Transcript PPT Master Format Template - International Rail Safety

International Railway Safety Conference 2008
Denver, Colorado
Development and Application of Hazard Analysis & Risk
Assessment Models for the Korea Railway
October 5-10, 2008
Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi
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About KRRI :
Korea Railroad Research Institute
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About KRRI :
Korea Railroad Research Institute
• Founded in 1996, financed by Korean government
• 254 individuals works for railway R&D division and national project division
• Key research area
- Rolling stock, track & civil engineering, signaling & electrical engineering,
railway policy & operation
• National projects
High speed train development , upgrading conventional railway,
design urban rail transit system, transportation technology, trans-Korean railway construction
• National safety R&D program from 2004
• Homepage : www.krri.re.kr
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Contents
I
Introduction
II
Risk Assessment Procedure
III
Hazard Identification
IV
Risk Assessment Model Development
V
Conclusion
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1. Introduction
Background
• Cyclic occurrence of major train accidents
- 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities
- 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities
- 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities
• Environmental changes in Korea
- KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at 2004
- Structural reform of railroad industries
- Electrification of conventional lines
- Preparation of TCR & TSR
• “Railway Safety Act” announced in 2004
- Focused on the risk-based safety management
- Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations
- Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control
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1. Introduction
Research Objective
Since Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed
the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models
for the Korea Railway.
Research Objective is to introduce
- Developing procedure of the risk models
- Application of the developed model to the Korea railway.
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2. Risk Assessment Procedure
Common Approach Risk Management
Risk Management Process
System
Definition
Railway System
Risk
Analysis
Context
Modification
Risk
Definition
Organization
Operation
Techniques/
Technology
Concept
Construction
Design
Exploitation
Demolition
Risk
Evaluation
System Life Cycle
Maintenance
Risk
Reduction
Risk
Management
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2. Risk Assessment Procedure
National Railway Risk Management
System Architecture
SE Management
National Safety
Management
System
Concept Design
Hazard
Analysis
Design
Safety
Control
Measures
Production
Construction
of Safety
Infrastructure
Operation
Safety
Management
Evaluation
Safety
Evaluation
1. National Safety
Policies (NSP)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for NSP
Establishment of
plan for NSP
Construction of
Basis for NSP
NSP Management
NSP
Evaluation
2. National Safety
Objectives (NSO)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for NSO
Establishment Of National
Safety Objectives
Resource Construction &
Distribution
Resource Management
NSO Evaluation
3. National Safety
Organization (NSOR)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for NSOR
NSOR Design
NSOR Construction
NSOR Management
NSO Evaluation
4. National Safety
Integrated Plan (NSP)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for NSP
NSP Establishment
Construction of
Operation Basis for NSP
NSP Operation
Management
NSP Evaluation
5. National Safety
Information Sys. (NSI)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for NSI
NSI Design
NSI Construction
NSI Management
NSI Evaluation
6. Nation Risk
Assessment Sys. (NRA)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for NRA
NRA Establishment
NRA Construction
NRA Operation &
Management
NRA
Utility Evaluation
7.National Education
& Training Sys, (NET)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for NET
NET Establishment
NET Construction
NET Operation &
Management
NET
Utility Evaluation
8. National Accident
Investigation Sys, (NAI)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for NAT
NAI Establishment
NAI Construction
NAI Operation &
Management
NAI
Utility Evaluation
Establishment of
Basis Direction for TS
TS Establishment
TS Construction
TS Operation &
Management
TS
Utility Evaluation
10. Safety P.R. Sys.
(SPR)
Establishment of
Basis Direction for SPR
SPR Establishment
SPR Construction
SPR Operation
SPR Appropriateness
Evaluation
11. Infrastructure
Safety Inspection (ISI)
Analysis of ISI Problems
ISI Plan Establishment
ISI Sys.
Modernization
ISI Sys.
Operation
ISI Sys.
Appropriateness Evaluation
IS Hazard Analysis
Establishment of IS Safety
Design Requirements
Construction of IS
Safety Certification System
IS Safety Certification
System Operation
IS Safety Performance
Evaluation
RS
Hazard Analysis
Establishment of RS Safety
Design Requirements
Construction of RS
Safety Certification System
RS Safety Certification
System Operation
IS Safety Performance
Evaluation Operation
TR&TP Hazard Analysis
- Terror, illegality
Establishment of TR&TP
Safety Design Requirements
Construction of TR&TP
Safety Certification System
TR&TP Safety Certification
System Operation
TR&TP Safety Performance
Evaluation Operation
9. Training & Supply
for Safety Specialist (TS)
12. Infrastructure
Safety (IS)
13. Railway Rolling
Stock Safety (RS)
14. Train Operation Safety
& Train Protection (TR&TP)
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2. Risk Assessment Procedure
Railway Risk Assessment Procedure
Hazard Identification
Defining the Initiating Hazardous Events
Development of Accident Scenarios
Railway Accident
Progress Scenarios
Hazardous
Events
FTA Model
ETA Model
Consequence
Analysis
Casual
Analysis
Railway Accident
Appearance Scenarios
Risk Evaluation & Reduction
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Hazard Identification Procedure
System definition and boundary setting
Identifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriers
Developing accident appearance scenarios
Developing accident progress scenarios
Accident scenario management
Setting up objective of hazard identification &
its boundary
Including the definition of measures
which stops the increases of accident
Defining relationships among hazardous
events, hazards and barriers.
Considering the relevant key influential
factors.
Drawing up hazard log.
