Transcript POLITICAL REGIONAL STUDIES

REGIONALISM IN
WORLD POLITICS
Prof. Alexander Sergunin
Department of International Relations
Theory & History
St. Petersburg State University
Russia
[email protected]
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE
COURSE
To examine the main theories of
regionalism and regionalization,
 To analyze the basic types of regionalism
in the EU and Russia;
 To study the main trends in interregional
cooperation in contemporary Europe.
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Skills acquired from the course
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To know the countries of the regions and basic
information about their politics and economy;
To operate with macro-, mezo- and micro-levels of
regional studies, as well theories of integration,
functionalism and neo-functionalism, interdependency;
To be aware of the cases of regionalism in the Baltic Sea
area, Arctic Area, Russia.
To understand the problems of contemporary
regionalism, the balance of cooperation and competition.
THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL
REGIONAL STUDIES (PRS)
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Domestically-oriented approaches:
The same as regional planning (economic geography):
socio-economic and political development of a region
Region as a historical-cultural entity
(antropological/socio-historical approach)
Region as a legal entity/sub-national unit
(administrative unit, autonomy, member of a
federation, overseas territory, etc.)
Political science: complex approach (combination of
the above approaches; any kind of a region with a
clearly identifiable centre of political power)
THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL
REGIONAL STUDIES (PRS)
2. Internationally-oriented approaches:
 International region in political geography
 International region in economic
geography
 International region in International
Relations Theory (IRT)
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THE STATUS OF PRS IN THE
SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
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Inter-disciplinary
prs
THE STATUS OF PRS IN THE
SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
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Autonomous discipline with the subject
and methods of its own
PRS
THE STATUS OF PRS IN THE
SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
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Part of political science (PS) with a
specific subject
PS
PRS
THE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
IN PRS
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Macro-level: meta-theories (paradigms) - political realism;
liberalism/globalism; post-positivism/social constructivism
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Mezo-level: middle-range theories: institutional approach
(legal studies, comparativism); rational choice; behavioural
studies; structural-functional approach; discourse analysis
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Micro-level: specific research methods and techniques
(applied, empirical)
The PS/IRT paradigms on
regionalism 1
Political realists and geopoliticians: the
emergence of regions (both domestic and
international), the world-wide process of
regionalisation are the results of powers
politics, struggle for re-distribution of
spheres of influence. Regionalism is not
valuable as such, it is a dependent
variable
The PS/IRT paradigms on
regionalism 2
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The liberal institutionalists: regionalism is a
natural and useful process, the way to
enhance international co-operation;
geoeconomics, instead of geopolitics.
Importance of “gate-way” and pilot regions
for the success of world’s regionalisation
The PS/IRT paradigms on
regionalism 3
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Globalists: regionalism is another side of
globalisation; regionalisation and
globalisation should be harmonised; they
both should be even and beneficial for all
international actors; regionalisation and
globalisation as instruments of desovereignisation, erosion of state and
creation of a global civil society
The PS/IRT paradigms on
regionalism 4
Social constructivists: identity-oriented
approach to regionalisation; multi-level
regionalisation as a way to nonconfronting identities; focus on regions-inthe-making (the Baltic Sea, Barents Sea,
Black Sea, Asia-Pacific regions, etc.)
TYPES OF FEDERALISM - I
1. Legal Basis:
 Contractual/treaty-based (USSR, RSFSR,
the Federative Treaty of 1992)
 Constitutional/constitution-based (the
Russian Constitution of 1993)
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TYPES OF FEDERALISM - II
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2. Nature of a unit:
Ethnic-based (USSR, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, etc.)
Administrative-territorial (USA, FRG,
etc.)
Mixed (the Russian Federation)
THE STRUCTURE OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (83)
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Regions (oblasts) - 46
Provinces (krays) - 9
National republic – 21
Autonomous region (oblast) - 1
Autonomous districts (okrugs) - 4
Cities of federal subordination (Moscow and St.
Petersburg)
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Eight Federal Districts
FACTORS OF RUSSIA’S
REGIONALISATION - I
Domestic:
 the weakness of the federal centre
 the collapse of the old vertical structure of political
control
 decentralization as a result of democratization
 the lack of proper legal basis for separation of powers
between centre and regions
 the economic challenges of a period of transition
(economic crisis, disruption of economic ties between
different regions, the tendency to self-reliance of the
regions)
 the rise of regional elites
 Russia's ethnic, religious, cultural and spatial diversity
FACTORS OF RUSSIA’S
REGIONALISATION - II
External:
 Global developments
 New geopolitical situation
 Strategic-military determinants
 Economic considerations
 Territorial and ethnic disputes
 Migration
 Cultural and religious factors
METHODS OF REGIONS’
PARADIPLOMACIES
Specialists distinguish two main forms
of the regions’ paradiplomacies–direct
(developing external relations of their
own) and indirect (influencing federal
foreign policies).
DIRECT METHODS -I
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Creating a regional legislative base. Negative experiences:
Constitutions of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan of 1992. Positive
experiences: Novgorod legislation on taxation and protection of
investment (1994), Nizhny Novgorod legislation on international
agreem-making. In the 1990s, the Russian regions concluded
more than 300 international agreements. They used to be
prepared with the Foreign Ministry’s assistance. However, some
agreements were signed bypassing Moscow. For example, the
Foreign Ministry expressed its concerns about the agreement
between Kabardino-Balkariya and Abkhazia that formally is a
part of Georgia. In 1995 Moscow even annulled the trade treaty
between Kaliningrad and Lithuania because it came into collision
with the federal legislation.ents of members of the Russian
Federation. (1995).
‘Making international treaties
DIRECT METHODS -II
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Attracting foreign investment. Most successful regions: Moscow, St
Petersburg, Novgorod, Samara. For example, Novgorod the Great: 49%
of oblast's GDP is derived from foreign investment. In investment dollars
per capita Novgorod is second only to Moscow, and is rated third for its
economic development over the past six years. There are about 200
foreign or joint-venture enterprises in Novgorod which play a major
economic role. They provide 20,000 with jobs and account for 62 per cent
of the regional industrial output. Firms with foreign capital provide half the
taxes paid to the region.
Creating a region’s positive image. To attract foreign investors many
regions launch dynamic PR campaigns.
Co-operation with international organisations. For example, Tatarstan
co-operates with UNESCO, UNIDO, the European Congress of Municipal
and Regional Governments, and Council of Europe. The north-west
regions of Russia co-operate with the Council of the Baltic Sea States
(CBSS), the Hanseatic League and the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council
(BEAC). It should be noted that co-operation with international
organisations is important for regions not only in terms of getting an
additional leverage in the power-struggle with Moscow but also in terms
of opening up them for the world-wide processes of globalisation and
regionalisation.
INDIRECT METHODS -I
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Influencing the federal legislation. The local legislation not only
legitimises the external relations of the regions but also affects
the federal legislation. For example, the comments made by the
Nizhny Novgorod regional legislature on the drafts of the federal
laws on international treaties of the Russian Federation (1995),
state regulation of foreign trade (1995), visa regime (1997),
foreign policy powers of the Federation and its members (1999)
have been taken into account by the State Duma.
Taking part in the federal diplomacy. Since the federal law
envisages regions’ participation in international treaty-making
their representatives used to be included into official delegations
and consulted as regards the content of agreements. For
example, the representatives of Karelia and the Krasnodar
province assisted the Foreign Ministry in preparing treaties with
Finland and Cyprus, respectively. The representatives of the Far
Eastern regions attended Sino-Russian summits and took part in
talks on demarcating the border between the two states. This
was quite helpful for harmonising federal and regional interests.
INDIRECT METHODS -II
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Conflict prevention and resolution. With time, the
federal authorities realised that regionalisation can
serve as an instrument for problem-solving with
respect to Russia's relations with neighbouring
countries. For example, Kaliningrad's close cooperation with Lithuania, Poland and Germany
prevented the rise of territorial claims on their part,
and dampened their concerns over excessive
militarisation of the region. Co-operation between
Finland and Karelia also eased Finnish-Russian
tensions on the Karelia issue. The cross-border cooperation between the Kuriles, Sakhalin and Japan
led to a quiet Russia-Japan dialogue on the
disputed territory.
INDIRECT METHODS -III
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‘Verbal diplomacy’. To influence federal foreign policies the
regional leaders often make statements on particular
