Transcript The Strategic Architecture of ISIS – An Emerging State Actor.

The Strategic
Architecture of ISIS – An
Emerging State Actor.
Timothy Clancy
1
Topics
• Problem & Reference Modes
• Theoretical Perspectives
• Methods: Boundaries & Modeling Approach
• Strategic Architecture
• World Model & Baseline Simulation
• Policy Options & Analysis
• Conclusion
• Appendix (available upon request):
─ Full detailed schema of the strategic architecture and the world model
─ Baseline scenario data tables
─ Vensim Code
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Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Problem & Reference Modes
• In 2013 ISIS took control of Ar-Raqqah with an estimated 13,200
militants.
Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)
20 M
• In the next year and a half ISIS:
─ Controlled 6-8m People
─ Grown to 50,000-80,000 militants
─ Taken control of nearly 30% of the
territory in Syria and Iraq.
People
15 M
10 M
5M
0
2004
• What is the Islamic State and how
does it achieve such rapid growth?
2006
2014
2016
Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)
200,000
500,000
150,000
375,000
"km^2"
People
2010
2012
Time (Period)
"Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" : Hoped
"Population Controlled by Coercive Power (People)" : Feared
ISIS Militants (People)
100,000
50,000
0
2004
2008
250,000
125,000
2006
2008
"ISIS Militants (People)" : Hoped
"ISIS Militants (People)" : Feared
2010
2012
Time (Period)
2014
2016
0
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Time (Period)
2014
2016
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"Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)" : Hoped
"Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)" : Feared
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
US Military perspectives on different forms
of non-state actor conflict.
Unconventional
Warfare:
“operating
or with
annon-state
underground,
Irregular
Warfare:
“A violent
strugglethrough
among state
and
actorsauxiliary,
for
and
guerrilla
force
in a denied
Joint Publication
1-02: Dictionary
of Military
legitimacy
and
influence
over area.”
the relevant
population(s).”
Joint Publication
1and
AssociatedofTerms,
02: Dictionary
Military261.
and Associated Terms, 125.
State-Like Actor
Challenge to State
Emerging State Actors
 The Islamic State
 Boko Haram?
Insurgent
Guerilla Insurgencies
 FARC  Taliban
‘01-’15
 IRA
 AQI
 PLO
 Red Army Faction
Terrorist
4
 Al Nusra & AQAP 2015?
Terror Networks
 Japanese Red Army
4
 Taliban 1993-2001 & 2015?
6 July 2015
 Italian Red Brigade
Unconventional
Warfare
 Al Queda Global Network
(e.g. Core AQ, AQIP,
AQIM, AQAP, Al Nusra pre
2015)
Global Insurgency
Tactics
State-Like Actors:
Insurgent:
Terrorist: the state
“non-traditional
“challenge
“disembodied
adversaries
have
by
making it thatcells
of radicalized,
evolved
to the
impossible
forpoint
the of
nihilistic state-like
attaining
government
to
individuals
power,
authority,
perform
its
[whom]…could
not a
and influence
functions,
or byover
and did those
not tap
into a
population”
& “may
usurping
mass base
thatofdrew
possess
some
the
functions”
Kilcullen,
its legitimacy
power
of statesfrom
and
David,
popular
grievances”
adopt
state-like
Counterinsurgency
Kilcullen,
David,
structures.”
Olson, Mattis,
Location
3123
and Mullen, IRREGULAR WARFARE:
Counterinsurgency.
COUNTERING IRREGULAR
THREATS
JOINT 3123
OPERATING
Location
CONCEPT, 8 & 16.
Irregular Warfare
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Transition from coercive power to legitimacy is key
to understanding emerging state actors.
Governing begins through “coercion and reward” that is “particularistic” & “resource
intensive” Turnley et al., COIN 2.0 Formulation, 37-38.
Over time governing relies on a function of legitimacy which “involves notions of
obligation, i.e. the moral necessity to obey. Control by others is replaced by selfcontrol, which socially is a much cheaper way to ensure social order.” Ibid., 38–40.
