Transcript The Cold War Explanations

Importance and Consequences of the
Cold War
• Wars: 1945-1990: 150 conflicts, 23 million dead
• Superpower wars:
– Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan
• Proxy Wars / Civil Wars:
– Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Somalia, Cambodia,
Guatemala, Mozambique, Ethiopia
• Risk of nuclear war
– Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
– Yom Kippur War 1973 (Egypt & Syria vs. Israel)
– Reagan & “Second” Cold War, 1980s
On the brink
• US Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense,
1981: “The United States could recover
from an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet
Union in just two to four years... If there are
enough shovels to go around, everybody’s
going to make it. Dig a hole in the ground,
cover with a couple of doors, and then cover
the doors with three feet of dirt. It’s the dirt
that does it.”
–
T. K. Jones
Importance and Consequences of the
Cold War
• Risk of nuclear war
– US war plans, 1982 committed US to fighting
and winning a nuclear war lasting up to six
months: “A war in which the U.S. could prevail
and force the Soviet Union to seek earliest
termination of hostilities on terms favorable to
the United States.”
• How did humanity bring itself to the brink
of self-inflicted catastrophe?
• How has disaster been avoided - what
explains the peaceful end of the Cold War?
The Cold War
Key Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?)
US Marshall Plan
Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe - Poland / Czech coup 1948
Cold War
Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, 1946
The Cold War
Key Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?)
US Marshall Plan
Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe
Truman & “Containment” policy (1947)
Cold War
Truman and Containment
The Cold War
Key Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?)
US Marshall Plan
Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe
Truman & “Containment” policy (1947)
Czech coup 1948
Berlin Blockade, 1948-9
The Cold War
Key Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?)
US Marshall Plan
Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe
Berlin Blockade, 1948-9
1st Soviet Atomic bomb test, 1949
NSC-68, 1950
Cold War
NSC-68 & Korea, 1950
The Cold War
Key Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?)
US Marshall Plan
Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe - Poland / Czech coup 1948
Berlin Blockade, 1948-9
1st Soviet Atomic bomb test, 1949
NSC-68, 1950
Korean War, 1950
US develops Hydrogen bomb 1952, Soviets 1953
Soviet 50 MT Nuclear Weapon, 1961
Nuclear
Fireball Size
Outer Red
line = Tsar
Bomba test,
1961: 50 MT
4.6 km
World nuclear tests
1030
1000
800
715
600
400
210
200
45
45
6
6
0
US
Russia
France
PRC
UK
Source: AJ Software & Multimedia
India
Pakistan
Nuclear Scare: 1950s
Nuclear Scare: 1950s
Nuclear Scare: 1950s
Importance of the Cold War
World stockpile
of nuclear weapons
Year
US
1945
1950
1960
1970
1980
1986
1990
1997
6
369
20 434
26 492
23 916
23 410
21 781
12 000
USSR/ UK France PRC TOTAL
Russia
0
0
0
0
6
5
0
0
0
374
1 605
30
0
0 22 069
11 643 280
36
75 38 526
30 062 350
250 280 54 858
45 000 300
355 425 69 490
37 000 300
505 435 60 021
23 000 260
450 400 36 110
US Peak:
1966 32 193 warheads
USSR Peak: 1986 45 000 warheads
Note: numbers include active and inactive warheads
Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53 (6).
The Cold War
Key Early Events
US dropping of atomic bombs, 1945 (?)
US Marshall Plan
Soviet occupations in Eastern Europe - Poland / Czech coup 1948
Berlin Blockade, 1948-9
Korean War, 1950
NSC-68
US develops Hydrogen bomb 1952, Soviets 1953
Soviets Build Berlin Wall, 1961
Cold War
Kennedy’s “ich bin ein Berliner” speech,
1963
Cold War
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
• Consider: What does the Cuban missile
crisis demonstrate:
– Nuclear deterrence works (implication: go
nuclear for own security)
OR
– Unacceptable risk of nuclear war (implication:
disarmament)
Cold War
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Overview
• October 12, 1962
– Kennedy shown U-2 photos of Soviet missiles
in Cuba
• October 22, 1962
– Kennedy speaks to the nation
Cold War
Cuban Missile Crisis,1962
Cuban Missile Crisis
Overview
• October 12, 1962
– Kennedy shown U-2 photos of Soviet missiles in Cuba
• October 22, 1962
– Kennedy speaks to the nation, announces blockade
• October 28, 1962
– Khrushchev announces missiles will be removed
• Kennedy believed chance of nuclear war between
1 in 3 and even, McNamara 50-50
Cuban Missile Crisis
Lessons
• Conventional Lesson: Nuclear superiority and
compellence prevailed (realism)
– Soviets “blinked”
– Implications:
• Nuclear Superiority matters
• Nuclear Arms Race
•
Cuban Missile Crisis
Conventional Lesson:
Lessons
– Nuclear superiority and compellence prevailed (realism)
• New Lessons:
– Risk of nuclear war was higher than realized
• Misperceptions: N readiness & local launch authority in Cuba
• Bureaucracy: Accidents / Loss of Control
– Compromise / cooperation / reassurance helped resolve crisis,
rather than compellence (liberalism) – US missiles in Turkey
– US nuclear superiority didn’t matter
– Conclusions:
• Minimum or “existential” deterrence worked, only a few N needed for
mutual deterrence, arms race unnecessary
• nuclear weapons also cause of crisis in first place: made each side
more insecure & raised risks
• If too terrible to use even one, why have them? Paradox of deterrence
• So, are they worth the risk?
