergency planning, crisis and
disaster management on all levels; Global communication and marketing
of security/safety as a preventive tool; Social and humanitarian support
programs as preventive tools
Bulgarian SAR teams in the action
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN
BULGARIAN SEA WATERS
as. prof. DS Кiril N. Коlev
аs. Syana B. Lutzkanova
Naval Academy “N. J. Vaptzarov”, Varna