Transcript PowerPoint Presentation - Explicit Deposit Insurance?

Bank Regulation Is Changing:
But for Better or Worse?
Gerard Caprio
Williams College
If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself.
James Madison, Federalist Papers, Number 51
The Public
Corruption
Media
Politicians
corruption
Regulators and
supervisors
corruption
Banks
The Market:
Depositors,creditors,
rating agencies
Borrowers,
counterparties
Technology, Information
Infrastructure
A Framework for Bank Regulation
Market Structure
Judicial, Legal,
Regulatory Environment
Institutional Environment
Democratic, Political Structure/System
2. Debate about government’s role
Public interest view

Gov’t maximizes social welfare

Gov’t has incentives / ability to
ameliorate market failures

If we identify “best practices,”
countries will change.
Private interest view



Gov’t maximizes Gov’t welfare; so do
regulatees
Gov’t does not necessarily have
incentives / ability to fix failures
Need more than “best practices”:
 Combination of incentives for
regulators and regulatees will
not maximize social welfare
Laissez-Faire : Market failures minor no need for government
3. Collecting the data...

3 Surveys

1st: 1998-99-2000



2nd: 2003



107 countries
175 questions
152 countries
275 questions
3rd: 2006


142 countries
300+ questions
Size of Banking Systems Differs Widely
Bank Assets/GDP
Bank Assets/GDP
K y r gy z st an
Gui nea B i ssau
Ni ger
Gui nea
A z er bai j an
S udan
A r meni a
Rwanda
Taj i k i st an
S waz i l and
Venez uel a
Cambodi a
Madagasc ar
Ec uador
K az ak hst an
Côt e d' Iv oi r e
Uk r ai ne
Togo
Lesot ho
B ur k i na Faso
Romani a
Gambi a
Mex i c o
B ur undi
B eni n
B ot swana
Mal i
Li t huani a
P apua New Gui nea
S enegal
P ar aguay
Russi a
P er u
B el ar us
Nami bi a
Col ombi a
Guat emal a
Ghana
S ur i name
Cost a Ri c a
Camer oon
B ul gar i a
Mol dov a
Ni ger i a
B osni a and Her z egov i na
Mac edoni a
A r gent i na
K eny a
Nor way
P ak i st an
S r i Lank a
Tur k meni st an
Oman
Fi j i
A l bani a
B hut an
B ol i v i a
Tonga
Zi mbabwe
P ol and
Tr i ni dad and Tobago
A l ger i a
Uni t ed S t at es
El S al v ador
Hondur as
Hungar y
Indi a
S audi A r abi a
Li by a
A r uba
Est oni a
Lat v i a
Ni c ar agua
B el i z e
S out h A f r i c a
Tur k ey
B r az i l
P hi l i ppi nes
S l ov eni a
Fi nl and
Guy ana
Mor oc c o
Tuni si a
Cr oat i a
P uer t o Ri c o
Maur i t i us
S l ov ak i a
Qat ar
Chi l e
K or ea
Egy pt
K uwai t
Uni t ed A r ab Emi r at es
Ur uguay
Ic el and
S i ngapor e
A ust r al i a
S weden
Thai l and
B ahr ai n
Gr eec e
Cz ec h Republ i c
Isr ael
Canada
Denmar k
It al y
S ey c hel l es
New Zeal and
J apan
S amoa
Chi na
S pai n
Tai wan, Chi na
Mal ay si a
P or t ugal
J or dan
Cy pr us
A ust r i a
Lebanon
Mac au, Chi na
Commonweal t h of Domi ni c a
S ai nt Luc i a
Mal t a
P anama
Uni t ed K i ngdom
S ai nt Vi nc ent and The Gr enadi nes
Gr enada
Ger many
Ir el and
A nt i gua and B ar buda
Net her l ands
B el gi um
Hong K ong, Chi na
S ai nt K i t t s and Nev i s
S wi t z er l and
Sudan 14%
Median=68%
Mexico 28%
Russia 34%
Argentina 45%
United States 64%
Singapore 117%
Japan 159%
Germany 361%
Vanuatu 14,342%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Ratio of Bank Assets to GDP
64%
361%
14%
Government-Owned Banks
Not Available
Less Than 10 Percent
Greater Than 10 Percent, Less Than 30 Percent
Greater Than 30 Percent, Less Than 60 Percent
Greater Than 60 Percent
Government Ownership of Banks Differs
Widely
Share of Total Assets in Government-Owned Banks
as of Year-End 2005
Median = 5%
United State 0%
Russia 39%
Brazil 45%
Germany 40%
China 68%
India 74%
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Government-Owned Bank’s Share of Total
Bank Assets
78 Percent
68 Percent
Foreign Ownership of Banks Differ Widely
China 2%
Share of Total Assets in Foreign-Owned Banks
as of Year-End 2005
Japan 6.1%
Median = 39%
Germany 6.5%
India 6.8%
Russia 8.3%
United States 8.5%
Brazil 20%
United Kindom 54%
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Foreign-Owned Banks’ Share
of Total Bank Assets
11 Percent
98 Percent
Grouping and Aggregating Data to Assess
What Works Best





