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ACRP 4-09 Risk Assessment Method to Support Modification of Airfield Separation Standards Period: Jun 2009 to Feb 2011 Developed by: Applied Research Associates, Inc. Robert E. David & Associates University of Oklahoma Risk of Collision per Operation ADG V 1.E-03 ADG V Standard = 267 ft 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 1.E-09 222 224 226 228 230 232 234 Taxiway/Taxiway Centerline to Centerline Separation (ft) 236 Project Panel Chair Ms. Laurie Cullen – HNTB Corporation ACRP Staff Representatives Ms. Marci A. Greenberger – Program Officer Mr. Joseph J. Brown-Snell – Program Associate Members Mr. Gary C. Cathey - California Department of Transportation Mr. Chad A. Gunderson - TKDA Mr. Paul Herrera - Los Angeles World Airports Mr. Scott McMahon - Morristown Municipal Airport Jorge E. Panteli - MacFarland-Johnson Liaison Representatives Mr. John Dermody - Federal Aviation Administration Mr. Chris Oswald - Airports Council International - North America Christine Gerencher – Transportation Research Board Project Team Principal Investigator Jim Hall – Applied Research Associates Co-Principal Investigator Richard Speir – Applied Research Associates Project Manager Manuel Ayres – Applied Research Associates Team Members Hamid Shirazi – Applied Research Associates Robert E. David – RED & Associates Yih-Ru Huang – University of Oklahoma Regis Carvalho – Applied Research Associates Arun Rao – Consultant Samuel Cardoso – Applied Research Associates Edith Arambula – Applied Research Associates Briefing Outline Background Study Objectives Project Tasks Rationale of Airfield Separations Accident and Incident Data Collected Basis of Approach Used Risk-Based Analysis Methodology Case Studies and Validation Plan to Gain Industry Support Limitations and Conclusions Background Many airports were built before current standards were set There is a need to increase airport and aviation capacity, and operation of larger aircraft may be required in existing airfields In many cases there are physical and environmental restrictions to increase existing separations Available analysis alternatives are prescriptive and not based on risk Approximately 20% of ground (commercial aviation) accidents in the U.S. are collisions during taxiing or parking More than 50% of fatal accidents occur during landing and takeoff operations Modification of Standards (MOS) AC 150/5300-13 (FAA, 1989) Modification to standards means any change to FAA design standards other than dimensional standards for runway safety areas. Unique local conditions may require modification to airport design standards for a specific airport. The request for MOS should show that the modification will provide an acceptable level of safety, economy, durability, and workmanship. Study Objectives Develop simple and easy to use methodology to evaluate risk of collisions associated with nonstandard airfield separations. Obtain quantitative assessment for decision making when standard cannot be met. The methodology should serve as a screening tool to evaluate the feasibility of submitting to the FAA a request for Modification of Standards. Project Tasks 1. 2. Literature review and rationale of airfield separations Collection of veer-off accident and incident data Modification of Standards (MOS) survey 4. Develop proposed risk assessment methodology 5. Perform airport survey for selected MOS cases 6. Develop risk assessment methodology 3. 7. 8. Develop plan to gain industry support Prepare project report Rationale for Standards - FAA Taxiways and Taxilanes: probability distribution of lateral deviations plus a safety buffer of 10 ft TWY/TWY: 1.2 x WS + 10 ft (between centerlines) TWY/OBJ: 0.7 x WS + 10 ft (axis to object) TXL/TXL: 1.1 x WS + 10 ft (between centerlines) TXL/OBJ: 0.6 x WS + 10 ft (axis to object) Runways: probability distributions of lateral and vertical deviations during final approach and initial climb, as well as probability of veer-offs during landing and takeoff Indication that standards were developed based on best engineering judgment and experience from WW II Rationale for Standards - ICAO Taxiway/Taxiway and Taxiway/Object: Wingtip Clearance = clearance (C) between the outer main gear wheel and the taxiway edge plus safety buffer (Z). Runway/Taxiway Distance to accommodate potential veer-offs and provide sterile area free of obstacles for aircraft executing a missed approach