Transcript Document
DINAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Tran Truong Thuy
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
S
South China Sea
3 Issues:
Territorial Disputes
Overlapping Maritime Claims
Freedom of Navigation
Issue of Freedom of Navigation
S Applying domestic regulations (Baseline around
S
S
S
S
S
Paracel, interpretation of USL)
US-China: Diverging interpretations of
UNCLOS on Art. 58 on military activities in
EEZ, between China and US and other powers
(Japan, UK, Australia…).
Excessive safety zone around artificial islands,
installations and structures
China-ASEAN: Freedom of navigation of fishing
boats, oil and gas exploration ships and other
lawful activities
Disputes can escalate into a full conflict =>
impact on freedom of navigation
New dimension: ADIZ
Interests of Concerned Parties
China:
S Important part within the “strategic
stability belt” in the “near” seas
S Chinese navy is shifting to far-seas
operations: The South China Sea then
becomes an area for training exercises
and a springboard for China to move
out (to Pacific, Indian Ocean)
S Energy Security: Resource;
Transportation; Regime survival
China & ASEAN oil net-import dependence
China
=> Beijing has legitimate concerns to
develop naval forces to protect its
SLOC.
OECD
ASEAN
Other ASEAN
Malaysia
2030
Indonesia
2008
Thailand
Philippines
0
20
40
60
80
100
ASEAN
S Divergent interests:
S Vietnam, Philippines
S Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia
S Singapore
S Thailand, Laos, Myanmar
S Cambodia
S Convergent interests:
S Freedom of navigation,
S Regional stability,
S Respecting of international law,
S Maintaining consensus and
centrality of ASEAN.
The US
The US has direct interests in the SCS:
S Maintaining the US-led order at sea;
especially the freedom of navigation,
including the activities of military ships;
S Protecting the interests of allies, especially
the strategic maritime routes for Japan,
South Korea and the Philippines;
S Managing China’s (naval) outreach to
ensure that its rise will not upset the present
US-dominated system;
S Safeguarding the interests of US oil and
gas corporations in the region.
Interest of Major Powers (EU, Japan, India, Australia…)
S Freedom of navigation
S Regional stability
S Respecting of international law, current
international order
(Allowing one power to use assertive method to change
status-quo in one region will encourage others to follow in
other regions)
S Economic Interest:
S Interdependence of Economic Development (conflict
will negatively impact on global economy);
S Investment in Energy Development.
S Maintaining centrality role of ASEAN:
ASEAN provides platform for these countries to engaging
in multilateral diplomacy (ASEAN+, ARF, ADMM+,
EAS, ASEM…)
DEVELOPMENT IN THE SCS
S Since 2002 when China and ASEAN signed
Declaration for the Conduct of Parties in the SCS:
no significant incidents on the SCS
S Since 2008: more incidents, mainly between China
and other claimants
6/7/2013: Two VN fishing
boats harassed
20/5/2013 VN
fishing boat hit
13/3/2013:Two VN
fishing boats harassed
2/1/2014: VN fishing
boat harassed
7/1/2014: VN fishing
boat harassed
22/3/2010: VN fishing
boats detained
4/5/2010
VN fishing boat
seized
5/2010
Seismic studies conducted
13/4/2010
VN fishing boat
seized
3/2013: Board and
Arrest Naval Exercise
1/3/2014:
VN fishing
boat in the SCS
China’s
behaviour
harassed
21/2:/2014 Two VN
fishing boat harassed
6/2010: 3 VN fishing boats
captured
S
29/5 & 31/5/2011: Chinese boats Fei Sheng No. 16 and Vessel No. B12549 attempted to approach the rear
deck of the
Viking II seismic survey ship and interfere with its operations.
18/3/2013,
VN
fishing boat harassed
3/1/2014
VN fishing
boat harassed
S
1/6/2011:
Chinese military vessels threatened to use their guns against a Vietnamese fishing boat operating in waters near the Spratly archipelago.
5-7/2014: CN-VN
confrontation over oil rig
CNOOC 981 deployment
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16/5/2012: Two VN
fishing boats captured
9/6/2011: Chinese fishing boat No. 62226 equipped with a cable cutting device snared the cable of the Viking II operating in survey Block 136‐03 in the vicinity of Vanguard Bank (Tu Chinh).
