EAP/CDMA2000 WLAN Access Authentication Using UIM

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Transcript EAP/CDMA2000 WLAN Access Authentication Using UIM

Lecture 5
E-Banking
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Outline
• Definition of e-banking
• Entity authentication and secure
communications
• Server side architecture & security
• Web client security
• Web application security
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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What Is E-Banking
• Definition
– The automated delivery of new and traditional
banking products and services directly to customers
through electronic, interactive communication
channels.
• Products and Services
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–
–
–
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Account information and management
Bill presentation and bill payment
Loan applications and approval
Investment and brokerage services
…
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Stages of E-Banking
• Automatic Teller Machine (ATM):
– An economical substitute for brick and mortar branches, longer
banking hours
– Services: Balance enquiry; cash withdrawal, deposit, funds
transfer, payment for IPO offerings, COE bidding, etc
• Tele-Banking:
– Retail banking by dial a phone #, automatic voice response
– all services as ATM except cash withdrawal and deposit
• PC-Banking
– Dial into a bank’s intranet proprietary software system to access
accounts for transactions
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Stages of E-Banking: Internet-Banking
• Definition:
– Consumers access banking products and services over the Internet
• Advantages
– PC-banking were proprietary, developed just by the bank
– Internet puts everyone on an equal footing. There is a wealth of 3rd party
providers
– The cost per transaction through the Internet is 27 times less than
through ATMs, 54 times less than that of a telephone transaction and
107 times less than that of a physical branch transaction.
• The Risks
– There is security risk in using any remote-access for financial services,
internet banking poses the greatest risk since internet is an open and
public network.
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Internet Banking - Informational Websites
• Objective
– Bank wants to provide
information to the public and its
customers
– Bank wants to verify the
information is correction and the
web site is usually up
• Risk issues
– Potential liability for inaccurate
information
– Potential liability for spreading
viruses and other malicious
code to computers accessing
the website
– Negative public perception if the
bank’s online service is
disrupted or website defaced or
presents offensive material
Inside ABC Bank
Company Information
Investor Relations
News Room
Careers
ABC Bank in the Community
Doing Business with ABC Bank
Help Center
Contact Us
ATM/Branch locations
Self Services
Frequently Asked Questions
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Internet Banking –
•
Objective
Inside ABC Bank
– Provide banking services in a
secure and reliable manner
•
Transactional Websites
Risk Issues
– Higher risk than info website due to
exchange of confidential customer
info and transfer of funds
– Authentication processes
– Liability for unauthorized
transactions
– Losses from fraud if the bank fails to
verify user identity
– Violations of laws or regulations
pertaining to consumer privacy, antimoney laundering, anti-terrorism etc
– Negative public perception,
customer dissatisfaction, liability
resulting from failure to process 3rdparty payments as directed or within
a time frame.
Company Information
Investor Relations
News Room
Careers
ABC Bank in the Community
Doing Business with ABC Bank
Help Center
Contact Us
ATM/Branch locations
Self Services
Frequently Asked Questions
Access Accounts
Personal Account Login
Commercial Account Login
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Consumer Switch Banks Due to Identity Theft
•
•
close to 60% expressed concern about identity theft
6% switched banks to reduce their risk of becoming a victim of identity theft
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Outline
• Definition of e-banking
• Entity authentication and secure
communications
• Server side architecture & security
• Web client security
• Web application security
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Working with a Simplified Model
User
Website
in DMZ
Internet
Bank’s
Network
AuthServer
Database
• Security requirements
– User authentication, confidentiality and integrity
– How about non-repudiation?