Structure, scope,
independence of
regulation and
supervision
Bank activities
Entry requirements
Capital requirements
Deposit Insurance




Supervisory powers
Private monitoring
External governance
Ownership
characteristics
All the data is online in the hopes of
lowering the entry barriers to
conducting better research.
How Many Bank Supervisory Authorities
Do Countries Have?
Not Available
Is there a single financial
supervisory agency for all
of the activities in which
commercial banks are
allowed to do business?
Is there a single financial
supervisory agency for all
of the main financial
institutions (insurance
companies, contractual
savings institutions,
savings banks)?
9
6
0%
82
No
51
44
20%
Yes
92
40%
60%
80%
100%
Is the Central Bank
a Supervisory Authority?
Not
Available
4%
No
42%
Ye s
54%
Who Funds Supervision
in Countries?
Not
Available
36%
Bank s
23%
Gov ernment
Both
10%
31%
What Is a Bank?
Regulatory Restrictions on Activities
Unrestricted
Permitted
Restricted
Prohibited
Percent
100
80
7
18
9
31
4
32
41
46
60
40
21
40
42
20
0
33
26
36
34
31
7
Securities
20
Insurance
13
Real estate
11
Bank
Nonfinancial
ownership of
firm
nonfinancial ownership of
firms
banks
Entry

Foreign



limitations on foreign entry/ownership
% of entry applications denied (foreign & domestic)
Domestic

summary indicator of rules to obtain a license

draft by-laws, organizational chart, financial projections,
financial background information on major owners, background
of directors/managers, sources of capital, etc.
Capital

Summary measure of initial and general
capital stringency






Basel C/A
Capital varies with market risk
loan securities, FX losses deducted from capital
initial capital only with cash and government securities
borrowed funds for initial capital
verify capital sources
Are Countries Planning on Adopting Basel
II?
Not
Available
11%
No
13%
Ye s
76%
Which Approach Do
Countries Plan to Adopt?
Standardized Approach
Advanced IRB Approach
Not
Available
16%
Not
Available
17%
Foundation IRB Approach
No
2%
Ye s
40%
Not
Available
17%
Ye s
45%
Ye s
82%
No
38%
No
43%
Deposit Insurance Generosity

Explicit

Level of coverage

Coinsurance

Coverage (e.g., FX, interbank deposits)

Funding (source; flat or risk based)

