Transcript Issues Facing U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

Issues Facing U.S.
Ballistic Missile Defense
Philip E. Coyle
Center for Defense Information
For the Arms Control Association
July 21, 2009
“The Threat”
Five Nations on Bush Chart but not on
Obama Chart:
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Moldova
Russia
China
Israel
South Korea
15 Nations on both Bush and Obama
Charts:
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Belarus
Ukraine
Syria
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
North Korea
Vietnam
India
Pakistan
Yemen
UAE
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Egypt
Libya
Issue #1
• Does the Congress believe that Iran
or North Korea is so suicidal that it
would attack the United States with
missiles?
• Such an attack would justify massive
retaliation, and the decapitation of
the regime that authorized the attack.
Issue #2
• Does the Congress intend that U.S. missile defenses
be able to handle attacks involving multiple
offensive missiles launched by Iran or North Korea,
not just one or two?
• Having developed and successfully tested any given
offensive missile type, it would not be difficult or
expensive for an adversary to build many missiles
of the same type. If an adversary would attack with
missiles, it would not just fire one or two, and then
sit back and wait for the consequences.
Issue #3
• Does the Congress intend that the proposed missile
defenses be able to handle decoys and
countermeasures?
• As explained a decade ago by the National
Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear
Programs, Iran or North Korea “probably would
rely initially on available technology - including
separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV
reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM),
booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff,
and simple (balloon) decoys - to develop
penetration aids and countermeasures.”
Issue #4
• What degree of effectiveness does the
Congress expect? That is, what probability of
successful intercept in actual battle would the
Congress accept?
• For example, is it acceptable to the Congress if
the system is only 10 percent effective and 90
percent of enemy missiles get through?
Issue #5
• To what extent is the Congress willing
to support working with Russia on a
solution that is in the interest of both
the United States and Russia, while
also sustaining our strong commitment
to our allies in Europe and Asia?
Options for Europe
• All four of the Options examined by CBO require close
partnership with Russia, as all four Options involve a radar on
Russian territory or very close to Russian territory. This is a great
strength of the CBO Options.
• If Iran were so suicidal as to attack Europe, the first thing Iran
would do is attack the “eyes” of the system. With a forward-based
X-band radar in Azerbaijan or Armavir, as recommended by CBO,
that would mean that Iran would have to attack Russia. This leads
then to the obvious question, is Iran so suicidal that it would attack
BOTH Europe AND Russia at the same time?
• The introduction of this idea and of Ascent-Phase missile defense
means that the original concept and architecture for U.S. missile
defenses in Europe has been overtaken by events.
Proliferation and Missile
Defense
• Missile defenses lead to proliferation.
• For example, Soviet and U.S. MIRVs in the
late 1960’s and 1970s.
• And recently, North Korea, Iran, Russia, and
China each have announced new steps to
counter U.S. missile defenses.
• U.S. missile defenses aimed at North Korea
and Iran have not deterred proliferation.
Some generalities
• Shorter range systems tend to be less expensive,
have undergone more extensive testing, and have
better track records in those tests, albeit scripted for
success.
• Decoys and countermeasures are different for shorter
range systems than for systems that operate outside
the atmosphere. None have been adequately tested.
• The best enemy “countermeasure” may well be to just
fire more offensive missiles.
• This leads to an arms race where the adversary just
builds more offensive missiles to overwhelm U.S.
defenses.
Test Results Summary
• 21 hits in 39 attempts = Patriot PAC-3
• 17 hits in 21 attempts = Aegis
• 6 hits in 6 attempts = THAAD, since 2006
• 8 hits in 14 attempts = GMD, but the most
recent hit was a partial failure. No decoys.
However, by design, all flight intercept tests have been
scripted for success.
And were not conducted with realistic decoys and
countermeasures.
Patriot in OIF ~ Friendly Fire
• March 23, 2003, a U.S. Patriot missile battery fired on a
British Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 aircraft as it was
returning from a mission, killing its two crew members.
• On March 25, a U.S. PATRIOT missile battery south of
Najaf nearly shot down a USAF F-16 jet after the battery's
radar locked on the jet. Believing he was being “painted”
by an Iraqi missile battery, not by U.S. forces, the F-16 pilot
fired back.
• A PATRIOT PAC-3 missile shot down a U.S. Navy F/A-18C
Hornet fighter jet on April 2, killing the pilot.
• This history raises issues about Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill, the
newest MDA program.
SECDEF Gates on ABL
Secretary Gates, HASC, May 13, 2009
SECDEF Gates on ABL cont’d
• “So, right now the ABL would have to orbit inside
the borders of Iran in order to be able to try and
use its laser to shoot down that missile in the
boost phase. And if you were to operationalize this
you would be looking at 10 to 20 747s, at a billion
and a half dollars apiece, and $100 million a year
to operate. And there's nobody in uniform that I
know who believes that this is a workable
concept.”
