Transcript THE “AIRLINER WARS” - International Trade Relations

DS316
Researchers
– Pinmook Tanteerasin – Ericka Ward Audena –
– Diane Wray Cahen – Farah Zuraika –
Dispute Settlement Case 316 (DS316)
European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
Short Title:
EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft
Complainant:
United States of America
Respondent:
European Communities—France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom
3rd Parties:
Australia; Brazil; Canada; China; Japan; Republic of Korea
Agreements Cited*:
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Art. 1, 3.1, 3.2, 5, 6.3, 6.4, 2
GATT 1994: Art. III:4, XVI:1, XXIII:1
Request for Consultations received:
6 October 2004
Panel Report circulated:
30 June 2010
*Agreements as cited in request for consultations.
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History of Large Civil Aircraft Disputes
NO COMPETITION = NO ISSUES
• Through the 1970’s –The US had a de facto monopoly in the Large Civil Aircraft
(LCA) sector.
• 1980’s—The Airbus consortium (created in 1969) began competing effectively in
the global market and undermining the US subsidized company’s market share.
THE ISSUE
• Post Airbus Consortium, the US became concerned about EC competition
– Earlier models of Airbus were developed thanks to subsidies paid by the EC.
• The EC was equally concerned about subsidies within the US market.
– The US provided subsidies through NASA and defense programs.
• Both sides were concerned about the usage of subsidies because subsidies skew
markets and provide an unfair advantage.
3
History of Large Civil Aircraft Disputes
THE SOLUTION
• Late 1980’s—The EC and the US began bilateral negotiations for the limitation of
government subsidies within the LCA sector
• 1992—The EC-US Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft is ratified.
– Imposed discipline on government support on both sides of the Atlantic
– This agreement was significantly stricter than the WTO rules.
– Regulated in detail the forms and limits of government support, prescribed transparency
obligations and committed the parties to avoid trade disputes.
THE SOLUTION DISOLVES
• 2004—The US unilaterally withdrew from the Agreement.
• 2004—The US filed a WTO suit alleging the EC gave unlawful subsidies/support to Airbus
• The suit filed even alleged unlawful support that both sides had agreed to allow within the
provision of the original 1992 agreement.
• The US requested formal WTO consultations with the EC regarding alleged subsidies to
Airbus by the EC and certain member states.
• 2004—The European Union files a complaint against the United States alleging that Boeing
received illegal subsidies through military and research contracts and tax breaks.
4
Airbus & Boeing Aircraft
Developed from 1992 to 2008
Planes of Primary Focus in WTO Dispute – B787 &A380
5
LCA Orders Rose After 9-11 Induced Fall
Airbus rebounded quicker…
NB: Airbus surge due to record sales of an
older model (320), not part of dispute focus
Airbus
Boeing
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The Contract that may have led the US & EC to the WTO?
US Military Tanker Aircraft Contract worth $35B-$50B
Its been out for bid 3 times, so far…
•
•
•
•
2003 - Boeing won (767)
– Decision overturned after conflict of interest between Pentagon and Boeing revealed
– A DoD senior purchasing manager had been negotiating employment with Boeing at the
time of the bid (later convicted of criminal conspiracy)
2004 – US pulls out of 1992 bilateral agreement and files complaint against EC
2008 - Airbus won a second call for proposals (330)
– Joint bid with US firm Northrop Grumman
– Decision annulled when the US Government Accountability Office found offers were
incorrectly analyzed
2010 – Bids accepted in July for 3rd time
– Northrop-Airbus withdrew from the race in Spring, EU accused USG of bias in favor of
the Boeing plane
– Now, back in the running, Airbus entered bid without a major partner
– Air Force is expected to make its decision by November 12
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The Complainant—United States of America
THE OFFICIAL COMPLAINT
“According to the request for consultations from the United States, measures by the EC and the
member States provide subsidies that are inconsistent with their obligations under the SCM
Agreement and GATT 1994. The measures include: the provision of financing for design and
development to Airbus companies (“launch aid”); the provision of grants and governmentprovided goods and services to develop, expand, and upgrade Airbus manufacturing sites for the
development and production of the Airbus A380”- WTO
IN PLAIN LANGUAGE
•
EU Member State co-financing of R&D for new Airbus aircraft.