Management

Membership
Do Countries Have Explicit
Deposit Insurance Schemes?
Survey III
143 Countries
Survey II
152 Countries
Not Available
2%
No
51%
Yes
49%
No
44%
Yes
54%
Countries recently adopting deposit
insurance: Armenia, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Moldova, Russia, Singapore, Tajikistan,
Uruguay, and Zimbabwe
Percent of the Commercial Banking System’s
Assets Funded by Deposits
Algeria
Botswana
France
Iceland
Sweden
Finland
Lesotho
Luxembour g
Belgium
Russia
Denmar k
Singapor e
Australia
Nether lands
Braz il
Belarus
Norway
Spai n
Estoni a
Malta
Zimbabwe
Mozambique
Germany
Poland
Hungary
Slovenia
United Ki ngdom
Latvia
Taj ikistan
Ital y
Tri ni dad and Tobago
Kyrgyz Republic
Armenia
Slovakia
Chil e
Cypr us
Argentina
El Salvador
Romani a
Jor dan
Portugal
Indonesia
Cz ech Republi c
Ghana
Burundi
Jamaica
Korea
Croati a
Ir eland
Canada
Mexi co
Bulgaria
United States
Greece
Phili ppi nes
Maur itius
Colombia
0
Angola
Panama
Macedonia
Uganda
Honduras
Switzerland
Peru
Japan
Oman
Sri Lanka
Costa Rica
Malaysia
Bolivia
Saudi Arabia
Bosnia and
Maldives
Uruguay
Venezuela
Jersey
Malawi
Guatemala
Moldova
Thailand
Nicaragua
Liechtenstein
Belize
New Zealand
Bahrain
India
Lithuania
Lebanon
Kenya
Pakistan
China
South Africa
Papua New Guinea
Morocco
Cook Islands
Tanzania
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Dominican Republic
Dominica
Fiji
Macau, China
Seychelles
Guyana
Suriname
Cayman Islands
Isle of Man
20
40
60
80
0
20
40
60
80
100
Percent of the Commercial Banking System’s
Assets Funded with Insured Deposits
62 countries with no assets
funded with insured deposits
Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
Australia, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana, British Virgin Islands, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Cayman Islands, Central
African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cook
Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivorie, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guernsey, Guinea
Bissau, Guyana, Jersey, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyz
Republic, Lesotho, Macau, China, Malawi,
Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Montserrat,
Mozambique, New Zealand, Niger, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Senegal,
Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Vanuatu
Brazil
Sweden
Lebanon
Moldova
Armenia
France
Tanzania
Liechtenstein
Finland
Iceland
Luxembourg
Malaysia
El Salvador
Spain
Croatia
Norway
Jamaica
Slovenia
Peru
Nicaragua
Romania
Slovakia
Korea
Cyprus
United States
Zimbabwe
Argentina
Macedonia
Netherlands
Denmark
Mexico
Hungary
Poland
Portugal
Latvia
Guatemala
Lithuania
Bangladesh
Bulgaria
Indonesia
Czech Republic
Colombia
Oman
Uruguay
Morocco
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Official Supervision

Supervisory power









Power to take legal action against auditors, director, officers
Force bank to provision, change organizational structure
Power to suspend dividends, bonuses, management fees
Legal power to declare insolvency
Power to supercede shareholder rights, remove/replace managers,
directors
Forbearance discretion
Loan classification and provisioning
stringency
Diversification: domestically and abroad
Supervisory resources
What Powers Do Supervisors Possess?
Not Available
Are bank directors legally liable if information
disclosed is erroneous or misleading?
9
Can the supervisory agency be held liable for
damages to a bank caused by its actions?
12
Can individual supervisory staff be held personally
liable for damages to a bank caused by their actions
or omissions committed in the good faith exercise of
their duties?
8
0%
Yes
No
117
16
66
64
28
20%
106
40%
60%
80%
100%
What Powers Do Supervisors Possess?
Not Available
Can supervisors take legal action against external
auditors for negligence?
9
82
Are external auditors legally required to report to the
supervisory agency any other information discovered in 8
an audit that could jeopardize the health of a bank?
Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to
the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of
8
bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities,
fraud, or insider abuse?
Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with
external auditors to discuss their report without the
4
approval of the bank?
Is it required by the regulators that bank audits be
publicly disclosed?
No
51
115
19
111
23
126
8
0%
Yes
12
101
20%
40%
33
60%
80%
100%
Are Courts Supervisory Authorities Too?
Not Available
Can the bank shareholders appeal to the court against a
decision of the bank supervisor?
9
Is court order required to appoint a receiver/liquidator in
the event of liquidation?
9
Is court approval required for supervisory actions, such
as superceding shareholder rights, removing and
replacing management, removing and replacing director,
or license revocation?
9 6
0%
Yes
No
115
18
69
64
127
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
3. Private monitoring