Cuban Missile Crisis:
Aftermath & Consequences
• Soviet N superiority
• Crisis Management: “Hot-Line”
• Era of “Détente” & Arms Control:
– Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963)
– Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
– SALT Treaties (1970s) / BTWC (1975)
Final Exam
• Thursday December 10, 12:00
• Wesbrook Building100
Reagan & the “Second” Cold War
US President Reagan:
•1981 calls USSR “evil empire” and
announces plans to “leave MarxismLeninism on the ash-heap of history”
•1983 “Star Wars” speech: SDI
•1984 (sound check for radio address):
“My fellow Americans. I’m pleased to
tell you today that I’ve signed legislation
that will outlaw Russia forever. We begin
bombing in five minutes.”
Gorbachev and Reagan sign INF Treaty 1987
Gorbachev and Bush sign START Treaty 1991
End of the Berlin Wall & Cold War:
Hammers, not Tanks / Missiles
End of the Cold War
• Learning objectives:
– How did it end without major conflict?
– What lessons do we draw from this major
change in the international system?
– Was it due to US military spending ‘bleeding
the Soviets dry”?
– At stake: implications for policy if above is
correct
End of the Cold War
Explanations
• System Level:
– Balance of Power (Realist): Imperial Over-Stretch
– Problems: What does this leave unexplained?
• 1) Why was it the USSR and not US that became overextended?
• 2) No great power war to change system = anomaly for balance of
power theory
• “There is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to
suggest it could ever accept imperial decline gracefully. None of the
over-extended empires… ever retreated to their own ethnic base until
they had been defeated in a Great Power war….” Paul Kennedy, 1987
• Timing: why 1989?
Did “Peace Through Strength” Work?
• Reagan’s “Peace Through Strength” (Realist): Spend Soviets into
the ground with SDI and massive military budget
• Problems:
– Reagan’s policy change: agreed to arms control agreements
– Made it almost impossible for Soviet reformers, legitimized
hard-liners: Arbatov
• End of Cold War came about despite US policies
• cf. Iranian reformers & W. Bush’s “axis of evil”
– Soviet reasons for policy changes:
• Dobrynin: “It was not the strain of matching Reagan’s
“huge arms build-up that led to the collapse of the Soviet
Empire. … The troubles in our economy were the result of
our own internal contradictions.” (Marxist/Critical)
Domestic Level:
• Soviet Union
– Economic decay
– Dissent and challenges to
ideological legitimacy
• Eastern Europe
– Civil Society: “People Power”
mobilizing dissident groups
(“bottom-up” explanations)
• Berlin Wall
• Lech Walesa & Solidarity, Poland
• Vaclav Havel & Civic Forum,
Czechoslovakia
End of the Cold War
Explanations
Civil Society – “People Power” and the
Velvet Revolution, Czechoslovakia, 1989
• Domestic Level: Soviet /
European domestic factors
End of the Cold War
Explanations
– “People Power”: Civil Society in
Eastern Europe, mobilizing
dissident groups
• Puzzle: Why weren’t these
efforts crushed with force?