international issues. For example, in the 1990s Yevgeny
Nazdratenko, the Governor of the Maritime Province, vigorously
objected the transfer of some Russian lands to China in
accordance with the Sino-Russian Treaty of 1991. Yuri Luzhkov,
the Moscow mayor, protested against the division of the Black
Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine and insisted on the
Russian jurisdiction over Sevastopol and Crimea. This became
less possible under the Putin’s rule.
Unfortunately, the ‘verbal diplomacy’ has often demonstrated
not only the growing influence of the regions over Russia’s
international strategy but also the lack of political culture among
the regional elites. In other words, this ‘diplomacy’ had rather
contradictory implications for to the Russian national interests.
INDIRECT METHODS -IV
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Exploiting the parliament. The regions use the legislature to lobby their
foreign policy interests at the federal level. The Council of the
Federation, the upper chamber of the parliament, made up of the
regional representatives is the most popular vehicle for the regional
lobbying. For example, the Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak, being in
the 1990s a chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of
the Federation and the Vice President of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, often used his official position to promote
Novgorod’s interests.
Capitalising upon the federal infrastructure. To influence federal foreign
policy the regions use the institutional structure created by Moscow in
the periphery. For example, the Foreign Ministry has established a
special unit on inter-regional affairs. The Foreign Ministry, Ministry of
Commerce, Customs Committee, Federal Border Service have offices in
those regions engaged in intensive international co-operation.
Theoretically, these agencies should co-ordinate and control regions’
international contacts. However, they often serve as a regions’
instrument of pressure upon Moscow rather than the centre’s leverage.
The problem is that these agencies are dependent on local authorities in
terms of housing, salaries and professional career. They are usually
staffed by the locals with close connections to the regional elites.
INDIRECT METHODS -V
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Exploiting international organisations. To put pressure on
Moscow the regions managed to use not only federal
institutions but also international organisations. For instance,
to get a more privileged status (special economic zone, visafree regime with Lithuania and Poland) Kaliningrad quite
skilfully exploited venues such as the CBSS (Council of the
Baltic Sea States) and the EU Northern Dimension. The
northern areas of Russia are represented at the Regional
Council of the BEAC (Barents-Euro-Arctic Council) and
develop direct ties with the neighbouring regions of Finland,
Norway and Sweden. With the help of the OSCE, Council of
Europe and the Red Cross, Ingushetiya managed to increase
the flow of the humanitarian assistance to the refugees from
Chechnya.
It should be noted that in the real life the regions combine
both direct and indirect methods because they are
complimentary rather than mutually exclusive.
The levels of paradiplomacies - I
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Operationally, there are three main levels of regions’
international activities: bilateral co-operation with foreign
countries; co-operation between the inter-regional
associations and foreign partners; and cross-border and
trans-regional co-operation.
Bilateral (sistership) co-operation between sub-national
units of foreign countries: ranges from economic, social,
environmental and cultural matters to security issues.
For example, Nizhny Novgorod has rather close
relations with North Rhine-Westphalia, Italian Lombardy,
and the French Buche-du-Rhone, the regions that have
much in common with the profile of the Nizhny Novgorod
economy.
The levels of paradiplomacies - II
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The second level of international co-operation (in case of Russia) are
external relations of the Russian inter-regional associations.
There is a number of inter-regional associations or blocs such as the
Northwest Association, Greater Volga Association, Chernozem
Association, Ural Association, and the Siberian Accords Association
which mainly deal with economic and social issues. The members of
these associations meet several times each year to discuss issues of
common interest which need co-ordination, such as transport,
communication, food and fuel supplies, and joint projects. However,
along with domestic affairs, these blocs are increasingly engaged in
international relations. For example, the Northwest Association led by
St Petersburg co-ordinates foreign economic relations of its members
with the Baltic/Nordic countries. At its February 2000 meeting, the
Siberian Accords Association (19 members) discussed the prospects
for constructing a highway to China and improving border controls on
the Russian-Mongolian frontier. The association is a driving force for
the Russian-Byelorussian integration. Its members account for 20% of
the Russian trade with Minsk. Moreover, the association initiated a
Siberian youth movement ‘Russian-Byelorussian Union’.
The levels of paradiplomacies - III