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Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Proposed Definition of ISIS
The Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging state actor
which is using methods of irregular warfare to
influence populations (“coercive power”) which it
then attempts to govern in furtherance of its
objective to become a functioning state
(“legitimate power”).
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Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Modeling boundaries informed by proposed
definition and slicing method.
The Islamic State (ISIS) is an
emerging-state actor which is
using methods of irregular
warfare to influence populations
(“coercive power”) which it then
attempts to govern in
furtherance of its objective to
become a functioning state
(“legitimate power”).
Saeed, Khalid, “Slicing a Complex Problem for System Dynamics Modeling.”
AXIS
SLICE MODELED
SLICE NOT MODELED
Mode
Exponential Growth of Gov. Pop.
Limits to Growth
Time
Duration= 2013-2017
Unit = 6mnths dt = .0055 (1d)
Pre-2013
>5 Year Feedback
Geography
Territory: Iraq & Syria City/Prov
Population: Kurds, Shia & Suuni
Forces: ISIS vs. Everyone Else
Cross Regional Flows
Tribal Substructures
Towns or Villages
Policy
Responses Exogenous Policies
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LatentPolytechnic
StructureInstitute
Policies
Worcester
Modeling Approach: Warren Method
Strategic Architecture
• Select Objectives:
─ Primary: Population Governed by Legitimacy (Demand Stock)
─ Secondary: ISIS Finances (Supply Stock)
• Map supply and demand resource stocks, flows, auxiliaries and
feedback connections within the Strategic Architecture that drive
performance.
• Locate the Strategic Architecture within an endogenous “World
Model” defined by the slice.
• Identify policies that aim to change flow rates, not adjust stock
levels.
• Supply Stocks (4): The Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state
actor which is using methods of irregular warfare
• Demand Stocks (6): to influence populations (“coercive power”)
which it then attempts to govern in furtherance of its objective to
become a functioning state (“legitimate power”).
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Strategic Architecture of ISIS
PopulationPopulation
Population
Population
(People)Population
(People)
(People)
(People)
(People)
Territory Territory
Territory
ISIS
ISIS
ISIS
Controls Controls
Controls
(km^2) (km^2)
(km^2)
+
++
People Governed
People Governed
+
through Coercive
through Power
Coercive Power
(People) (People)
+
DEMAND
STOCKS
Shura
Councils
(Councils)
+
ISIS
ISIS
ISIS
Squads
Squads
Squads
(Squads) (Squads)
(Squads)
ISIS
+ ++ Squads
++
+
(Squads)
+
+
+
PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE
++
ISIS
ISIS
ISIS
Finances Finances
Finances
(Dollars) (Dollars)
(Dollars) - +-
+
ISIS
Finances
SECONDARY
(Dollars)
OBJECTIVE
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People Governed
through
Legitimacy
(People)
+
-
AFV & IFV AFV
AFV&&IFV
IFV
(Pieces) (Pieces)
(Pieces)
ISIS Militants
ISIS
ISISMilitants
Militants
(People)
(People)
(People)
++
ISIS Militants
ISIS(People)
Militants
SUPPLY
STOCKS
(People)
Militant
Experience
Worcester Polytechnic
(Exp Years)
Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture World Model
Policy
Conclusion
The world model ISIS operates within.