–
•
"Member State Financing" or "reimbursable launch investment"
Infrastructure projects built or upgraded exclusively for Airbus
–
Airbus enjoyed preferential treatment.
•
Airbus benefits from EU member-State research and technology support
•
Airbus benefits from preferential loans from the European Investment
Bank.
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Agreements Cited by Complainant
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures*
Uruguay Agreement Round
• Article 1: “Definition of a Subsidy
– 1.1 a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member…
where a direct transfer of funds … or government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone… a
government provides goods or services other than infrastructure or a government makes payments
to carry out one of the functions illustrated… or”
– (a)(2) income or price support”
– (b) and a benefit is thereby conferred. “
• Article 2: “Specificity – to determine whether a subsidy is specific to an enterprise…”
• Article 3.1: “Prohibited Subsidies
– (1) Subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon
export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I.
– (2) Subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of
domestic over imported goods.”
• Article 3.2: “A Member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to in paragraph 1.”
• Article 5: “No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 1, adverse effects to the interests of other Members.”
*See Appendix for additional information.
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Agreements Cited by Complainant
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures*
Uruguay Agreement Round
• Article 6.3: “Serious prejudice … may arise in any case where one or several of the following apply:
– (a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another Member
into the market of the subsidizing Member”
– (b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another Member
from a third country market”
– (c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product … “
– (d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member…”
• Article 6.4: “…It has been demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares of the market due
to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product … [when]
– (a) there is an increase in the market share of the subsidized product”
– (b) the market share of the subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in which, in the
absence of the subsidy, it would have declined”
– (c) the market share of the subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been
the case in the absence of the subsidy”
*See Appendix for additional information.
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Agreements Cited by Complainant
GATT 1994 Articles III:4, XVI:1 & XXIII:1
• Article III:4. “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use...”
• Article XVI:1. “If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or
price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce
imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the
extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of
the affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances
making the subsidization necessary…”
• Article XXIII:1. “If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of
the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
– (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or
– (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with
the provisions of this Agreement, or
– (c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may… make written representations
or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or
proposals made to it.”
*See Appendix for additional information.
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DS316 Complaints
The measures that are the subject of the US complaint may be
grouped into five general categories…
(i) “Launch Aid” or “Member State Financing”
(ii) Loans from the European Investment Bank
(iii) Infrastructure and infrastructure-related grants
(iv) Corporate restructuring measures
(v) Research and technological development funding
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Now for the Debate
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Launch Aid & Member State Financing
Boeing contends that Airbus was built on illegal
subsidies.
•The benefits of illegal launch aid: "But for the
provision of (launch aid), Airbus would not have been
able to launch any of its existing range of (jets), that
is, the A300, A320, A330/340, A340-500/600 and
A380, as and when it did.“
•Without launch aid: Airbus "would not have
achieved the market presence it did." It would have
been a "much different, and we believe a much
weaker, (large jet) manufacturer." The U.S.
commercial-jet industry "at a minimum, ... would
have had a larger market share.“
•Harm to Boeing: "Boeing suffered substantial lost
sales during the period 2001-2006.“
•Harm to the U.S.: "The governments of France,
Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom have caused
serious prejudice to the United States' interests.”
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Launch Aid & Member State Financing
Airbus defends its actions...
• The main allegation is that the EU Member
State co-financed R&D for new Airbus aircraft
– EU provided reimbursable launch investment,
not subsidies
– Expressly agreed upon under the 1992
bilateral EU-US Agreement. (Used on 3 of the 9
Airbus aircraft launched since 1990)
– It provides for government funding to Airbus
repaid with interest (loan rates of return are
cost to government plus 1%, and interest and
principal is repaid on deliveries before the
programs break-even).
• However, Boeing has received grants,
subsidies, and tax credits from several state
and local governments
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Loans from the European Investment Bank
Boeing alleges
•
There are 12 questionable loans provided by the
European Investment Bank (“EIB”) to various Airbus
entities between 1988 and 2002.
• The US also argues that Airbus benefited from
preferential loans from the European Investment Bank
(EIB).
Airbus responds
•
Loans provided are not questionable.
• Airbus paid its loans plus 40% more than received.
