Transcript Document

Welcome
RIIO - What does success look like?
Delivering Network Outputs in a more visible world
Network 2015
Anna Rossington
19/02/15
Agenda
• RIIO objectives
• Reviews
• Implementation
4
What is RIIO designed to achieve?
Support the delivery of a sustainable energy sector
Innovation
De-carbonisation
Security of Supply
Ageing Assets
Affordability
Optionality
& flexibility
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Renewables / new generation
Smart Grids
• Biomethane
Electricity storage
• HVDC
Electric vehicles
• Skills shortages
Different network patterns
Electrification of heat
Energy efficiency
Local generation
Working with
Demand Side Management
Carbon Capture and Storage
others to identify
best delivery
solutions
While delivering long-term value for money network services
for existing and future consumers
Reviews
DPCR5 process
Policy & cost assessment
RIIO-T1
policy development
fast-track assessment
slow-track assessment
licence
fast-track assessment
slow-track assessment
licence
RIIO-GD1
policy development
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
RIIO-ED1
policy development
fast-track assessment
slow-track assessment
licence
Transmission
 ‘Gone green’ scenarios
 innovation strategies
 stakeholder feedback
 long term benefits (ie 45 year CBAs)
 potential major network upgrades/connections
Gas distribution
 Future of gas, and unconventional sources
 innovation strategies
 stakeholder feedback
 long term benefits (ie 45 year CBAs)
 HSE requirements
Electricity
distribution
Companies’ business plans considered:
 DECC low carbon scenarios
 SGF, transform model, LCN Fund learning
 innovation strategies
 stakeholder feedback
 long term benefits (ie 45 year CBAs)
Content &
quality
varied
Weak on
long term
strategies
and
broader
industry
awareness
7
Business plans
Stakeholder
engagement
Process
Price control review process
 Clarity up-front about process and timescales
 Majority of policy developed up-front – clarity for companies to develop their plans
 Clarity on expectations from companies and stakeholders

Potential to be fast-tracked significantly increased quality of submissions
 Two-stage assessment drove further improvements in plans
 Significantly more engagement than in previous price control processes ? education /
understanding
 Companies increased stakeholder bases/engagement strategies &
needed to
processes
participate in
detail
 Significantly more information and explanation of companies’ plans
 Significantly more detail published – greater level of transparency
Needs to be a
 Evidence of how stakeholders have informed those plans
living, business
 Evidence of longer-term thinking
document
 Consideration of innovation in developing the plans
Fundamentally changed behaviour and Board discussions at companies
Implementation
9
Stakeholders/customers
SUCCESS
DEPENDS ON
Get outputs/service they want,
at efficient cost
Ex ante allowances, output
targets and incentives
Understand what company is
doing / facing
Monitoring, reporting,
information sharing
Appropriate apportionment /
valuation of risk
Regulatory & institutional
transparency
Influence over what company
does
Ongoing stakeholder
engagement / reputation
10
Environment
Transmission
Compliance with
HSE
asset health
measures
losses
BCF
visual amenity
SF6
EDR
Energy Not
Supplied
Minimum
standards
Network Access
Policy
Legal obligations
Compliance with
HSE
risk reduction
asset health
measures
EEI
BCF
Broad
Environmental
Objective
Minimise supply
interruptions
1 in 20 supply
capacity
obligation
Compliance with
HSE
asset health
measures
losses
BCF
visual amenity
SF6, FFC
Environmental
report
IIS
GSOPs