Territory &
Scenario
Territory
&
Sector
Scenario
Sector
SFS
SFS
Combat
Combat
Simulator
SFS
Simulator
Sector
Combat
Sector
Simulator
OpTempo
OpTempo
Attack
OpTempo
OpTempo
Attack
Sector
Attack
Attack
Sector
Sector
Sector
Governance
& Population
Sector
Sector
AFV & IFV
AFV
& IFV
Sector
Sector
Key
Key
Key
Performance
Key
Performance
Performance
Resource
Performance
Resource
Resource
Resource
Stocks
Stocks
Stocks
Stocks
Militant
Recruiting &
Loss Sector
STRATEGIC
STRATEGIC
STRATEGIC
STRATEGIC
STRATEGIC
STRATEGIC
ARCHITECTURE
ARCHITECTURE
ARCHITECTURE
ARCHITECTURE
ARCHITECTURE
ARCHITECTURE
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Revenue
Sector
Sector
Sector
Sector
Sector
WORLD
MODEL
WORLD
MODEL
WORLD
MODEL
WORLDMODEL
MODEL
WORLD
MODEL
WORLD
SECTORS
SECTORS
SECTORS
SECTORS
SECTORS
SECTORS
10
Expenses
Expenses
Expenses
Sector
Sector
Sector
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Subsystem Example: Transition from Coercion to
Legitimacy
<Population Controlled
by Coercive Power
(People)>
Territory &
Scenario
Sector
FV
r
Governance
& Population
Sector
<Population
Governed through
Legitimacy (People)>
Ungoverned
Population
Key
Performance
Resource
Stocks
Militant
Recruiting
Table&for Effect of
LossShura
Sector Councils on
<Shura
Councils
(Councils)>
Desired Shura
Councils
Transition Time
Effective Time to Transition to Governance
Expenses
10
Sector
Normal Ratio of
Shura Councils to
Population
TRANSITION FROM
COERCION TO
LEGITIMACY
<LEGEND>
Effect of Shura Council
Sufficiency on
Transition to
Governance
<Key Performance
Resource Stocks of the
Strategic Architecture>
Period
7.5
Normal Time to
Transition to
Governance
5
Effective Time to
Transition to
Governance
2.5
0
2013
11
<Dynamic Resource
Flows of the Strategic
Architecture>
2013.60
2014.20
2014.80 2015.40
Time (Period)
Effective Time to Transition to Governance : Baseline Scenario
2016
<Inputs from other
Sectors of the World
Model>
2016.60
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Baseline Simulation: The Emerging State
Key Parameters
Starting Value
Population Governed through
Legitimacy
0
Population Controlled through 0
Coercion
Militants & Squads
13,200 Militants, 1200 Squads
Average Militant Experience
3.025 Years
ISIS Finances
$5M USD
AFV & IFV
0 Pieces
Territory Controlled
0km^2
Model Duration & Time Step
4 Years & .0055 (~1day)
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Baseline Simulation Start: March 2013
Lister, Charles. “Profiling the Islamic State.” Brookings Institution, n.d.
Selected
Variables to Legitimacy (People)
Emerging State:
from Coercion
(USD)
ISISFinances
Finances (Dollars)
30 M
3B
2.25 B
Dollars
People
22.5 M
15 M
7.5 M
0
2013
1.5 B
750 M
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
0
2013
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Baseline Simulation: January 2014
Selected
Variables to Legitimacy (People)
Emerging State:
from Coercion
(USD)
ISISFinances
Finances (Dollars)
30 M
3B
2.25 B
Dollars
People
22.5 M
15 M
7.5 M
0
2013
1.5 B
750 M
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
0
2013
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Baseline Simulation: January 2015
Selected
Variables to Legitimacy (People)
Emerging State:
from Coercion
(USD)
ISISFinances
Finances (Dollars)
30 M
3B
2.25 B
Dollars
People
22.5 M
15 M
7.5 M
0
2013
1.5 B
750 M
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
0
2013
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Baseline Simulation: May 2015
Selected
Variables to Legitimacy (People)
Emerging State:
from Coercion
(USD)
ISISFinances
Finances (Dollars)
30 M
3B
2.25 B
Dollars
People
22.5 M
15 M
7.5 M
0
2013
1.5 B
750 M
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
0
2013
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Actual System Performance Mid-April 2015
Emerging State: from Coercion to Legitimacy (People)
Finances (USD)
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Baseline Simulation Finish: January 2017
Selected
Variables to Legitimacy (People)
Emerging State:
from Coercion
(USD)
ISISFinances
Finances (Dollars)
30 M
3B
2.25 B
Dollars
People
22.5 M
15 M
7.5 M
0
2013
1.5 B
750 M
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
0
2013
2013.60 2014.20 2014.80 2015.40
2016
2016.60
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Available Exogenous Policies (Best Case Scenario)
1.Do nothing.
2.Attack ISIS’s oil production & oil smuggling.
3.Convince allies not to pay ransom for ISIS hostages.
