Transcript POPULIST PHANTASIES IN POSTCOMMUNISM OF THE 2010IES

POPULIST PHANTASIES IN
POSTCOMMUNISM OF THE
2010IES
By
Pal TAMAS [HAS –Corvinus,
Budapest]
DE-DEMOCRATIZATION
Trends in the late 2000ies:
De-Democratization in post-communism in 4-5
indicator systems [BTI, Freedom House, etc.]
a. not-only in the Post-Soviet region, but in
„finalized” democracies of Central Europe, as
well
b. New movements, rhetorics and public
ideologies from the bottom, used and amplified
by elites
RE-INTERPRETATIONS
Metaphores of the 90ies
a. Linearity in democracy-building
b. 1989-1991 collapse and democracy could
not be separated
c. Democracy and market are united
d. Real danger: return of communists
e. Hibrid regimes are temporarities
a-e SEEMS NOW UNDEFENDABLE
NEW REALITIES
a. Soft borders between hibrids and
mainstream democracies
b. Hibrids are generated not by breaks in
thier prehistories, but by the
international political environmets
[„drivers licencies”]
c. Markets are more stabile, then
democracies
d. Nation-states versus neoliberal order
Try to guess: which countries were hares (rabbits) and which were turtles (tortois)?
REGIME CHANGE [LINDEECKMAN, 2010]
OLD/NEW REGIME THEORIES
Pseudo-multipartism [Juan LINZ, 1973-75]
Competitive authoritarianism [LEVITSKY-WAY,
2002]
Hegemobic-noncompetitive [Andreas SCHEDLER,
2002]
Transit outcomes [O’DONNELL, SCHMITTER]
A.democracy B.DICTABLANDA [liberalized
authoritarian] C. DEMOCRADURA [restricted,
illiberal democracy]
DUALIZATION OF
ECONOMY/SOCIETY
2 STRATEGIC CONFLICTS:
A.INTERNATIONAL/LOCAL
B.COSTS/BENEFITS OF
TRANSFORMATION
DUALIZATION 2
INCLUSION
LOCALIST
INTO
INTERNAT.DIV
BENEFITS
Neoliberal
triumphators
A
National
bureacrats
B
COSTS
New
workingclass
C
Marginalized,
non-active
lumpenized D
Political strategies
A+B
C+D
A+C
B+D
exclusion of the bottom
classic. class struggle 2.0
liberal modernization
national populism
strategies 2
a. Vulnerability
b. Exit, voice, loyalty
[Hirschmann, 1970]
loyalty – clienture
exit- mobility, migration
voice –grassroot populism
Outline of the Exit, Voice and
Loyalty Framework
QUALITY
PROBLEM
Cost of Exit: Low
Cost of Exit: High
Information
Channels
Closed
Open
Loyalty
Problem
Loyalty: High
Loyalty
Information
Channels
Open
Closed
Voice
Loyalty: Low
Exit
Loyalty
Problem
Loyalty: High
Loyalty
Loyalty: Low
Exit
Reasons for exit
POPULISM MATRIX
II. Euroscepticism placed on the
ideological continuum of Second
Modern
EUROSCEPTICISM
Radical
Left
- Defence of Welfare
state
- Against globalization
and neoliberalism
Types:
soft (left radical
socialists)
hard (eurocommunists)
Neoliberal
Right
Neoconservative
Right
- Against excessive
regulations
- For free market
- For confederation
- Against EU federation
- For nation-state
and sovereignity
- For preserving national
and cultural identity
- For Christian values
in EU constitution
- Against lower level of
democracy
Type: soft
Populist radical
Right
-
Against integration
For nation-state
Against EU federation
For Europe of
homelands
- Against globalization
- Against immigrants
and multiculturalism
Type: hard radical
„ THIN” AND „THICK” POPULISM
THIN POPULISM
a. Direct references to the „people” [on
behalf, in the name….]
b. Simple people, nation, hard working, the
taxpayers]
THICK POPULISM
A. CORRUPTION, ANTI INSTITUTIONS
B. ANTIELITIST, ANTIMODERN, ANTIURBAN,ANTI.INTERNATIONAL
Oliver Löser: Demokratie, Republikanismus, Gemeinsinn und politische Ordnung
MEASUREMENT OF THICKNESS/THINNESS OF
POPULISM
Dimensionen des „dicken
Populismus“: Inklusion und
Exklusion bestimmter
gesellschaftlicher Gruppen
und Elemente (bei Exklusion
häufig mit Schuldzuweisung)
Gemeinsinn zerstört
Gemeinsinn?
Durchmesser des Kreises:
Ausmaß des „dünnen
Populismus“
Quelle:Jagers & Walgrave (2007), S. 333