The third level of international cooperation, used to be cross-border (i.e.,
co-operative projects between regions in
neighbouring countries) and
transregional (i.e., collaboration with and
within multilateral organisations).
 In case of Russia, the coordination role
can be played by the system of Federal
Districts
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The special case of Kaliningrad
 Due
to its unique geopolitical and
geo-economic locations almost all
forms and levels of paradiplomacy
are present: direct and indirect;
bilateral, inter-regional associations’
international activities, cross-and
trans-border cooperation
THE MAP OF THE KALININGRAD REGION
LEVELS OF COOPERATION ON
KALININGRAD
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Country-to-supranational
organisation (Russia-EU)
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Country-to-international
organisation (Russia-CBSS,
Nordic Council, etc.)
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Country-to-country
(bilateral)
Local
government-to-local
government
(Pilau – Baltijsk – Klaipeda)
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KALININGRAD’S PARTICIPATION
IN THE EUROREGIONS
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The Baltic Euroregion (1998): local governments from
Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia and the
Kaliningrad Region
The Saule Euroregion (1999): local governments from
Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia and the Kaliningrad Region
The Neman Euroregion (2002): local governments from
Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and the Kaliningrad Region
Lyna-Lava Euroregion (2003): local governments from
Poland and the Kaliningrad Region
Šešupė Euroregion (2004): local governments from
Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the Kaliningrad Region
Euroregion
“Baltika”
PRIORITIES FOR THE BALTIC EUROREGION
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Development of a comprehensive and long-term strategy
for the Euroregion.
Water resources: monitoring of the current situation and
further reduction of water pollution.
Establishing of innovation centers to support small and
medium-size businesses.
Development of rural areas, including introduction of new
technologies and development of the transport
infrastructure.
Introduction of information technologies and
improvement of communication systems. Under this
subproject TACIS provides the local authorities with
equipment, software and expert assistance. For
example, with the TACIS help a new website was
developed for the Baltiysk national secretariat.
The administrative structure of the Baltic Euroregion
PRESIDENT
VICE-PRESIDENT
COUNCIL
CHIEF SECRETARIATE
NATIONAL SECRETARIATES
WORKING GROUPS
NATIONAL SECRETARIATES
EXECUTIVE
BOARD
Euroregion
“SAULE”
Euroregion
“NEMAN”
Euroregion
“Šešupė”
EUROREGION
“Karelia”
The Novgorod Region
LESSONS FROM THE
EURORGIONS EXPERIENCE
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With exception of the Baltic and Karelia Euroregions they
are semi-dormant, do not work properly
Basically reduced to the ‘bureaucratic tourism’
A lot of overlapping, the lack of coordination and a
proper division of labor
It is unclear: whether each Euroregion should specialize
on particular freedoms or cover all 4Fs?
Unhealthy competition for funds/sponsors
Are the Euroregions sustainable without or with a
minimal support (financial, administrative, moral) of
Moscow, EU, IFIs, etc.?
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:
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The existing and future Euroregions with Russia’s participation should become
one of the locomotives of the EU-Russia co-operation on CES/FTA business.
While general rules are established at the national/supranational level the
implementation of concrete projects should be done by local companies and
governments. It is advisable that the creation of the CES and promotion of the
4Fs should become the main priority for the Euroregions.
The Euroregions also can contribute to facilitation of the movement of people
and goods in the sub-region by building new and developing the existing border
crossings and the transport infrastructure in the area. Currently, local
governments prefer to shoulder this responsibility on the federal budget.
However, with providing local government with more powers in taxation the local
authorities will feel themselves more responsible for this business (on the one
hand) and get more funds for implementing projects (on the other).
A better division of labour should be established between the Euroregions. While
the Baltic and Karelia Euroregion could keep its current specialisation on subregional economic planning, support of private entrepreneurship, environment
protection and home and justice affairs (particularly, fighting organised crime),
Saule Euroregions could focus on cross-border trade and developing the
transportation infrastructure. The Neman, Lyna-Lava and Sesupe Euroregions
could pay more attention to development of people-to-people contacts,
education, culture and cooperation between NGOs. In addition, the Neman
Euroregion could focus on engaging Belarus (which is becoming an important
priority for the ENP) in sub-regional co-operation. Border crossings development
could be a joint sphere of responsibility for all Euroregions.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:
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To support Euroregion activities the interoperability of various EU cooperative programs and instruments should be improved in the new
institutional framework of the EU-Russia common spaces. In short, it is
essential that flexibility remains a central tenet of the EU approach. Some
steps have already been taken by the European Commission over the last
five years to ensure better co-ordination between the different programs
such as PHARE, TACIS and INTERREG. The ENPI seemingly aims at the
same direction. This work should be completed in the process of
implementation of the four roadmaps.
The very nature of the existing (semi-dormant) Euroregions should be
changed. Not only municipal officials should be participants of exchange
programs, other actors such as local businessmen, NGOs, journalists,
students and teachers should be involved. To strengthen cooperation within
the Euroregions and its institutional basis joint structures – ventures,
chambers of commerce, professional associations, NGOs, education
institutions, etc. – should be developed. The local actors should not wait for
Moscow’s permission and should be more proactive and initiative-minded.
By the way, even the current Russian legislation allows local actors to
establish links to the similar actors in the foreign countries (the Russian
Foreign Ministry only asks for information about these contacts, visits and
joint projects). The main problems are the lack of finance and psychological
inertia that was inherited from the Soviet time. However, with coming of a
more sustainable economy and increase in living standards as well as
overcoming the Soviet-type mentality (through civic activism and growing
international contacts) these problems could be successfully solved.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:
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Establishment of a proper legal basis for the Euroregions
should also be an important priority for Russia. Moscow
ratified the European convention on border co-operation
as late as in 2003. Russia does not have border treaties
with Latvia and Estonia. There is a clear need in passing
a federal law on Euroregions because several Russian
regions experience difficulties in this area.
On the organisational/administrative note both Russian
and EU representative bodies in the Russian northwestern regions should initiate a series of meetings,
expert seminars and workshops (with participation of
local governments from countries and regions
concerned) to discuss the future of the existing
Euroregions and the prospects for the creation of other
Euroregions.
City-twinning: a conceptual
dimension
Related concepts:
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‘connected cities’
‘border-crossing cities’
‘trans-border cities’
‘partnership cities’
‘bi-national cities’
‘sister cities’
‘sputnik-cities’
Defining the concept of
‘twinning’:
Twin-cities: city-pairs that do not just
aim at bridging and intensified
international cooperation as ‘border
cities’ or ‘connected cities’ but also at
creating – in varying degrees –
communality and joint space
Typical characteristics of
twin-cities
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They should harbour a joint history as cities that have existed as
administrative units in the past, prior to national borders separating them.
Although previously separated by borders, this delimiting should have been
traded for open borders.
A preferable case consists of cities where a river both separates and
connects the cities facing each other across the river (and, for this reason,
they are called bridge towns).
There should be connecting factors and features conducive to cooperation
such as ethnic minorities as well as command of the neighbour’s language.
There should be a certain level of institutionalization of cooperation between
the twins in terms of unified administrative structures and common urban
planning.
The most advanced twin towns purport themselves as ‘Euro-cities’ in
emphasizing their European rather than national identity.
City Twins Association (2006):
Imatra-Svetogorsk
 Narva-Ivangorod
 Frankfurt (Oder)-Slubice
 Görlitz-Zgorzelec
 Tornio-Haparanda
 Valga-Valka
 Ciezyn-Cesky Tiesin
 Candidates: Kirkenes-Nikel
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Tornio-Haparanda
Tornio-Haparanda
(aerial photo)
Tornio-Haparanda
‘Eurocity’ cooperative projects:
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joint rescue and ambulance service
joint tourist service
joint employment information agencies
joint schools and educational facilities
common circle bus line
joint postal service
common library
Provincia Bothniensis (joint development body)
joint city core (including shopping centre)
Tornio-Haparanda: joint
shopping and recreational area
Narva-Ivangorod: A Case of
Partition
Narva-Ivangorod cooperative
projects:
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Baltic Welcome Centre (tourism, recreation)
SuPortNet
City Twin
Narva River Water Routes (water tourism)
Est Rus Fort Tour (joint tourist route covering
the two fortresses on the Narva River)
Historical promenade
Imatra-Svetogorsk
Imatra hydroelectric plant
Svetogorsk Paper Combine
Imatra-Svetogorsk cooperative
projects
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«Air quality in the Imatra-Svetogorsk region»
«Development of fisheries in the Vuoksi River,
