Transcript LEARNING AND ADAPTING: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN’

‘LEARNING AND ADAPTING:
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
AFGHANISTAN’
Dr Daniel Marston
SDSC ANU
I'm generally reluctant to talk about myself when
I'm making a presentation; in fact, I have been
known in the past to plunge straight into my topic
without telling anyone my name. However, I've
been advised that for this group, I need to provide
a bit of background information. Since I'm not
that comfortable with the idea, I've decided to let
someone else do the job, and provide you with a
summary of my involvement with the Iraq
campaign written by a senior British officer.
Opening Thoughts
• I am not an expert—one is not learning if one calls
himself an expert
• Learning and adapting are key in all aspects of
warfare, not just COIN
• Met and worked with Australian officers and
NCOs since 2004
• Do not formally speak for the US or UK armies,
however, I am involved with many of the
discussions
• Will discuss learning curve in MND SE first and
then Afghan
The British campaign in MND (SE) was not a glowing
success, as some within Whitehall and PJHQ may try to claim.
The fact that it will end on a positive note, as of the summer of
2009, has more to do with bottom-up reform within units and
formations in theatre, and less to do with planners in Whitehall
and PJHQ. The war has been changing in Iraq since the
beginning of 2007, and many within MND (SE) recognised
early on that different approaches might be needed. Some
British commanders expressed concern that the ‘withdrawal’
strategy from Basra to the COB would cause major splits with
MNF-I. The decisions taken in Whitehall in 2006 and 2007
promoting Provincial Iraqi Control and handover, as well as
withdrawal to the COB, were not linked to the eventual success
of the CotK; they could not have been, since the COTK was
not part of this strategy. In some significant ways, they were
two different campaigns.
The British Army’s campaign in Iraq, its overall
impact, and whether it has been a success or
failure, are currently topics of intense discussion
in the UK press, military and government
communities. Recently, the Chief of Defence Staff
referred to Britain as having become “too
complacent” and “smug” about its experiences in
Northern Ireland and Bosnia and their application
to operations in Iraq. Many within the Army do not
dispute this, but I think the opposite viewpoint is
also worth stating: that there were an equal
number, if not more officers, NCOs and soldiers
who were not smug, and who actively sought to
know more about how to reform and adapt for the
counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign in Iraq
Learning and adapting in MND SE
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What was the mission?
Arrogance
Hands off approach with ISF
Many mistakes by US and UK that forced decisions—changed in 2007
Envy for success of al Anbar and the north
Distrust of British position
Recognition to learn from mistakes and humility to learn from others—
bottom up reform and did not wait for mother army to fix things
Frustration by many
Things finally changed for the better—Charge of the Knights and MiTTs
Honour was restored
Major tactical, operational and strategic assessment taking place about what
happened in Iraq and the need to avoid similar pitfalls in Afghanistan
Reform was disjointed and needed to be better unified and this is now being
worked out
Many know there is a need for long and deep reform and no ‘band-aid’
applications for the fight in Afghanistan
Training issues identified in Iraq
‘Once a unit is warned off for operations, it should
be taken off any other taskings and left to use the
limited time training and preparing for operations.’
‘Prior to deployment, opportunities must be made
to conduct training for COIN rather than
traditional warfighting.’
‘Lack of knowledge of the incoming troops in
regard to TTPs and theatre specific issues.’
‘Have a team commander per multiple deploy
earlier to embed with outgoing BG/COY to
deepen the understanding of TTPs and theatre
specific issues.’
Education problems and solutions
• Education in COIN had been shown to be wanting from the lieutenants’ to the
senior officers’ level
• Lack of knowledge regarding previous successful and unsuccessful COIN
campaigns across all ranks
• Less than 15% of officers and NCOs had read the doctrine or understand what
COIN was about
• Reform began bottom up RMAS—ETS was against it as were some senior
officers
• This is now changing as many within the Army recognized the need to finally
educate as well as train
• It needs to be a building block piece from NCO, RMAS, Captains MOD, Staff
College, RCDS
• Things are finally shifting
• Formal COIN Cadres—with input from academe, US and Coalition partners
• COIN and Stability Centre finally set up
• Support of CTC A in Afghanistan—will like to discuss the recent comments
regarding CTC-A from CDF in the discussion period
Feedback from Captains COIN course
• ‘I thoroughly enjoyed the course (MOD C). . . . I feel far
better armed . . . to go forward and act pragmatically with
the benefit of others’ hindsight for the mistakes of the past.
