Transcript Slide 1

Bradford Disarmament Research Centre
Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK
National Series
Lecture 1
Introduction
Georgia
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Outline
1. Where we are in the early 21st
century
2. Outline of the following lectures
a) What we should know
(learning outcome)
b) What we can do
(policy contribution)
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What is “Life Science”?
• “Any field of science that is leading to or has the potential to lead to
an enhanced understanding of living organisms, especially human
life.”
• E.g. Biology, proteomics, genetic engineering, nanotechnology,
aerosol technology, chemistry and mathematics
(National Research Council, 2006: 27)
•
Applied in:
Public health, Medicine, Agriculture, Energy, Environment and
National security studies
Biotechnology:
An integral part of national strategy in the 21st Century
A growing market in Biotechnology: the pharmaceutical market
(National Research Council, 2006: 85)
Region
Annual Worth
Share
North America
$204 Billion
51%
Europe
$102 Billion
25%
Japan
$47 Billion
12%
Asia, Africa, Australia
$32 Billion
8%
Latin America
$17 Billion
4%
•
Similar results in number of researchers and the amount of private
investment for R&D in the life sciences
•
Rapid growth in the Asia-Pacific region
(Ernst&Young 2011, Frost&Sullivan 2010)
Science Outlook: Georgia
Georgian National Academy of Sciences
(GNAS)
• GNAS was established in February 1941, in Tbilisi.
• GNAS consists of 10 scientific departments
including:
– Medicine,
– Agricultural sciences,
– Chemistry and chemical technology, and
– Biological sciences
http://www.science.org.ge/english.html
• GNAS publishes 5 academic periodicals including
Bulletin of the Georgian National Academy of
Sciences (BNAS)
(GNAS 2012)
Georgia
Institutions for the life sciences in higher education (not exclusive)
State Universities
• Tbilisi State University
• Ilia State University
• Gori University
• Tbilisi State Medical University
• Georgian State University of Subtropical Agriculture
Private Universities
• University of Georgia
• Tbilisi Medical Institute
• Tbilisi Petre Shotadze Medical Academy
• Kutaisi Institute of Medicine
• Institute of Medicine Management and Stomatology
Why do we care?
Should this be an issue for us?
The dual-use nature of science and technology:
– “Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal
combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy — has been
intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for
hostile ones.”
Hostile
Peaceful
– “…Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a
dominant technology of the twenty-first century?”
Matthew Meselson: Professor of Molecular Biology at Harvard University
(Meselson, 2000: 16)
Meselson’s Forecast in 2000
Ability
• “Our ability to modify fundamental life processes
continues its rapid advance”
• “We will be able not only to devise additional ways to
destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it”
Dilemma
• “…[This has a] Vast potential for beneficial application
and could have inimical consequences for the course
of civilization.”
Meselson’s Forecast in 2000
“At present, we appear to be approaching a crossroads —a time that
will test whether biotechnology…”
• It will come to be intensively exploited for hostile purposes, or
• Our species will find the collective wisdom to take a different course.
Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC)
1972
Article I
• “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or
retain:
• 1. Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”
• This applies for not only states but also non-state actors
Science and Security: Dual-Use
The need for a broader conceptualisation of dual-use
• Biological agents and toxins can be used for hostile purposes without
weaponization and technology is typically diffused globally for peaceful
purposes
• Hostile use can take the form of criminal acts or terrorist acts (nonstate level) in parallel to military application (state level),
• The BTWC prohibits the misuse of the life sciences by both states and
non-state actors
Dual-use: traditional concept
Military
Civilian
Dual-use: broader concept
Peaceful
Non-peaceful
Georgia with international regimes
WMD
•
“Nonproliferation challenges relevant to Georgia primarily relate to export
controls. Georgia does not possess or produce nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons, and is a party to the major nonproliferation treaties
and regimes. ”
BTWC
• Accession (22 May 1996)
•
“Some vaccine manufacturing facilities in Georgia that were part of the
Soviet Anti-Plague system possessed dual-use biological weapons
production capabilities” . [However],...All dual-use equipment and
selected buildings at Biokombinat were eliminated based on the 30
December 2002 agreement between Georgia and the United States”
CWC
•
•
Signature (14 January 1993); Ratification (27 November 1995)
A founding member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons
(Nuclear Threat Initiative 2012)
National Series: Lecture Outline
2. Biosecurity Threats
3. The Web of Prevention
4. National Measures
5. Responsibility of Scientists
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Reviewing threats (Lecture 2)
Natural outbreaks of
infectious disease
Safety/accidental risks at
laboratories
Manmade threats: warfare,
crime and terrorism
Unpredictable future of the
life sciences
• ‘No single focal point’ of threats
– Potential actors, material and information, which can be related to dualuse issues, exist at international, regional, national, local and individual
levels.
The Web of Prevention (WoP) (Lecture 3)
To address natural outbreaks of infectious disease
•
Public health preparedness and response planning
To address safety/accidental risks
•
Laboratory regulations to safely manage dangerous pathogens and
toxins, to prevent an accidental release into the environment and
unauthorized access
To address manmade threats
•
Strong international arms control agreements with effective national
implementation
•
Internationally coordinated export controls
•
Intelligence
•
Biodefense
To address the unpredictable future of the life sciences
•
Oversight: Review of security-sensitive science and technology
developments
•
Responsible conduct in research through education
Public health
measures
Natural
threats
Safety risks
Responsible
conduct
Oversight
and review
of Sci-Tech
Laboratory
measures
Web of
prevention
International
prohibition
regime
Manmade
threats
Export
control
Biodefense
Governance
of science
Intelligence
National implementation (Lecture 4)
To National Context
National implementation (Lecture 4)
1
2
3
• International agreements
• Signature and ratification by states
• National measures in states
• Legislation, regulation, order or other forms
of governance
References
• The references cited in this lecture are
viewable in the Notes section of this
presentation.