• Possible means of user authentication:
– Using user’s public key certificate
– Using smart card and possibly in combination with biometric
– Most e-banking systems use PIN (or password); backward
compatible with legacy systems
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Using SSL for Internet Banking
User
•
Website
in DMZ
Internet
Bank’s
Network
AuthServer
Database
Secure communication over internal network
– Communication between web server and bank’s internal servers are protected using
IPSEC (Internet Protocol Security)
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Secure communication over the Internet
– Bank obtains public key certificate from a CA
– Bank’s private key kept at web server, ideally in a tamper-resistant hardware
– User and web server runs SSL, authenticate server and set up a secure tunnel
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Customer authentication
– Customer sends PIN in clear text over the secure tunnel
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Using WTLS for Wireless Banking
User
Wireless
Network
WAP
Gateway
Pub or Priv Website
in DMZ
Network
Bank’s
Network
• Secure communication from WAP gateway to bank internal servers
– Communication between web server and bank’s internal servers using
IPSEC; communication between WAP Gateway and web server using
SSL
• Secure communication over the Internet
– Bank obtains an ephemeral public key certificate for the WAP Gateway
from a CA (valid for 25 hours)
– User and web server runs WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security),
authenticate gateway and set up a secure tunnel
• Customer authentication
– Customer sends PIN in clear text over the tunnel
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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The Security “Gaps”
• “Web server gap”: In “SSL for Internet Banking”, cleartext
appears in the web server, which may be in house or
hosted by a service provider; web server is vulnerable to
attacks
• “WAP gaps”: In “WTLS for Wireless Banking”, cleartext
appears in WAP gateway (which is normally hosted by a
cellular operator) and in the web server
• Directive from a central bank: “all PINs must be
protected end-to-end, from customer terminal to bank’s
authentication server”.
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Outline
• Definition of e-banking
• Entity authentication and secure
communications
• Server side architecture & security
• Web client security
• Web application security
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Server Side Architecture & Security
- Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
• DMZ
– A semi-trusted network zone to segment off systems that
accessed by Internet users from those that are accessed by
internal users and servers
• DMZ policy rules
– Any system that can be directly contacted by an external user
(web server, external mail server, external DNS server, etc)
should be placed in DMZ.
– DMZ systems are always under attack and can not be trusted,
should be severely restricted from accessing internal systems.
Ideally, internal system should initiate connection to DMZ
systems.
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Server Side Architecture & Security
- A typical DMZ architecture
Web
Server
External
Mail Server
External
DNS Server
DMZ
Initiate
connections
Internal
Network
Response
only
Firewall
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
Only services offered
by DMZ systems
Internet
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A Typical E-Banking Server Side
Architecture
E-banking
App Server
Firewall3
Firewall2
Makes SQL
queries to
database server
Bank
Internal
Network
Web
Server
F/W only allows access
ports 80 and 443 on the
web server
Firewall1
Internet
Database
Server
HSM
HSM – Hardware Security Module
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E-Banking Server Side Architecture
- Web Server, App Server, Database Server
• Web Server
– Sensitive information: Open to access from the Internet; is at most semitrusted. Should not store sensitive information; PINs only transit through
it, should not be kept on it
– Server location: Firewall1 only allow access to ports 80 and 443 on web
server
– OS configuration: Remove all unnecessary services; Check for and load
latest patches
– Dual home web server, one interface for web traffic and responds to
customer; another (may resides on a 2nd DMZ) handle application
queries to the e-banking server
• E-Banking Server
– process customer requests, makes SQL queries to the database server
and provides information to the Web server for presentation to
customers
• Database Server
– contains lots of sensitive information, is located in the internal network,
no Internet connection
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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E-Banking Server Side Architecture
- Communication with Database Server
• Ideal solution
– e-banking app server does not make connection to database
server, but the latter initiate connection to the former;
– however this delays response and is not acceptable
• Practical solution
– e-banking app server uses an ID and secret key to access the
database, but the secret key may be compromised.
