Transcript No Slide Title

THE US ARMY’s VANGUARD FORCE IN THE RMA
Essential Features: Speed, Lethality
and Surprise within a Joint
Framework at the CINC’s disposal.
The US Army’s Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups are
designed to be on the leading edge of the revolution in military
affairs and provide the blueprint for future ground force
development into the next century.
Kosovo Lessons: U.S. Army
Example is a Warning!
•
•
•
•
•
Must adapt force structure to
future security environment
within a new Joint
Operational Architecture
“Army After Next” looks too
much like the Army today
Division Organization Too
Slow, Too Centralized; Not
organized for rapid
deployability within JTF
A Combination of Strategic
Air and fast Sea Lift can move
reorganized Army Forces
faster!
Must be organized to conduct
any mission the NCA assigns
including both peace support
operations and warfighting
Improve Army’s agility & punch
through organizational change to
achieve rapid deployability and
real Joint Warfighting Capability.
During the Kosovo Crisis, a Light Recon Strike
Group would have been a flexible deterrent force!
SFOR
SARAJEVO
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA AOR
JFC
In JAN 99, an LRSG could have deployed to demonstrate
US readiness to intervene and threaten the Serb position
in Kosovo. Army Prepositioning Afloat could have
rapidly reinforced within days if released to the CINC by
the JCS. This action would have influenced Belgrade!
Federal
Republic of
Yugoslavia
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA
SOFIA
PRISTINA
KOSOVO
JFLCC CLOSE
COMBAT CDR
KOSOVO
JFACC
JFLCC
DEEP
COMBAT
CDR
ALBANIA
TIRANA
SKOPJE
JFLCC
CDR
FYROM
THESSALONIKI
JFLCC
REAR
CBT CDR
This Light Reconnaissance Strike Group is designed to be
moved by existing USAF aircraft anywhere in the world in
24 hours with 162 C-17 Sorties!
Light Recon-Strike Group (5,000 Troops)
II
RECON
II
AIR
SQDN
ATTK
2400
TROOPS
II
II
II
CBT ENG
MOBILITY
BN
GROUP
SPT
SQDN
C4I
SQDN
500
550
700
700
TROOPS
TROOPS
TROOPS
TROOPS
•3 Groups should be Conus-based and ready on a
rotational basis for immediate global deployment.
•Equipment sets could be leased for 7-8 years.
Light Recon-Strike Group
Medium Weight Brigade
REQUIRED C-17 SORTIES= 162
REQUIRED C-17 SORTIES= 168
Troops: 4,741
Equipment: 584 vehicles + (100) 463L Pallets
114 AGS 105mm gun with adv munitions (30 tons)
200 Light Strike Vehicles (18 tons) [35mm &
LOSAT + (27) 120mm Adv. Mortar system]
24 M9 ACE Engineer Vehicles
7 Fox Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Vehicles
9 MLRS rocket launchers
160 HUMMV Vehicles (various configurations)
70 Trucks (medium weight)
40 Hughes 600 Armed Helicopters
12 UH 60 (Armed and Transport Helicopters
•Brigadier General with seasoned staff
commands a ready, cohesive, all arms
Battlegroup capable of real Independent
Warfighting Operations within the Joint Task
Force!
Troops: 3,600
Equipment: 600 wheeled armored vehicles
armed with 25mm and 90mm cannon plus
either TOW or LOSAT + additional equipment.
No stabilized gun platform; cannot fire on the
move.
•Colonel Commands Conventional Brigade
Combat Team within the existing ten division
structure. No new Joint Operational
Architecture.
•Not structured for independence. Without
significant reinforcement, exclusively Small Scale
Conflict Force (peacekeeping).
•Equipment sets are purchased with enormous
•Equipment sets are leased for eight years to
sunken costs and little salvage value. Technology
support the establishment of three Light Recon- is moving too fast to buy in most cases. Old R&D
Strike Groups on rotational readiness!
process cannot keep up! Civil leads Military!
Note: Software system for determining individual plane loads is the Air Load Planning System
THE LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE STRIKE GROUP:
COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE
COMMAND AND
STAFF STRUCTURE OF A
COMBAT GROUP
BRIGADIER GENERAL
(COMMANDER )
CHIEF OF STAFF ( COL )
(Also includes a Colonel as deputy CDR)
(HQTRS Cap of 150 Officers and Soldiers)
PERSONNEL OPERATIONS STRIKE SUSTAINMENT INFORMATION CIVIL AFFAIRS
(LTC) & INTELLIGENCE COORD
LOGISTICS/ SUPPORT (C4)
&
(LTC)
(LTC)
(LTC)
(LTC)
PSYOPS
(LTC)
In contrast to the current Brigade Com m ander, the Group Com m ander can reach across
service lines to m obilize Joint capabilities to achieve m aneuver dom inance .