• The EIB has indeed provided loans to Airbus but it has
done so in full conformity with its lending rules and
policy on conditions strictly similar to that of loans to
other clients.
• For instance, the EIB has provided loans to European
airlines for the purchase of Boeing aircraft, as well as to
several other large US companies for investments in
the EU.
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Infrastructure & Infrastructure Related Grants
Boeing alleges
• The Mühlenberger Loch industrial
site, the lengthened runway at the
Bremen airport and many other
facilities constitute the provision of
specific goods and services other
than “general infrastructure” and
are subsidies for Airbus.
• Construction of manufacturing
and assembly facilities in several
locations in Germany and Spain are
specific subsidies.
Airbus defends
• The US also claims that a number of
infrastructure projects were allegedly
built or upgraded exclusively for Airbus,
or that Airbus enjoyed preferential
treatment.
• However, unlike infrastructure projects
in the State of Washington (which were
designed for Boeing and for which
Boeing benefited from preferential
treatment), Airbus pays a market-based
rent and clearly did not benefit from any
preferential treatment for these
projects, or they were for the use of the
general public.
17
Corporate Restructuring Measures
Boeing alleges
•
•
•
There are a number of suspicious
investments. The acquisition of 20% equity
interest by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau of
Deutsche Airbus in 1989 and the subsequent
sale in 1992 was for considerably less than its
market value.
Four capital contributions by the French
government and Crédit Lyonnais to
Aérospatiale between 1987 and 1994
constitute specific subsidies to Airbus.
Airbus defends
• Associated with 1989 restructuring of
Deutsche Airbus (linked to EIB; German
transfer of shares to Daimler Benz Group)
•
The 1998 Settlement of Outstanding
Repayment Obligations owed the German
Government by Deutsche Airbus does not
constitute a subsidy
•
The 1998 settlement was made on market
terms
Both of the aforementioned cases are
demonstrations of usual investment practice
of private investors and therefore each
capital contribution is a specific subsidy.
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Research & Technological Funding
Boeing alleges
• Grants have been provided by the
French government R&TD grants
between 1986 and 2005
• German Federal government R&TD
grants from the Bavarian authorities
under the OZB and Bayerisches
Luftfahrtforschungsprogramm, from the
Bremen authorities under the AMST
programmes, and from the Hamburg
authorities under the
Luftfahrtforschungsprogramm
• Loans under the Spanish government
PROFIT and PTA programmes
Airbus defends…
• As regards research and technology support
in the EU - such activities are always 50:50
co-financed by the industry
• The EU abides by the cap provided in the
bilateral EU-US agreement for such support
• HOWEVER, the amounts budgeted by NASA
and the Department of Defense for R&D
support to Boeing's LCA business are
estimated to be 10 times higher.
• In the US, not a cent of R&D support is repaid
by Boeing.
• UK government grants under the
CARAD and ARP programmes, are
specific subsidies.
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Research & Technological Funding
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The Complainant’s Conclusion
The EC must halt all subsidies…
• The measures at issue in this dispute are more than 300 separate instances of alleged
subsidization, over a period of almost forty years, by the European Communities and four of its
member States, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, with respect to large civil
aircraft (“LCA”) developed, produced and sold by the company known today as Airbus SAS.
• Launch aid has been granted on top of other forms of government support that Airbus
receives: tax relief, government-sponsored R&D and government-paid infrastructure projects.
•The U.S. case documents in detail the substantial harm European subsidies to Airbus have
caused to U.S. companies. European launch aid violates the WTO Subsidies Agreement and is a
market- distorting subsidy that is unique to Airbus. A permanent and complete end to launch aid
is necessary to ensure free and fair competition in the large commercial airplane market.
•The EU’s claims against the U.S. are grossly overstated. Most of the alleged “subsidies” to
Boeing are legitimate U.S. payments for services rendered. Others concern forms of government
support that are common to both companies and are consistent with WTO rules.