– make the ID very restrictive, e.g., read access to non-sensitive
information
– couple e-banking app server ID & secret key with customer
authentication information to access the customer sensitive
information
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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A High Availability E-Banking Server Side
Architecture
App layer switches provide
load sharing & fail-over across
web servers
Web servers
App layer switch
Firewall
Routers & firewalls are
cross-connected to switches
to provide redundant paths
Switch
Router
ISP #1 POP
BGP
running
between
ISPs
Internet
ISP #2 POP
Internal
network
e-banking app servers
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
Database server
on redundant cluster
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Outline
• Definition of e-banking
• Entity authentication and secure
communications
• Server side architecture & security
• Web client security
• Web application security
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Web Spoofing
Web Server
2. Request
original URL
Victim’s
browser
1. Request
spoofed URL
Attacker
3. Original page
contents
5. Spoofed page
contents
4. Change page
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Web Spoofing
•
Attacker
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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makes victim visit his web page (e.g., by phishing attack)
either sends victim a fake page or passes on the original URL request
to the real web server (e. g., function as a proxy)
intercepts response
may change the response
sends the response to victim
Consequences
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Attacker may get victim’s account and password, may spoof stock
market information
Difficult to counter
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Victim may not be able to recognize it’s fake. Browser’s location line
and status may be changed by attacker using JavaScript
Victim needs to examine SSL certificate’s owner carefully!
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Phishing Attack
• One of the most prolific identity theft attacks,
especially targeting e-banking users
• Some recent statistics (figures for Oct 2004,
based on Comodo Inc unless otherwise stated):
– Some 57 Million US Internet users have identified the
receipt of an e-mail linked to a Phishing scam --Gartner 2004
– Number of active Phishing sites: 1142
– Average monthly growth rate July-Oct 2004: 25%
– Country hosting the most Phishing websites: USA
Average time online for a site: 6.3 days
– Longest time online for a site: 31 days
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Mounting Phishing Attacks
• Attacker directs victim to a malicious website typically via
e-mail spoofing
• E-mail spoofing: E-mail seems to origin from a trusted
company and urges users to follow a hyperlink referring
to a malicious server having a web domain name similar
to that of the spoofed site. Examples:
– http://www.signin.abcbanker.com, easily confused
with http://www.signin.abcbank.com.
– http://[email protected], refers to
the.attacker.com instead of www.paypal.com which is
interpreted as a login name instead of an address
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Phishing Attack to DBS
Singapore's DBS warns of fraudulent site in Hong Kong
Posted: 11:02 PM (Manila Time) | Dec. 27, 2003
Agence France-Presse
SINGAPORE -- The Hong Kong Monetary Authority and police are working to shut a
fraudulent online banking website claiming to be a part of Southeast Asia's largest
lender DBS Bank, the Singapore-based bank said.
"DBS Bank wishes to advise that this website has no affiliation whatsoever with DBS
Bank, nor the Group," the company said in a statement on its website. "DBS Bank
has reported the fraudulent website to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the
police, who are working with relevant authorities to shut down the fraudulent website."
The fraudulent website, www.dbshk.net, has two small boxes for customers to fill in
their account names and passwords to access a list of online banking services.
It features the bank's distinctive red logo and even a picture of the smiling female
bank teller clad in the grey uniform that greet online customers on the actual Internet
site.
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Outline
• Definition of e-banking
• Entity authentication and secure
communications
• Server side architecture & security
• Web client security
• Web application security
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Web Application Security
• More and more web based applications; they
are becoming one of the major targets for
attacks
– 70% of new attacks target the web (SQL injection,
buffer overflow, etc)
• Network based firewalls and IDS are entirely
blind to encrypted web traffic
• Firewalls let in web traffic through ports 80 and
443
Robert H Deng, SIS-SMU, 2005
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Web Application Security Gateway
Flash Demo:
http://www.teros.com/products/appliances/gateway/attacks_defeated.shtml
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Summary
• Definition of e-banking
• Entity authentication and secure
communications (the “gap” problem)
• Server side architecture & security (DMZ policy
rules)
• Web client security
• Web application security and application security
gateway
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• Reading assignments:
– http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/html_pages/
ebanking_book_frame.htm
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