Transcript Unit 4 Monitoring, Control and Surveillance

Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08 Apia, Samoa
Unit 3
Fisheries Enforcement: major
aspects
Peter Manning - FAO
Secretariat of the Pacific Community
FMR: Main components
Fisheries
management
system,
FMS
Monitoring,
control &
surveillance,
MCS
Fisheries
judicial
system,
FJS
•All links in the same chain
•Interdependent
•Each must be designed w.r.t. the others
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY MCS?
Monitoring – collection and analysis of data and
information on fishing activities
– information for improving fisheries management data generation monitoring
• biological
• economic
– information for enforcing existing rules –
enforcement monitoring
MCS – meaning...
Control –terms and conditions under which
resources can be harvested
Surveillance – observations required to maintain
compliance with the regulatory controls
Enforcement monitoring...
....of biological restrictions
– gear restrictions
– area restrictions
– closed seasons
– other biological restrictions (eg minimum
fish size)
Enforcement monitoring...
....of direct economic restrictions:
– effort restrictions
– TAC
....of indirect economic restrictions:
– taxes
– property rights
MCS – integrated into management system
• Management strategies and plans must be
enforceable
• If not, credibility of fisheries management
authority undermined
Questions in devising management
measures from MCS perspective:
•
•
•
•
•
Practical requirements to implement
Previous successes or failures
What will encourage compliance
Consequences of non-compliance
Cost of implementing management measures,
cost of non-compliance
note well...
need to consider level of
compliance in relation to costs
eg:
- 100% at high cost
- 75% at low cost
Table 2.12 Fisheries Management Costs Year: 1997 (Source: Primarily Wallis and Flaaten
2000)
Countries
MCS-costs as a fraction of
revenues (%)
MCS-costs per volume of landings
USD/metric tonne
Australia*
11%
408
Canada
8%
153
Greece
9%
236
Italy
4%
139
Iceland
2%
9
Japan*
4%
104
Mexico
2%
14
New Zealand
8%
66**
Norway
7%
34
Spain
1%
37
UK
8%
94
United States
18%
143
EU (total)
6%
87
OECD (total)
6%
71
* Enforcement costs not included. ** Author’s estimate (From: R Arnason’s course note)
MCS costs
(especially enforcement)
MCS
costs
Ecomp
Effort
The Sustainable Fisheries
Model
Costs
Value,
$
Sustainable
revenues (yield)
OSY
Biomass
MSY
Effort
Sustainable
biomass
Impact of MCS costs on
the optimal fisheries policy
Costs with
MCS
Costs without
MCS
E* E**
Effort
Is it worth breaking the rules:
• Expected value of a violation, V(z):
Let z be a violation
Let (z) be the (expected) profits from
the violation
Let C(z) be the expected penalty for
committing the violation
=> V(z)=(z)-C(z)
Expected costs of violations
Example of C(z)
C(z)= p1(discoveredz)p2(guiltydiscovered)p3(penaltyguilty)penalty
 p*penalty
Arithmetic of probabilities
P1
0,1
0,5
0,5
0,1
P2
0,5
0,5
0,1
0,1
P3
0,8
0,8
0,5
1
P*
0,040
0,200
0,025
0,010
So basically p* will not be large in most cases!!
V(z)=(z)-C(z)
•
•
C(z)=p*penalty
But p* is usually very low
•
penalty will have to be high to make V(z)
negative
compliance vs enforcement
- participation in management decisionmaking engenders ownership of rules
- management measures legitimate? ie fair
and workable
- public perception of management authority
can have an effect on overall compliance
surveillance...
• by whom – peer surveillance? fisheries
enforcement officer? local police?
• how – depends on management measures
• when – constant or periodic
• where – might be at sea, at landing sites etc
Fisheries judicial system....
• legislative framework adequate
• courts need to be aware of value of the gains
from violations
– seminars for judges, magistrates
– establishment of special courts