Vaclav Havel and Czechoslovakia, 1989
End of the Cold War
• Individual level: Gorbachev
– Domestic Reform: “Glasnost” &
“Perestroika”
– Foreign policy
• Strategy:
– “Common security”
– “Reasonable Sufficiency”
– “Sinatra doctrine”
Explanations
Gorbachev Initiatives
• Foreign policy
– 1987: INF Agreement / Test Ban Moratorium
– Unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops
– Announce withdrawal from Afghanistan Feb. ‘88,
complete by Jan. ‘89
– May ‘89 Sino-Soviet summit
– 1990-91 Gulf War: UN Security Council authorization
– May ‘91 established relations with Israel
– May ‘91 Cubans out of Angola
Gorbachev effects
• Europe
– June ‘89 elections in Poland (1990 Walesa President)
– Feb. ‘89 independent parties in Hungary; May ‘89 border
barricades w/Austria removed; EGermans flee to WGer via
Hungary Sept. ‘89; elections Mar/Apr. ‘90
– Oct. 6 ‘89 Gorbachev visits East Germany: “Policies which affect
the GDR are decided not in Moscow but in Berlin.”
– Nov. 9, ‘89 Berlin Wall falls
– Gorbachev accepts principle of reunification Jan. ‘90; elections
Mar. ‘90; Oct. 3, ‘90 German unification; Warsaw Pact dead by
Mar. ‘91
– Havel elected President of Czechoslovakia Dec. ‘89
– Communist leader Ceausescu overthrown by force in Romania,
Dec. ‘89; elections May ‘90 won by Illiescu’s National Salvation
Front
• Internal Soviet empire
– 1989-91 fifteen Soviet republics declare sovereignty, then
independence
– June ‘91 Yeltsin elected President of Russia
– Aug. ‘91 attempted coup; Dec. ‘91 Gorbachev resigns (Nobel
Peace Prize 1990)
Power of Civil Society: Failed Russian
Coup 1991
Power of Civil Society: Failed Russian Coup 1991
Lessons & Implications of the
End of the Cold War:
• Can major economic reform (towards
capitalism) take place without accompanying
political reform towards greater democracy?
– China
• Civil Society & People Power: Global spread
of democratic ideas
– 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union
Lessons & Implications of the
End of the Cold War:
• Civil Society & People Power
– 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union
– October Revolution Serbia 2000
– Orange Revolution Ukraine (Dec 2004)
But
Lessons & Implications of the
End of the Cold War:
• Civil Society & People Power
– 1989-90 EEurope / Soviet Union
– October Revolution Serbia 2000
– Orange Revolution Ukraine (Dec 2004)
But
• “Saffron Revolution” Burma 2007
• Iran election protests 2009
– Global spread of democratic ideas
• Transnational activist networks & technology
Lessons & Implicatoins of the
End of the Cold War:
• 3) Who won and why?
– US won / USSR lost
• Due to aggressive US policy of militarized containment
(realism)
• Is this right in this case? Even if so, will it work to
apply in other contexts?
Lessons & Implicatoins of the
End of the Cold War:
• 3) Who won and why?
– US won / USSR lost
• Due to aggressive US policy of militarized containment
(realism)
OR
• Despite this strategy which prolonged the cold war and
at unnecessary cost
– Ideas & individual leadership (liberalism)
– Internal contradictions (critical theory)
– Inevitable superiority of capitalism & democracy
(liberalism)?
• “End of History” - Fukuyama
Lessons of the Cold War
The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947, Foreign Affairs
“X” (George Kennan)
“…it is clear that the main element of any US policy
toward the USSR must be that of a long-term,
patient but firm and vigilant containment of
Russian expansive tendencies. It is
important…that such a policy has nothing to do
with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering
or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness.”
The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947
“X” (George Kennan)
“…If anything were ever to disrupt the unity and efficacy
of the [Communist] Party as a political instrument,
Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of
the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of
national societies… Soviet power…bears within it the
seeds of its own decay, and the sprouting of these seeds
is well advanced.
… To avoid destruction, the US need only measure up to
its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of
preservation as a great nation”
Lessons of the Cold War:
• Why was the Cold War not “hot”? Did nuclear weapons
“keep the peace”?
– If so, would suggest the advantages of nuclear proliferation
(implication: obtain WMD).
– If not, their risks might outweigh their advantages (nonproliferation).
• Implications: Do nuclear weapons & other WMD
provide security?
– Do they prevent (nuclear/conventional) war?
– Will they be used? Why or why not? Why haven’t WMD been
used more often?
– Are they counterproductive for state security in an era of
terrorism?
– Is the use / possession of nuclear weapons morally acceptable?
A Nuclear Revolution?
“We knew the world would not be
the same…
...I am become death, the destroyer
of worlds”
Robert Oppenheimer
Has there been a nuclear (WMD)
revolution?