Certified audit required

Percent of 10 biggest banks rated by
international rating agencies

Accounting disclosure and liability




accrued but unpaid interest
consolidated statements
liability of directors
No deposit insurance
Private monitoring ≠
Laissez-Faire
Private monitoring
involves supervision
Do Countries Require a Simple
Leverage Ratio?
Not
Avail abl e
13%
Yes
17%
No
70%
4. What Works Best?
What “works”





Bank development
Efficiency
Integrity
Stability
Bank governance?
4. Bank development
Bank Development =  + s + X + u
s = Z + 

s = Supervisory/regulatory indicators

X = Exogenous determinants of Bank Development, identified by
existing research (legal origin, ethnic diversity, settler mortality, etc.)

Z = Instrumental variables for the bank supervision and regulation
variables (religious orientation, endowments, latitude)


u and  are error terms
, , , and  are the estimated parameters
Private monitoring boosts bank development
Official supervisory power lowers bank
development
4. Summary
Bank
Efficiency
Development
Capital Regulation
Supervisory Power
Private Monitoring
Activity Restrictions
Entry Restrictions
Deposit Insurance
Government Banks
Diversification
Basel II: Remember Pillar III
++
--
--
++
0
--
Stability/Loan
Quality
0
0
0
-0
--
Lending
Integrity
-++
++
Private vs. Public interest:
Suggests wariness of relying
on official intervention
Changes in Restrictions on Banks
Changes - Overall Restrictions - Survey III - I
A rgentina
Tajik is tan
Guy an a
Tha iland
Per u
Moldov a
Ken y a
C z ec h Re public
Tr in ida d a nd Tobag o
Sw itz erland
Por tugal
Pan ama
Lux embour g
Fr anc e
C y pr us
C hile
Spa in
Sou th Afric a
Singap ore
Lithuania
K orea
Ita ly
Indone sia
H unga ry
H ondu ras
Ger ma ny
Finland
Aus tr ia
Aus tr alia
Maur itius
Belar us
Mexico
-6
-4
Sw ede n
Slov en ia
Sau di Ar abia
R ussia
N ew Zealan d
Malaysia
Les oth o
India
D enmar k
C ro atia
C anad a
Bots w ana
Boliv ia
Bah rain
U nited St at es
Philippines
N ether lan ds
Malta
Leb anon
Latv ia
Kuw ait
J or dan
Japan
Guatemala
Es tonia
Bur undi
U nited K ingdom
Mor oc c o
Ireland
Ic eland
Gre ec e
Ghana
Br az il
R omania
Poland
Oman
Bhu tan
Belgium
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Impact of Changes in Restrictions
Difference in BankDevelopment - Overall Restrictions - Survey III - I
Tajik is tan
Guy an a
-0.4
A rgentina
Tr in ida d a nd Tobag o
Sw itz erland
Por tugal
Pan ama
Lux embour g
Fr anc e
C y pr us
C hile
Tha iland
Per u
Moldov a
Ken y a
C z ec h Re public
-0.3
-0.2
Spa in
Sou th Afric a
Singap ore
Lithuania
K orea
Ita ly
Indone sia
H unga ry
H ondu ras
Ger ma ny
Finland
Aus tr ia
Aus tr alia
R omania
Poland
Oman
Bhu tan
Belgium
U nited K ingdom
Mor oc c o
Ireland
Ic eland
Gre ec e
Ghana
Br az il
U nited St at es
Philippines
N ether lan ds
Malta
Leb anon
Latv ia
Kuw ait
J or dan
Japan
Guatemala
Es tonia
Bur undi
Sw ede n
Slov en ia
Sau di Ar abia
R ussia
N ew Zealan d
Malaysia
Les oth o
India
D enmar k
C ro atia
C anad a
Bots w ana
Boliv ia
Bah rain
-0.1
0
0.1
Maur itius
Belar us
0.2
Mexico
0.3
Changes in Entry Requirements
Changes - Entry Requirements - Survey III - I
Sw ede n
Per u
C y pr us
-6
-4
Ven ez uela
Tajik is tan
Spa in
R omania
N ether lan ds
K orea
Ken y a
Gre ec e
Aus tr alia
-2
Finland
Kuw ait
Tr in ida d a nd Tobag o
Latv ia
Ger ma ny
Bur undi
U nited St at es
Sr i Lan k a
Singap ore
Poland
Philippines
N ew Zealan d
Malaysia
Japan
Indone sia
Ic eland
H unga ry
Guy an a
Fr anc e
