Transcript Document

Implementing Legislation for the BWC in Eastern Europe

Yasemin Balci, Legal Officer Regional Workshop on National Implementation of the BWC for Eastern Europe 27-29 May 2013, Kyiv, Ukraine

About VERTIC

VERTIC is an independent not-for-profit organization located in London, United Kingdom that promotes the effective verification and implementation of international agreements and related regional and national initiatives. VERTIC’s National Implementation Measures (NIM) Programme advises States on national implementation of the obligations in the following international instruments: •the Biological Weapons Convention (“BWC”); •the Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”); •the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (“CPPNM”) (as amended); •the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (“ICSANT”); •the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and other instruments for the security of nuclear and other radioactive (“RN”) material; •as well as UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) (“UNSCR 1540”).

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• • •

BWC and UNSCR 1540

The BWC is a multilateral treaty that entered into force on 26 March 1975 It has 170 States Parties and 10 Signatory States It requires States Parties to adopt measures to prohibit and prevent biological weapons • • • United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted on 28 April 2004 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter It is legally binding on all UN Member States It was extended most recently in 2011 (UNSCR 1977) until 25 April 2021 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 3

National Implementation Measures

Under Article IV of the BWC and operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of UNSCR 1540, States are required to take national measures, in accordance with their constitutional processes, to prohibit and prevent biological weapons. • A legislative framework should cover the following areas: 1) Definitions 2) Prohibitions and penalties 3) Jurisdiction 4) Biosafety and biosecurity 5) Transfer control regime 6) Enforcement 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 4

National Implementation Measures

1) Definitions

(biological weapon, biological agent, toxin, etc.)

2) Prohibition

of certain activities – development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, direct or indirect transfers, and use of biological weapons – preparations (attempts, conspiracy, threats, financing, etc.) related to biological weapons – unlicensed activities involving controlled biological agents and toxins (such as anthrax, botulinum, Ebola, plague, salmonella, etc.)

3) Extending the reach

of the prohibitions – to natural and legal persons – extraterritorially (e.g. on the basis of nationality of perpetrator, nationality of victim, impact on State interests) 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 5

National Implementation Measures

4) National biosafety

and

biosecurity

measures play a key role in preventing biological weapons proliferation.

• Some specific measures could include: – Adoption of a control (or select) agents list based on threat to public health and safety and national security (e.g. WHO risk-based approach; Australia Group lists for human, animal and plant pathogens and dual-use technology) – Establishing a notification of accidents, loss or theft mechanism – Comprehensive record-keeping – Biosafety and biosecurity training for personnel – Physically secure labs (externally and internally) – Personnel background checks – Secure transportation (approved carriers, secure containers and packaging, labelling, shipment tracking, etc.) 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 6

National Implementation Measures

5) Transfer Controls

: – Adoption of a control (or select) agents list based on threat to public health and safety and national security (e.g. WHO risk-based approach; Australia Group lists for human, animal and plant pathogens and dual-use technology) – Establish permit system – Require end-user certificate – Establish effective border controls 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 7

National Implementation Measures

6) Legislative enforcement

to ensure non-proliferation of biological weapons: – National Authority (and States are strongly encouraged to designate a national point of contact to the BWC’s Implementation Support Unit) – National inspections of laboratories and other facilities where controlled biological agents and toxins may be found (as there is no regime in place for international inspections) – Training and special powers for law enforcement officials including customs and other border officials, sea and air port authorities – Disease surveillance; response capability in the event of a natural, accidental or intentional outbreak (and co-operation among law enforcement and health officials) – International co-operation on judicial and criminal matters 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 8

Regional Status of Implementation

23 States in Eastern Europe – Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine – All BWC States Parties – 15 States surveyed in Eastern Europe • 170 BWC States Parties in total – 142 surveyed 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 9

Measures Eastern Europe: Number (%) of 15

DEFINITIONS

Biological weapon

PROHIBITIONS

Develop biological weapons and penalties 2 (13%) 9 (60%) Manufacture/produce biological weapons and penalties Acquire biological weapons and penalties 14 (93%) 12 (80%) Stockpile/store biological weapons and penalties Possess/retain biological weapons and penalties Transfer biological weapons and penalties 10 (67%) 9 (60%) 13 (87%) Use biological weapons and penalties Engage in activities involving dangerous biological agents or toxins without authorisation/in violation of the conditions of an authorisation and penalties 12 (80%) 8 (53%) Transfer dangerous biological agents or toxins without authorisation/to unauthorised persons and penalties 12 (80%)

