Transcript Slide 1

Efficient Fully-Simulatable
Oblivious Transfer
Andrew Lindell
Aladdin Knowledge Systems and Bar-Ilan University
04/08/08 CRYP-106
2-out-of-1 Oblivious Transfer
 A paradoxical protocol
?
» Inputs:
A sender with two inputs m0,m1
• A receiver with an input bit 
» Output:
• The receiver obtains m
» Security:
• The sender learns nothing
about 
•
•
The receiver learns only one
message
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mm
0,m
 1
? m1-

Importance of Oblivious Transfer
 Theory of cryptography
» Oblivious transfer is “complete”
» Oblivious transfer stands at the center of all protocols for
secure computation without an honest majority
 Protocol constructions
» Widely used to construct efficient protocols
Including multitude of protocols under the heading of
“privacy-preserving data mining”
» Efficiency of the oblivious transfer is a bottleneck in the
efficiency of many other protocols
•
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Applications
 Efficient protocols based on oblivious
transfer
» Comparing information without leaking it
One oblivious transfer per bit of input
» Oblivious pseudorandom function evaluation
• Application to set intersection and more
» Secure auctions
» Privacy-preserving data mining
•
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Efficient Oblivious Transfer
 Most work considers definitions that
guarantee privacy only
» The sender cannot guess the receiver’s bit with probability
greater than ½
» There exists one input message of the sender about which
receiver learns nothing (formalized via indistinguishability)
 Highly efficient constructions
» Naor-Pinkas: the DDH assumption
» Aiello-Ishai-Reingold: homomorphic encryption
» And more (see the paper)
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Simulation-Based Definition of Security
 The real/ideal model paradigm for defining
security [GMW,GL,Be,MR,Ca]:
» Ideal model: parties send inputs to a trusted party, who
computes the function for them
» Real model: parties run a real protocol with no trusted help
 A protocol is secure if any attack on a real
protocol can be carried out in the ideal model
» Since no attacks can be carried out in the ideal model,
security is implied
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The Real Model
m0,m1

Protocol output
(should be m)
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The Ideal Model

m0,m1
m0,m1

m
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Perfectly
secure
channels
m
The Security Definition
For every real
adversary A