Secondary
deliverables
Electricity
distribution
Safety
Gas distribution
Outputs/service at efficient cost
Reliability
availability
Connections
legal
requirements
plus timely
connection
GSOPs
Voluntary stds for
distributed gas
TTC (small)
ICE (large)
GSOPs
Customer
service
Social
Stakeholder
satisfaction
Broad measure
of customer
satisfaction
Fuel poor
network
extensions
Discretionary
reward
Broad measure
of customer
service
Stakeholder
engagement
incentive
11
Outputs/service at efficient cost
outputs
Network output
measures / network
asset indices
Efficiency incentive
Innovation stimulus
package
Smart grids benefits
12
Understanding what company is doing
Performance reporting
• Companies publishing annual status across price control elements to
stakeholders
• Ofgem provides centralised summary/overview/comparison
• RIIO-ED1 – companies have to report on business plan commitments
RIIO accounts
• Companies publish financial statements which reflect annual iteration,
incentives, carried-forward over/under recoveries, fair value adjustments
• Statements of financial position, performance, governance
13
Influence over what company does
Direct:
• Stakeholder engagement assessed annually
• Several incentives (ICE, visual amenity) require direct stakeholder input
• Strategy updates (eg innovation, losses) require stakeholder engagement
Reputation:
• Public comparison with other network companies
• Public comparison with other industries
14
Companies
14%
Return on Regulatory Equity (real, post-tax)
12%
10%
8%
6%
RIIO-ED1 potential returns
Tax trigger deadbands
Time to connect & incentive on
connections engagement
Losses discretionary reward
Guaranteed standards for
connections
Guaranteed standards for
severe weather
Guaranteed standards for
reliability
Broad measure of customer
service (BMCS)
Health index (HI)
4%
Interruptions incentive scheme
(IIS)
Totex efficiency incentive
2%
Ex ante reward/penalty
RPI formula effect
0%
Baseline RoRE
• High performing
company could earn
double digit return
• This means:
•
•
delivered additional
outputs
achieved efficiency
savings (shared with
customers)
• A company which
under-delivers could
earn less than cost of
debt.
Potential to outperform allowance – IF deliver outputs and efficiency
15
RIIO-T1/GD1 year 1 results
Do company outperformances mean RIIO not working?
•
•
•
•
No - companies are incentivised to outperform – to deliver benefits for customers
Can’t draw conclusions from one year – plus legacy from previous controls
Expenditure savings shared with consumers
Companies have to achieve their network secondary deliverable commitments
Ofgem RIIO-T1 & GD1 annual reports (published shortly) will provide more detail
16
Conclusion
• Positive feedback from those involved in reviews
• Global reputation
• Process – significant improvement over previous price
controls – but still room to improve (lessons learned)
• Implementation – components in place – now for the outputs
RIIO-1  RIIO-2 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Renewables / new generation
Smart Grids
• Biomethane
Electricity storage
• HVDC
Electric vehicles
• Skills shortages
Different network patterns
Electrification of heat
Energy efficiency
Local generation
Demand Side Management
Carbon Capture and Storage
long-term value for
money network
services for existing
and future
consumers
17
What’s good and not
so good about RIIO:
Andy Manning
Date: February 19th 2015
© British Gas
Introduction
• Why does British Gas get involved in Network Regulation?
• RIIO in principle
• Historical evidence
• RIIO in practice
• Conclusion
© British Gas
Slide 20
Why does British Gas get involved in network
regulation?