I am more than slightly concerned that I have gone this far
through my career without being armed with this
knowledge of this sort!’
• ‘Thank you again for the COIN module. Fascinating and
professionally useful, I only wish that I had been taught
that before Op TELIC 5!’
• ‘COIN module was excellent—should this be predeployment education rather than Captains’ education?
This should be for all officers.’
• ‘Personally I feel that British doctrinal knowledge of COIN
is actually a bit of a myth so to be taught it in the
classroom prior to deploying to Afghanistan is extremely
useful.’
Feedback from Cos for study nights in theatre
• ‘Thank you for your support and time you have given . . .
[and for] an excellent insight into COIN. . . . This was
valuable for the unit and helped us focus the minds of the
officers and men.’
• ‘You gave a fascinating insight into the recurring themes of
British operations over the past fifty years and what you had
to say has made us aware that we need to implement those
lessons learnt by our predecessors. As a result of your talk
the officers are now burying their heads into the doctrine
and readings that you recommended so highly.’
Issues with some commanders
“I think you have got to recognise that if you took the
attacks on the Coalition out of the equation, what
you are left with is actually a very low level of residual
violence within Iraqi society compared to anywhere
else across Iraq. . . .This is not a war zone. This is
nothing like you are seeing on the streets of Baghdad
and here you have got to ask the question what is the
most appropriate force or capability to deal with this
problem and I would argue that a foreign army is
particularly ill suited to resolving those kinds of
societal problems.”
“Many of us feel that, notwithstanding limited
political and popular support for the Iraq
campaign, too much military advice from theatre
was watered down on the basis of perceptions of
what the market would bear. In contrast with the
US our people in Basra struggled to get their views
over, as reflected in our lukewarm response to the
SSR challenge right up to Charge of the Knights
(CotK). Personally I point the finger at PJHQ who,
in my view, filter straight up advice on our
requirements. The whole construct lacks the
dynamism and necessary tension that you see in
the US relationships.”
Major issues with lack of continuity
‘Your points relating to rotation of commands through the 6
month tour structure is at the root of most of our problems from
Basra and also now in Afghanistan. Not only does it work
against our accumulation of knowledge and understanding of
the situation, but it also ultimately undermines our reputation in
the face of our US allies who think it's a joke that we scuttle
back home after only 6 months in theatre. The extension to 9
months for Staff officers is an improvement but still doesn't
compare to the American system. Collation of intelligence was
dire when I was out there. It was clear that intelligence from the
previous BG's in Maysaan had either been thrown away or never
collected in the first place. We started on a blank canvas. My
patrol reports were always praised for their level of detail, but
there was never any follow-up, never any pursuit of some
significant leads I uncovered when in lengthy dialogue with the
local Sheikhs. I think this was inherent throughout the chain of
command.’
4th Mech Brigade how it changed
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Meeting with Brigadier Julian Free
‘General Mohan’s (COIN) plan for the retaking of BASRA is a key
development—14 DIV must win this fight and the British must
support it in all aspects
British assets in terms of 4 Brigade and future TELICs need to
support this effort in many manners—this will provide a focus of
effort for the British officers and soldiers as well as playing a role in
the future pacification of BASRA and BASRA province
British officers, NCOs and soldiers can be embedded across many
lines of operation within 14 DIV—from staff officers, ISTAR etc to
platoon to coy embedded roles
This future plan will need to be briefed to MNC-I and MNF-I so they
clearly see a plan developing for this important area of IRAQ with
major British support—which will be well received by many sceptics
in BAGHDAD.’