• "The unleashed power of the atom
has changed everything save our
modes of thinking, and thus we drift
toward unparalleled catastrophe.”
• Albert Einstein, 1946
• Was he right?
• Or has humanity adapted and
learned?
Effects of nuclear weapons
Effects of Nuclear Weapons
The Power of Nuclear Weapons
• Hiroshima = 15-20 kilotons
(atomic bomb)
• Today’s nuclear weapons:
– 1 Ohio (“Trident” )
Submarine:
• 24 Trident missiles: 8475
kilotons (8 megatons) each
– Each sub = 6,080 Hiroshima
bombs
– US has 14 Trident subs
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
Yield
10KT
500KT
1MT
20MT
0.1
0.5
0.65
2.2
0.15
0.3
0.54
2.8
0.55
1.1
2.0
10.4
0.7
1.4
2.5
13.0
1.9
3.8
6.8
36.0
0.77
1.3
2.8
4.8
3.6
6.0
10.0
16.0
Thermal Radiation
1st Burns - Severe Sunburn 1.7
2ndBurns - Blistering
1.2
rd
3 Burns - Full Skin Gone 0.95
8.5
6.8
5.7
12.0
9.0
7.5
35.0
30.0
25.0
537
2096
358
1379
101
40
389
155
Radius (Miles)
Fireball
Maximum Overpressure
Mortality (92psi)
Severe Lung Hemorrhage
Threshold Lung Hem.
Glass Windows Shatter
Winds
200mph
100mph
Dose from Radioactive Fallout
10 rad/hr - ill 24hrs, 50% mortality in 2 days
68
393
30rad/hr - ill 4 hrs, death probable in 1 day
45
262
300rad/hr - ill 30min, death probable in 1 day
13
74
1000rad/hr - death in 1 hr
5
30
One-megaton nuclear explosion
Source: Mansbach, Global Puzzle, 2nd edition, p. 377
Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD)
• Nuclear / Radiological
• Chemical Weapons (CW)
• Biological Weapons (BW)
Biological Weapons
• Nuclear Weapons
Use of WMD
– Hiroshima & Nagasaki, 1945
• Chemical Weapons
– WWI / Italy in Ethiopia 1937 / Iraq vs.
Iran/Kurds 1980s
– Terrorist attempts
• Japan 1995 (Sarin)
• Biological Weapons
– Japan in Manchuria, 1930s
– Terrorist attempts
• US anthrax 2001
Puzzles: Why WMD Restraint?
• Why haven’t nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons been
used more frequently?
Explaining the Non-Use of WMD
• Realism:
– Deterrence: Fear of Retaliation
– Interests (utility): Only useless weapons
restrained / technical obstacles
– Cicero: `inter arma silent leges'
Laws of War
Laws of War
Explaining the Non-Use of WMD
• Realism: Problems:
– Why no WMD use when WMD state in war vs. non-WMD
state?
• Why no US nuclear use in Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War, Iraq when faced
no nuclear retaliation? UK Falklands / USSR Afghanistan. No mutual
deterrence, but still no use.
• Why no CW use by US in Vietnam? By USSR in Afghanistan?
– Questionable Utility/technical limitations
• Best for BW
• False for CW/N
– E.g, WWI used massively / modern CW
– US assessment of CW utility vs. Japan 1945
Explaining WMD Restraint
• Neo-liberalism (rationalism): Cooperation &
Compliance with treaties.
– Self-interest and Reciprocity
• Treaty Verification and Compliance (to overcome
cheating):
– Geneva Protocol 1925 / Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC 1997)
– Biological & Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC
1975)
Compliance and International Law:
USSR & Biological Weapons Convention
Explaining WMD Restraint
• Realism: Deterrence (fear of retaliation)
– Problem: Many cases of non-use with no fear of retaliation
• Neo-liberalism (rationalism): Treaties
– Verification and Compliance
– CWC, BTWC, NPT
– Problems:
• Cheating (realism)
– USSR and BTWC
– Iraq, Iran, North Korea and NPT
• Non-parties - Pakistan, India, Israel, NKorea withdrew 2003
• BUT even non-parties and cheaters on possession have
mostly not used their WMD
– There is no international treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear
weapons: Nuclear Weapons Convention & “Global Zero”?
Explaining WMD Restraint
• Constructivism: Power of Moral Norms and
Identity
– Personal belief
• “I / we just don’t do that kind of thing…”
– International / domestic costs of breaking
taboos
• Reputation (social power, not material)
Moral Norm vs. CW
• WWII
– US President Roosevelt: “I have been loath to
believe that any nation could be willing to loose
upon mankind such terrible and inhumane
weapons. . . I state categorically that we shall under
no circumstances resort to the [first] use of such
weapons...”
