Transcript INTRODUCTION TO BIOSECURITY AND DUAL-USE

INTRODUCTION TO BIOSECURITY
AND DUAL-USE
Neuroethics Education Module
Unit 8
OBJECTIVES
• To provide understanding of how neuroscience may be
misused.
• To understand the concept of the dual-use challenge
(in the context of neuroscience), building awareness of
how benignly intended research may be subject to
misuse , and exploring how the dual-use challenge
relates to scientific responsibility.
• To explain the role of international law as an influence
on the conduct of scientific research and its place in
the ‘web of prevention’.
• To promote specific awareness and understanding and
the international legal instruments relevant to the
dual-use challenge.
OUTLINE
• A. Modern Hostile Applications (Slides A.1-A.4)
• B. The Dual-use Challenge and Scientific
Responsibilities (Slides B.5-B.10)
• C. The Role of International Law (Slides C.11-C.15)
• D. International Treaties Relevant to the Dual-Use
Challenge (Slides D.16-D.20)
A1. Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and
Related Technologies
• Chart 5-1
– “Aerosols of opioids serve as excellent incapacitants;
reversal agents and premedications can be
administered to protect soldiers. Russia deployed this
technology in the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre in 2002.
The agents were probably fentanyl derivatives…”
• Chart 5-4
– “New nanotechnologies have allowed molecular
conjugation or encapsulation that may permit
unprecedented access to the brain.”
NAS. 2008
A2. The Dual-Use Challenge
• UK Royal Society. 2012. Brain Waves Module
3: Neuroscience, conflict and security.
Recommendation 1:
– “There needs to be a fresh effort by the
appropriate professional bodies to inculcate the
awareness of the dual-use challenge (i.e.
knowledge and technologies used for beneficial
purposes can also be misused for harmful
purposes) among neuroscientists at an early stage
of their training.”
A3. Averting the Hostile Exploitation of
Biotechnology(i)
• “… During the century ahead, as our ability to modify
fundamental life processes continues its rapid
advance, we will be able not only to devise additional
ways to destroy life but also be able to manipulate it
– including the processes of cognition, development,
reproduction and inheritance. A world in which these
capabilities are widely employed for hostile purposes
would be a world in which the very nature of conflict
had changed. Therein could lie unprecedented
opportunities for violence, coercion, repression or
subjugation…”
A4. Averting the Hostile Exploitation of
Biotechnology (ii)
• “… Unlike the technologies of conventional or even
nuclear weapons, biotechnology has the potential to
place mass destructive capabilities in a multitude of
hands and, in coming decades, to reach deeply into
what we are and how we regard ourselves. It should
be evident that any intensive exploitation of
biotechnology for hostile purposes could take
humanity down a particularly undesirable path.”
B5. ‘Internal’ Responsibilities of Scientists
• Professional Ethics Report, 2011:
– “Typically… covers nine instructional areas: [for
example] (1) Data Acquisition, Management,
Sharing and Ownership; (2) Conflict of Interest
and Commitment; (3) Human Subjects; (4) Animal
Welfare; (5) Research Misconduct; (6) Publication
Practices and Responsibilities; (8) Peer Review; (9)
Collaborative Science. It is virtually silent,
however, on the social responsibilities of
scientists…”
B6. ‘External’ Responsibilities of Scientists
• Professional Ethics Reports, 2011:
– “… As one of the leading commentators on ethics
in science and engineering has observed,
‘Currently, attention to professional responsibility
in science and engineering research concentrates
more on issues that arise in the conduct of science
than in its social influence.’ Scientists must be
prepared to consider their responsibilities
associated with, for example, emerging
technologies…”
B7. Responsible Conduct in Dual-Use
Research
• Four papers on ethics and dual-use:
– Taking due care: moral obligations in dual use
research. Bioethics, 22, 477-487.
– A precautionary principle for dual use research in
the life sciences. Bioethics, 25, 1-8.
– The ethics of disseminating dual-use knowledge.
Research Ethics (in press).
– Ethical competence in dual use life science
research. Applied Biosafety, 17, 120-127.
B8. Ethical Competence and Dual-Use
Responsibility
• Applied Biosafety, 17,(3), p.121
– “Ethical competence is strongly connected to
responsibility. Without competence, responsibility
cannot be taken and without responsibility to
take, competence is not needed. Having identified
three capacities necessary for ethical competence
(awareness, reflection and action), this article now
provides an analysis on how these capacities
might contribute to a culture of dual use
responsibility.”
B9. Four Methods for Building Ethical
Competence
• Applied Biosafety, 17, (3), 121-125
• Text Boxes
– 1. Ethics Education as a Method to Build Dual Use
Ethical Competence
– 2. Ethics Consulting as a Method to Build Dual Use
Ethical Competence
– 3. Ethics Rounds as a Method to Build Dual Use Ethical
Competence
– 4. Ethical Mentoring as a Method to Build Dual Use
Ethical Competence
B10. Ethical Competence Conclusions
• Applied Bioethics, 17, (3), 124
– “In this article the concept of ethical competence
has been described and applied in a dual use
context. Three main conclusions can be drawn
from the analysis of dual use ethical competence:
1) it is necessary in developing and sustaining a
culture of dual use responsibility; 2) it requires
organisational support; and 3) it is insufficient to
safeguard all dual use research.”
C11. The Web of Prevention
• Prohibition (in place at both
national and international levels)
• Controls on dangerous
pathogens, agents, toxins and
chemicals (handling, use, transfer,
export)
• Preparedness, detection,
diagnosis, medical counter
measures
• Strong response to any
use/threat of use
• Regulatory responses: treaties,
standards, guidelines and codes.