there exists an
adversary S
Protocol
interaction
Trusted party
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REAL
IDEAL
Simulation-Based Definitions
 Properties of the definition
» Privacy
» Independence of inputs
» Input extraction (adversary “knows” which input it is using)
» Correctness
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Simulation versus Privacy Only
 When is simulation needed?
» When oblivious transfer is used as a subprotocol, it is often
necessary to have a protocol that is proven by simulationbased definitions
• Example: efficient general protocol by [Lindell-Pinkas]
based on Yao (with security for malicious adversaries)
» Composition: privacy-only definitions can interact “badly”
with other protocols
 The bad news:
» It seems much harder to construct efficient protocols with
simulation-based proofs
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Protocols with Simulation
 Existing protocols
» Semi-honest protocols compiled with GMW
Highly inefficient
» Recent protocols of [Camenisch-Neven-Shelat] and [GreenHohenberger]
• They solve a harder problem of adaptive 1-out-of-N OT
• They use less standard assumptions (at least Bilinear
DDH)
• Since they use Bilinear maps, exponentiations are more
expensive than for regular DDH
•
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Background – the Naor-Pinkas Protocol
 Receiver
» Computes (ga,gb,gc,gd) where a,b,c,d are random under the
following constraint
• If =0, then c = ab
• If =1, then d = ab
» Sends the tuple to the sender
 Sender
» Let (h1,h2,x,y) be the tuple received
•
•
•
Check that x ≠ y
Randomize (h1,h2,x), (h1,h2,y) and derive keys kx and ky
Encrypt m0 with kx and m1 with ky
 Receiver
» Derive appropriate key and decrypt m
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Background – the Naor-Pinkas Protocol
 Security in case of a corrupt sender
» Sender cannot know if c=ab or d=ab, because this means solving
the DDH problem
• Recall (ga,gb,gab) is indistinguishable from (ga,gb,gr)
 Security in case of a corrupt receiver
» Sender checks that x ≠ y
» Therefore, only one of (h1,h2,x) and (h1,h2,y) is a DH tuple
» The randomization on the DH tuple can be reproduced by the
receiver to get the output
» The randomization on the non-DH tuple results in a uniformly
distributed key that the receiver knows nothing about
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Simulating the Naor-Pinkas Protocol
 Security in case of a corrupt sender
» In order to simulate in ideal model, need to extract the sender’s
input
» Information-theoretically, only one message can be obtained
» Rewinding the sender doesn’t help because the sender’s input
can depend on the receiver’s first message
 Security in case of a corrupt receiver
» Needs to be able to extract the receiver’s input
» In this case, can be achieved with zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge of Discrete log
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Solving the Problem of a Corrupt Sender
 We need to be able to extract the sender’s
input
» Instead of sending (h1,h2,x,y), send
(h1,x1,y1) and (h2,x2,y2) where one is a DH tuple and the
other is not
» The simulator makes both tuples DH and extracts both
inputs
» The sender cannot tell the difference (due to the DDH
assumption)
•
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A Corrupt Receiver
 What about a corrupt receiver?
» It can also make both tuples be DH
» Solution: have the receiver prove that only one tuple is DH
using a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
• The simulator for a corrupt sender can still send two DH
tuples by “cheating” in the ZK
• The simulator for a corrupt receiver extracts the
receiver’s input from the proof of knowledge
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An Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof
 We use cut and choose for this task
» The receiver sends s pairs of tuples
The DH and non-DH tuples are ordered randomly
» The sender asks it to open ½ and then checks that all
opened pairs have one DH and one non-DH tuple
» The receiver sends a reordering
• If =0, then all DH tuples are first
• If =1, then all DH tuples are second
» The sender randomizes all and:
• Encrypts m0 with all the keys from the first set
• Encrypts m1 with all the keys from the second set
•
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The Cut and Choose
m0,m1

[(ga1,gb1,gr1),(ga1,gb1,ga1b1)]
[(ga2,gb2,ga2b2),(ga2,gb2,gr2)]
[(ga3,gb3,gr3),(ga3,gb3,ga3b3)]
[(ga4,gb4,gr4),(ga4,gb4,ga4b4)]
(1,4)
(a1,b1,r1,a4,b4,r4)
[(ga2,gb2,ga2b2),(ga2,gb2,gr2)]
r3),(ga3,g
b3a3b3
[(ga3,gb3,ga3b3
),(ga3b3
,g,g
,gr3)]
Randomize and encrypt
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A Corrupt Receiver
 Main observation:
» If any of the unopened tuples has one non-DH tuple, then
the randomization will prevent the receiver from receiving
one of the messages
» Therefore, in order to cheat:
• All of the opened pairs must have one DH and one nonDDH
• All of the unopened pairs must both be DH
» Since the cut and choose is chosen randomly, this can
occur with probability 2-s only
• Important: s can be made small (between 20 and 40)
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Extensions
 Smooth projective hashing
» A generalization of DDH and other assumptions
» Includes N-residuosity and Quadratic residuosity
» A generalization of Naor-Pinkas to smooth projective
hashing was shown by [Kalai]
» Our protocol can be based on her generalization
 Homomorphic encryption
» Similar ideas can be used to obtain a protocol that is secure
using any homomorphic encryption scheme
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Efficiency
 The Most Efficient Instantiation
» The DDH protocol, using Elliptic curves
 Comparison to Naor-Pinkas
» Requires s times the work and communication
» For s = 40, this is significant, but by far the best
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Summary
 Efficient protocols for oblivious transfer
» A significant but reasonable cost
 Achieve full simulation
» With a rigorous proof of security
 This reduces the bottleneck of oblivious
transfer
 The future:
» Reduce to a constant number of exponentiations?
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