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The Respondent’s Conclusion
Details of the US subsidies to Boeing challenged by the EU
• State and Local Subsidies—States of Washington, Kansas, Illinois: incentives, including tax
incentives, relocation assistance and other advantages, to the US LCA industry
• Federal Subsidies - NASA, Department of Defense and National Institute of Standards &
Technology, US Department of Commerce
• US Department of Labor—transfers economic resources to the US LCA industry on terms more
favorable than available on the market
— The Aerospace Industry Initiative, High Growth Training Initiative, funds for the training
of aerospace industry workers associated with the Boeing 787.
• Federal tax incentives—The US Government transfers economic resources to the US LCA industry
through the federal tax system, and in particular through the following tax measures:
— Sections 921-927 of the Internal Revenue Code (prior to repeal) and related measures
— Establishing special tax treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations" ("FSCs“)
— FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000; and
— American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
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The WTO Decision
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The WTO Panel found… in June 2010
6 years later…
Case DS316
Complainant US  Boeing
Respondent EC  Airbus
Loser: Both & Neither
• The panel found that the “Launch Aid”/LA was a subsidy in every case that it was given to Airbus with the
exception of the A350 which was dismissed due to lack of evidence.
• The panel found that loans provided by the European Investment Bank (“EIB”) to various Airbus entities
were subsidies, but that none of these subsidies was specific, and therefore this claim by the US was
dismissed from further consideration.
• The panel found that infrastructure upgrades in specific EC countries “constituted the provision of specific
goods and services other than “general infrastructure” and were specific subsidies.
• The panel found investment practices that were inconsistent with the usual investment practice and such
practices were in fact subsidies.
• The panel found that most of the R&D grants by the EC to Airbus were subsidies.
• The panel concluded that Airbus would have been unable to bring to the market the LCA that it launched as
and when it did but for the specific subsidies it received from the European Communities and the
governments of France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.
• The panel rejected the US argument that the specific subsidies in this dispute provided Airbus with
significant additional cash flow and other financial resources on non-market terms which allowed it to price
its aircraft more aggressively than it would otherwise be able to without those subsidies.
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The Global Impact
Case DS316
Complainant US  Boeing
Respondent EC  Airbus
Loser: Both & Neither
• Overall, the panel concluded that the United States had established that the effect of the specific subsidies
found was
– (i) displacement of imports of US LCA into the European market;
– (ii) displacement of exports of US LCA from the markets of Australia, Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei,
Korea, Mexico, and Singapore;
– (iii) likely displacement of exports of US LCA from the market of India; and
– (iv) significant lost sales in the same market, and that these effects constituted serious prejudice to
the interests of the United States within the meaning of Article 5(c) of the SCM Agreement.
• However, the panel concluded that the United States had not established that the effect of the specific
subsidies found was
– (i) significant price undercutting;
– (ii) significant price suppression; and
– (iii) significant price depression.
• In addition, the panel concluded that the United States had not established that, through the use of the
subsidies, the European Communities and certain EC member States cause or threaten to cause injury to the
US domestic industry.
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Remedy in Order for the US
Case DS316
Complainant US  Boeing
Respondent EC  Airbus
Loser: Both & Neither
• Taking into account the nature of the prohibited subsidies, the panel recommended that the
subsidizing Member granting each subsidy found to be prohibited withdraw it without delay,
specifying that this be within 90 days.
• The panel recommended that the EC/EU take “take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects
or ... withdraw the subsidy” without making specific suggestions.
•July 2010, the EU appealed on the grounds of “legal interpretation”.
• August 2010, the United States appealed to the Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in the
panel report and certain legal interpretations developed by the panel.
• September 2010, the Chairman of the Appellate Body notified the DSB that it would not be able to
issue its report within 60 days due to the considerable size of the record and the complexity of the
appeal.
• The Appellate Body will hold oral hearings in the appeal in November and December 2010, and will
provide thereafter an estimate for circulation of the report.
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Recent News
Boeing’s CEO statement in response to WTO Decision DS353
•
"Given the shape of today's opinion, as it has been reported, the WTO findings against the US are
likely to require few changes in U.S. policies and practices.
•
One of the two principal matters that the WTO is reported to have cited as inconsistent with its rules
was long ago remedied by the Congress: general US export tax policy embodied in FSC/ETI.
•
As to the second principal matter – NASA research – we are heartened to read that, contrary to
statements earlier today from European sources, three-quarters of the subsidies at issue were found
to be wholly compliant with WTO rules.