El Salv ador
C hile
Bhu tan
A rgentina
U nited K ingdom
Tha iland
Sw itz erland
Sou th Afric a
Slov en ia
Sau di Ar abia
R ussia
Por tugal
Pan ama
Oman
Mor oc c o
Moldov a
Mexico
Maur itius
Malta
Lux embour g
Lithuania
Les oth o
Leb anon
J or dan
Ita ly
Ireland
India
H ondu ras
Guatemala
Ghana
Es tonia
D enmar k
C z ec h Re public
C ro atia
C anad a
Br az il
Bots w ana
Boliv ia
Belgium
Belar us
Bah rain
Aus tr ia
0
2
4
6
Impact of Entry Changes
Difference in BankDevelopment - Entry Restrictions - Survey III - I
Sweden
Peru
Cyprus
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
United Kingdom
Thailand
Switzerland
South Africa
Slovenia
Saudi Arabia
Russia
Portugal
Panama
Oman
Morocco
Moldova
Mexico
Mauritius
Malta
Luxembourg
Lithuania
Lesotho
Lebanon
Jordan
Italy
Ireland
India
Honduras
Guatemala
Ghana
Estonia
Denmark
CzechRepublic
Croatia
Canada
Brazil
Botswana
Bolivia
Belgium
Belarus
Bahrain
Austria
Venezuela
Tajikistan
Spain
Romania
Netherlands
Korea
Kenya
Greece
Australia
0
United States
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Poland
Philippines
NewZealand
Malaysia
Japan
Indonesia
Iceland
Hungary
Guyana
France
El Salvador
Chile
Bhutan
Ar gentina
Finland
Kuwait
Trinidad and Tobago
Latvia
Germany
Burundi
0.05
0.1
0.15
Impact of ‘Improved’ Supervision
Difference in BankDev elopment - Official Superv isory Power - Surv ey III - I
B hutan
B otsw ana
C zechR epublic
Luxembourg
A ustria
U nited K ingdom
N ew Zealand
B ahrain
P oland
C yprus
C roatia
S audi A rabia
S lovenia
P anama
Oman
Germany
E l S alvador
V enezuela
U nited S tates
P eru
Lebanon
K enya
Japan
H ungary
H onduras
Greece
B razil
A r gentina
R ussia
Lesotho
B elgium
S w itzerland
P ortugal
Morocco
Finland
C hile
C anada
Italy
Thailand
Malaysia
India
France
E stonia
D enmark
B urundi
B olivia
A ustralia
S pain
Mexico
Guyana
B elarus
Malta
Iceland
Ghana
K or ea
Moldova
Ireland
Guatemala
Latvia
Trinidad and Tobago
Lithuania
Mauritius
S outh A frica
S ingapore
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Impact of Private Monitoring
Difference in BankDevelopment - Private Monitoring - Survey III - I
Mexico
Belarus
Thailand
Netherlands
Morocco
Latvia
Italy
Hungary
Guatemala
Greece
Germany
France
El Salvador
CzechRepublic
Cyprus
Indonesia
Sweden
Spain
South Africa
Slovenia
Russia
NewZealand
Mauritius
Lithuania
Japan
Ireland
Iceland
Bolivia
Belgium
Bahrain
Ar gentina
United States
Trinidad and Tobago
Singapore
Panama
Moldova
Luxembourg
Honduras
Guyana
Estonia
Croatia
Chile
Brazil
Botswana
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Korea
Portugal
Peru
Malta
Malaysia
Jordan
Australia
Oman
Finland
Burundi
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Impact of Diversification
Difference in Probability (Banking Crises) - Diversification Index - Surv ey III - I
Burundi
Honduras
Guyana
-1
-0.8
-0.6
Ghana
Guatemala
Lesotho
-0.4
Korea
Lithuania
Belarus
Lebanon
Greece
Venezuela
Oman
South Africa
Rwanda
CzechRepublic
Hungary
Spain
Jordan
Bahrain
Malta
Moldova
Saudi Arabia
United States
United Kingdom
Trinidad and Tobago
Thailand
Switzerland
Sweden
Slovenia
Russia
Romania
Portugal
Poland
Philippines
Peru
NewZealand
Netherlands
Morocco
Mauritius
Malaysia
Luxembourg
Japan
Italy
Iceland
Germany
France
Finland
Estonia
Cyprus
Croatia
Chile
Canada
Brazil
Botswana
Bolivia
Austria
Australia
Argentina
Tajikistan
Indonesia
India
Mexico
Panama
Denmark
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
6. Qualified Conclusions