Urban ops center to train a coy for two weeks
Briefed across the BDE that mission is now MiTT throughout
Joint operations carried out along the Shatt
MNF-I staff what about PJHQ?
Post CoTK
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3 of the 4 battlegroups were MiTTs
Working alongside the USMC/USA MiTTs
Campaign plan embedded within MNF-I
Marsh Arab Levy
Constant need to adapt—talks and working with 14
DIV as well as 7 Brigade—difficult at times
FP less of an issue
1+3 in IA vehicles
At BN level
Last British GOC: “Thank you for all that you did
for us. Your advice proved prophetic - but I can't
discuss over this means. Keep in touch and I'll tell
you why. Let's get together in the Autumn.”
New thinking on Afghanistan
COIN is a strategy not a tactic—CT is not the message anylonger
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Population centric approach is needed (has occurred at tactical and
maybe operational levels at time) lack of forces
It is not the simplistic hearts and minds as there will be some killing
and dying in the coming years
Reconciliation is important and not new and very complicated
COIN through education and training reform has impacted the key
military allies US/UK/Can (not so much with AuZ—according to many
within the Army)
More forces, both Coalition and Afghan (ANA, local aux.) needed—also
operating jointly
Advisory mission (civ/mil) has been a work in progress and still needs
more work—major shifts are about to occur
There are major questions in regards to the selection of the OMLT or
ETT concept within the US and UK militaries and different thinking
AATTV concepts of recruiting across Army needs to be discussed
McChrystal to LA Times
• Do you think there has been too much focus on
counter-terrorism?
I think there hasn't been enough focus on
counterinsurgency. I am certainly not in a position
to criticize counter-terrorism. But at this point in
the war, in Afghanistan, it is most important to
focus on almost classic counterinsurgency.
I don't want people to think it is inflexible; it
should be uniquely adapted to the conditions in
each part of the country.
McChrystal La Times
• Another priority you have outlined is the Afghan security forces. You
want to expand their numbers faster. It sounds like the main way to do
that is to expand the partnerships between Afghans and alliance forces.
Is there a way to improve there?
• After analysis, we've determined we could increase the rate of their
growth and their target numbers. The results of our analysis are not
approved up the chain of command yet. But all of our analysis tells us
that is something we need to recommend, so that is my intent.
Whether we grow the Afghan security forces larger or not, partnering
closer is to our benefit and we can do it better than we have in the past.
We need a combination of mentoring and partnering. Mentoring is
people who stay with a unit all the time and teach and evolve as units.
Partnering is where you operate together. Our thought is to bring the
concepts much closer together. So a unit is partner, is partnering in a
much tighter relationship. Then two things happen. The coalition force
gets much better performance on the ground because Afghans are
great soldiers and they have huge cultural acuity that a coalition soldier
is not going to have. And the other part is as we operate we think we
can give them best practices
GEN McC ‘8’ imperatives for success 13 06 2009
Protect and partner with the people
Conduct a comprehensive campaign
Understand the Environment
Ensure values underpin our effort
Listen closely—speak clearly
Act as one team
Constantly adapt
Act with courage and resolve
Practitioner
At the time [beginning of 2003] the US military
had not published COIN doctrine since Vietnam,
and units had relatively little training in COIN
before their arrival in country. There was much
learning by doing and even disagreement as to
whether the fight in Afghanistan was a COIN fight
at all. In fact unit commanders were forbidden to
from using the word COIN in describing their
missions—they were executing a CT mission in
keeping with US strategic guidance and an
operational focus on the enemy.’—COIN narrative
in Australia?
2007 Gen Barno
Continual turnover of US senior leaders has made
continuity of effort a recurrent challenge in this
very complex fight… [S]ince mid-2005, the
comprehensive US led [counterinsurgency]
strategy…has been significantly altered by
subsequent military and civilian leaders who held
differing views. With the advent of NATO military
leadership, there is today no single comprehensive
strategy to guide the US, NATO, or international
effort. Unity of purpose – both interagency and
international – has suffered; unity of command is
more fragmented.