•
"Today's ruling underscores our confidence in the WTO processes and dispute-resolution
procedures. We applaud the body for its work and continue to look to Airbus/EADS and the EU to
recognize that in today's global market, it is essential that everyone play by the rules and abide by the
WTO requirements.
•
Playing by the rules, for Airbus/EADS, means withdrawing their still-outstanding A380 prohibited
launch aid subsidy and financing the A350 on commercial terms.“
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World Trade Organization Decision
Rules-based international trade is fundamental to a healthy, competitive business
environment. It is especially important in these times of economic uncertainty that
the WTO hold governments to the international trade agreements they have signed.
By issuing strong, clear decisions in these cases, the WTO will set important
precedents for all governments that wish to compete in the global aerospace market.
Source: WTO.org
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Who wins? Boeing or Airbus?
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Appendix
Uruguay Agmt
Article 1: 1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
•
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this
Agreement as "government"), i.e. where: (i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is
foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits)[1]; (iii) a government provides goods or services other than
general infrastructure, or purchases goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a
private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; or (a)(2) there is any form
of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994; and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred. 1.2 A subsidy as defined
in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II or shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is
specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.
Article 6.3: “Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in any case where one or several of the following apply:
(a)
the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the
subsidizing Member; (b)
the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another Member
from a third country market; (c)
the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as
compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price depression
or lost sales in the same market; (d)
the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing
Member in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity as compared to the average share it had during the previous
period of three years and this increase follows a consistent trend over a period when subsidies have been granted.”
Article 6.4: “For the purpose of paragraph 3(b), the displacement or impeding of exports shall include any case in which, subject to the
provisions of paragraph 7, it has been demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares of the market to the
disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product (over an appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends
in the development of the market for the product concerned, which, in normal circumstances, shall be at least one year). “Change
in relative shares of the market” shall include any of the following situations: (a) there is an increase in the market share of the
subsidized product; (b) the market share of the subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in which, in the absence of
the subsidy, it would have declined; (c) the market share of the subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have
been the case in the absence of the subsidy.”
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Appendix
GATT 1994
III:4. ”The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not
prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product. “
XVI:1.
“If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or
indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the
quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of the circumstances making the
subsidization necessary. In any case in which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting party is
caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other
contracting party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization.”
XXIII:1.” If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
•
(a)
the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or
•
(b)
the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement,
or
•
(c)
the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make
written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party
thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.”
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Sources
Historical Background
EU – US Agreement on Large Civil Aircraft 1992: key facts and figures, Boeing Government Operations,
http://www.boeing.com/aboutus/govt_ops/wto.html
European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, World Trade Organization B
Background for Boeing
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2010/june/fighting-unfair-trade-practices-winning-wtokey-findings
http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2009/01/09/boeing-and-airbus-face-mass-aircraft-deferrals-andcancellations/page1
mega380liner.blogspot.com/2007_12_23_archive.html
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2007/04/30/1177788002519.html
http://www.cameronnewland.com/fuel-economy-boeing-vs-airbus/
http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1423
Background Information, "Airbus Subsidies". Boeing Corporate Offices. Boeing
WTO: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgibin/PrintStory.pl?document_id=2012243954&zsection_id=2003750727&slug=wto01&date=20100630
Tanteerasin – Ward Audena – Wray Cahen – Zuraika
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Sources
Background for Airbus
•www.wto.org
•trade.ec.europa.eu
•www.ustr.gov
•www.airbus.com
•www.boeing.com
•www.eads.com
•www.euronews.net/2010/09/16/airbus-and-boeing-each-claim-wto-victory/
•www.boeing.com/aboutus/govt_ops/docs/wto/What_the_WTO_Held.pdf
•www.airbus.com/en/worldwide/americas/
•www.airbusmilitary.com/
www.airliners.net/aircraft-data/
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/images/airbus-boeing-pop06092005104216.gif
http://www.boeing.com/randy/images/future_ip.jpg
http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/media_gallery/files/press_centre/Airbus_report_on_Boeing_Subsidies_May_2010.pdf
The WTO Decision
Boieing.com
WTO: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm
Tanteerasin – Ward Audena – Wray Cahen – Zuraika
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