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3/2009:USS Impeccable
harassed
6/7/2011: Armed Chinese naval troops beat the skipper of a Vietnamese fishing boat, threatened the crew, and then forced the boat to leave contested waters near the Paracel Islands.
5/12/2013 :USS Cowpens
nearly collide Chinese warship
5-25/5/2011: Fishery
Admin. Vessel deployed
4/2012: Scarborough
confrontation with PLP
20/3/2013
Fire on VN fishing boat
22/2/2012
VN fishing boat harassed
27/1/2014: Two PLP fishing
boats fired by water
cannons
11/2012: Binh Minh 02
ship cable cut incident
16/5-1/8: Unilateral fishing
ban imposed
3/3/2012: Two VN fishing
boats captured
25/2/2011
3 PLP vessels got fired
Since 2014: CN land
reclamation on Spratly reefs
6/7/2011: VN fishing boats
harassed
2/3/2011: PLP survey
vessel harassed
8-10/2009: VN fishing
boat seized
4/2012: Two VN fishing
boats seized
9/3/2014: Two PLP civilian vessels
prevented to Second Thomas
Shoal
6/2012
VN fishing boats seized
24/5/2011
Building material unloaded
6/2012: CNOOC’s Notification on
Hydrocarbon Development
1/8/2010
National flag planted
11/9/2010
VN fishing trawler seized
3/2013
Building material unloaded
29/3:/2014 PLP Ship evades
Chinese Coast Guard ship’s
blockade
26/5/2011
VN Binh Minh ship harrased
16/5/2013 PLP
passenger-boat chased
9/6/2011
VN Viking II ship snared
7/2010 : Confrontation with
Indonesian Navy
26/3/2013: PLAN hold oath-taking
ceremony on James Shoal
3/2013: Naval Landing
Exercise on James Shoal
19/1/2013: MLS
exploration vessel harassed
21/8/2012: MLS
exploration vessel harassed
19/9/2013: MLS
exploration vessel
harassed
OTHER UNILATERAL ACTIVITIES
S CHINA:
S Map with U-shaped line
S Hainan’s regulation on “board & search”
(1/2013)
S New passport with U-shaped line
S Tour to Paracels
S Hainan’s Fishing Rules 1/2014
S VIETNAM
S Submission of outer limit of continental shelf
S Adopted the Law of the Sea
S PHILIPPINES:
S Arbitration Case;
S Mil. Exercises with the US
S MALAYSIA: CLCS Submission of
outer limit of continental shelf
EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S STRATEGY
• Since 2011, The South China Sea issue is
elevated in priorities of China’s foreign
policy decision-making process (main
issues in China-US, China-ASEAN
relations):
China’s approach become much more
coordinated and centralized
– Whole Government Approach
Competition between and independent
activities of interest’s groups are manageable.
(Unifying Maritime Law Enforcement
Agencies )
Centralized and Coordinated Strategy to
Deter other Claimant in Specific
Confrontation.
CHINA-VIETNAM
SJune 2012: Vietnam passed the Law of
the Sea
SChina:
S Elevating the Sansha City;
S CNOOC’s invitation for bids for 9
blocks within 200 nm of Vietnam’s
EEZ
S Deploying a large number of
paramilitary vessels to patrol the South
China Sea,
S Putting the military forces of “Sansha
city” under the combat-ready position.