• Export control groups
• Early warning systems
• Oversight of research
• Verification systems
• Review of scientific and
technological developments
• Threat anticipation and
intelligence
• Detection, surveillance and
response to human, animal and
plant disease threats
• (Laboratory) biosafety and
biosecurity
• Registration and licensing
procedures
• Tracking and documentation of
transboundary movements
• Education, awareness-raising and
promotion of a culture of
responsibility among scientists
• Scientific and technical expertise
in the security community
C12. International Law
• Some problems are beyond the ability of individual states
to address; in these cases states tend to cooperate
internationally to more effectively address common
concerns.
• A key form of such cooperation is the development of
international law – generally in the form of treaties,
conventions, standards and guidelines – to set out
expectations for state behaviour.
• Science is a global endeavour – knowledge, materials,
equipment and scientists themselves move rapidly around
the globe. Applications and impacts are not limited by
national boundaries.
• Neuroscience is therefore an area in which international
law has relevance. This includes the international rules that
have been developed to prevent the hostile use of science.
C13. Dealing with the Revolution in the
Life Sciences
E.g. International
Declaration on
Human Genetic Data
E.g. Laboratory Biosafety Manual;
International Health Regulations
SOCIAL / ETHICAL
IMPACTS
DRUGS CONTROL
HEALTH
TRADE
BIOTECHNOLOGY
REGULATION
E.g. Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement
E.g. the United Nations
Drugs Conventions
SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
E.g. Biological
Weapons Convention
E.g. Convention on
Biological Diversity
C14. Dealing with the Revolution in the
Life Sciences – Health Example
HUMAN
World Animal Health
Organisation
World Health
Organisation
ANIMAL
Terrestrial Animal Health Code
International Health
Regulations
HEALTH
Laboratory Biosafety Manual
Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance
Terrestrial Manual of
Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines
Aquatic Animal Health Code
Aquatic Manual of Diagnostic Tests
Guidance on Safe Transport of
Infectious Substances
PLANT
Food and Agriculture
Organisation
International Plant Protection Convention
C15. Dealing with the Revolution in the
Life Sciences – Security Example
1925 Geneva Protocol
Biological Weapons Convention
Review Conferences
(generally once every five years)
Intersessional Process
(between review conferences)
Convention Against the Use of Environmental
Modification as a Method of Warfare
Chemical Weapons Convention
Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons
Review Conferences
(generally once every five years)
D16. The 1925 Geneva Protocol
• “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the
enemy is not unlimited… It is especially forbidden (a) To
employ poison or poison weapons.” – 1907 Hague
Regulations Concerning the Law and Customs of War on
Land
• The 1925 Geneva Protocol “condemns the use of
‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all
analogous liquids, materials or devices’ and declares that a
prohibition on them is already contained within
international treaties. The Parties to the Protocol then
agree to ‘extend this prohibition to the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare’”. (Rhodes, 2010, p.72)
D17. BWC Article I
Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention:
• “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never
in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or
otherwise acquire or retain:
1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins
whatever their origin or method of production, of
types or in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed
to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in
armed conflict.”
D18. CWC Articles I and II
Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
“1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
never under any circumstances:
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile
or retain chemical weapons or transfer, directly or
indirectly chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons…”
Article II of the CWC provides a definition of permitted
purposes of certain chemicals
D18. Main Features of the BWC and CWC
Both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention contain provisions which cover:
• Not obstructing economic and technological development of
states, and ensuring extensive exchange of information, materials
and equipment for peaceful purposes (Article X, BWC; Articles VI
&XI CWC)
• Mechanisms for dealing with suspected breaches (VI & VII, BWC
and IX & XII CWC)
• For review of the Conventions to take place, including
opportunities to review relevant scientific and technological
developments.
• Only the CWC has provisions on verification (Articles IV, V and
Annex on Verification); their absence from the BWC is noted as a
problematic weakness.
• The CWC has an oversight body the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
D19. Dealing with Scientific and
Technological Developments
• Reports presented to the latest review conferences of
the Biological Weapons Convention (7th Review
Conference, 2011) and the Chemical Weapons
Convention (3rd Review Conference, 2013) both
contained references to advances in neuroscience likely
to be relevant to the Conventions
• “Since the last review conference, there have been
advances in understanding the role of neuroregulators;
how to influence psychological states and alter physical
performance; as well as linking neurobiology to
disease.” – ISU Report to the 7th Review Conference –
Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to
the Convention, p.4.
D20. Bottom-Up Approaches to Prevent
Misuse
“Incorporating Norms in Research Culture
Recent years have seen some interesting moves in
international organisations and negotiating processes to
develop alternative governance initiatives, particularly
aimed at closing the gap between scientific and
regulatory development. One strand of these focuses on
promoting bottom-up ethical governance, through the
incorporation of particular norms in scientific research
culture, rather than relying solely on top-down
governmental implementation of international rules.”
Rhodes, 2013.
ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS
• In your field, identify a key area of technology or
knowledge that may be open to misuse, and outline
what this should imply for conduct in that area.
• Explain what the dual-use challenge is? What
implications does it have for scientific responsibility?
• Does international law have an important role to
play in promoting ethical scientific work?
• Which international legal instruments and/or
processes are relevant to the dual-use challenge in your
field?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
• Frankel, MS. And Carlsson, R. “Reshaping responsible conduct
of research education”, AAAS Professional Ethics Report,
Vol.xxiv(1), Winter 2011.
• Kuhlau, F. et al. 2012. “Ethical Competence in Dual Use Life
Science Research”. Applied Biosafety, Vol.17(3): 120-127.
• Forge, J. 2008. “Responsible Dual Use”, pp.121-132 in The
Responsible Scientist, Pittsburgh University Press.
• Ehni, H-J. 2008. “Dual use and the ethical responsibility of
scientists”, Arch. Immunol. Ther. Exp. 56: 147-152.