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
System & Boundary Definition
Typical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project
According to the accident classification of “Railway Accident Report Regulation”,
The scenarios were divided into the five main areas
1) Train collision accident,
2) Train derailment accident,
3) Train fire accident,
4) Level crossing accident,
5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident.
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Hazardous Event Identification
Railway
Category
Train
Collision
Hazardous Events
Misrouted train
Mistaking in dealing points, point faults, mistaking in dealing blockage,
interlocking system faults
Faults in driving
Signal/direction violation, signal fault, mistaking in dealing braking
system, braking system fault, over speeding
Abnormal train
Obstacles
on the track
Level
Crossing
Accident
Being trapped
in level crossing
Crossing during
warning signal
Breaking through or
detour the barrier
People
struck/crushed
Railway
Traffic
Casualty
Accident
Trip/Slip
Falling
Caught/Dragged
Others
Train separation, car rolling, train stop, backward moving
External obstacles, parts from train/freight falling, infrastructure
collapsing/obstruction
-Engine stop
-Deviation of pathway
-Gangway blocking
-Lack of propulsion/braking
-Violation entry
-Limit interference
-Breaking or detour
Striking with train, Striking with objects
Trip/slip during train boarding/alighting, Trip/slip by train emergency
braking/emergency start
Falling from train, Falling from platform during train boarding/alighting
Caught in a train door, Caught between platform and train
Electric Shock, Burn, Suffocation
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Railway Accident Appearance Scenario
Built up by classifying properly the immediate causes and underlying causes.
• Immediate Causes: conditions which immediately cause hazardous events
- Substandard Act: Substandard acts/behavior of who can cause hazardous events
- Substandard Conditions: Physical conditions which can cause hazardous events
• Underlying Causes: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions
- Human Management Factors
- Technological Factors
- External Factors
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Railway Accident Appearance Scenario
Hazardous Event
Immediate Causes
Underlying Causes
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Railway Accident Scenario
Critical factors influencing accident severity
were identified in the accident progress scenarios”
Example of the Accident Progress Scenarios
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Risk Measure Method
Risk assessment model
: the form of a cause and consequence analysis
: using fault trees and event trees.
Collective Risk
(Average Number of FWI/year)
=
Frequency
(Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs)
X
Consequences
(the number of FWI/scenario sequence)
1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Data Population
• Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database.
• Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills
• Many thousands of records are reviewed and classified
• Where data was not available,
Use was made of:
- Human error probability assessments
: using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART)
- Safety expert judgment from in-house expertise within Korea railway.
- Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions.
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Railway Risk Assessment & Information
Management System (RAIMS)
RAIMS
Accident
Analysis
Risk
Analysis
Safety Requirement
Verification
Management
System
Management
Accident Search
Event Tree Analysis
Safety Requirement
Management
User Management
Environment
Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
Railway System
Management
Code Management
Hazard Analysis
Risk Evaluation
Damage Analysis
Human Factor
Analysis
Options Analysis
Safety Requirement
Change
Management
Classification
Management
Requirement
Traceability
Management
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Web-Based Accident Analysis Subsystem
• Application running on the web
• One purpose is to provide
- Fundamental information for an in-depth risk assessment of railway accidents
- Information on railway safety performance levels to both assessors and the public
• This system is composed of three modules
1) Accident input module.
2) Accident analysis & statistics module
3) Hazard management module.
Environment Analysis
Accident Analysis
Accident Statistic Analysis
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Risk Analysis Subsystem
• Windows-based application
• Dedicated railway risk assessment software package
- Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Human Factor Analysis
• The risk of the railway systems can be assessed by the ET/FT linking approach
- Accident progress scenarios: defined as event trees, using an event tree editor.
- Each branch of the accident progress sequences requires one or more supplementary fault trees,
which can be developed by a fault tree editor.
- Sum of the frequency of each sequence becomes the total frequency of the accident of concern.
Event Tree Editor View
ET/FT Linking approach
Fault Tree Editor View
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Railway Human Reliability Analysis (R-HRA) Module
• Supporting the analysts in analyzing potential human errors
• Used under the railway risk assessment framework
• Computer software developed for aiding the R-HRA process.
• Revised R-HRA method supplementing the original R-HRA method developed by RSSB
• Providing a specific task analysis guideline and a classification of performance shaping
factors (PSFs)
General Information Input
Error Analysis & Quantification
Reporting Results
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Railway Accident Risk Assessment Results
• Railway accident data until 2005 year on the main line of South Korea
• Train operation on the main line fully carried out by Korea Railroad Corp..
• The total risk: 217 FWI per year
Accident Category
Risk (FWI)
Train collision accident
0.6744
Train derailment accident
3.6898
Train fire accident
14.1
Level crossing accident
16.94
Railway traffic casualty accident
161.138
Railway safety casualty accident
20.742
Total
217.284
• The overall risk made up from different profiles of frequency and consequences.
• Railway casualty accident
: Tend to consist of high frequency low consequence type events (slips, trips and falls)
• Train accidents
: Tend to have a risk contribution from the low frequency high consequence type events
: Increase the risk contribution for the hazardous events above the level seen in practice.
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Future Development of the Risk Model
The model is being prepared currently and will include:
• Feasibility and uncertainty test in the results of the developed model
• Improved level of human factors modeling
• Use of more sophisticated statistical analysis techniques
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5. Conclusion
This study has proposed
• Developing procedure of the risk models for the Korea railway
• Application of their application to the Korea railway
The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway
Which will
• Increase the industry’s knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance
• Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls
• Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction
• Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes
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Thank you!
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