Peace by Cooperation ? - Prof. Dr. Dr. hc Reinhard Meyers

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Transcript Peace by Cooperation ? - Prof. Dr. Dr. hc Reinhard Meyers

Peace by Cooperation ?
The Stability Pact for S.E. Europe
Premisses, Problems,
Consequences
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard Meyers
Institut für Politikwissenschaft - Westfälische Wilhelms- Universität Münster
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Useful Reading

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Mejlina Modanu: The European Union and Conflict
Prevention in the Balkans: Regional Integration and the
impact of the enlargement process, in: New Balkan Politics
Issue 7/8; to be found under www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk
[or on the seminar CD under Zusatzinfos: Nützliche Websites]
SP website: www.stabilitypact.org

The new book by Prof.Dr.Rafael Biermann on the Stability
Pact is to appear with Schöningh publishers in Paderborn at
the end of April. Dr. Biermann is the author of the ZEI
discussion paper on: The Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe – potential, problems, and perspectives C 56/1999,
downloadable under www.zei.de
EU „Ostpolitik“: Aims
Support of socioeconomic
modernisation
+
regional security
contribution to/ precondition of stability
for the whole of Europe
Security
international:
implementation of the rules
of peaceful coexistence and
of a regime of conflict
prevention/ conflict
resolution between the
nations of Europe
domestic:
conservation of social peace
as precondition of a
successful transformation
to a market economy and a
liberal democracy
The vicious circle of Balkan politics
Problem:
how to break into the vicious circle ?
domestic/
international
security
precondition of
regional
stability
precondition of
precondition of
conservation
of social
peace
successful
modernisation/
transformation
precondition of
How to break into the vicious circle ?
Develop a strategy of regime change using
non-military instruments transforming SE
Europe into a region of
* sustainable stability
* growing prosperity
* firmly established peace
Regional cooperation as the main instrument
of problem solving
Regional Cooperation Instruments
# Matchmaking: bringing together donors,
implementing agencies, and recipient countries for
joint priority setting
# Peer review & peer pressure as methods to
advance the reform process
# Honest brokerage & good offices as instruments to
bring together institutions that do not normally
cooperate
Object: to stabilize the S.E.European region after the
conflicts of the 1990s enhancing regional
cooperation and supporting ever closer integration
into European and Euro-Atlantic structures
Stability Pact for S.E.Europe:
How it started
Problem: During the Kosovo crisis, decisionmakers realised that there had never been a
coherent, longterm policy of conflict prevention
in S.E.Europe.
Rather, the international approach to the Balkans
had been piecemeal and country-oriented,
following the geographical direction Milosevic’s
policies chose to take.
The transnational character of many regional
problems was hardly admitted; a predominantly
reactive, „fire-brigade“ policy concentrated on
managing crisis after crisis, from Slovenia to the
Kosovo.
Stability Pact for S.E. Europe:
How it started (2)
„The previous policy of the international
community vis-a-vis former Yugoslavia
had two severe deficits: It concentrated
on the consequences instead of on the
sources of conflict, and it tackled the
problems of the region individually and
separately from the ones in other parts of
Europe.“
Joschka Fischer, Cologne, June 1o, 1999
Stability Pact for S. E. Europe:
Precursors
a) EU Regional Approach adopted on February 27, 1996,
as part of the Royaumont process following the
Dayton Agreement
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cooperation agreements with Albania & Macedonia;trade preferences for
Bosnia/Hercegovina & Croatia; more than € 7 bn. expenditure since 1991 on
strict, regularly monitored conditions
b) EU Common Strategy for the Western Balkans,
commissioned by the Vienna European Council in
December 1998
The Union’s Regional Aproach of 1996 encouraged
closer political and economic ties among the Balkan
countries, but appeared late, with vague goals, and
little incentives for the countries to actually carry out
the proposed objectives. Differential bilateral EU
approaches to individual countries undermined
much of the Regional Approach in the second half of
the 90s.
Stability Pact for S.E.Europe:
Precursors (2)
Problems:
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Main focus on bilateral relations
Not enough attention paid to the Eastern Balkans, i.e.
neglecting the stabilisation potential of Romania and
Bulgaria for the region
No coordination of competing numerous initiatives
Main actors lacked political will and resolve to make a real
difference
From today’s point of view, all Balkan initiatives prior to
the Stability Pact are perceived as ill-conceived and
unsufficient
On 10 June 1999, at the EU's initiative, the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe was adopted in Cologne. Its main aim is to
strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe "in their efforts to
foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic
prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region". The
Stability Pact is a political declaration of commitment and a
framework agreement on international co-operation to develop a
shared strategy among all partners for stability and growth in South
Eastern Europe. It is not a new international organisation nor does it
have any independent financial resources or implementing
structures. It is a co-ordinating mechanism which matches requests
from the region with offers from participating nations and
organisations and co-ordinates political and economic reforms and
reconstruction in the region. It seeks to provide a forum to stimulate
change in the region.
