The European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment L’Organisation Européenne pour l’Equipement de l’Aviation Civile

WORKING GROUP 73 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AIRWORTHINESS (SG2)

Michael Allouche, SG2 Leader Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

Topics for presentation



GENERAL INTRODUCTION



EUROCAE WG73 AIRWORTHINESS



Work Approach



Expected outputs



PECULIAR ISSUES



System Safety Parameters & Harmonization Challenges



Airworthiness and Operation interrelated Aspects



CONCLUSIVE REMARKS Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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INTRODUCTION

- Eurocae - Eurocae WG73

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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The EUROCAE Organisation

 Established in 1963 as a European technical forum for administrations, airlines and industry.  Prepares minimum performance specifications for airborne electronic equipment as a basis for EASA Technical Standard Orders (ETSO).  Activities now extended to include complex CNS/ATM systems including their ground segment.  EUROCAE:  Is recognised by the European Commission as the unique body competent for the standardisation and interoperability required for the Single European Sky concept; and  is acknowledged by ICAO which references its documents.

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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EUROCAE Working Group 73

 EUROCAE WG-73 was launched in April 2006 following earlier work by EUROCONTROL, NATO, and JAA.  WG-73 participates in the ICAO UAS Study Group.

 WG-73 cooperates with other bodies dealing with UAS.

European Aviation Safety Agency

EUROCAE WG73 Objectives



Requirements framework airworthiness

that will support civilian UAS certification and

operational

approvals.



Safe operation within non-segregated airspace

in a manner compatible with other airspace users,

including

step by step process



Compatibility with the existing ATM

regulatory framework; Investigation of

longer term ATM adaptations M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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Primary Civil Aviation WG-73 Partners ICAO

FAA RTCA SC-203 EUROCAE Industry Members Council of EUROCAE Secretariat Working Groups Working Groups Working Groups Working Groups Working Group 73 WG-73 sub-groups

EUROCAE

EUROCONTROL EASA European National Authorities JARUS

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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WG73 Leadership / Structure

Chairman: Daniel Hawkes [EUROCAE] Vice Chairman: Gérard Mardiné [SAGEM] Vice Chairman: James Sizemore [FAA] Secretary: Dewar Donnithorne-Tait [AUVSI] EASA: Filippo Tomasello, David Haddon ATM: Holger Matthiesen [EUROCONTROL] ICAO UASSG: Tony Henley [BAE Systems] RTCA SC-203: Ken Geiselhart [Lockheed Martin] Standing Advisor: Peter van Blyenburgh [UVSI] Subgroup #1: UAS Operations & Sense and Avoid Gérard Mardiné SAGEM Subgroup #2: Airworthiness & Continued Airworthiness Michael Allouche IAI Subgroup #3: Command and Control, Communications, Spectrum, & Security Norbert Tr änapp IABG Subgroup #4: UAS <150kg for VLSO Ron van de Leijgraaf CAA NL Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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WG73 Deliverables & Status



Deliverable 1 (Inventory of Issues)



Agreed January 2007.



Deliverable 2 (Work Plan)



First version end 2007, ongoing iterations



Deliverable 3 (Concept Document)

 

1st iteration second quarter 2009 Final Agreed Version second quarter 2010.



Deliverable 4 (Command & Control) / Deliverable 5 (Sense & Avoid)



In coordination with US RTCA SC-203



Deliverable 6 (ATM Incompatibility Issues)



Ongoing activity

.

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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EUROCAE WG73 SG2 AIRWORTHINESS

- Work Approach - Expected outputs

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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EUROCAE WG73 Airworthiness WP Approach

EASA TC Policy R.Y000-01 UAS Type Certification Basis

(1) Select & Tailored Manned CS (2) System Safety Objectives & Criteria (3) Special Conditions (Control Station, C3 etc … )

Eurocae WG 73 SG2 Work Packages Generic Criteria & Recommendations Relating to (1) & (2) & (3) Consider also Restricted Type Certification & C of A Process & Criteria INPUTS/INTERFACES/COORDINATION:  SG1 & SG3 WPs  Draft USAR/STANAG 4671  FAA System safety Group  RTCA SC 203 DO-304 & WG1  Any other