or balked landing maneuver. Veer-off Data Collection Veer-off accidents and incidents occurring in several countries from 1980 to 2009 Taxiway/Taxilane veer-offs Identified 300 incidents in straight segments of taxiways Only 6 relevant incidents were identified in taxilanes Identified 679 runway veer-off accidents and incidents during landing and takeoff Taxiway Veer-offs – Some Conclusions Taxiing airplanes are at lower speeds (normal 20 knots, max 30 knots) when compared to runway operations. The edge of the paved area is a discontinuity and the pilot is able to stop as soon as the aircraft departs the taxiway. The model for lateral deviation can be truncated for taxiways outside the ramp area. The collisions occurred in curves or when other aircraft and equipment were inside the taxiway/taxilane OFA. Taxiway Veer-offs – More Conclusions Taxiway veer-offs in straight segments occured due to poor visibility or low surface friction (e.g. Icing conditions). Two-part models based on frequency and location were not appropriate for the methodology. Only two fatal accidents due to taxiway veer-offs were identified; neither was relevant to this study. Basis of Approach Used Probability distributions of lateral and vertical deviations during operations Boeing/FAA Taxiway Deviation Studies at ANC and JFK (Scholz, 2003 and 2005) Airborne risk during landing derived from Collision Risk Model (CRM) runs Ground roll risk of veer-off derived from models developed in this project (landing and takeoff) Taxiways and Taxilanes Separation Probability Distribution of Lateral Deviations WS1 X d = wingtip separation d = CS – (WS1 + WS2) / 2 centerline separation (CS) WS2 Taxiway or Taxilane to Object Separation Probability Distribution of Lateral Deviations aircraft semi wingspan wingtip lateral deviation probability distribution 0 X obstacle RWY/TWY Separation Risk of collision during airborne phase Landing Final Approach Missed Approach Rejected Landing Takeoff – Initial Climb Risk of collision during ground roll Landing Takeoff Deviations in Airborne Phase x Nominal Flight Path (x = 0, y = 0) Obstacle y h Nominal Flight Path x Y1 = NFPh - h Obstacle y X1 = XO – WS/2 h Runway Veer-off Landing (or Takeoff) 1 2 x 3 Risk-Based Analysis Methodology Taxiway to Taxiway or Taxilane Taxiway to Object Taxilane to Taxilane Taxilane to Object Runway to Taxiway/Taxilane/Object Landing Airborne Ground phase rolling phase Takeoff Ground rolling phase Taxiway Lateral Deviation Studies FAA/Boeing (Scholz, 2003 and 2005) Collision risk models were developed by Boeing/FAA based on B-747 taxiway deviation studies at ANC and JFK The objective was to evaluate the risk of collision for B-747-800 operations Data was collected during one year In both cases, lateral deviation data was collected in straight segments with taxiway centerline lights Assumptions Lateral deviation for smaller aircraft are similar or smaller than those of the B-747 The taxiway or taxilane centerline is conspicuous and visible to the pilot under any operational conditions The FAA separation standards for taxiways and taxilanes are based on similar probability of aircraft departing the lane during taxiing operations The risk estimated with the CRM is more restrictive compared to the risk under visual conditions ACRP 4-09 Methodology Example of Risk Plot for Taxiway/Taxiway Separation – ADG I ADG I 1.E-05 Risk of Collision per Operation ADG I Standard = 69 ft 1.E-06 8.0E-7 1.E-07 1.E-08 1.E-09 62 64 66 68 70 Taxiway/Taxiway Centerline Separation (ft) 72 Lateral Deviation Models for Taxilanes Wingtip Separation Taxiway/Object Taxilane/Object Ratio I 20 15 0.75 ADG - Distances in ft II III IV V 26 34 44 53 18 22 27 31 0.69 0.65 0.61 0.58 VI 62 36 0.58 Taxilane Similar Probability Taxiway Analysis Procedure Taxiways/ Taxilanes/Objects Identify the type of separation Identify the ADG or aircraft types involved Characterize the separation (between centerlines, between centerline and object, or wingtip clearance) Identify the appropriate risk plot to use Use the centerline or wingtip clearance to estimate risk of collision Example - Taxiway/Taxiway Separation Taxiway/Taxiway Separation - ADG V Risk of Collision per Operation 1.E-05 ADG V Standard = 267 ft 1.E-06 1.E-07 2.3E-08 1.E-08 1.E-09 226 228 230 232 234 Taxiway/Taxiway Centerline to Centerline Separation (ft) 236 Risk Analysis during Landing Airborne Phase Ground Roll Phase Collision Risk Model (CRM) Runs Development