Transcript Maritime Strategic Context for AFRICOM With Particular

Maritime Strategic Context
for AFRICOM
With Particular Reference to the Gulf of Guinea
Briefing for the
Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR)
Systems Center, Charleston
25-26 October 2007
Dr. J. Peter Pham
Strategic Vision
“Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high
priority of this Administration. It is a place of promise and
opportunity, linked to the United States by history, culture,
commerce, and strategic significance. Our goal is an African
continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing
prosperity.”
—National Security Strategy
of the United States of America (2006)
“I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of
Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed
the Secretary of Defense to stand up U.S. Africa Command by the
end of fiscal year 2008. This new command will strengthen our
security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to
bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command
will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people
of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health,
education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.”
—President George W. Bush (February 6, 2007)
Geographical and Environmental
Context
Gulf of Guinea
U.S. Africa Squadron, 1842-1861
“The rights of our citizens
engaged in lawful commerce are
under the protection of our flag;
and it is the chief purpose as well
as the chief duty of our naval
power to see that these rights are
not
improperly
abridged
or
invaded…It is to be borne in
mind, that while the United
States
sincerely
desire
the
suppression of the slave trade,
and design to exert their power,
in
good
faith,
for
the
accomplishment of that object,
they do not regard the success of
their efforts as their paramount
interest.”
—Instructions to Captain Matthew
C. Perry from Secretary of the
Navy Abel P. Upshur
Economic Context


Low GDP: regional average is $1,500
per capita (PPP).
Hydrocarbon sector is significant
proportion of economy and source of
foreign exchange: 50-90 in Angola,
20-95 in Nigeria, 50-75 in Gabon.
Hydrocarbons
Top
West
African
producers by barrels of
oil per day:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Nigeria: 2.5 million
Angola: 902,000
Equatorial Guinea:
350,000
Gabon: 289,000
Congo: 235,000
Chad: 200,000
Cameroon: 67,000
Côte d’Ivoire: 33,000
U.S. Energy Security
millions of barrels per day of growth

Production in the Gulf of
Guinea will increase 40
percent by 2015.
3

2
Gulf of
Guinea
1
0
2005
2010
2015
The
region
already
provides approximately 55
percent of U.S. imports of
light, sweet crude, which is
easier
to
refine
for
domestic
consumption
than the high
sulfurcontent petroleum from
the
Middle
East
or
Venezuela.
Demographic Context
• African demographics creates
breeding ground for extremists
• “Youth bulge” – 40% of population
is less than 15 years old
• Systemic corruption prevents
equitable distribution of resources
• Two choices for growing
population:
• Stay in Africa with little hope;
terrorism and criminal activity
perpetuates and aggravates
instability
• Immigration (legal and illegal)
upsets European Muslim ratio;
promotes Islamic extremism
African Demographics
and Corruption
• Uganda: highest percentage
of youth bulge at 51% under
age 15
• Nigeria currently 9th most
populous country (132 million)
will be 8th most populous in
2015 (163 million)
• Transparency International:
Half of the 20 most corrupt
countries in the world are in
Africa
Religious Context
Political Context
Multilateral Organizations in the Region
United Nations (UN) and
Africa Union (AU) members
Maritime Organization for
West and Central Africa
(MOWCA)
Economic Community of
West African States
(ECOWAS)
Economic Community of
Central African States
(ECCAS)
Southern African
Development Community
(SADC)
Political Context




Weak governance capacity
afflicts most nation-states
in the region.
Democratization
efforts
have been uneven.
Living standards have been
in relative decline.
Religious divisions have
accentuated ethnic and
economic
factors
as
conflict motivators.
“Tipping Points”
Migration
Minimally
governed areas
Extremist
inroads
Piracy and
Theft
Piracy and
Theft
Wars and serious
conflicts since 1994
Niger Delta Region
MEND
Bakassi Peninsula
Liberian Civil Wars
Congo War (DROC)
(1989-2003)
1996-2003
Nigerian-led regional
intervention (ECOMOG)
Recent Coup Attempts
São Tomé and Príncipe
(2003)
Equatorial Guinea (2004)
Democratic Republic of the
Congo (2004)
Togo (2005)
Angola Civil War
(1974-2002)
Military Context



Focus has been predominantly on
army and internal security services.
Overall maritime capability is poor,
even by developing world standards:
small,
undermanned,
poorly
equipped, inadequately trained naval
components are largely inoperable.
Most countries are unable to cope
with piracy, criminal enterprises, and
poaching, much less with terrorism.
Liberia



Coastline: 579 km
No personnel since
2003
4 inoperable craft
Ghana

Coastline: 539 km

1000 personnel

4 patrol craft

2 patrol aircraft
Togo

Coastline: 56 km

200 personnel

2 patrol craft
Benin

Coastline: 121 km

200 personnel

5 patrol craft
Nigeria

Coastline: 853 km

6700 personnel

1
frigate,
1
corvette, 6 missile
boats, 5 maritime
patrol
craft,
2
aircraft, 17 coastal
patrol craft, and 50
riverine patrol craft
Cameroon

Coastline: 402 km

1300 personnel

10 riverine patrol
craft, 6 harbor
patrol craft, 3
maritime patrol
craft
Equatorial Guinea