Secretary Gates, HASC, May 13, 2009
SECDEF Gates on KEI
• “The Missile Agency itself last fall, during the Bush
administration, essentially eliminated the kinetic energy
interceptor from its FY '10 POM.”
• “First of all, this was to have been a five-year development
program and it now looks like it's about a 16-year
development program.”
• “The missile’s 38 or 39-feet long. It weighs 12 tons.
There’s no extant ship we can put it on. We would have to
design a new ship to put it on. And as I say, it would have
to operate in close proximity to the territorial waters of
these countries.”
• “So for all these reasons, the decision has been made that
this is not a productive way to look at the booster problem.”
Secretary Gates, House Defense Approps, May 20, 2009
Further Issues
• Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill, a new program.
• To what extent will ALHK supercede or
conflict with existing programs?
• SBIRS-High and STSS way behind schedule
and billions over budget.
• Sea-Based X-Band Radar compatibility with
the maritime environment.
New Directions for US Missile
Defense?
• Has testing been rigorous enough? No.
Always overly scripted. MDA ThreePhase review; Critical Engagement
Conditions.
• Which system holds the greatest promise
over the short, medium, and long-term?
Ascent-Phase? A brand new program!
• What will be the future budgetary
constraints? ~ $10 billion/year is a lot.
“There’s no crying is baseball!”
• The Obama MDA budget ($7.8 billion) = Bush request in
2006.
• Bigger than Bush request in 2004 ($7.7 B).
• And significantly bigger than Bush request in 2003 ($6.7
Billion).
• And the Obama MDA budget is equal to or greater than the
as-passed appropriations by Congress in four of the Bush
years, including two years when Republicans controlled
both the Congress and the White House (2004 and 2006).
Most Asked Questions
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Q: Which systems are farthest
along?
A: None are very far along, despite
the U.S. trying for 60 years.
Q: How well proven are these
systems?
A: Any determined adversary can
overwhelm them.
Q: Can we rely on the UHF search
radars and X-band targeting radars?
A: Not against an adaptive enemy.
Q: How capable are each of the
systems in a real world situation vs.
decoys and pen-aids? What are the
realities of the testing programs?
A: None have been adequately
tested. Tests are designed for
success.
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Q: What are the budget implications
and costs?
A: No U.S. system is “cost effective
on the margin.” Costs are open
ended with no end in sight?
Q: How much more difficult is it to
intercept ICBMs than SRBMs?
A: Both involve environments that
can be exploited by an enemy.
Q: What is the viability of the “3rd”
GMD site in Europe and potential
alternative architectures?
A: The current plan with an X-band
radar near Prague is vulnerable.
Working with Russia is better.
Backup slides
Focus on the Rogue Threat
• “We
will restructure the program to focus on the
rogue state and theater missile threat.”
• “We will terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV)
program because it is not a necessary capability to
defeat rogue threats, …”
• “We will also terminate the Kinetic Energy
Interceptor (KEI) program since its capability is also
inconsistent with the missile defense mission to
counter rogue nations threats, …”
Lt. Gen Patrick J. O’Reilly, HASC, May 21, 2009
• “The Obama-Biden Administration will
support missile defense, but ensure that it is
developed in a way that is pragmatic and
cost-effective; and, most importantly, does
not divert resources from other national
security priorities until we are positive the
technology will protect the American
public.”
Obama White House web site.
Missile Defense in Europe
• “As long as the threat from Iran
persists, we will go forward with
a missile defense system that is
cost-effective and proven.”
President Barack Obama, April 5, 2009, Prague.
PAC-3
• The PAC-3 has made a target intercept 21 times out
of 29 attempts during testing. There has also been
one failed intercept test conducted with Japanese
forces on Sept. 17, 2008. The latest PAC-3 flight test
was held on April 21, 2009 where two PAC-3 missiles
reportedly engaged a target ballistic missile. This was
the first test of the PAC-3 that incorporated an
advanced guidance system, known as the Simplified
Inertial Measurement Unit, into the missile.
Aegis
• “The Aegis BMD system has achieved 14
successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 18
attempts. This total includes one successful
intercept and one unsuccessful intercept by
Japanese Aegis ships in two Japanese test
flights. The Aegis BMD system has also
achieved 3 successful endo- atmospheric
intercepts in 3 attempts, for a combined total of
17 successful exo- and endo- atmospheric
intercepts in 21 attempts.”