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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EUROCAE UAS WG73 Deliverable 3 Airworthiness Volume (Draft Lay Out)

     

INTRODUCTION REFERENCES UAS AIRWORTHINESS CONSIDERATIONS UAS TYPE CERTIFICATION BASIS

   

EASA General Regulations EASA UAS Policy UAS Airworthiness Categorization EASA CS Tailoring

  

EASA CS Tailoring Guidelines UAS Safety Objectives & Criteria Additional Airworthiness Certification Criteria RESTRICTED TC & CoA CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

  

Conceptual approach to support UAS Manufacturers and Civil Airworthiness Authorities Develop further guidelines compared to generic EASA UAS TC policy Identify future UAS Special Conditions issues and parameters

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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PECULIAR ISSUES

- System Safety Parameters & Harmonization Challenges - Airworthiness and Operational Interrelated Aspects

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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Overall System Safety Objective Parameters



Manned versus Unmanned

Requirement (“1309”) 

Catastrophic Failure Definition

tailored to UAS 

System Safety Objective Definition

 Individual versus Overall Objective 

Absolute versus Relative

Quantitative Objective  “Easy” conservative approach : use manned 1309 quantitative target “as is” (likely penalizing)  Absolute approach, defining acceptable risk for specific UAS hazards 

Airworthiness

versus

Operational

Safety Objectives 

Restricted Type Certification

Scenario

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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Safety Criteria – Harmonization Challenge Illustration Reference MIL-STD-882C AC 23.1309

Catastrophic Definition Death, System Loss or severe environmental damage Failure Conditions that are expected to result in multiple fatalities of the occupants, or incapacitation or fatal injury to a flight crewmember normally with the loss of the airplane. AMJ25.1309 (A340 TC basis) Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and landing.

ACJ CS-25.1309 Amdt 5 Failure Conditions, which would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the loss of the aeroplane STANAG4671/USAR EASA A-NPA 16/2005 Failure conditions that result in a worst credible outcome of at least uncontrolled flight (including flight outside of pre-planned or contingency flight profiles/areas) and/or uncontrolled crash, which can potentially result in a fatality.

The worst UAV hazard event designated hereafter as “Catastrophic” or Severity I Event may be defined as the UAVs inability to continue controlled flight and reach any predefined landing site, i.e. an UAV uncontrolled flight followed by an uncontrolled cra Not specified. To be part of the manned CS tailoring exercise EASA DRAFT UAS TC POLICY FAA-EASA Meeting (April 2009) Failure Conditions that could result in multiple fatalities on the surface or in the air.

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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Airworthiness and Operational interrelated aspects

   

Any equipment

that may be

required under operational

also be

subject to airworthiness approval

rules shall under relevant criteria

Operational assumptions

that may be taken during the airworthiness certification process, as an example:  UAS envisaged mode of operation  Emergency Procedures considered in UAS System Safety Assessment  ATC interface, should

be clearly identified.

Airworthiness versus Operational Safety Targets Operational Restrictions

envisaged in the framework of

Restricted Type Certification Process.

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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Conclusive Remarks

  

Civil UAS Rule-making process Pragmatic approach

 EASA UAS TC Policy framework  At this stage, Type Certification Basis on a case by case basis, considering

specific UAS

character.

 Restricted TC to be also considered 

Intermix of civil and military inevitable

 Military UAS likely to be used in civil applications

Harmonization is a must

  Civil / Civil Civil / Military takes more time… 

Eurocae WG73 open to harmonization efforts and related cooperation Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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Thank you for your attention

[email protected]

The European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment

102, rue Etienne Dolet, 92240-Malakoff, France Tel.: +33 1 40 92 79 30

www.eurocae.net

The information in this presentation references draft material for use by EUROCAE WG-73 and should not be regarded as statements of EUROCAE policy unless approved by the EUROCAE Council.

Military Airworthiness Workshop, EU2009.CZ, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 5 June 2009 – M. Allouche WG73 SG2 Briefing

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