of Risk Curves Airborne Phase ADG III - CAT I -328 ft 0 ft 1500 ft 1.0E-08 3000 ft 4500 ft 1.0E-09 1.0E-12 1.0E-15 0 100 200 300 400 500 Aircraft Distance from Runway Centerline (ft) Risk of Collision per Operation. Risk per Operation 1.0E-06 600 ADG III - CAT I ADG III Approach Cat C Standard = 400 ft 1.0E-09 700 1.0E-10 1.0E-11 200 250 300 350 400 Runway/Taxiway Centerline Separation (ft) 450 500 Runway Veer-off Incident Rates (U.S.) (1980-2009) Number Type of of Incident Incidents LDVO 512 TOVO 111 Incident Rate per Operation 1.195E-06 2.590E-07 Incident Rate in Operations per Incident 837,000 3,861,000 Location Model – Landing Veer-off Prob=exp((-.02568)*Y**(.803946)) R2=99.5% Probability of Stopping Beyond Y 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0 200 400 600 Distance Y from Runway Edge (ft) 800 1000 Analysis Procedure – Runway/Taxiway Identify the ADG Identify type of approach (Cat I or Cat II) Characterize the separation between the runway and taxiway axes Identify plots for specific ADG (landing) Airborne phase (lateral and vertical deviations) Ground roll phase (frequency and location) Use axes separation to estimate risk of collision for each phase Repeat process for takeoffs Risk Criteria – FAA Risk Matrix Risk estimated is compared to risk criteria to check for acceptability Case Studies and Validation Airp. ADG Type of MOS Risk Level Expected # Yrs Risk < 1.0E-7 Risk < 1.0E-09 Credible Severity FAA Risk Classification Acceptable PHL ANC ADS BDR III, IV VI III II Taxilane/Taxilane Taxiway/Object Runway/Taxiway Runway/Taxiway <1.0E-9 <1.0E-9 1.0E-7 1.1E-7 N/A N/A > 100 > 100 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Major Major Catastrophic Catastrophic Low Low Medium Medium Yes Yes Yes Yes MFV N07 JFK EWR II I VI V MSP ORD ORD HYA LCI SEA SEA ASE ACK ILG JYO TAN IV V V III III VI VI III III IV II II Runway/Object Taxilane/Object Taxiway/Taxiway Taxiway/Taxiway Taxilane/Object Taxiway/Taxiway Taxiway/Object Taxiway/Taxiway Runway/Taxiway Runway/Taxiway Runway/Taxiway Taxiway/Taxilane Runway/Taxiway Taxiway/Taxiway Taxiway/Object Runway/Taxiway Runway/Taxiway 5.9E-8 1.2E-9 <1.0E-9 <1.0E-9 <1.0E-9 <1.0E-9 <1.0E-9 <1.0E-9 8.8E-8 2.0E-7 1.6E-6 <1.0E-9 9.0E-8 <1.0E-9 2.8E-8 1.2E-7 8.0E-8 > 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A > 100 > 100 N/A N/A > 100 N/A > 100 > 100 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes No No No Catastrophic Major Major Major Major Major Major Major Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Major Catastrophic Major Major Catastrophic Catastrophic Medium Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Medium Medium High* Low Medium Low Low Medium Medium Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Plan to Gain Industry Support Research Product Risk assessment methodology to evaluate airfield separations and intended to serve as a screening tool to support the submittal of MOS for FAA approval Audience Civil aviation agencies like the FAA, ICAO, military aviation organizations, and civil aviation stakeholders Main obstacle for implementation Will require FAA support Implementation Actions to present the product in airport conferences and aviation safety meetings (TRB, AAAE, ACC, ACI) Presentation to the FAA Office of Airports Limitations Can only be used to assess risk for straight parallel segments of taxiways and taxilanes. Taxiway deviations for smaller aircraft were assumed to be equal or smaller than deviations for the Boeing 747 aircraft. Application of the models for taxiway and taxilane deviations assume the centerline is conspicuous under any weather and light conditions. Veer-off models were developed based on incidents and accidents of aircraft with MTOW larger than 5,600 lbs. Assumed the lateral and vertical deviation probability distributions provided by the Collision Risk Model is conservative when considering visual conditions. Conclusions The methodology developed in this research study provides a practical and simple guide to help airports quantify and evaluate risk associated with nonstandard airfield separations. The risk assessment obtained can be helpful to examine the feasibility of and to support MOS requests to the FAA. The methodology is based on lateral and vertical deviation studies and models developed in this research as well as in previous studies conducted by the FAA, Boeing, and ICAO. The methodology was validated using twenty MOS cases approved by the FAA.