CHINA-PHILIPPIN
S 2012 Scarborough Confrontation
- PLP: Navy ship arrested Chinese
fishing boats in Scarborough
- China: coordinated strategy:
S imposing diplomatic pressures,
S strengthening presence in the disputed
area with hundreds of fishing boats and
law enforcement vessels from deference
agencies (Marine Surveillance and
Fishing Patrol),
S applying economic sanction on
Philippine agricultural products
S promoting international propaganda
Confrontation with Japan in the East China Sea
S Using various forces on the Sea
S Fishing boats
S Law Enforcement Vessels (and Flights)
S Navy Vessels
S Legal Warfare:
S Release White Book on sovereignty
S Announce straight baselines
S Submit to CLCS Extended Continental
Shelf in the ECS
S Announcing ADIZ
S Diplomacy
S Demonstration
S Create Coordination Sub-Committee
Confrontation with Vietnam over Oil Rig HYSY 981
Deployment
S Long duration: two and
half months
S Higher level of
mobilization of protecting
forces (more than 100
vessels of civilian, law
enforcement, military)
S Propaganda
S Diplomacy
S China’s centralized approach: aiming for “creeping
control in an expanding but non-confrontational
dispute” in the SCS:
S increasing presence and control of civilian and paramilitary force in
S
S
all areas within the U-shaped line;
refraining from using military forces, but continuing to show forces
“Divide and Rule” Strategy:
S offering economic intensives to ASEAN countries, especially to
non-claimants (New round of Charm Offensive: Maritime Silk
Road; Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); upgrade
CAFTA)
S actively pushing diplomatic pressure to prevent ASEAN from
forming a common position;
Incrementally changing the status-quo
Preventing ASEAN from forming a common position
Incrementally limiting the possibilities of US and other major
powers to engage into the SCS issue to protect their interests
Policies of ASEAN
SCS Littoral Countries :
SUsing the international law, especially the
UNCLOS, to defend their maritime claims;
SNegotiating directly with China to defuse
tensions and to settle remaining bilateral issues.
SSolving disputes and promoting cooperation
among themselves (Vietnam-Indonesia;
Vietnam- Malaysia; Indonesia – Philippines)
SClaimants Meeting (Philippines-Vietnam-
Malaysia)
SBringing up the South China Sea issue to
regional forums for discussion with involvement
of other external powers;
Policies of ASEAN
ASEAN:
SConcerns about group’s consensus,
credibility and centrality role (especially after
Phnom-Penh incident in June 2012)
SVoiced more concern over the SCS issues in
Statements of internal meetings and meetings
with partners
SMay 2014, issues first joint statement on
SCS since 1995
SEngaging China in DOC implementation
SWorking for a COC: adopted basic elements
of COC and negotiating with China on COC
finalization.
US Rebalancing
The comprehensive shift in US policy:
S Politics and diplomacy: increasing number of visits of the
President, State Secretary and Defense Secretary and other
high-ranking officials to the region.
S Economically: concentrating on the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP).
S Militarily: “rotating base” in Australia, Philippines, plan to
move the majority of its naval forces to the AP region.
S Declared its national interests in the South China Sea;
indirectly rejected U-shaped line; direct engagement in the
SCS issue with new proposal on “Freeze”
Question of sustainability? Budget constraint; Overstretch
with other issues (Ukraine, IS..)
Other countries
S Japan, Australia, India, EU, UK
pay more attention to the SCS
S Issued statements on the SCS
S Voiced concern on global and
regional forums (G7, ARF,
EAS, ASEM…)
S Enhance activities with relevant
countries; promoting maritime
security cooperation
Greeting Japanese vessel on May 2012
Implications
S South China Sea: unbalanced equilibrium?
S China is dominating on the sea and on diplomatic arena,
S For the US, the SCS is not only relating to its strategic
interests, but also to the credibility of the US power.
However, US is still seeking approach how to deal with a
rising China while confronting with budget constraint and
global overstretch
S Major powers have huge interests but there is lacking of
mechanism for their engagement.
S ASEAN is improving consensus but its centrality and role in
managing the South China Sea disputes can be limited due
to intra-bloc division and external impacts.
S What US can respond to China’s strategy is adding and/or
emphasize more on other elements to its strategy such as law
enforcement (Coast Guard), maritime capacity building, and
economic elements (TPP) - with strategic vision when
negotiating.
S To protect its interest, other powers should pay more
attention to SCS, voice concern on regional and international
diplomatic forums and promote maritime security
cooperation with regional contries
S China now seemingly trying to reconciling its interests in
external relations (especially with neighboring ASEAN, the
US and other major powers) with specific maritime interests
in the SCS => one can expect a more nuanced Chinese
approach in the SCS.
Questions, comments are welcome.
Thank you!
S