Transcript Privacy in Mobile Internet - Western Michigan University

Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
(PETs)
Simone Fischer-Hübner
Note: The “OPTIONAL” tags (for the CS 6910 students)
and page numbers were added by L. Lilien
Overview
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
Introduction to PETs
Anonymous Communication Technologies
Anonymous eCash
P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences)
Privacy-enhanced Idenity Management
2
I. Introduction to PETs
Need for Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies



Law alone is not sufficient for protecting
privacy in our Network Society
PETs needed for implementing Law
PETs for empowering users to exercise
their rights
3
Classifications of PETs
1. PETs for minimizing/ avoiding personal data losses
(-> Art. 6 I c., e. EU Directive 95/46/EC)
(providing Anonymity, Pseudonymity, Unobservability, Unlinkability)
 At communication level:
•
Mix nets, Onion Routing
•
DC nets
•
Crowds

At application level:
Anonymous Ecash
•
Anonymous Credentials
2. PETs for the safeguarding of lawful processing
(-> Art. 17 EU Directive 95/46/EC)
•
P3P
•
Privacy policy languages
•
Encryption
3. Combination of 1 & 2
•
Privacy-enhanced Identity Management
•
4
Definitions - Anonymity

Anonymity: The state of being not
identifiable within a set of subjects (e.g. set
of senders or recipients), the anonymity set
Source: Pfitzmann/Hansen
5
Perfect sender/receiver
anonymity

Perfect sender (receiver) anonymity:
An attacker cannot distinguish the
situations in which a potential sender
(receiver) actually sent (received) a
message or not.
6
Definitions - Unobservability

Unobservability ensures that a user may use a
resource or service without others being able to
observe that the resource or service is being
used
Source: Pfitzmann/Hansen
7
Definitions - Unlinkability

Unlinkability of two or more items (e.g., subjects,
messages, events):


Within the system, from the attacker’s perspective,
these items are no more or less related after the
attacker’s observation than they were before
Unlinkability of sender and recipient (relationship
anonymity):

It is untraceable who is communicating with whom
8
Definitions - Pseudonymity


Pseudonymity is the
use of pseudonyms
as IDs
Pseudonymity allows
to provide both
privacy protection
and accountability
Person pseudonym
Role
pseudonym
Relationship
pseudonym
Role-relationship pseudonym
Transaction pseudonym
L
I
N
K
A
B
I
L
I
T
y
Source: Pfitzmann/Hansen
9
Definitions - Pseudonymity
(cont.)
Source: Pfitzmann/Hansen
10
II. Anonymous Communication
Technologies
Mix-nets (Chaum, 1981)
Bob
Alice
A2, r1
A3, r2 Bob, r3, msg K3 K2
K1
msg
Mix 3
Mix 1
A3, r2 Bob, r3, msg
K3 K2
Bob, r3, msg K3
Mix 2
Ki: public key of Mixi, ri: random number, Ai: address of Mixi
11
OPTIONAL
Functionality of a Mix Server
(Mixi)
Input Message Mi
Discard
repeated
messages
Collect
messages in
batch or
pool
Sufficient
messages from
many senders ?
Change
outlook
*)
i
Reorder
*) decrypts Mi = ci[Ai+1, ri, Mi+1] with the private key ci of Mixi,
ignores random number ri,
obtains address Ai+1 and encrypted Mi+1
Output Message
Mi+1 to Mixi+1
MIX
Message
DB
12
OPTIONAL
Why are random numbers
needed ?
If no random number ri is used :
ci(M, Ai+1 )
Mixi
M
Mixi+1
Address(Mixi+1) =
Ai+1
=?
ci (M, Ai+1)
13
OPTIONAL
Sender Anonymity with Mix
nets
14
OPTIONAL
Sender Anonymity with Mix-nets
(cont.)
15
OPTIONAL
Recipient Anonymity with Mix- nets
16
OPTIONAL
Recipient anonymity with Mix- nets
(cont.)
17
Two-Way Anonymous Conversation
18
Protection properties &
Attacker Model for Mix nets

Protection properties:



Attacker may:





Sender anonymity against recipients
Unlinkability of sender and recipient
Observe all communication lines
Send own messages
Delay messages
Operate Mix servers (all but one...)
Attacker cannot:


Break cryptographic operations
Attack the users personal machine
19
Attacks & Countermeasures
Passive attacks:
Correlation by content :
-> all message to / from Mix should be encrypted and have to include
random string
Correlation by message length :
-> uniform message length (through padding)
Time correlation :
-> Output batch: accumulate N messages, forward them in random order
-> Pool: If (N+1)th message arrives, forward one message from the pool
-> Combination of batch + pool
-> Interval batching: Fill batch/pool with dummy messages at end of time
interval T
20
-> random delay
OPTIONAL
Attacks & Countermeasures
Active attacks:
Isolate & Identify ( (n-1)-attack):
-> Dummy messages
-> Check sender ID
Message replay attacks:
-> Discard replays
-> Intermix detours
-> charge of Ecash
Intersection/partitioning attacks:
-> Mix cascades (use always the same sequence of Mixes)
21
Mix- Applications:
Anonymous remailers




Sender anonymity against
recipients
Servers that strip off identifying
information from emails and
forward them to receiver
Simple remailers (one ”Mix”) are
”single points of trust” with no
protection against time/content
correlation attacks
Some use encryption, can be
chained and work like mixes
(e.g., Mixmaster)
Sender
Remailer
Recipient
22
OPTIONAL
Existing Mix-based systems for
HTTP (real-time)

Simple Proxies



Anonymizer.com
ProxyMate.com
Mix-based Systems considering traffic
analysis:



Onion Routing (Naval Research Center)
TOR (Free Haven project)
JAP (TU Dresden)
23
OPTIONAL
Anonymising Proxies –
Anonymizer.com
Functionality:




Web proxy (single ”Mix”) that
forwards request on the user’s
behalf
Does not forward IP address of end
user
Eliminates infos about user’s
machine (e.g., previously visited
sites)
Filters out cookies, JavaScript, active
content
Limitations:


Single point of trust
Connection itself is not anonymised
24
Onion Routing



Onion = Object with layers of public key encryption to produce
anonymous bi-directional virtual circuit between communication
partners and to distribute symmetric keys
Initiator's proxy constructs “forward onion” which encapsulates a
route to the responder
(Faster) symmetric encryption for data communication via the circuit
U
X
Z
Y
X
Y
Y
Z
Z
Z
25
OPTIONAL – see 6030 slides
Forward Onion for route W-X-Y-Z:
X exp-timex, Y, Ffx, Kfx, Fbx, Kbx
Y exp-timey, Z, Ffy, Kfy, Fby, Kby,
Z exp_timez, NULL, Ffz, Kfz, Fbz, Kbz, PADDING
Each node N receives (PKN = public key of node N):

{exp-time, next-hop, Ff, Kf, Fb, Kb, payload} PKN

exp-time:
expiration time

next_hop:
next routing node

(Ff, Kf) :
function / key pair for symmetric encryption of data moving
forward in the virtual circuit

(Fb, Kb) :
function/key pair for symmetric encryption of data moving
backwards in the virtual circuit

payload:
another onion (or null for responder´s proxy)
26
OPTIONAL
Example: Virtual Circuit with
Onion Routing
27
OPTIONAL
Onion Routing - Review

Functionality:





Hiding of routing information in connection oriented
communication relations
Nested public key encryption for building up virtual
circuit
Expiration_time field reduces costs of replay detection
Dummy traffic between Mixes (Onion Routers)
Limitations:

First/Last-Hop Attacks by


Timing correlations
Message length (No. of cells sent over circuit)
28
Crowds for anonymous WebTransactions
1.
User first joins a "crowd" of other users, where he is
represented by a "jondo" process on his local machine
2.
User configures his browser to employ the local jondo
as a proxy for all new services
3.
User´s request is passed by the jondo to a random
member of the crowd
4.
That member can either submit the request directly to
the web server or forward it to another randomly (with
pf> 1/2) chosen user.
-> Request is eventually submitted by a random member
[jondo – derived from “John Doe”], an epitome for an anonymous
29
OPTIONAL
Communications with Crowds
1
6
3
5
5
1
2
6
2
3
4
4
Communications between jondos is encrypted with keys shared
between jondos
30
Anonymity degrees in Crowds
31
OPTIONAL
Anonymity Properties in
Crowds
32
Crowds -Review

Sender anonymity against:




end web servers
other Crowd members
eavesdroppers
Limitations:






No protection against “global” attackers, timing/message length
correlation attacks
Web server´s log may record submitting jondo´s IP address as
the request originator´s address
Request contents are exposed to jondos on the path
Anonymising service can be circumvented by Java Applets, Active
X controls
Performance overhead (increased retrieval time, network traffic
and load on jondo machines)
33
No defend against DoS-attacks by malicious crowd members
OPTIONAL
DC (Dining Cryptographers) nets
[Chaum 1988 ]
34
OPTIONAL
DC-nets: Perfect sender anonymity
through Binary superposed sending and
broadcast
35
OPTIONAL
Anonymity preserving multiaccess protocols
36
OPTIONAL
Anonymity preserving multiaccess protocols (cont.)
37
OPTIONAL
Implementation-Example:
Local-Area Ring Networks
38
OPTIONAL
DC nets - Review

Protection properties:




Perfect sender anonymity through superposed sending
(message bits are hidden by one-time pad encryption)
Message secrecy through encryption
Recipient anonymity through broadcast and implicit
addresses (addressee is user who can successfully decrypt
message)
Problems:


Denial of Service attacks by DC-net participants (Defense:
trap protocols)
Random key string distribution
39
III. Anonymous Ecash
based on Blind Signatures
Protocol Overview
40
Protocol steps for creating and
spending untraceable Ecash
Customer (Alice):



Bank:



generates a note number (100-digit number) at random
in essence multiplies it by a blinding (random) factor
signs the blinded number with a private key and sends it to the bank
verifies and removes Alice´s signature
debits Alice´s account (by $1)
signs blinded note with a digital signature indicating its $1-value and sends it to Alice
Customer (Alice):


divides out the blinding factor
uses bank notes (transfers it to shop)
Merchant (Bob):


Bank:




verifies bank´s digital signature
transmits note to bank
verifies its signature
checks the note against a list of those already spent
credits Bob´s account
sends signed ”deposit slip” to Bob
Merchant (Bob):

hands the merchandise to Alice together with his own signed receipt
41
OPTIONAL
Mathematical protocol for issuing
and spending untraceable money
[Chaum 1987]
(e,n) : bank´s public key,
(d,n): bank´s private key
1. Alice chooses at random x and r, and supplies the bank with
B= re * f(x) (mod n) where:
x: serial number of bank note, r: blinding factor, f: one-way function
2. The bank returns Bd (mod n) = (re f(x) )d (mod n) = r * f(x) d (mod n)
and withdraws one dollar from her account
3. Alice extracts
C = Bd / r (mod n) = f(x)d (mod n)
from B
4. To pay Bob one dollar, Alice gives him the pair (x, f(x)d(mod n))
5. Bob immediately calls the bank, verifying that this note has not already been
deposited
The Bank and the shop do not know the blinding factor, i.e. they cannot relate the
banknote to Alice -> Alice can shop anonymously
42
OPTIONAL
Why is one-way function f needed?


Suppose (x, xd mod n) is electronic money
Money can be forged:



choose y
exhibit (ye mod n, y)
To forge money of the form (x, f(x)d mod n),
you have to produce (f-1(ye) mod n, y).
43
OPTIONAL
Blind Signatures and Perfect Crime
(e.g. blackmail)
[von Solms et al. 1992]:
Open bank account, create blinded notes, send
mail with threat announcement and blinded notes
Let the bank first sign the blinded notes and then
publish them (e.g. in a newspaper)
Divide out blinding factors to create digital money
(only the blackmailer knows the blinding factors)



Note: Conditions are worse as in usual kidnapping
cases:



Police cannot register serial number of bank notes
No physical contact needed (to transfer blackmailed
money)
44
IV. Platform for Privacy Preferences
Project (P3P) - Overview

Developed by the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C)









Summarize privacy policies
Compare privacy policies with user
preferences
Alert and advise users

P3P increases transparency,
but it does not set baseline
standards or enforce policies
P3P user agent software

Does not require web sites to
change their server software
Enables the development of
tools (built into browsers or
separate applications) that
P3P helps users understand
privacy policies

Final P3P 1.0 Recommendation
issued 16 April 2002
Allows web sites to
communicate about their
privacy policies in a standard
computer-readable format


Microsoft Internet Explorer 6
Netscape Navigator 7
AT&T Privacy Bird
http://privacybird.com/
For more information

http://www.w3.org/P3P/
http://p3ptoolbox.org/

Web Privacy with P3P

by Lorrie Faith Cranor
http://p3pbook.com/
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
45
Basic components


P3P provides a standard XML format that web sites
use to encode their privacy policies
Sites also provide XML “policy reference files” to
indicate which policy applies to which part of the site
(usually at ”well known location” /w3c/p3p.xml)