© British Gas
Slide 21
RIIO in principle is good
“...we regard an appropriately calibrated price
control package as one in which RoRE upside (ie
the reward available for the best-performing
DNOs) provides the potential for double-digit
returns on (notional) equity, and RoRE downside
(ie the penalties that would apply to the worstperforming DNOs) is at or below the cost of
debt...”,
Ofgem (2012), ‘Consultation on strategy for the next electricity distribution price controls - RIIO-ED1 - Financial issues’, para. 3.13. See:
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/47149/riioed1sconfinancialissues.pdf
Ofgem (2013), ‘RIIO-ED1: Draft Determination for Western Power Distribution Ltd’, page 27. See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgempublications/84602/draftdeterminationsmaster.pdf
© British Gas
Slide 22
Historical evidence is less clear cut
Allowed
Control Return
Years
on
Equity
Price
control
DPCR4
2005-10
7.50%
DPCR5*
2010-15
6.70%
GDPCR1
2008-13
7.25%
TPCR4
2007-12
7.00%
*First 2 years
© British Gas
Slide 23
Average
actual
Return on
Equity (and
range)
Companies
at or above
allowed
Return on
Equity
Companies
below
allowed
Return of
Equity
8.4%
(5.5%-10%)
11.2%
(6.8%-14.4%)
9.5%
(8.2%-11.2%)
9.1%
(7.4%-10.1%)
12
2
14
0
8
0
4
0
RIIO is practice is complicated
© British Gas
Slide 24
Conclusion
•
RIIO principles good:
• Rewarding high performing networks
• Delivering outputs that are important to customers
•
Further evidence required to demonstrate value for money
• More clarity about expected results and justification
• Critical assessment of historical performance
•
Stakeholders can have a role in providing this assurance
• Stakeholders play a much enhanced role in the price control process
• However, little engagement in the detailed design
• More active engagement on the details (incentive schemes) may prove beneficial
© British Gas
Slide 25
Delivering Network
Outputs Implementation
Mark Drye
Director of Asset Management
Northern Powergrid
RIIO-ED1: The Outputs Challenge
Network 2015
Mike Kay
19 February 2015
27
Introducing Electricity North West
4.9 million
2.4 million
25 terawatt
hours
£12 billion of network assets
56 000 km of network l 96 bulk supply substations
363 primary substations l 33 000 transformers
28
Introducing RIIO-ED1
What is RIIO?
Purpose
Model
Benefits
Revenue
=
Incentives
+
Innovation
+
Outputs
Designed to drive
real benefits for
consumers
£
Ofgem’s new
electricity
distribution price
control framework
for network
regulation
Sets the outputs
and revenues for
GB’s 14 DNOs for
the eight-year
period from
1 April 2015 to 31
March 2023
Strong incentives to
deliver low carbon,
sustainable energy
sector at value for
money for
consumers
29
Increasingly complex price controls…
DPCR1
DPCR2
DPCR3
DPCR4
DPCR5
RIIO-ED1
1990-95
1995-2000
2000-05
2005-10
2010-15
2015-23
Five year review period
Fixed income
Eight year period
Uncertainty mechanisms
Quality of Supply Incentives
Broad Measure of Customer
Telephone response measures
Satisfaction
Losses incentive
Losses reporting
Innovation Funding Incentive
Network
Innovation
Low Carbon
Allowance and
Network Fund
Competition
Balancing of opex and capex
incentives
Incentives for workforce renewal
Health indices
and load Indices
Fully fledged risk
based health
indices
Cost benefit
analysis
Outputs
Fast track 30
RIIO-ED1 challenges
Greater use of Incentives
to drive behaviour
Increased political influence
on priorities and actions
Continued focus on
Innovation and delivery of
demonstrable benefits
Need to up the sector’s
game in terms of customer
service
Greater need to tie
investments and activities
to demonstrable Outputs
£
Greater uncertainty - new
approaches to deal with
optionality & uncertainty
?
Need to prepare for, and
start investing in, a low
carbon future – scale
remains uncertain
Need to demonstrate much
greater understanding of the
asset base
31
RIIO framework more aligned with
asset management
Asset management aims
DPCR
RIIO-ED1
Whole life consideration
Short-term
Different efficiency models
encourage long term
evaluation
Evaluation of different
intervention options
Silo assessment –
cherry picking
Different efficiency models
encourage evaluation of
different options
Cost benefit analysis –
cheapest is not always best
Lowest cost
CBA models introduced
Customers are important
Activity is key
Output metrics more
important
Balanced incentives for costs Underspending is
and outcomes
rewarded
New incentives encourage
best value
32
Puts checks and balances into process
Onus on DNOs to
demonstrate that
any changes
justified
Company
makes case at
price control
Allowances
generated
through DPCR
process
Asset or
performance
deteriorates
Competing routes
to contract
outperformance
incl re-investment
Detailed
assessment
including analysis
of past
performance
Company
makes
efficiencies by
de-scoping
Associated
targets, incentives
and sanctions for
non-delivery
33
Outputs are critical to the contract
Outputs are the products and services we will deliver for
customers and stakeholders
!