– British Major-General Henderson: ‘such a
deplorable departure from our principles and
traditions would make us wonder if it mattered
which side won.’
Moral Norm vs. Nuclear Weapons
• Korea:
• General Ridgway: N as “the ultimate in
immorality”
• Truman: “I could not bring myself to order
the slaughter of 25 million”
• Vietnam - Sec. of State Rusk: “We never seriously
considered using nuclear weapons”
• Iraq, 1991 - Colin Powell: “Let’s not even think
about nukes. You know we’re not going to let that
genie loose.”
Explaining WMD Restraint
• (Liberal) Constructivism: Power of Moral
Norms and Identity
• Problems:
– While states and decision-makers are socialized
by norms or abide by them for their own
interests, (suicidal) terrorists not constrained by
norms.
Implications of WMD
• So where to from here? Should / can the
proliferation of nuclear weapons be
stopped? If so, how? What are the
implications for dealing with terrorism?
• Realism: Spread of nuclear weapons is
– Inevitable
• Wouldn’t you know it? Now the Hendersons have
the bomb.
The Davy Crockett
• smallest nuclear
device ever deployed
• 76 lbs.
• 1.25 to 2.5 mile range
• variable yield (10 to
20 tons TNT)
• deployed 1961-71
Implications of WMD
• Realism - Spread of WMD is
– Inevitable
– Desirable (Mearsheimer): Cold War -> India & Pakistan
• Con:
– Not inevitable
• Only 9 nuclear states (due to treaty verification / power of
nuclear taboo)
• Many states reversed nuclear arsenals and programs
– Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa / Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, etc.
– Not desirable: Risks
– Assumes rationality
– Risk of accidental nuclear war / loss of control
(Bureaucracies / Organizational Theory / Misperceptions)
• Human or technical error -> accidental /
• Hey! What does that clown think he’s doing?
Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation
Organizational Theory (Domestic level, bureaucracy) &
Individual level
• Pro-proliferation argument assumes rationality
• Risk of accidental nuclear war / loss of control
– Human or technical error
• Accidental detonation
• False alerts
Threat of Nuclear Accidents
Norwegian Rocket Incident, 1995
Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation
Organizational Theory (Domestic level, bureaucracy) &
individual level
• Proliferation as stability argument assumes
rationality
• Risk of accidental nuclear war
– Human or technical error • accidental detonation
• false alerts
– Loss of control: Command and control
– Smuggling, theft, loss of materials or weapons ->
use by terrorists
• 1500 incidents 1993-2008, 30% occurred
1993-95
Significant cases of nuclear smuggling
1992-95
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1992: 1.5 kg of highly enriched (90%) uranium stolen in Podolsk, Russia
July 1993: 1.8 kg of enriched (36%) uranium stolen from naval base in
Andreeva Guba, Russia
November 1993: 4.5 kg of enriched (20%) uranium from naval base in
Severomorsk, Russia
May 1994: 6.15 g of highly purified (99.75%) plutonium discovered by
German police in garage of a businessman in Tengen, Germany
June 1994: 800 mg of highly enriched (87.7%) uranium powder bought
by undercover agents in Landshut, Germany
August 1994: 363 g of weapons-grade plutonium and 200 g of lithium
seized in suitcase in Munich airport
December 1994: 2.72 kg of highly enriched (87.7%) uranium discovered
in back seat of a car in Prague, Czech Republic
June 1995: 2 kg enriched (2-4%) uranium to be bought in sting operation
in Moscow; shootout prevents seizure or arrests
November 1995: Chechen rebels place small amount of Cesium-137 in
Ismailovsky Park, Moscow
Source: Frontline, Loose Nukes
Dangers of WMD Proliferation
“Suitcase bombs”
Source: Frontline, Loose Nukes
Implications of WMD
• Can or should proliferation of WMD be stopped?
– Realism: Proliferation of N inevitable / desirable
– Critics: Not inevitable / Risks of proliferation
• Human / Technical Error
• Loss of Control
• Smuggling / Terrorism
Implications and Prescriptions of dangers of
proliferation
– Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs / G-8
Global Partnership Against the Spread of WMD
• $20 billion over 10 years to secure Russian nuclear
materials (Canada pledged $650 million)
•
What kind of world ought we strive
to live in?
Is that world possible?