Practitioner UK IV Examples of reform mindset
‘Additionally as in previous counter-insurgency
campaigns, WARFIGHTING is an element of
COIN. . . . Many of the lessons learned from the
BG’s resulting experiences are not new. Common
themes from previous UK COIN campaigns and
conflicts were all evident in operations conducted in
HELMAND Province. The key lesson is that we
ignore previous experience of such campaigns, and
those of our allies, at our peril.’
Practitioner UK VII
(coalition ability)
‘TASK FORCE FURY were highly experienced, having been in
Afghanistan at that point for 12 months; and they were a very
capable force. It was illuminating to see their approach to COIN
and the extent that it had become a part of them. They were
equipped for it, had the training and doctrine behind them,
really understood it. . . You sensed in them the extent the US
Armed Forces have transformed since it looked over the Iraqi
precipice and did something about it. What, to my mind, is all
the more remarkable is how they have undergone that
transformation, the momentum that has been generated and the
commitment and attention to detail that has left no stone
unturned in seeking out better solutions.’
Practitioner USMC
‘The Marines and sailors leveraged Pashtunwali to our
advantage when able. We sought to establish relationships,
which incurs obligations of reciprocation for deeds and
respect. This pulled some Afghan tribes and villagers to us.
Understanding and use of Pashtunwali assisted in our
understanding of the environment, maintaining the neutral to
the positive outlook of our operations and presence, and
countered Taliban information ops and resurgence. . . In
general, people fight based upon the norms of their cultural,
historical, economic and political influences that exist in their
environment. Connect the critical cultural thinking and
understanding in our training and education program. Do not
make the assumption that it is too complicated for the junior
Marines. They understand these concepts and will care about
this if the leadership cares .’
Where does Australia go from here
• The Rudd government needs to decide if the narrative for Afghanistan needs
to change—alliance debate, in your national interests, CT not COIN; what is
COIN
• The narratives are changing in the northern hemisphere
• Population focused COIN is the way forward in the East/South
• Provincial boundaries are breaking down in the South
• Advisory mission is a work in progress and major changes are being
discussed
• AATTV? Serve throughout the South? Selected from across Army?
• The Australian Army prides itself in COIN training and tactical excellence,
however, the US/UK militaries have now recognised the importance of
education for all commanders and OGDs to implement a COIN strategy that
is properly resourced and focused—major issues in Australia with OGDs
• Education is key and there needs to be a building block system—Weston
Creek is doing COIN education for Lt Colonels and Majors, is it linked with
the Lts and Captains and the NCO courses? Do the other courses need to be
expanded in terms of content?
• Assessment of what happened in Iraq is being done, however, will it be as
open and critical as other armies assessments? Advisory mission heavily
questioned—2 BNs from 10 Div in surge
• There is talk of reform within the Australian Army, however, how linked is it
and does it go long and deep? Many within the Army are questioning this
Keys to past success in COIN
• Comprehension of existing doctrine
• Adaptation to local situations and learning from
mistakes—humility to learn from others
• Risk-taking organizations
• Harmony of effort
• Small-unit approach
• Corporate memory within theatre HQs
• Appropriate training
• Reconciliation amongst their enemies
• Ongoing education in COIN
• Population security
• Understand local perspectives—non-western metrics
• Raise, mentor and fight alongside indigenous forces
(army/paramilitary police/local auxiliaries)
• Regular and aux indigenous forces needed
Thinking within the US/UK
‘We have seen that it is only by a close
combination of civil and military measures that
insurgency can be fought, so it is logical to expect
soldiers whose business it is to know how to fight,
to know also how to use civil measures in this way.
Not only should the army officers know about the
subject, they must also be prepared to pass on
their knowledge to politicians, civil servants,
economists, members of the local government and
policemen where necessary. The educational
function of the army at these critical moments is
most important. Amongst senior officers in
particular, ignorance or excessive diffidence in
passing along such knowledge on can be
disastrous.’
Kitson, Bunch of Five