Global: Number (%) of 142

15 (11%) 36 (25%) 52 (37%) 42 (30%) 34 (24%) 43 (30%) 50 (35%) 50 (35%) 34 (24%) 56 (39%) 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 10

Measures Eastern Europe: Number (%) of 15

CONTROL LISTS

Control lists for dangerous biological agents and toxins Control lists for dual-use biological equipment and related technology

PREVENTATIVE MEASURES

Measures to account for production Measures to account for use Measures to account for storage Measures to account for transport Measures to secure production Measures to secure use Measures to secure storage Measures to secure transport Regulations for physical protection of facilities which produce, use or store dangerous biological agents or toxins and related penalties Regulations for physical protection of dangerous biological agents and toxins and related penalties Authorisation of activities involving dangerous biological agents or toxins National licensing authority Regulations for genetic engineering work 27-29 May 2013 13 (87%) 11 (73%) 1 (7%) 5 (33%) 2 (13%) 3 (20%) 2 (13%) 3 (20%) 4 (27%) 6 (40%) 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 7 (47%) 6 (40%) 11 (73%)

Global: Number (%) of 142

33 (23%) 24 (17%) 10 (7%) 16 (11%) 9 (6%) 17 (12%) 7 (5%) 11 (8%) 13 (9%) 31 (22%) 6 (4%) 7 (5%) 42 (30%) 30 (21%) 53 (37%) Kyiv, Ukraine 11

Measures Eastern Europe: Number (%) of 15

TRANSFER CONTROLS

Authorisation for exports and imports of dangerous biological agents and toxins 13 (87%) Export/import control authority End-user controls for dangerous biological agents and toxins 13 (87%) 13 (87%) Transit control over dangerous biological agents and toxins Trans-shipment control over dangerous biological agents and toxins Re-export control over dangerous biological agents and toxins 13 (87%) 0 (0%) 7 (47%) Export control over dangerous biological agents and toxins Import control over dangerous biological agents and toxins 13 (87%) 12 (80%)

Global: Number (%) of 142

87 (61%) 52 (37%) 26 (18%) 33 (23%) 7 (5%) 18 (13%) 50 (35%) 62 (44%) 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 12

Benefits of Implementation

• • • • • • States can investigate, prosecute and punish any offences, including preparatory acts, associated with biological agents or toxins committed by non-State actors States can monitor and supervise any activities, including transfers, involving biological agents and toxins States will enhance their public health and safety and national security States with effective and adequate legislation will strongly signal to potential investors that they are a safe and responsible location for activities involving certain biological materials States’ obligations under the BWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 will be satisfied States will be able to comply effectively with international reporting requirements 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 13

VERTIC

s Drafting Tools

• • • • • • • ICRC-VERTIC sample legislation: ‘A

Model Law

: The Biological and Toxin Weapons Crimes Act’ VERTIC’s ‘

Sample Act

for National Implementation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Related Requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540’ VERTIC’s ‘

Regulatory Guidelines

for National Implementation of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Related Requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540’ VERTIC’s ‘

Guide

(2004)’ to National Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 VERTIC ’ s BWC National Implementation

Database

(at www.vertic.org

NIM > Biological weapons and materials > BWC Legislation Database) > Programmes > We have

fact sheets

on the BWC and the establishment of a BWC National Authority All are available in various languages at www.vertic.org

and on CDs 27-29 May 2013 Kyiv, Ukraine 14

Contact VERTIC

Yasemin Balci, Legal Officer, [email protected]

/ + 44 20 7065 0880 (Dutch, English, French, Turkish) The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) Development House, 56-64 Leonard Street London EC2A 4LT, United Kingdom Tel +44 20 7065 0880 Fax +44 20 7065 0890 Web www.vertic.org

VERTIC wishes to thank Canada (Global Partnership Program, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), the United Kingdom (Strategic Programme Fund, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the United States (Biosecurity and Chemical Security Engagement Programs, Department of State) and the European Union (CBRN Centres of Excellence Project 8) for their financial and in-kind support for the NIM programme. The views expressed by VERTIC do not necessarily reflect those of these governments or agencies.

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