Congressional Research Service, April 13, 2009
Aegis Issues
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Cost relative to Defended Area
Range/speed of SM-3 interceptors
Divert capability ~ SDACS
Scripted tests
THAAD
• THAAD testing stopped in 1999, program
revamped. Testing resumed in late 2005.
• Since then, THAAD has made an intercept
in six out of eight flight test attempts. The
latest flight test, FTT-10, was held on March
18, 2009, and resulted in an intercept.
• Target complications caused the two
unsuccessful attempts.
THAAD
• According to FY09 budget MDA plans to deliver first
THAAD fire unit between 2QFY09 and 4QFY10 (instead of
3QFY08 and 3QFY09, as planned in the previous year’s
budget request); it will be made up of 24 interceptors, 3
launchers, 1 THAAD radar, and 2 fire control and
communications units. The second fire unit will be
delivered between 3QFY10 and 4QFY11 (instead of
3QFY09 and 4QFY10, as planned in the previous year’s
budget request), with same components as the first
THAAD fire unit. Significant schedule delays, many of
which are due to problems with its test targets.
GMD
• The system has made eight intercepts out of fourteen
attempts. The latest test, FTG-05, held on Dec. 5, 2008,
resulted in an intercept, but decoys did not deploy.
• But in the last five years there have only been 6 flight
intercept tests, and four of those have failed, a success
rate of only 33%. The MDA counts the most recent of
those six tests as a partial failure, but considering that
the main reason for the test was not achieved, it was a
serious setback.
SECDEF Gates on ABL, cont’d
• I have kept the first -- the prototype,
because we do need to continue the
research on directed energy and on
lasers, and that will be robustly funded
because we do need to continue
developing a boost- phase capability.
But, operationally, this first test, for
example, is going to be from a range of
85 miles.”
Secretary Gates, HASC, May 13, 2009
SECDEF Gates on KEI, cont’d
• “But a big part of the problem with this
program is that it needs to be close to
the launch site to be able to be
effective. -- the only potential country
where it could have a role with some
confidence would be North Korea. It
has poor capability against Iran and
virtually no capability against either
Russia or Chinese launch facilities.”
Secretary Gates, House Defense Approps, May 20, 2009
SECDEF Gates on MKV
Secretary Gates, SASC, May 14, 2009
Patriot in OIF
• PAC-3 was designed to intercept SCUDs, after the first
Persian Gulf War in which some 158 PATRIOTs were fired
at 42 SCUDs launched by Iraq, and almost none shot
down.
• The GAO estimated the Patriot success rate in the Persian
Gulf War may have been no better than 9 percent, or four
SCUDs shot down.
• The Congressional Research Service reported that there
was conclusive proof of only one destroyed Scud
warhead.
• Israel came to similar conclusions which are part of the
public record.
Patriot in OIF, cont’d
• At first the Army and President George H.W. Bush
claimed near perfection, saying 41 of 42 Iraqi
missiles were shot down. The Army said 95% at
first, but later revised that figure downward in
successive steps. In 1992, SECDEF William Perry
told a congressional committee that PATRIOT was
"not an effective antiballistic missile system”
because it was too easily confused by
countermeasures.
• On January 12, 2001, Secretary of Defense
William S. Cohen said, "the PATRIOT didn't work.”
Patriot in OIF cont’d
• To this day the PAC-3 is still untested in battle. Iraq
fired no SCUDs in OIF, having destroyed or
dismantled them all per UN resolution. Instead Iraq
fired shorter-range missiles and low flying cruise
missiles for which PAC-3 was not designed. These
were FROG -7 missiles, Ababil-100s, CSSCs, and
Al Samoud missiles.A history written by the 32d
Army Air and Missile Defense Command
documents 23 Iraqi missile launches (9 Ababil100s, 4 Al Samouds, 4 CSSC-3s, 4 FROG-7s, and
2 unknowns).
Patriot in OIF cont’d
• In OIF the Army claimed 8 engagements for 9 tries, and possibly 9
for 9. Thus even if we assume that the Army brought down 8 or 9
targets, that leaves 14 or 15 enemy targets that Patriot did not bring
down.
• Also, it puts the Army’s claim into perspective to point out that 24
PATRIOTs were fired at those 9 targets, and if every one of the nine
were hit, that would be only a ratio of 37.5% (9/24).
• PAC-3 did not play a role in OIF because, compared to other
variants, there were relatively few in the field. One PAC-3 was
responsible for one of the fratricides.In OIF only 54 PAC-3s ended up
being deployed in-theater, out of a total of 1069 PATRIOT
interceptors that were rushed in-theater. Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, told
Congress, only four PAC-3's were fired in OIF and one of those
PAC-3s shot down a U.S. Navy F-18 jet fighter.