• Strike Coordination officer orchestrates precision strike capabilities of all services within
m aneuver fram ework of land warfare. Single link to JFACC .
• Inform ation Support officer m anages inform ation assets in support of the Group’s
operations.
• Operations and Intelligence officers are integrated into one structure.
• Civil Affairs & PSYOPS officer is perm anent link to interagency process and regional or
local civil authorities.
• Personnel and Logistics could be integrated on the Intelligence/Operations m odel.
THE C4I BN: CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE JOINT
C4ISR OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE.
600 Troops
I
HHC
I
NLOS
BATTERY
I
ISR/IW
CO
I
Command &
Control CO
I
AIR
DEFENSE
BATTERY
I
(C4I Battalion Structure in a Close Combat Group; configuration of
Deep & Rear C4I BNs will be similar, but tailored to different needs.)
• GROUP HEADQUARTERS COMPANY: Administration and
Maintenance activities
• NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT(NLOS) CO/BATTERY: Tactical UAVs/
Over-the horizon attack systems (EFOGM).
• ISR/INFO WARFARE CO: Intelligence/Info Opns
• Command and Control CO: Designed for dispersed,
mobile communications
• AIR DEFENSE BATTERY: Short-range Air Defense
• CHEMICAL CO: Recon, Detection and limited Decon support
• MILITARY POLICE SECURITY DETACHMENT: Added or
integrated as necessary for deployments and training.
CHEMICAL
CO
Breaking the Phalanx,
pages 71-73.
Reorganization creates a larger pool of
ready, available Army Forces!
•In the Group-based structure, Army Forces are involved in one of three
180 day operational readiness cycles in peacetime. This reduces
personnel tempo, makes deployments and costs predictable.
•Training Cycle (six months): Unit and Individual Training under
Service control.
•Deployment Cycle (six months): Units are ready for deployment to
Joint Command and Control and become part of the pool that
responds to Major Theater of War or Lesser Theater of War
contingencies.
•Reconstitution Cycle (six months): Unit returns to home station for
re-fitting, modernization (if required) and leave.
This approach creates a pool of 35-40,000 ready, CONUS-based
Army Expeditionary Forces that can deploy 24 hours a day, seven
days a week to fight, deter or conduct any mission the National
Command Authorities decide to assign.
Ground Force Deployment Readiness in the Groupbased Force Structure
CONUS
SIX MONTHS
SIX MONTHS
TRAININGREADINESS
PHASE
DEPLOYMENT
PHASE
RECONSTITUTION
ARMY CONTROL
CINC CONTROL
ARMY CONTROL
AIRBORNEAIR ASSLT
GROUPS
(2)
AIRBORNEAIR ASSLT
GROUPS
(2)
AIRBORNEAIR ASSLT
GROUPS
(2)
AIRBORNEAIR ASSLT
GROUPS
LIGHT
RECONSTRIKE
GROUPS
(1) LIGHT
RECONSTRIKE
GROUP
(1) LIGHT
RECONSTRIKE
GROUS
(1) LIGHT
RECONSTRIKE
GROUP
COMBAT
MANEUVER
GROUPS
(4) COMBAT
MANEUVER
GROUPS
(4) COMBAT
MANEUVER
GROUPS
(4) COMBAT
MANEUVER
GROUPS
CONUS-BASED
CLOSE COMBAT
ECHELON
AVIATION
STRIKE
GROUPS
(1) AVIATION
STRIKE GROUP
(1) AVIATION
STRIKE GROUP
SIX MONTHS
PHASE
(1) AVIATION
STRIKE
GROUP
Overseas
Presence
ARMY
FORCES IN
ROK,
EUROPE &
SWA.
(1)
AIRBORNEAIR
ASSAULT
GROUP
NONE.
ALL LRSGs
ARE CONUSBASED
(3)
COMBAT
MANUEVER
GROUPS
(1)
AVIATION
STRIKE
GROUP
► To make a difference in the 21st Century, the US Army
should field three Light Reconnaissance Strike Groups.
Fielding one LRSG is just tinkering on the margins!
► Adopting the Combat Group organizational structure is the
first step toward leveraging specialized modules of Army
combat power within a training and readiness system that
ensures the Army is relevant to Joint Operations across the
spectrum of conflict.
► Compression of division and brigade into new echelon to
achieve fewer C2 nodes, deep/close/rear functionality and the
consolidation of CSS into JTF Support Group structures are
critical steps in this broader strategic process.
► Implementing new Joint C4ISR architecture to facilitate the
employment of Army Ground Forces within the JTF is vital!