Svetogorsk» (Phare/Tacis СВС TSP 36/97)
«Program for the development of the Svetogorsk
energy system and cooperation with Imatra» (СВС
TSP 29/97)
«Developing tourism in Svetogorsk (Russia) and
Imatra (Finland)» (СВС TSP/RL/9803/037).
«Centre for Business Partnership in Svetogorsk»
«Twin-Cities Day»
Valga-Valka: Divided by Nationness
In the left part of the picture is the Estonian-Latvian boundary post no. 190H-2.
The number is actual 190H, and "-2" is actually telling the number of meters to
the position of the actual boundary, namely 2 metres. The actual boundary here
is the ditch north of where it stands, at the traffic sign. 120 Võru street is
located in the middle of this photo.
Valga city centre map
Valka map
Valga-Valka cooperative
projects:
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spatial planning
cross-border bus line
tourism
education
healthcare
culture
sports
joint secretariat
Kirkenes-Nikel: Catching a
Second Wind of Twinning?
Polar ‘city-pair’
Kirkenes
Nikel
The areas of cooperation:
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Support for small and medium-size business
Establishment of a joint Business Cooperation Centre in Nikel
Environment protection
Health care (including direct cooperative schemes between
municipal hospitals)
Education (direct links between elementary and secondary
schools)
Training programs for municipal officials
Tourism
Cultural festivals and exhibitions
Library and museum cooperation
Mass media cooperation
Women and youth cooperation
Sports
Conclusions (on twinning):
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Although the legacies tend to pertain to the existence of
rather divisive borders and despite a number of other
obstacles, city twinning has more recently turned into an
established form of crossing and doing away with the
divisive effects of borders.
The model of cities re-imagining their borders and
pooling resources does not merely impact the local
landscapes but has broader consequences as well.
Moreover, it does not seem to be restricted to some
cases located at the edges of Europe but is, instead,
conducive to the creation of cooperative borderlands in
Europe at large (City Twins Association).
Implications of paradiplomacy for
a nation/federative-state:
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Regionalisation of (unstable) federative
states does have negative consequences:
further disintegration of the single economic,
financial and cultural space; degradation of
the party system and the rise of interest
group politics answering to parochial
interests; regionalisation and privatisation of
security services and armed forces;
inconsistency of the international strategy
caused by the regional elites’ intervening the
decision-making process; and the rise of
separatism and secessionism, which could
result in disintegration of the country.
Positive Implications of Regionalization:
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First and foremost, regionalisation encourages
further democratisation of the political system,
including managing the external relations of the
regions.
Regionalisation has also helped to discredit the “topdown” model of federalism and replace it with the
“bottoms-up” process with very lively grass-roots.
Moreover, international co-operation has helped
many regions-particularly remote and border
regions-to survive the transition period in many postSocialist countries.
Devolution of power in post-Socialist countries
boosted foreign relations of the regions and made
them real international actors.
Finally, regionalisation serves as an instrument for
problem-solving with neighbouring countries.
The Baltic Sea Region
The BSR Institutional Network
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EU Strategy for the BSR (2009)
Northern Dimension (1997; reorganized 2007)
Nordic Council of Ministers (1971)
Nordic Council (1952)
Council of the Baltic Sea States (1992)
HELCOM (Helsinki Commission)
BSSSC (Baltic Sea States Subregional Co-operation)
(1993)
Union of the Baltic Cities
The Baltic Development Forum (1998)
International Financial Institutions (EIB, EBRD, NIB, etc/)
CBSS Long-Term Priorities:
 environment
 economic
development
 energy
 education
and culture
 civil security and the human
dimension
Priorities for the Russian CBSS Presidency,
2012-2013 (according to Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov):
1. Development of cooperation in the field of
modernization and innovation with a focus on
clusters of growth
2. Establishment of a network of public-private
partnerships as a platform for sustainable growth
and setting up a regional private equity fund
3. Promotion of the traditions of tolerance as a means
of combating tendencies of radicalism and
extremism.
4. Promotion of people-to-people contacts, facilitating
the visa regime
The Arctic Region
Categorization of Arctic
actors: coastal states
 Russia
 Canada
 United
States
 Norway
 Denmark (Greenland)
Categorization of Arctic
actors: sub-Arctic countries
 Finland
 Iceland
 Sweden
Categorization of Arctic actors:
‘non-regionals’ with Arctic ambitions
 China
 Japan
 South
 India
 UK
Korea
The Arctic Region: an
Institutional Framework
Arctic Council (1996)
 Barents-Euro-Arctic Council (1993)
 Nordic organizations (Nordic Council of
Ministers, Nordic Council, NEFCO, NIB,
etc.)
 ‘Newcomers’: EU, NATO
 UN and its specialized units (Commission
on Continental Shelf, etc.)