Sites can optionally provide a ”compact policy” by
configuring their servers to issue a special P3P
header when cookies are set
“P3P user agent” fetch and read P3P policies and can


inform users about the site’s P3P privacy practices, and/or
compare P3P policies with privacy preferences (in XML) set
by users and take appropriate actions
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
46
A simple HTTP transaction
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.att.com
. . . Request web page
Web
Server
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
. . . Send web page
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
47
… with P3P 1.0 added
GET /w3c/p3p.xml HTTP/1.1
Host: www.att.com
Request Policy Reference File
Web
Server
Send Policy Reference File
Request P3P Policy
Send P3P Policy
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
Host: www.att.com
. . . Request web page
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
. . . Send web page
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
48
P3P increases transparency


P3P clients can
check a privacy
policy each time it
changes
P3P clients can
check privacy
policies on all
objects in a web
page, including ads
and invisible images
http://www.att.com/accessatt/
http://adforce.imgis.com/?adlink|2|68523|1|146|ADFORCE
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
49
P3P in [MS] IE6
Automatic processing of
compact policies only;
third-party cookies without
compact policies blocked by
default
Privacy icon on status bar
indicates that a cookie has
been blocked – pop-up appears
the first time the privacy icon
appears
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
50
Users can click on
privacy icon for
list of cookies;
privacy summaries
are available at
sites that are
P3P-enabled
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
51
Privacy summary
report is
generated
automatically
from full P3P policy
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
52
AT&T Privacy Bird






Free download of beta from
http://privacybird.com/
“Browser helper object” for
IE 5.01/5.5/6.0
Reads P3P policies at all
P3P-enabled sites automatically
Puts bird icon at top of browser window that changes to
indicate whether site matches user’s privacy preferences
Clicking on bird icon gives more information
Current version is information only – no cookie blocking
Source: Lorrie Cranor, lorrie.cranor.org
53
OPTIONAL
Chirping bird is privacy
indicator
Source: Lorrie Cranor,
lorrie.cranor.org
54
OPTIONAL
Click on the bird for more info
55
OPTIONAL
Privacy policy summary mismatch
Source: Lorrie Cranor,56
lorrie.cranor.org
OPTIONAL
Users select warning conditions
Source: Lorrie Cranor,57
lorrie.cranor.org
What’s in a P3P policy?







Name and contact information for site
The kind of access provided
Mechanisms for resolving privacy disputes
The kinds of data collected
How (for what purposes) collected data is
used, and whether individuals can opt-in or
opt-out of any of these uses
Whether/when data may be shared and
whether there is opt-in or opt-out
Data retention policy
58
Source: Lorrie Cranor
P3P/XML encoding
Statement
P3P version
<POLICIES xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/01/P3Pv1">
<POLICY discuri="http://p3pbook.com/privacy.html"
Location of
name="policy">
human-readable
P3P policy name
<ENTITY>
<DATA-GROUP>
privacy policy
<DATA
Site’s
ref="#business.contact-info.online.email">[email protected]
name
</DATA>
<DATA
and
ref="#business.contact-info.online.uri">http://p3pbook.com/
contact
</DATA>
info
<DATA ref="#business.name">Web Privacy With P3P</DATA>
</DATA-GROUP>
Access disclosure
</ENTITY>
Human-readable
<ACCESS><nonident/></ACCESS>
explanation
<STATEMENT>
<CONSEQUENCE>We keep standard web server logs.</CONSEQUENCE>
<PURPOSE><admin/><current/><develop/></PURPOSE>
How data may
<RECIPIENT><ours/></RECIPIENT>
be used
<RETENTION><indefinitely/></RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP>
Data recipients
<DATA ref="#dynamic.clickstream"/>
<DATA ref="#dynamic.http"/>
Data retention policy
</DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
Types of data collected
</POLICY>
</POLICIES>
59
Source: Lorrie Cranor
P3P - Limitations
P3P alone does not
 ensure compliance of privacy policies with
privacy laws
 guarantee a minimum, non-negotiable level
of privacy protection for individuals
Are users forced/pushed to give-up privacy ?
60
OPTIONAL
V. Privacy-Enhanced Identity
Management - Motivation
phone no
Friend Glenn
Government
name
income
tax
interests
Blood
group
diary
Hospital
Users release different partial identities in
dependence of their current roles/relationships
61
OPTIONAL
EU FP6 Integrated Project
Vision: Users can act securely and safely in the
Information Society while keeping sovereignty of their
private sphere
http://www.prime-project.eu.org/
62
OPTIONAL
Pseudonymous Credential
Systems
(according to [Chaum 1985 ])
63
OPTIONAL
PRIME – user control of data
release and linkability
User controls
 What personal data
is provided to what
site under which
conditions
 What identities
/pseudonyms to use
for interactions
Person pseudonym
Role
pseudonym
Relationship
pseudonym
Role-relationship pseudonym
Transaction pseudonym
[Pfitzmann/Hansen]
L
I
N
K
A
B
I
L
I
T
y
64
OPTIONAL
PRIME - E-Shopping Application
65
OPTIONAL
HCI in PRIME: From legal reqs to PRIME UI
- Enforcing informed consent