4.Embed military advisers and personnel to improve the
fighting quality.
5.Work to reduce the effectiveness of foreign recruiting.
6.Supply opposing forces with advanced military
equipment improving their capabilities.
7.Leverage close air support missions to aid opposing
forces engaged in combat with ISIS.
People Governed (People)
Territory ISIS Controlled (km^2)
19
Scenario1 with
Scenario1 with Foriegn
Scenario1 with
Scenario1 with
Scenario1 Do Scenario1 with Ransom
Recruiting
Embedded US Scenario1 with US Close Air
Nothing
Oil Destroyed Eliminated
Eliminated
Troops
US Weaponary Support
3,284,178
1,022,570
3,342,036
3,281,934
2,391,083
2,931,268
2,663,104
347,940
44,280
350,082
351,171
314,682
325,492
316,146
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Some Policies Improve ISIS Performance. Why?
• Eliminating foreign recruits:
─ Increases Average Militant Experience, allowing ISIS to perform
better.
─ Still valid reasons to stop foreign recruit inflow – they may come
back home.
• Eliminating ransom payments:
─ Slight reductions to revenue only decrease number of ethnic
cleansing & suicide attacks leaving a larger population to recruit
from.
─ Illustrates the partial measures paradox.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Other Policies only Delay the Inevitable
1. Embed US Troops
2. Supply Weapons
3. US Close Air Support
•
Only change the timing of ISIS’s growth – they do
not change the behavior or ultimate outcome.
•
Only 100% elimination of oil revenue changes the
behavior of ISIS growth – stopping it effectively at
a much smaller territorial footprint.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Why are exogenous policies so limited in
effectiveness against emerging state actors?
•
Timing Matters:
─ Limited window prior to emerging state actor becoming selfsufficient.
─ Once self-sufficient, realistic exogenous policies can slow, but
have a challenge in changing the shape of growth.
─ How long until limits to growth kick in?
•
Overlap of Effect:
─ Many exogenous policies involve killing militants – but a
militant can only ever be killed once.
•
Partial Measures Paradox:
─ Certain policies actually leave ISIS in a better position than
when they started.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Findings of the effort
• The Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor
which is using methods of irregular warfare to influence
populations (“coercive power”) which it then attempts
to govern in furtherance of its objective to become a
functioning state (“legitimate power”).
• Emerging state actors are a new kind of threat –
traditional methods of dealing with non-state actors
and/or insurgencies may not work.
• Slowing or reversing ISIS’s growth with realistic policies
exogenously affected from abroad will be very difficult.
They can sustain themselves from the resources from
within the territory they now control.
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Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Additional development planned for model.
• Modeling latent structure (behaviors, beliefs attitudes)
using Turnley or Unified Cognition engine of Sandia
National Labs.
• Expanding model boundaries to include cross-regional
flows.
• A more rigorous approach to geographical slicing to
determine what level of decomposition to currently
aggregated elements in ethnicities, rebel forces and
cities/townships/villages.
• Creating versions of the same model with parameters
for Boko Haram, Al-Nusra, AQAP.
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Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Proposed latent structure using Unified Cognition.
Behaviors of
Population on "Choice
Making" and "Side
Choosing" relative to
ISIS Destabilization
Behavior of
Population on
Resistance &
Uprising
Territory &
Scenario
Sector
SFS
Combat
Simulator
Sector
OpTempo
Attack
Sector
AFV & IFV
Sector
Governance
& Population
Sector
Key
Performance
Resource
Stocks
Militant
Recruiting &
Loss Sector
STRATEGIC
ARCHITECTURE
Revenue
Sector
WORLD MODEL
SECTORS
Behaviors of
Pouplation on
Legitimacy of
ISIS
Expenses
Sector
Behavior of
Population on
Recruiting &
Desertions
PROPOSED
LATENT
STRUCTURE
SECTORS
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Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Perspectives
Methods
Architecture
World Model
Policy
Conclusion
Lessons (still) Learned
• Pick your problem.
• Leverage theories to define your problem.
• Use the definition to inform slicing.
• Identify a modeling approach based on the definition
and slicing.
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