The Arctic Region: Problematic Areas:
Degradation of environment
 Climate change
 Challenges to indigenous people
 Maritime safety
 Growth of competition between different
nations because of the Arctic natural
resources and sea routes

Climate Change: Positive Implications:

Fisheries. Climate change might bring
increased productivity in some fish stocks
and changes in spatial distributions of
others. New areas may become attractive
for fishing with increased access due to
reduced sea ice coverage.
Climate Change: Positive Implications:

Hydrocarbons. Retreating ice opens up
new commercial opportunities for gas and
petroleum activities. New industrial
development in the High North will not only
take place offshore. There is a huge
potential also for new onshore activity in
connection with the gas/petroleum
industry.
Climate Change: Positive Implications:

Transport. Retreating ice opens up new
opportunities for shipping as well with a
more intensive use of the Northern Sea
Route (NSR) and North-West Passage
(NWP).
The Northern Sea Route
Two conflicting approaches to the Northern Sea
Route in the Russian geopolitical thinking:
1. NSR is Russia’s possession and
valuable asset, part of the Russian Arctic
Zone (RAZ). Russia should resist any
‘foreign encroachments’ on the NSR
 2. NSR (as a part of Arctic) belongs to the
humankind at large. Russia is responsible
for its ‘smart exploitation’, protection and
sustainable development

Pluses:
 Shorter than the route via Suez canal by
distance (by 34%) and time (two weeks)
 May become the main way for shipping
energy resources from the Russian Arctic
Zone
 May become the main way for supplying
the Russian RAZ territories (coastal and
inland) by fuel, equipment, consumer
goods and services
 Safer than the southern routes (no pirates)
Southern and Northern Routes: a Comparison
Ice-class tankers ‘Varzuga’ and
‘Indiga’
The Polarcus Alima 3D seismic X-bow vessel first to travel
the Northern Sea Route in 2011
Minuses (for international partners):







Tanker speed is problematic: 21-24 nautical miles p/h for
southern routes and 14 nautical miles p/h for the NSR
(because of the drifting ice and - potentially - icebergs)
Fuel consumption and savings are not calculated
properly
Dependence on the Russian ice-breaker escort
The lack of experienced crews to navigate in Arctic
The lack of proper port, navigation, communication,
search and rescue infrastructure
International insurance companies are unfamiliar with
the nature of risks in the region and may increase fees
The risk of environmental hazards
Some preliminary recommendations on
the revival of the NSR







To develop the port, navigation and communication
infrastructure
To build liquid-gas production plants
To build further the ice-breaker fleet (3 nuclear powered
and 5 diesel ice-breakers by 2020)
To develop ice-class tanker fleet (some 60 vessels by
2020)
To develop the Arctic search and rescue system (10
S&R centres by 2015)
To train crews for the Arctic conditions
To increase language skills of both vessel crews and
coastal services
Climate Change: Positive
Implications:

Tourism. Climate change could expand
opportunities for development of the
tourist/recreation industry which is a
relatively new business in the region.
Climate Change: Negative Implications:

Fisheries. For some of the Arctic high
seas waters there is not yet an
international conservation and
management regime in place. This might
lead to unregulated fisheries and, hence,
conflicts because of that.
Climate Change: Negative Implications:

‘Hydrocarbons race’ may increase competition
between the five coastal states for control over
continental shelf and maritime zones as well as
invite another conflict – between the Arctic-5 and
non-coastal states (such as Finland, Sweden, UK,
China, Japan, South Korea, India, etc.) who would
like to participate in exploitation of the Arctic natural
resources. The role of international legal regimes
(especially UNCLOS) and bodies (UN Commission
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) are
particularly important in this regard.
Continental Shelf Limits
Delimitation of the Norwegian-Russian
maritime border in the Barents Sea (2010)
Climate Change: Negative Implications:

The growing availability of the Arctic sea routes may
increase competition between coastal and noncoastal states for the control of these passages and,
at the same time, emphasize the need for new legal
regimes and transport and search/rescue
infrastructures. China, Japan and South Korea (the
nations that are most interested in exploitation of
these sea routes) insist that the NSR and NWP are
the humankind’s assets or commons and should be
available for everyone and – hence internationalized.
Climate Change: Negative Implications:

Migration. Climate change leads towards
migration of both indigenous population
because of the radical restructuring of its
economy and way of life and work force
which is occupied in the gas/petroleum
industries, transport and military sectors.
These developments dictate the need for
large-scale socio-economic programs to
adapt the local population to such a radical
change.
Climate Change: Negative Implications:

Remilitarization. The increasing competition for
trade routes, maritime zones and natural
resources has already led and continues to lead
to a military build-up of particular coastal states
and intensification of NATO military activities in
the region. In contrast with the Cold war era, the
current military efforts aim at protection of
economic interests of the Arctic states and
assertion of their national sovereignty over the
maritime zones and trade routes rather than
global confrontation between two superpowers
or politico-military blocs.
Venues for Cooperation in the Arctic:
Environment protection
 Climate change monitoring
 Joint exploration and exploitation of vast
Arctic natural resources
 Search and rescue operations
 Fighting oil spills
 Preservation of traditional cultures and
economies of indigenous people

In Lieu of Conclusion:
 World
regionalism and
globalization are two sides of
the same coin
Recommended Literature
Browning C., Joenniemi P. Regionality Beyond Security? The Baltic Sea Region
after Enlargement. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003.
 Henningsen B., Etzold T. (eds.). The Political State of the Region Report 2012.
— Copenhagen: Baltic Development Fund, 2012.
 Joenniemi P., Sergunin A. Laboratories of European Integration: City-Twinning
in Northern Europe. — Tartu: Peipsi Center for Transboundary Cooperation, 2012.
 Kaliningrad in Europa: Nachbarcchaftliche Perspektiven nach dem Ende des
Kalten Krieges. — Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010.
 Konyshev V., Sergunin A. The Arctic at the crossroads of geopolitical interests //
Russian Politics and Law, 2012. — Vol. 50, — № 2. — P. 34-54
 Oldberg, Ingmar. Soft Security in the Baltic Sea Region . Stockholm: Swedish
Institute of International Affairs, 2012.
 Sergounin A. External Determinants of Russia’s Regionalization. Working Paper
No. 3. Zurich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, 2001.
http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_319_290_en.pdf
 Sergunin A. Russia’s Baltic policy – new horizons? // Baltic Rim Economies,
2012. — № 2. — P. 34


Zagorsky A. (ed.). The Arctic: A Space of Cooperation and Common Security
— Moscow, — 2010.
Recommended Literature
Арктика: зона мира и сотрудничества. / Отв. ред. А.В. Загорский. (Коллективная
монография). — Москва: Издательство Института мировой экономики и
международных отношений РАН, 2011.

Барыгин И.Н. Регионоведение. М.: Аспект-Пресс, 2007.

Гладкий Ю.Н., Чистобаев А.И. Регионоведение. Москва: Гардарики, 2002.

Ланко Д.А. Процессы глобализации, регионализации и локализации вокруг
Балтийского моря. – СПб., 2008.

Конышев В.Н., Сергунин А.А. Арктика в международной политике:
сотрудничество или соперничество? — Москва: Российский институт
стратегических исследований, 2011.

Конышев В.Н., Сергунин А.А. Канадская стратегия в Арктике и Россия:
возможно ли взаимопонимание? // Арктика и Север, 2012. — № 8. — С. 4-26

Макарычев А.С. Федерализм эпохи глобализма: вызовы для региональной
России // Полис (Политические исследования). 2000. № 5. С. 81 – 97.

Медведев Н.П. Политическая регионалистика. Москва: Гардарики, 2002.

Прозрачные границы. Безопасность и трансграничное сотрудничество в зонах
новых пограничных территорий России. Москва: Научно-образовательный форум
по международным отношениям , 2002.
 Регион как субъект политики и общественных отношений / Под ред.
Н.B.Зубаревич. М: МОНФ, 2000.

Туровский Р.Ф. Субнациональные регионы в глобальной политике (на примере
России) // Полис (Политические исследования). 2011. № 2. С. 99 – 117.