Until angels govern, the data suggest …




Supervisors have crucial role



Avoid relying on official oversight, restrictions, & ownership
Emphasize private monitoring / incentives (deposit insurance)
Stress Basel II’s 3rd pillar (not capital and official oversight)
Support market discipline, not supplant it
Foster / force information disclosure
Do not fax “best practices to countries!
Empiricists / Researchers deserve a seat at
the regulatory reform table
What to do?


Data say that capital and supervision do not work
Implications:



Focus on private sector incentives and diversify





Emerging markets need to emphasize infrastructure first,
with better information, incentives to use it
Look to why supervision has not been working (politics).
State guarantees (deposit insurance) and/or state ownership
reduces monitoring
Limits on activities are bad
Diversification (activities, portfolios) is essential
Foreign entry matters, esp. for small countries
Go slow on Basel II (wait for version II.x, or
later)

Emphasize pillar 3…Till Angels Govern.
Our Limitations

Measurement





Gauging Government Role




Errors, omissions, time-series in measuring supervision / regulation?
Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies)
Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation?
Solution: get better data
Policies may work differently in different political / institutional regimes
Do we capture these nuances?
Solution: add case studies
Regulatory choices


Does X-C evidence add much?
Solution: add time series data
Our Limitations

Measurement





Gauging Government Role




Errors, omissions, time-series in measuring supervision / regulation?
Impact of supervision on the ground (only have proxies)
Better aggregate indexes of approaches to supervision / regulation?
Solution: get better data
Policies may work differently in different political / institutional regimes
Do we capture these nuances?
Solution: add case studies
Regulatory choices