Safety
Reliability and
availability
Social obligations
40
specific outputs
Customer
satisfaction
Connections
Environmental
impact
Everything we do on our network
will be linked to an output measure
34
Outputs
Outputs cover the range of our service offering
35
Output challenges
Outputs
Variable incentive properties
Service-led
Worst-served customers,
time-to-connect
Directly incentivised
IIS
Compliance-led
Safe climbing, overhead
clearances
Indirectly incentivised
Losses
Resilience-led
Black Start, flood
protection
£
Reputational incentives
Many of the output metrics have been trialled and developed through DPCR5
Significant future work on harmonisation of assessing health, condition and risk
36
Health, condition and risk
!
Risk
= probability of failure x
consequences of failure
Consequences of failure
= criticality factor x
average consequences
Risk indices – new output for RIIO-ED1
Needs a scale for probabilities of
failure, linked to discoverable and
recordable condition metrics
Builds on health indices deployed for
DPCR5
Also needs a common, quantified
framework for considering the
consequences of asset failure
Gives an indication of network risk by
including criticality
Probability of failure varies from regular
to extremely rare
Ofgem intend to use it as a metric for
delivery
Impacts of failure vary from
inconsequential to disastrous
37
Risk indices including criticality
Process generates risk matrices
by asset type . . .
. . . which can be added together
to form a view of total risk
End of DPCR5
(31 March 2015) with investment
HI 1
HI 2
HI 3
HI 4
Network risk without intervention
16,000,000
14,000,000
HI 5
12,000,000
392
1073
577
295
914
3,251
C2
1106
3031
1630
831
2582
9,180
C3
429
1175
632
323
1001
3,560
10,000,000
Risk
C1
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
C4
94
257
139
71
220
2,021
5,536
2,978
1,520
4,717
781
2,000,000
2015 start
2019 without
2023 without
38
Risk indices including criticality
Broadly common overall
process for criticality
assessments for ED1
Criticality
index
Consequence
categories
Requires harmonisation
of approaches to health,
risk and criticality
assessments
Consequence factors
Asset specific parameters
BUT still significant
variation of interpretation
and no standardisation
for Health assessment
Licence condition on
DNOs to submit a
common asset indices
methodology by Jul 15
Some fundamental
questions to answer, eg
‘what is failure?’
39
Our innovation strategy
Offer new
services and
choice for the
future
‘Fit and forget’
Generate
value for
customers
now
Maximise
use of existing
assets
Delivering
value to
customers
Proven
technology
deployable
today
Innovative
solutions
to real
problems
40
Our smart grid development
Leading work on developing smart solutions
Deliver value
from existing
assets
Customer choice
Four flagship products (second tier)
£36 million
Capacity to
Customers
41
Our LCN Fund projects
Technical innovation
Combines proven technology
and new commercial contracts
to release network capacity
Seeks to demonstrate that
electricity demand can be
managed by controlling
voltage…without any
discernible impacts on
customers
Combines innovative
technology with existing assets
to make networks and
appliances perform more
efficiently
The first UK demonstration of
an active fault level
management solution that
avoids traditional network
reinforcement
New commercial
contracts
Lower network costs
Faster connections
Lower balancing costs
Reduced carbon
Lower energy costs
New controllable
switching devices
stabilise voltage
Allows us to lower
voltage levels
Enables networks
and appliances to
work in harmony
£
Faster LCT adoption
Less disruption
Lower bills
42
Summary
Innovation in RIIO is key for Electricity North West
Development of
asset management
as a holistic view
Recognising the
challenges of the
future and customer
choice
Techniques to
efficiently refresh the
current asset base
Innovation to
minimise the need
for investment
43