Coastline: 296 km

No personnel

No craft
São Tomé and Príncipe

Coastline: 209 km
(142,563 km2 EEZ)

50 personnel

2 inflatable craft
Gabon

Coastline: 885 km

600 personnel

3 coastal patrol
craft, 1 maritime
patrol craft
Congo (Brazzaville)

Coastline: 169 km

800 personnel

12 riverine patrol
craft
Democratic Republic of Congo

Coastline: 37 km

1300 personnel

5 patrol craft
Angola

Coastline: 1600 km

2200 personnel

16 coastal patrol
craft, 5 landing
craft, 5 aircraft, 5
helicopters,
11
harbor craft
Gulf of Guinea Maritime Traffic

Regionally: 40 ship departures per
day, 280 per week.
• Tankers: 11 per day, 76 per week
• General cargo ships: 8 per day, 56 per
week
• Container ships: 7 per day, 51 per week

Nigeria is most significant source of
merchant traffic: 50 percent of
tanker departures, 57 percent of
Togo
2 daily
Benin
Nigeria
3 daily
11 daily
Cotonou
Lagos
Lomé
Ghana
Warri
Cameroon
Port Harcourt
3 daily
Calabar
Douala
5 daily
Tema
Equatorial
Guinea
São Tomé
and
Príncipe
3 weekly
Malabo
Bata
2 weekly
São Tomé
Congo
Angola
2 daily
2 daily
Pointe Noire
Luanda
Shipping Departures and
Major Port Locations
Gabon
DRC
2 daily
1 daily
Libreville
Banana
Criminal Activities
Diamonds
Middle East Heroin to
U.S. and Europe
Stolen Cars from U.S.
and Europe
Oil “Bunkering”
Weapons Trafficking, Human
Trafficking, and other Illicit
Trade throughout the Region
Cocaine from South America to
U.S. and Europe
Global Maritime Traffic Flow
Other Interested Parties
Ever-increasing economic,
political,
and
military
engagement of Africa by
the People’s Republic of
China and India (and
others) in search of:

Resources

Business opportunities

Diplomatic initiatives

Strategic partnerships
Other Strategic Concerns



Developing multilateral institutions: African Union (AU),
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
Southern African Development Community (SADC),
Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa
(MOWCA), etc.
Potential for state failure, including the conflict in or even
collapse of regional pivots: Angola (Cabinda separatism),
Nigeria (Igbo, Ijaw, and Yoruba nationalism; Islamism
among the Hausa and Fulani).
Spread of terrorist phenomena: Northern Nigeria, Niger
Delta, South Africa.
Strategic Guidance
Naval Operations Concept (2006)

Traditional Missions
•
•
•
•
•
•

Forward Naval Presence
Crisis Response
Expeditionary Power Projection
Maritime Security Operations
Sea Control
Deterrence
New Missions
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Security Cooperation
Civil-Military Operations
Counterinsurgency
Counterterrorism
Counter-Proliferation
Air and Missile Defense
Information Operations
Specific Strategic Priorities
in the Gulf of Guinea

Maritime Security—Detect, deter, interdict, and
defeat terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile
acts in the maritime domain, and prevent its
unlawful exploitation for those purposes.
(ref. National Strategy for Maritime Security)

Influence—The power of producing effects
without obvious exertion of force or direct
exercise of command. It requires the creation of
secure and stable environments that nurture
enduring relationships and interdependencies.
(ref. CNO Strategic Studies Group XXIV)
A Possible Response…
Global Fleet Station (GFS)
“A hub where all manner of joint, interagency,
international organizations, navies, coast guards and nongovernmental organizations could partner together as a
force for good.”
—ADM Mike Mullen (CNO)
“GFS is a persistent sea base of operations from which to
coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a
regional area of interest.”
—SOUTHCOM Website
“The Global Fleet Stations (GFS) pilot program will serve as
a regional cornerstone for phase “0”, Shaping and Stability
Operations. GFS supplies an adaptive force package that
supports the 1,000-ship Navy with a persistent presence.”
—U.S. Navy Office of Information (CHINFO)
Recent and Current Efforts

GFS Pilot Programs
• HSV-2 Swift (April-September 2007)
• USS Fort McHenry (October 2007–May 2008)

Humanitarian Assistance
• USS Emory S. Land
February-April 2006)
(January-March 2005;
• USNS Comfort (June-October 07)
• USS Pelilieu (June-September 2007)
The Next Steps

Functional
Area
Analysis
to
determine
capabilities
and
requirements for GFS, examining
mission areas, including:
• Peacetime Engagement
• Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
• Interagency and/or NGO Coordination

Functional Needs Analysis to
weigh attributes in each mission
area, measure the attributes, and
determine
capability
vis-à-vis
Questions?
Contact Information
Dr. J. Peter Pham
Director
The Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs
James Madison University
MSC 1205
Harrisonburg, Virginia 22801
(540) 568.2281 ▪ (540) 568.2977 FAX
[email protected]
Weekly “Strategic Interests” Column on African Security Issues:
http://worlddefensereview.com/strategicinterests.shtml