Does X-C evidence add much?
Solution: add time series data
Percent of the Commercial Banking System’s
Assets Denominated in Foreign Currency
El Salvador
Bangl adesh
Algeria
New Zealand
Australia
Portugal
Colombia
Spai n
Malaysia
Morocco
Ital y
Seychel les
Fij i
Beliz e
South Afr ica
Korea
Dominican Republi c
Dominica
Greece
Braz il
Papua New Guinea
Thai land
Malawi
Venez uela
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Botswana
Bhutan
Guyana
Slovakia
Kenya
Paki stan
Chil e
Saudi Ar abi a
Burundi
Argentina
Mexi co
Nether lands
Norway
Indonesia
Guatemal a
Cz ech Republi c
France
Ghana
Poland
Iceland
Uganda
Russia
Lesotho
Croati a
Tri ni dad and Tobago
0
Belgium
Jordan
Isle of Man
Oman
Tanzania
Honduras
Canada
Moldova
Belarus
Finland
Jamaica
Denmark
Slovenia
Hungary
Romania
Angola
Suriname
Tajikistan
Liechtenstein
Armenia
Bulgaria
Costa Rica
United Kingdom
Cook Islands
Macedonia
Cyprus
Mauritius
Bosnia and
Nicaragua
Lithuania
Switzerland
Peru
Maldives
Kyrgyz
Lebanon
Latvia
Uruguay
Singapore
Bolivia
Kazakhstan
Macau, China
Malta
Bahrain
Labuan,
Cayman Islands
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
20
40
60
80
100
Percent of the Commercial Banking System’s
Liabilities Denominated in Foreign Currency
El Salvador
Bhutan
Venez uela
Lesotho
Seychel les
Morocco
Australia
South Afr ica
Kazakhstan
Thai land
Colombia
Fij i
Spai n
Guyana
Malaysia
Korea
Ital y
Papua New Guinea
Braz il
Zimbabwe
Botswana
Malawi
Greece
Burundi
Paki stan
Kenya
Argentina
Mexi co
Beliz e
Poland
Cz ech Republi c
Chil e
Indonesia
Guatemal a
Saudi Ar abi a
New Zealand
Dominican
Dominica
Oman
Ghana
France
Slovakia
Nether lands
Belgium
Uganda
Jor dan
Isle of Man
Russia
Hungary
Moldova
0
Trinidad and
Tanzania
Belarus
Canada
Norway
Iceland
Honduras
Jamaica
Slovenia
Romania
Denmark
Mozambique
Malta
Macedonia
Lithuania
Suriname
Costa Rica
Angola
Finland
United Kingdom
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cook Islands
Maldives
Bosnia and
Cyprus
Liechtenstein
Mauritius
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Peru
Armenia
Lebanon
Jersey
Latvia
Nicaragua
Singapore
Macau, China
Kyrgyz
Uruguay
Bahrain
Bolivia
Labuan,
Cayman Islands
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
20
40
60
80
100
Percent of the Commercial Banking System’s
Assets in Government Securities
Bosni a and Herz egovina
Kosovo
Syr ia
Jer sey
Taj ikistan
United Ki ngdom
Burundi
Iceland
Switzerl and
Finland
Cayman I sl ands
Cook Islands
Isle of Man
Norway
Germany
Romani a
Panama
France
New Zealand
Sweden
Ir eland
Malaysia
Latvia
Beliz e
Uruguay
Spai n
Ital y
Russia
Singapor e
Boli vi a
Kyrgyz Republic
South Afr ica
Moldova
Cypr us
Croati a
Canada
Chil e
Bhutan
Denmar k
Thai land
Kazakhstan
Hungary
Lithuania
Suri name
Bulgaria
Tri ni dad and Tobago
Fij i
Malta
Bangl adesh
Maur itius
Macau, Chi na
Belarus
Oman
0
Netherlands
Macedonia
Dominica
Dominican
Peru
Japan
United States
El Salvador
Greece
Czech
Armenia
Belgium
Honduras
Mexico
Philippines
Jordan
Pakistan
Morocco
Lesotho
Slovakia
Costa Rica
Saudi Arabia
Brazil
Nicaragua
Slovenia
Luxembourg
Poland
Angola
Colombia
Lebanon
Ghana
Tanzania
Kenya
Uganda
Indonesia
Zimbabwe
Guyana
Venezuela
Malawi
Papua New
India
Jamaica
Argentina
Seychelles
Mozambique
Botswana
Maldives
2
4
6
8
10
12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80