Transcript Poland's Power and Influence in the European Union: Can a

Influence and Power in the
EU: the case of Poland and
the Eastern Partnership
Dr. Nathaniel Copsey
Dr. Karolina Pomorska
Warsaw, PISM, 4 March 2010
Structure
(1)
National preferences and influence and why they matter
(2)
What factors determine the shape of national preference in
the European Union?
(3)
What have we learnt about the preferences of the newer
Member States?
(4)
What have we learnt about the capacity of Poland Member
States to exercise influence in the European Union?
(5)
About the research project: thanks to ESRC, Polish
Government and British Academy
National Preferences

Moravcsik’s theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (1998)

Capacity to exercise power and influence in the European
Union is dependent on the intensity with which a given
Member State holds a particular view

Study concentrated overwhelmingly on UK, France and
Germany in the 1980s

Need to investigate how useful this is for understanding the EU27
Preferences and Power
 Focus
on upward form of ‘Europeanization’: expanding
area of academic enquiry in recent years, new Member
States, unlikely power brokers etc.
 Problematic
nature of ‘power’; problems of
measurement/causality
 Thus
project examines the capacity of a new Member
State to exercise ‘influence’ within the EU
 Draws
on Lukes’ second dimension of power
Synthetic Framework for Old Member States’ National
Preferences
Broad Policy Area
What Shapes preferences?
‘More Europe’/Deeper Integration
Visionary
Zeal
Resistance
Distributive Politics
Net Contributor/Recipient
Liberalization
Ideology
of
governments
Foreign Policy
Sense of self-importance, territorial
legacies or ‘historical destiny’
Size
Wider Europe
Geography
Attitudes towards deeper integration
vs.
Ideological
politicians
and
Capacity to Exercise Power and Influence

Independent variables: population and economic strength

Dependent variables: intensity of policy preference, skill at alliance forming,
administrative capacity, persuasive advocacy, receptiveness of other
Member States, domestic political strength
Fixed Variables
Table 1: The Crude Political Power of the Five Largest Member
States by Population and GDP
Germany
UK
France
Italy
Spain
Poland
Population
(millions)
83.25
60.59
60.76
59.7
45
38.6
GDP
(trillions US
$)
3.414
2.933
2.656
2.174
1.524
0.444
Source: IMF (2008)
Dependent Variables
To recap: assumptions about Influence

Capacity of states to exercise influence in EU seen as determined by two
factors: (1) intensity with which it holds a given preference and is willing to
argue for it (Moravcsik); and (2) its capacity to secure a desired outcome
(determined by a number of dependent and independent variables) (see
Copsey and Pomorska, 2009)
Preliminary Findings:
National Preferences I

We should be careful in making assumptions about the nature of national preferences
based on ‘ideal-type’ models or based on the experiences of old Member States (see
Copsey and Haughton, 2009)

Of course, in many instances newer Member States may not have a preference at all – not
surprising

Or they may not know what their national preference should be – this is more surprising

Notion of defence of ‘national interest’ without any means of knowing what these
national interests truly are

Often lack the reliable data (cost–benefit analyses) that could point towards what a
preference should be
Preliminary Findings:
National Preferences II

Above all, we should not assume that the policy-making process resembles, for example,
Dahl’s descriptions of pluralism in the United States

Consultation with interest groups, such as trade unions, lobbyists, or business
confederations remains very underdeveloped

In consequence, policy-makers tend to overemphasize ‘catch-all factors’ in explaining why
a particular policy has been adopted: i.e. geopolitics, history, security

These factors offer ex post justification for a particular action but do not explain why a
state ought to have acted in that in the first place

Thus the notion of national preferences in the EU-27 requires some thorough reexamination and a revised theoretical framework
Preliminary Findings:
New Member States’ Capacity for Influence in
the EU
 Most
newer Member States do not have, and may
never have, the capacity to exercise ‘influence’ in the
way that we understood older Member States to have
done in the past
 Crucially,
many newer Member States are not
interested in being ‘influential’ let alone ‘powerful’
 Poland
is, however, different in this respect
Preliminary Findings:
New Member States’ Capacity for Influence in the EU

Administrative capacity remains the principal weakness – this is also true of
many other older Member States
- Demoralization of elite segments of civil service
- Weakness of coordination of European policy
- Failure to foster productive networks between Poles working in Brussels and
Warsaw – and occasional active discouragement!

Problems of ending conditionality: less willingness to undertake annoying
reforms; less willingness to learn from best practice in other Member States and
adapt it to match local particularities; time for a ‘rest’ mentality
Concrete Case Study

Poland’s Influence on the EaP

Alliance-Building

Persuasive Advocacy

Receptiveness of Other Member States

Administrative Capacity/Experience
Alliance-Building

Change of Government in 2007

Choice of Sweden (but cf. Lithuania)

Role of Sweden in guiding the initiative through committees in the Council,
especially during the Czech Presidency

Improved relations with France and Germany
Persuasive Advocacy

Credibility boost post-2007

Clearer delineation of competences between PM and President

More measured tone

War in Georgia provides impetus and gives credence to Poland’s overall
position on relations with the ex-USSR
Receptiveness of Other MS

Election of Sarkozy

But views on finalité politique unchanged

Union for the Mediterranean assuages southern discomfort

Impact of the War on Georgia – senior levels of the Commission
bureaucracy mobilized by Barroso and Day
Administrative Capacity

Poles remain ‘rough around the edges’

Improvement needed regarding co-ordination (“playing many pianos at the
same time”)

Many proposals prepared for domestic not EU audiences

Above all – ‘them’ in Brussels versus ‘us’ in Warsaw
Conclusions: How to be Influential

Learn the value of constructive ambiguity

Bureaucratize and depoliticize the issue where possible

Set concrete but minimalistic targets with a short time frame – logic of small
steps
Conclusions: Where Next?

What may be needed next:
- Revised concepts, frameworks and theories to explain better
the notion of national preferences and how they are formed
- More robust means of measuring power and influence in the
EU; use of Lukes’ third dimension of power
- More comparative work on how European policy is made in
the newer Member States
More information

Copsey and Haughton (2009) ‘The Choices for Europe’. JCMS, Vol. 47, No. 2.

Copsey and Pomorska (2010) ‘Poland’s Power and influence’. Comparative
European Politics, forthcoming July 2010.

Copsey and Pomorska (2010) ‘The Influence of the Newer Member States in
the European Union’. forthcoming Europe-Asia Studies.
Contact
Nat Copsey, Aston Centre for Europe: [email protected]
Karolina Pomorska, Maastricht University: [email protected]