The Stability Pact Partners are:
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The European Union Member States and the European
Commission;
The countries of the region and their neighbours: Albania,
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro), Turkey and Moldova;
Non EU-members of the G8: USA, Canada, Japan and Russia;
Other countries: Norway and Switzerland;
International organisations: UN, OSCE, Council of Europe,
UNHCR, NATO and OECD;
International financial institutions: World Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB) and
Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB);
Regional initiatives: Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC),
Central European Initiative (CEI), South East European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and South East Europe Co-operation
Process (SEECP).
Stability Pact for S.E.Europe:
Characteristics
SP an example for a general trend in international politics:
regionalization replacing bipolarity
SP based on lessons from international crisis management and
conflict prevention, stressing the need for
* a secure environment
* promotion of sustainable democratic systems
* economic and social well-being
* reconstruction of intra- and intersocietal relations based on
agreed rules, legitimacy and public authority
as preconditions for successful conflict prevention and
sustainable peace.
SP also incorporates the CSCE process experiences – trust in the
power of confidence-building measures, coherence of approach
to problems in a number of baskets, insistence on peaceful
change, compromise, and package deals as means of international (re)conciliation, emphasis on local ownership of policies
Premiss: CSCE concept of conflict transformation through an openended process of increasing cooperation that will unfold over time
Stability Pact for S.E.Europe:
Mechanism:
Working
Mechanism
S.E.Europe
Regional Table
Steering Body acting as Clearing
House for all matters of
Principle
Chair: Special Coordinator
Coordinates all activities of and among
the working tables, meets regularly with
the chairs of the working tables, and reports periodically to the OSCE
Working Table
on democratisation
and human rights
Working Table
on economic reconstruction,
development, and cooperation
meets on Foreign
Minister level
appointed by
the European
Union
Working Table
on security issues
Working Tables establish work plans in conformity with the objectives of the Stability Pact. Within the range
of their competence, they can establish side tables or call meetings and conferences on matters of a specific
or sub-regional nature.
Sub-Table
Meetings
Sub-Table
Conferences
Sub-Table
Meetings
Sub-Table
Conferences
Regional Table
Chair: Erhard Busek
Working Table I: DEMOCRACY
Chair: Goran Svilanovic
Working Table II: ECONOMY
Chair: Fabrizio
Saccomanni
Working Table III: SECURITY
Chair: Janez
Sub Table
Security & Defence
Premoze
Sub Table
Justice & Home Affairs
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The Stability Pact was launched in a manner which raised
exaggerated expectations of what it might achieve. Since
then, it has been viewed mostly with indifference if not
scepticism. It could, and should, have been better
explained at the start that it was not a new international
funding organisation with financial resources of its own
and an operational mandate. It is a forum bringing
together 35 countries and 16 international organisations,
financial institutions and regional initiatives committed to
working within a common framework to promote stability
and growth in the region. In that role it has sought with
some modest success to promote regional co-operation
and intra-Balkan trade; to focus non-EU donors on the
needs of the region; and to achieve better co-ordination
amongst the plethora of donors. We welcome the
consensus which emerged at the Bucharest Regional
Conference that the Stability Pact's role and activities
should be given a focus more clearly in line with its status
as a generator of international political commitment to the
region and a catalyst for greater co-operation within it.
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House of Lords, Select Cttee.on the EU, 20th report,para.154
Stability Pact: Achievements:
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Through the Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe the EU, for the first time
in history, undertook to draw South
Eastern Europe closer to the perspective
of full integration into its structures. All
Southeast European countries have been
recognised as potential candidates for
EU membership
Stability Pact: Achievements (2):
The European perspective has proved to be the
most powerful incentive for reconciliation, cooperation and internal reforms in the region.
Countries in the region view the Pact as the
primary instrument of political and institutional
support for the EU integration of SEE countries.
More important: The Stability Pact has
succeeded in giving life to regional cooperation. For the first time in history, SEE
countries perceive such co-operation as a
building block, not a stumbling block for
European integration.
How could the Stability Pact
make a difference ?
First, the Pact has made it clear that regional cooperation is an indispensable component and a
precondition for Euro-Atlantic integration. It is the
fast track to full EU membership. The EU, on its
part, has recognised that it should not reward a
race towards membership. “If countries want to
join the European Union, they have to demonstrate
that they can develop regional co-operation and can
solve their problems in co-operation with their
neighbours,” Commissioner Verheugen once
stated. People in the region should have by now
understood that such co-operation is one of the
founding principles of the European Union itself.