JITCTAs- ”Just-in-Time Clickthrough
Agreements”
Art. 29 Working Party Proposal of
Mulitlayered Privacy Notices
DADAs – ”Drag and Drop Agreements”
66
OPTIONAL
Dialog box for click-through
67
OPTIONAL
”DADA” to send credit card
info
68
OPTIONAL
From legal reqs to PRIME UI –
Data Track

Increase transparancy through

Intelligible access to previous data disclosures



Scrollable transaction records,
Search template sentences: “Who has received my [drop-down
list with data]?”
Online help and functions for exercising basic rights
69
OPTIONAL
PRIME application scenario for RFIDs based on “Blocker” Tag
1,2,3, …, 2023 pairs
of sneakers and…
(reading fails)…
Blocker simulates
all (billions of)
possible tag serial
numbers!!
70
Source:Ari Juels, RSA Laboratories
OPTIONAL
Two bottles
of Merlot
#458790
Blocker tag system should protect privacy but still
71
avoid blocking unpurchased items
OPTIONAL
Selective blocker tags
(RSA Laboratories)

Blocker tag can be selective:



Privacy zones: Only block certain ranges of RFIDtag serial numbers
Zone mobility: Allow shops to move items into
privacy zone upon purchase
Example:




Tags might carry a “privacy bit”
Blocker blocks all identifiers with privacy bit on
Items in supermarket have privacy bit off
On checkout, leading bit is flipped from off to on

PIN required, as for “kill” operation
72
OPTIONAL
PRIME
IDM
Privcay-enhanced IDM solution
73
OPTIONAL
Privacy-enhanced IDM




User’s personal device act as a ”RFID proxy”
and runs an IDM system
blocks all tags in a certain range and
response on their behalfs
Personal device controls what RFIDs may be
selectively scanned, or can pretend that user
carries certain RFIDs
Response is governed by user-defined privacy
policy, computed by IDM system
74
OPTIONAL
Questions ?
http://www.cs.kau.se/~simone/
75
SEE CS 6910 WEB PAGE
Further reading
A.Pfitzmann, M.Hansen, ”Anonymity, Unlinkability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management – A Consolidated
Proposal for Terminology”, V0.28, http://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de/Anon_Terminology.shtml
D.Chaum, "Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms", Communications of the ACM, 24 (2). 1981,
pp. 84-88, http://world.std.com/~franl/crypto/chaum-acm-1981.html
D.Chaum, "The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability", Journal of Cryptology, 1,
1988.
D.Chaum, "Security without Identification: Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete", Communications of the ACM, 28
(10). 1985, pp.1030-1044, http://www.chaum.com/articles/Security_Wthout_Identification.htm
P. Syverson, D. Goldschlag, M. Reed, "Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing", Proceedings of the 1997 Symposium on
Security and Privacy, Oakland, 1997, http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/projects/onion-routing/OAKLAND_97.ps ,
http://www.onion-router.net/Publications.html
M.Reiter, A.Rubin, "Anonymous Web Transactions with Crowds", Communications of the ACM, Vol.42, No.2, February 1999, pp.
32-38.
D.Chaum, "Achieving Electronic Privacy", Scientific American, August 1992, pp.76-81,
http://www.chaum.com/articles/Achieving_Electronic_Privacy.htm
Garfinkel, Juels, Pappu, ”RFID PRivacy: An Overview of Problems and Proposed Solutions”, IEEE Security & Privacy, May/June
2005
PRIME Framework V1, April 2005, http://www.prime-project.eu.org/
Simone Fischer-Hübner, "IT-Security and Privacy - Design and Use of Privacy-Enhancing Security Mechanisms", Springer
Scientific Publishers, Lecture Notes of Computer Science, LNCS 1958, May 2001, ISBN 3-540-42142-4 (chapter 4).
76