How could the Stability Pact
make a difference ? (2)
Secondly, the Stability Pact has given evidence
that co-operation serves the mutual interests of
all participating countries.
Against this
background, the Pact has been engaged in
facilitating the resolution of transnational
issues, using the tool of regional co-operation
as a catalyst for reconciliation, goodneighbourliness
and
improved
political
relations.
Stability Pact: Criticisms &
Problems
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As the prospect of full integration has proven to be a powerful
incentive for reconciliation, cooperation and internal reforms in
SEE, the EU needs to live up to its full commitment that SEE
countries will be welcomed as full and equal members once the
necessary conditions are fulfilled. Yet, the engagement of major
donors in the Balkans has fallen dramatically. The Stability Pact
community, including the EU, does not have appropriate
instruments to promote social cohesion, private investment and
sustainable growth in the region. Complicated bureaucratic
procedures create difficulties to spend the money available
efficiently and create disappointment among recipient countries.
Thus, the credibility of donors is at stake. The SP has been given
the difficult task to coordinate partners who sometimes resist to
such coordination. For greater efficiency, SEE partners should be
granted greater ownership in the design and management of
external assistance. (Bodo Hombach, 2004)
Stability Pact: Criticisms &
Problems (2)
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The Stability Pact for SEE is not as efficient as it could be. The
economic development in the region is still unsatisfactory, the
population is unaware of the existence of the pact and its
extensive programmes. The main problem is the lack of
coordination. The single donor states even do not know which
projects are funded by other countries. (Rainer Stinner, 2004)
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The record of the international involvement and that of the
Stability Pact in particular is mixed. This is partly due to the fact
that the Stability Pact has mainly a coordinating function, while
much more active involvement is necessary because the regional
will is weak. (Vladimir Gligorov, 2004)
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[Note: the Special Coordinator only has about 30 staff !!]
Stability Pact: Criticisms &
Problems (3)
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Main problem:
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Inconsistencies – perhaps even competition – between Stability
Pact and Stabilization and Association Process –
SP emphasizes regional cooperation and judges progress
made by SEE states on this basis.
SAP establishes competition among the candidates for a
Stabilization and Accession agreement, as their chances to
enter the EU later on are judged on the basis of their individual
progress towards the goals and qualifications agreed on. In this
context, achievements in regional cooperation are regarded as
marginal.
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Future Prospects
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The Stability Pact provides a superstructural framework
between Romania & Bulgaria as accession countries, the SEE
states as potential accession countries, and Moldowa. Thus, it
will be needed at least until the SEE accession process is
successfully resolved.
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The Stability Pact also binds Kosovo into regional cooperation
via UNMIK. Thus, it will be needed as long as the Kosovo
status problem is not resolved.
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The development of regional cooperation is an open-ended
continuing process. This means that at last in the immediate
and medium term future the Stability Pact will have enough
work to do. Any obituaries therefore are decidedly premature.
Thank you for your
attention !
The Stabilisation and Association
Process for South-Eastern Europe
Recipients:
Albania, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Croatia,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Size:
4,5 bn Euro 1991 – 1999 on part of EU
17 bn Euro including humanitarian assistance
+ contributions of member states
The Stabilisation and Association
Process for South-Eastern Europe
Definition:
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EU’s main contribution to the stability pact
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Enhancement of the Regional Approach
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Stronger incentives for the region, but also an element of
conditionality regarding political and economic development
and regional cooperation
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Tailor-made approach taking into account the needs of each
country
Goal:
bring peace, stability, and economic development to the region
and open the long-term perspective of EU membership
151. We heard from many of our witnesses that the Stability Pact, in
particular the Quick Start Package, was announced with a great deal
of fanfare which led to high expectations of it. Stephen Wordsworth
from the FCO told us that these expectations were overblown (Q 34).
Clare Short went one step further and indicated that the grandiose
promises made at its inception were a cause for concern because
they were seen by many as too ambitious (Q 252). Chris Patten
believed that:
"the expectations were less than coherently explained or
analysed and that it is unfair to blame those who run the
Pact for the gap between the initial rhetoric and what the Pact
has usefully been able to do." (Q 65)
152. Gary Titley MEP made a similar point when he explained that the
Pact had been established as a reaction to the problem of a perceived
lack of co-ordination of aid efforts in the Balkan region. He thought
that the Pact itself needed to be more streamlined and focused and
given specific yearly tasks to achieve (Q 177).